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I. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Scope of Claim for Purposes of Claim Preclusion
In Kent County Board of Education v. Bilbrough I the Court of Ap-
peals adopted the "transactional" approachadvocated by the Re-
statement (Second). ofJudgments2 to define a claim within the preclusion
context. By doing so, the court expanded existing law under which
the courts had determined the scope of a claim by the narrower
"same evidence" test.3 The court's stated purpose in adopting the
Restatement view was to assure that the scope of a claim not receive
an "improperly narrow" definition.4
At issue was the effect of ajudgment entered against Bilbrough,
a public employee, in a civil rights action in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Maryland.5 Bilbrough alleged that the
newly elected Superintendent of Schools for the Kent County Board
of Education had terminated his employment' because he had been
politically active on behalf of certain Board of Education candi-
1. 309 Md. 487, 525 A.2d 232 (1987).
2. Id. at 499, 525 A.2d at 238. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24
(1980). Section 24 addresses the dimensions of a "claim" for the purposes of merger or
bar:
(1) When a valid'and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes
the plaintiffs claim pursuant to the rules of merger or bar .... the claim extin-
guished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant
with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions,
out of which the action arose.
(2) What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction", and what group-
ings constitute a "series", are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to
such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or
motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treat-
ment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding
or usage.
Id. (emphasis added).
3. The "same evidence" test, as its name implies, looked to whether a party would
need to use the identical evidence to establish the claims presented in the two suits. See
infra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
4. 309 Md. at 494, 525 A.2d at 236.
5. Id. at 490, 525 A.2d at 234. Bilbrough brought suit jointly with one other plain-
tiff. There were seven defendants in the case, including the Kent County Board of Edu-
cation and the Superintendent of Schools. Id.
6. Id. Bilbrough had been employed as manager of maintenance services at the
Kent County Board of Education from 1978 to 1981. In the summer of 1981 the Super-
intendent abolished the position by consolidating its duties with those of another job
classification. Id.
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dates.7 The trial court found that the Superintendent based Bil-
brough's termination on legitimate business considerations rather
than his political activities 8 On appeal the Fourth Circuit affirmed.9
While the Fourth Circuit appeal was pending, Bilbrough filed
the instant suit in state court alleging, inter alia, invasion of privacy
claims against six of the seven defendants in the federal action.'0
The state circuit court judge granted two of the defendants sum-
mary judgment on all counts on the basis of claim preclusion." Bil-
brough then obtained a rule 2-602 certification' 2 of a final judgment
and appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.'" Bilbrough re-
stricted his argument on appeal to the invasion of privacy claims and
the damage claims arising from lost earnings associated with his al-
legedly wrongful discharge. Although the Court of Special Appeals
7. Id. These candidates had supported the Superintendent's unsuccessful prede-
cessor in the campaign.
8. Id. See infra note 14:
9. 309 Md. at 490, 525 A.2d at 234. The Fourth Circuit opinion is unpublished.
10. Id. at 491, 525 A.2d at 234. Three of the seven counts in the state suit were
invasion of privacy claims, two of which alleged improper disclosure of information re-
garding Bilbrough's criminal history. Id. at 491-92, 525 A.2d at 234-35. Specifically, the
first count alleged that two of the defendants obtained Bilbrough's criminal history rec-
ord from the local police department, made photocopies of it, and provided it to the
incoming Superintendent, who in turn passed it oh to other Board of Education mem-
bers. Id. at 491, 525 A.2d at 234. For a discussion of this form of privacy claim, see W.
PROSSER, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 17, at 856-59 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) Or TORTS § 652D (1976). The third count contained "false light" privacy alle-
gations related to the characterization of Bilbrough's orders for pens and business
cards, the legitimacy of his mileage expense vouchers and use of county gas pumps, and
the characterization of his behavior on school grounds. 309 Md. at 492, 525 A.2d at
235. For a discussion of the "false light" form of privacy action, see PROSSER & KEETON,
supra, § 117, at 863-65. The Court of Appeals noted that whether any of these privacy
counts stated claims upon which relief could be granted was not a question before the
court. 309 Md. at 492 nn. 1-3, 525 A.2d at 234 n. I, 235 nn.2-3.
i1. 309 Md. at 490, 525 A.2d at 234.
12. MD. R. 2-602 provides:
(a) Generall.-Except as provided in section (b) of this Rule, an order or other
form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all of the
claims in an action .... or that adjudicates less than an entire claim, or that
adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties to the action:
(1) is not a final judgment; [and]
(2) does not terminate the action as to any of the claims or any of the
parties ....
(b) When Allowed.-lf the court expressly determines in a written order that
there is not just reason for delay, it may direct in the order the entry of a final
judgment:
(1) as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties ....
13. 309 Md. at 490-91, 525 A.2d at 234. The opinion of the Court of Special Ap-
peals is unpublished.
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held that the. damage claims were precluded because the federal
court had found no liability for wrongful discharge," it reversed on
the privacy claims, finding that they were not precluded.' 5
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to review the interme-
diate appellate court's reversal on the privacy claims..16 The court
was particularly, interested in the method of analysis that the Court
of Special Appeals used in determining that the claims were not pre-
cluded by the previous litigation.' 7 As the court noted, "[W]e are
concerned that sole reliance on the same evidence or required evi-
dence analysis to determine if the same claim is involved in two ac-
tions may improperly narrow the scope of a 'claim' in the preclusion
context."' 8
Maryland courts previously used the "same evidence" or "re-
quired evidence" test to determine whether a second suit duplicated
a first for claim preclusion purposes.'I The line of cases employing
this test began in 1940 with Williams v. Messick,2 ° a minority share-
holder's derivative suit. The Court of Appeals held that because the
individual shareholder had sued the company on the same grounds
in an earlier action, the second action was barred, even though it
was a derivative suit that included additional parties.'
More than twenty years later the Court of Appeals reiterated
14. Id. at 491, 525 A.2d at 234. The federal trial judge expressly found that the
Superintendent based Bilbrough's discharge on the business considerations of "greater
efficiency and cost savings," a proper basis for a defense verdict in a wrongful discharge
case. Id. at 490, 525 A.2d at 234.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 493-94, 525 A.2d at 235-36.
18. I/ at 494, 525 A.2d at 236.
19. Two other largely outdated methods of determining the scope of a claim or a
"cause of action," expressed in terms of definitional theories, are the "same remedial
right" theory and the same "substantive" or "primary" right theory. F. JAMES & G.
HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.8 (3d ed. 1985). The "same remedial right" theory
views a cause of action as one right which might have a number of possible remedies, all
of which may be pursued in separate actions, although double recovery would be pre-
cluded. See McCaskill, The Elusive Cause ofAction, 4 U. CHI. L. REv. 281 (1937); McCaskill,
Actions and Causes of Action, 34 YALE LJ. 614 (1925). See also C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING
132-34 (2d ed. 1947). The same "substantive" or "primary" right theory views a cause
of action as a single wrong, or single breach of a primary duty, which would give rise to
only one cause of action, although there might be multiple remedies. See J. POMEROY,
CODE REMEDIES §§ 346-356, 417 (5th ed. 1929); Schopflocher, What Is a Single Cause of
Action for the Purpose of the Doctrine of Resjudicata?, 21 OR. L. REV. 319 (1942).
20. 177 Md. 605, 11 A.2d 472 (1940).
21. Id. at 609, 11 A.2d at 474. The shareholder attempted to distinguish the two
cases on the basis of his difference in position, the legal theories involved, the addition
of other parties, and differences in the nature of the rights and duties asserted. Id. at
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this approach in Alvey v. Alvey." The court noted that the relitigat-
ing plaintiff was attempting to use all of the same facts upon which
he had relied in an unsuccessful first suit, but was seeking different
legal conclusions from those facts." The court held that the second
action was barred because "all questions of fact arising in connec-
tion with the present transaction ... [had] been litigated and deter-
mined in the first suit, not only as to the matters and claims which
were presented-in that suit, but also as to all matters that could have
been presented but were not."124 In other words, the same evidence
would be required in the second action, and that evidence already
had been before the court. The court reaffirmed the "same evi-
dence" test during the course of the next two decades. 25  Thus
stood the state of the law until the instant case.26
In Bilbrough the court first examined the law of claim preclusion
in Maryland and found it "to be settled here that a mere change in
the legal theory, applied to the same set of facts previously litigated,
will not in and of itself avoid claim preclusion."127 The court further
609-10, 11 A.2d at 474. In addressing the question of claim preclusion, the court noted
that the shareholder
conceded that exactly the same evidentiary facts would have to be presented
and considered if this second contest were carried through. And one of the
tests commonly applied to determine whether the issues have been the same in
the two suits is whether in both they could be supported by the same evidence.
Id. at 613, II A.2d at 475.
22. 225 Md. 386, 171 A.2d 92 (1961).
23. Id. at 390. 171 A.2d at 94.
24. Id.
25. See MPC, Inc. v. Kenny, 279 Md. 29, 367 A.2d 486 (1977); Mettee v. Boone, 251
Md. 332, 247 A.2d 390 (1968). Mettee concerned a summary judgment that had been
granted in favor of a building contractor in an action for breach of contract for damages
caused by leaking pipes. The court held the judgment barred a second action for negli-
gence, breach of warranty, and fraud that was based on the same facts. 251 Md. at 340-
41, 247 A.2d at 395. The court colorfully noted:
Just as the embittered French Legionnaire who described a camel as a horse
designed by a committee knew perfectly well that it was a camel, Mettee should
have known that the same facts, having once been used, without success, in
pursuit of one conclusion, cannot, under another label, still be used to obtain a
different conclusion.
Id. at 341, 247 A.2d at 395. In MPC the court cited what was by then the long-standing
rule of Mettee, Alvey, and Wiliams and engaged once more in "same evidence" analysis.
279 Md. at 33-34, 367 A.2d at 489-90.
26. For additional applications of the "same evidence" test in Maryland, see Ellett v.
Giant Food, Inc., 66 Md. App. 695, 505 A.2d 888 (1986); Jack v. Foster Branch Home-
owner's Ass'n, 53 Md. App. 325, 452 A.2d 1306 (1982); Klein v. Whitehead, 40 Md.
App. 1, 389 A.2d 374 (1978); Singer v. Steven Kokes, Inc., 39 Md. App. 180, 384 A.2d
463 (1978).
27. 309 Md. at 495, 525 A.2d at 236 (citing Mettee, 251 Md. 332, 247 A.2d 390, and
Alvey, 225 Md. 386, 171 A.2d 92).
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noted that to construe the scope of a cause of action for claim pre-
clusion purposes as broadly as the scope of permissive joinder of
claims effectively would require "mandatory joinder for pleading
purposes of all claims which the original plaintiff has against any
original defendant."2
As an analytic tool the court set up a continuum of claim preclu-
sion issues. At one end of the continuum lie plaintiffs who, by virtue
of modem, liberalized pleading practice, assert no preclusion for a
second claim based on the same facts. At the other end of the con-
tinuum lie defendants asserting preclusion because the second
claim, although based on different facts, could have been joined in
the earlier action under modem pleading practice. Between these
two extremes exists a substantial grey area representing "the same
claim-separate claim conundrum.''29
The court examined the approach that the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments has taken to this "conundrum": "The present trend is to
see a claim in factual terms and to make it coterminous with the
transaction .... The transaction is the basis of the litigative unit or
entity which may not be split."30 The court looked to section 24 of
the Restatement for practical guidance as to the application of the
transactional approach,3" finding this method well tailored to mod-
em pleading practice.-
2
The court then applied transactional analysis to the facts of Bil-
brough's tw6 actions. Examining factors such as time, motive, and
the "trial unit," the court determined that there were two separate
transactions, one involving Bilbrough's discharge and one involving
privacy claims grounded in the alleged invasion of police files, ensu-
ing cover-up, and spreading-of information in a "false light." ' 3
More noteworthy, however, was the discussion following this
portion of the opinion. The court clearly was concerned not with
the enforcement of a rule, but rather with the exposition of a
method of analysis to be used in future cases presenting the same
"conundrum" of claim definition. The court cited specific illustra-
tions from section 24 of the Restatement,"4 as well as a recent federal
28. Id. at 497, 525 A.2d at 237.
29. Id
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 24 comment a (1980).
31. 309 Md. at 498, 525 A.2d at 237-38. For the text of § 24, see supra note 2.
32. 309 Md. at 499, 525 A.2d at 238.
33. Id. at 500, 525 A.2d at 239.
34. Id. at 502, 525 A.2d at 240. The court examined one particularly relevant
example:
A, under a contract of employment with B, is discharged from the job on the
746 [VOL. 47:742
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case,3 5 to demonstrate that there must be a sufficient "nexus" 3 6 be-
tween the different actions under consideration in order for them
"to be so interrelated as to constitute one transaction or a con-
nected series [of transactions). 3s
The court's adoption of the transactional method for determin-
ing the scope of a claim significantly affects existing, Maryland law."8
The potential scope of a claim is now wider than under the "same
evidence" test. It seems likely, however, that Maryland attorneys
still must engage in some "same evidence" analysis, because neither
the Bilbrough court 9 nor the Restatement4" totally rejects the "same
evidence" test. As the Bilbrough court phrased it, the second action
will be barred if there is enough "of a nexus between the two actions
involved"" to warrant preclusion.
The adoption of the transactional approach is a sensible and
predictable step for the court to take. The 1984 reform of the Mary-
land Rules modernized the State's procedural system along the lines
of the federal system, whose courts have applied this analysis for
some time.42 Thus, the occasion was ripe for Maryland to adopt the
transactional approach.
alleged ground of his technical incompetence. [One] year later B, in response
to an inquiry from C, a prospective employer of A, states that A is an habitual
drunkard. A may sue B and recover against him for wrongful discharge without
thereby forfeiting his right to sue B on the basis of his report to C.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 illustration 8 (1980).
35. United States v. Athlone Indus. Inc., 746 F.2d 977 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding that
claims for distributing a hazardous product in commerce and failing to report a defect
arise from separate transactions).
36. 309 Md. at 504, 525 A.2d at 24 1.
37. Id. at 503, 525 A.2d at 240.
38. In one recent case, the Court of Special Appeals determined that using the trans-
actional approach would have produced a different outcome than using the "same evi-
dence" test. SeeJack v. Foster Branch Homeowner's Ass'n, 53 Md. App. 325, 334, 452
A.2d 1306, 1311 (1982) (finding that zoning applications for a variance and a modifica-
tion, waiver, or reduction were essentially the same "transaction," because both sought
permission to operate a doctor's office with limited off-street parking).
39. The court expressed concern regarding the effect of "sole reliance on the same
evidence or required evidence analysis" in determining the scope of a claim. 309 Md. at
494, 525 A.2d at 236 (emphasis added).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 24 comment b (1980) explains:
If there is a substantial overlap [between witnesses or proofs in the second ac-
tion and those relevant to the first], the second action should ordinarily be held
precluded. But the opposite does not hold true; even when there is not a sub-
stantial overlap, the second action may be precluded if it stems from the same
transaction or series.
Id.
41. 309 Md. at 504, 525 A.2d at 241.
42. In the District of Maryland the first reported case applying the transactional ap-
proach was J. Aron & Co. v. Service Transp. Co., 515 F. Supp. 428, 445-46 (D. Md.
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B. Appealability of Nonfinal Judgments
The Court of Appeals held in State Highway Administration v.
Kee45 that a plaintiff's failure to make proof of service or return of
nonservice on one defendant does not necessarily render summary
judgment for the other defendant a final judgment44 that is appeala-
ble without a rule 2-602(b) certification.4 5 The court based its deci-
sion in this case on three findings: (1) the record was facially
ambiguous;46 (2) statements made at oral argument indicated that
the trial court had acquired in personam jurisdiction over the de-
fendant foreign corporation;47 and (3) rule 2-602 reflects a policy
against piecemeal appeals.48
The case arose as the result of a 1982 motor vehicle accident
involving two brothers. The car in which they were traveling failed
to negotiate a curve, broke through a guard rail, and plunged down
an embankment. One brother died at the scene; the other sur-
vived. 49 Kee, the personal representative of the deceased brother's
estate, filed claims for wrongful death, survival, and personal injury
against the State Highway Administration (SHA) and Green Acres,
Inc. (Green Acres), a foreign corporation with whom the SHA had
contracted to repair the guard rail.50
The docket entries in the case indicated that the clerk of the
court issued a summons for the corporation and returned it to Kee's
counsel for service by mail. The attorney never filed any return in-
dicating whether the summons in fact had been served. Nearly two
months after the date on which the validity of service of process
would have expired,"' the clerk received a letter from Kee's counsel
requesting that the summons be reissued. The docket entries
1981) (carrier's claim for loss for failure to provide appropriate insurance coverage part
of same transaction as action for declaratory judgment of noncoverage of loss).
43. 309 Md. 523, 525 A.2d 637 (1987).
44. See MD. R. 2-602(a). The text of the rule is set forth at supra note 12.
45. MD. R. 2-602(b).
46. 309 Md. at 530, 525 A.2d at 640.
47. Id. at 529, 525 A.2d at 640.
48. Id. at 531, 525 A.2d at 641. This policy seeks to avoid the additional expense,
delays, frustrations, and unnecessary demands on judicial resources that these appeals
entail. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1 (1980); Parish v. Maryland
& Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 242 A.2d 512 (1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
940 (1971).
49. 309 Md. at 525, 525 A.2d at 638.
50. Id. According to the complaint, Green Acres was "a Pennsylvania corporation
doing business in Maryland." Id.
51. MD. R. 2-113 specifies that "[a] summons is effective for service only if served
within 60 days after the date it is issued. A summons not served within that time shall be
dormant, renewable only on written request of the plaintiff."
748 [VOL. 47:742
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showed that this was done and that the reissued summons was sent
to the attorney for service. Again, however, the counsel never filed
proof of service, nor did any company named Green Acres enter an
appearance in the case.52
The suit proceeded against the SHA, which moved for summary
judgment on grounds of sovereign immunity.5 3 When the circuit
court entered summary judgment in favor of the SHA, Kee appealed
the judgment without securing a rule 2-602(b) certification.5 4 The
Court of Special Appeals, without questioning the appealability of
the judgment, reversed and remanded on the merits.55
The Court of Appeals, however, after granting certiorari to con-
sider the immunity issues,56 . recognized the threshold jurisdictional
question and proceeded to address it sua sponte. The court realized
that although the parties had not argued the issue of appealability,
the court was obliged to question its own jurisdiction.57 In review-
ing the law of judgments, the court noted that a summary judgmeit
is final and appealable without certification only when it disposes of
all claims against all parties over whom the court has acquired in
personam jurisdiction.58 Thus, the question turned on whether the
trial court had acquired jurisdiction over Green Acres even though
the record did not indicate whether service of process had been
perfected. 9
52. Neither the majority opinion nor the dissent states this point expressly. This,
however, is the only logical inference that supports the thrust of each discussion, partic-
ularly as the majority opinion includes excerpts from the oral argument in which Kee's
counsel at one point claimed serving "somebody up [in Pennsylvania] named Green
Acres." See 309 Md. at 528, 525 A.2d at 639. If any party named Green Acres had
entered even a limited appearance in the case, the issue under consideration would not
exist. As the court pointed out: "[O]ur holding deals solely with appealability." Id. at
531, 525 A.2d at 641.
53. Id. at 527, 525 A.2d at 639. The State Highway Administration (SHA) based its
motion on a portion of the Maryland Tort Claims Act which waives sovereign immunity
in certain actions to the extent that the State is covered by liability insurance. See MD.
CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-403 (Supp. 1987). The SHA argued that the State was
immune because it had no liability insurance at the time of the occurrence. Kee's coun-
sel argued, inter alia, that the State had chosen to "self-insure" and thereby had waived
its immunity. The Court of Special Appeals addressed these issues in its opinion. Kee v.
State Highway Admin., 68 Md. App. 473, 486-90, 513 A.2d 930, 936-38 (1986).
54. 309 Md. at 527, 525 A.2d at 639.
55. 68 Md. App. at 491, 513 A.2d at 939. In fact, nowhere in the intermediate appel-
late court's opinion is there any reference to another party.
56. 309 Md. at 525, 525 A.2d at 638. For a brief discussion of these issues, see supra
note 53.
57. 309 Md. at 528 n.2, 525 A.2d at 639 n.2.
58. Id. at 529, 525 A.2d at 640.
59. Id.
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Rule 2-12 6 (g) provides: "Failure to make proof of service does
not affect the validity of the service. '"60 The court, however, chose
not to accept the SHA's argument that the record should be deter-
minative and provide "facial appealability" when no return has been
filed.6 Instead, the court viewed the lack of any return as produc-
ing. a facial ambiguity "because the Maryland Rules require either
proof of service or a return of nonservice."62 The court then looked
to the statements by Kee's counsel at oral argument, 6 interpreting
them as indicating that Green Acres indeed had been served.'
Thus, the court found Kee's appeal premature because the case in-
volved multiple defendants. The summary judgment in favor of the
SHA therefore was not a final judgment under rule 2-602.65
Judge McAuliffe dissented. 66 He argued that the majority had
inferred too much from the attorney's oral statement, which lacked
the requisite specificity to satisfy the "substantive and procedural
requirements for valid mail service on an out-of-state corpora-
tion." 67 More importantly, Judge McAuliffe believed that the docket
entries in a case should be controlling for purposes of determining
60. MD. R. 2-126(g).
61. 309 Md. at 530, 525 A.2d at 640.
62. Id. The court reasoned that the SHA had learned from the record that a sum-
mons for Green Acres was issued, and knew from the explicit language of rule 2-126(g)
that failure to file proof of service would not affect the validity of service. Id. at 530-31,
525 A.2d at 640.
63. See id. at 528-29, 525 A.2d at 639-40 (excerpts of the exchange between the trial
judge and Kee's counsel on this point). The dialogue may appear confusing because the
judge's questions went to the issue of appealability, while the attorney's answers were
largely directed to issues of misjoinder and misnomer.
THE COURT: Is it clear that you did serve Green Acres?
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY: No, your Honor. That's a problem. We
served a corporation in Pennsylvania called Green Acres, but they're a golf
course. They're not a contractor.
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY: They've never been-we have not served the
Green Acres that we're alleging the argument against.
THE COURT: But you did serve a Green Acres?
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY: We did serve a Green Acres.
Id. (emphasis added).
64. The court pointed out that at oral argument Kee's counsel admitted serving "the
corporation identified by name and address in the complaint." Id. at 530, 525 A.2d at
640. The court did not consider relevant the substantive question of whether the Green
Acres that was served was the Green Acres that allegedly had contracted with the State.
As the court noted: "Whether service on Green Acres of Sharon, Pennsylvania resulted
from a misnomer or a misjoinder is not before us and does not affect appealability." Id.
at 531, 525 A.2d at 641.
65. Id. at 530, 525 A.2d at 640.
66. Id. at 532, 525 A.2d at 641 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 532-33, 525 A.2d at 641.
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which parties are before the court within the meaning of rule 2-602.
Failure to accord "dignity to the record" has the undesirable effect
of adding more uncertainty to the law of final judgments.6 8
The holding in this case is in step with previous decisions inter-
preting the object of Maryland Rule 2-602 to be the prevention of
piecemeal appeals, 69 as with the federal rule after which it was. pat-
terned.7" The new ground that the case breaks is a narrow one, ad-
dressing for the first time the role that a return of process plays in
determining what is a final and appealable judgment in a multiple-
party case. In holding that failure to file proof of service will not
necessarily defeat the trial court's jurisdiction for purposes of deter-
mining the appealability of a judgment, the majority adopted an ap-
proach that follows the thrust of prior decisions, which have
strenuously protected the policy against piecemeal appeals by man-
dating strict compliance with the rule 2-602(b) certification
7'requirement.
It is noteworthy that the court did not insist upon strict compli-
ance with the rule relating to return of service. 7 . The dissent would
have found that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over a party
until a return of service was filed or the party actually entered an
appearance in the case.7" Under this view, the docket entries would
68. Id. at 533, 525 A.2d at 641-42.
69. See Picking v. State Fin. Corp., 257 Md. 554, 263 A.2d 572 (1970); Parish v.
Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 242 A.2d 512 (1968), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 940 (1971); Russell v. American Sec. Bank, 65 Md. App. 199, 499 A.2d 1320
(1985).
In the instant case the court noted that the potential for a piecemeal appeal existed
if the status of Green Acres remained nebulous and the State prevailed on its immunity
defense. In that event,
unless [Kee's counsel] completely abandonts] the action, [the attorney] would
have to address the status of Green Acres. [The attorney] might attempt to
press the claim against the corporation served, or ... attempt service on an-
other person, contending that the service previously effected was the result of a
mere misnomer .... These kinds of issues could give rise to future appeals.
309 Md. at 531, 525 A.2d at 64 1.
70. MD. R. 2-602 mirrors FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). See Lewis v. Lewis, 290 Md. 175, 428
A.2d 454 (1981) (comparing rule 605, the predecessor of rule 2-602, to the federal rule);
P. NIEMEYER & L. RICHARDS, MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY 348 (1984).
71. See supra notes 48, 69 & 70. For examples of the court's strict compliance re-
quirement, see Lewis, 290 Md. 175,428 A.2d 454 (ruling that parties may not circumvent
the rule and acquire appellate jurisdiction by consent); Robert v. Robert, 56 Md. App.
317, 467 A.2d 798 (1983) (holding that a determination that there is no just reason for
delay will not be acceptable unless explicitly stated).
72. The rule states: "An individual making service of process by delivery or mailing
shall file proof of the service with the court promptly and in any event within the time during
which the person served must respond to the process." MD. R. 2-126(a) (emphasis added).
73. 309 Md. at 535, 525 A.2d at 643 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
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be controlling on the jurisdictional question. 4
The Court of Appeals has not effected a dramatic change in the
law of finaljudgments. Rather, the court has engaged in some "fine
tuning" of the law. The potential effect of the decision, however,
must not be underestimated. Given the liberal modern rules of
pleading and joinder, 5 multiple-party litigation is onthe rise.76 In
every case the plaintiff's failure to file proof of service or a return of
nonservice on even one of the defendants will render the judgment
against all of the others nonfinal and thus nonappealable absent a
rule 2-602(b) certification.
The majority noted that this case highlights a problem in the
present rules, referring the-matter to the Rules Committee for pos-
sible changes.77 Although the court did not elaborate upon what
changes would be desirable, the case may point the way toward re-
quiring a rule 2-602 certification whenever the record does not
facially reflect the jurisdictional status of all defendants.
C. Statute of Limitations for Architects and Contractors
In Hilliard & Bartho Joint Venture v. Fedco Systems, Inc. 78 the Court
of Appeals examined the applicability of the "continuation of
events" theory to the statute of limitations for contract actions
against architects and contractors. Under this theory, when one
party performs continuous service for another, the statute of limita-
tions does not commence running until the service is completed. 79
The court rejected the theory in this instance, holding that the dis-
covery rule determines when a cause of action accrues in such cases.
Although this decision concerns the special limitations statute for
actions against architects and contractors," ° it is consistent with
74. Id
75. See, e.g., MD. R. 2-212 (permissive joinder); MD. R. 2-214 (intervention); MD. R.
2-221 (interpleader); MD. R. 2-331 (joinder of additional party for counterclaim and
cross-claim); MD. R. 2-332 (third-party practice); MD. R. 2-341 (liberal amendment of
pleadings).
76. The Maryland circuit courts, for example, presently are laboring under an ava-
lanche of toxic tort litigation in which the defendants in each case often number in the
dozens.
77. 309 Md. at 532, 525 A.2d at 641. The Process' Parties and Pleadings Subcom-
mittee of the Maryland Rules Committee has since determined that no rules changes are
necessary, believing that the factual situation in Kee is a rare one. Letter from Alan M.
Wilner to the Judges of the Maryland Court of Appeals (Oct. 30, 1987).
78. 309 Md. 147, 522 A.2d 961 (1987).
79. See Booth Glass Co. v. Huntingfield Corp., 304 Md. 615, 622, 500 A.2d 641, 644
(1985) (finding theory inapplicable to suit for negligent glass installation).
80. MD. CTS. &JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 5-108 (1984).
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Maryland's adherence to the discovery rule in cases controlled by
the general limitations statute.8 1
The court also considered when the statute of limitations be-
gins to run on a claim for breach of warranty to repair. Consistent
with its decision in the recent case of Antigua Condominium Association
v. Melba Investors Atlantic, Inc. ,82 the court held that the statute does
not begin to run until the warrantor learns of the defect and fails to
repair within a reasonable time.8 3
Don Hilliard and John Bartko (H & B), as joint venturers, em-
ployed contractor Gardiner & Gardiner, Inc. (Gardiner), and archi-
tect Fedco Systems, Inc. (Fedco) to build a warehouse and office
building. H & B executed separate contracts with Fedco and Gar-
diner, each containing an arbitration clause.8 4 Before construction
was complete, H & B discovered numerous leaks in the project.
H & B eventually sued Fedco and Gardiner in the Circuit Court for
Prince George's County, and the court ordered that the dispute be
submitted to arbitration. Four months later H & B filed demands
for arbitration. Fedco and Gardiner in turn sought to permanently
enjoin the arbitration hearings as barred by the statute of limita-
tions. The trial court ruled for Fedco and Gardiner, and the Court
of Special Appeals affirmed.8 5 The Court of Appeals granted certio-
rari to decide whether any H & B claim could survive the bar of the
statute of limitations.
H & B argued that although H & B knew of the leaks more than
three years before filing for arbitration, the statute of limitations did
not begin to run until after Fedco and Gardiner had completed the
promised services. Because the contract required Fedco to conduct
a final inspection of the project, and because this inspection oc-
81. Id. § 5-101.
82. 307 Md. 700, 517 A.2d 75 (1986).
83. 309 Md. at 164, 522 A.2d at 970.
84. Id. at 150-51, 522 A.2d at 963. The contracts provided that all claims between
the parties relating to the contracts or the breach thereof would be submitted to arbitra-
tion. Id. at 155, 522 A.2d at 965. The contracts further provided that any demand for
arbitration
shall be made within a reasonable time after the claim, dispute, or other matter
in question has arisen. In no event shall the demand for arbitration be made
after the date when institution of legal or equitable proceedings based on such
claim, dispute or other matter in question would be barred by the applicable
statute of limitations.
Id. at 151 n.2, 522 A.2d at 966 n.2 (quoting the contract between H & B and Fedco).
85. Id. at 152, 522 A.2d at 964. The opinion of the Court of Special Appeals is
unreported. The Court of Appeals provided a chart setting forth the chronology of the
facts. Id. at 152-54, 522 A.2d at 964-66.
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curred within three years of the filing of demands for arbitration,
H & B contended that section 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Pro-
ceedings Article did not bar the action.86
In determining that the "continuation of events" theory was in-
applicable8 7 the court ruled that section 5-108,88 rather than section
5-101, provided the appropriate limitation period for actions
against architects and contractors.89 Subsection (e) of section 5-108
reads: "A cause of action for an injury described in this section ac-
crues when the injury or damage occurs." 90 A strict reading of the
statute seems to indicate that the period of limitations runs from the
occurrence of an injury, regardless of when the injury is discovered.
After an examination of the legislative history, however, the court
held that subsection (e) "was not intended to abrogate the discovery
rule."'" Moreover, the subsection did not "accommodate further
postponing of the time for accrual of an H & B cause of action be-
yond the time of discovery." 92 Thus, any claims against Fedco or
Gardiner based on leaks which H & B discovered more than three
years before the requests for arbitration were barred.93
Although the Hilliard court rested its decision on section 5-
108(e), its refusal to expand the "continuation of events" theory is
consistent with previous Court of Appeals' decisions applying sec-
tion 5-101, the general statute of limitations.94 Maryland has stead-
fastly permitted use of the theory only in medical malpractice
cases,95 despite applications by other states to suits such as architect
86. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1984).
87. Before addressing this argument, the court considered a procedural issue raised
by Fedco. Fedco claimed that because H & B's original complaint in the circuit court did
not set forth any contract claims, and this complaint was incorporated by reference in
the demand for arbitration, no contract claims were involved. The court held, however,
that this issue was "within the very broad submission of the arbitration clause and is for
the arbitrator to decide." 309 Md. at 156, 522 A.2d at 965.
88. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-108 (1984).
89. 309 Md. at 159, 522 A.2d at 967.
90. MD. CTS. &Jun. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-108(e) (1984).
91. 309 Md. at 161, 522 A.2d at 968.
92. Id. at 162, 522 A.2d at 968-69. See MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-108
revisor's note (1974).
93. 309 Md. at 159, 522 A.2d at 967.
94. Unlike § 5-108, § 5-101 provides no guidance as to when a cause of action "ac-
crues." Section 5-101 reads: "A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from
the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a different period of
time within which an action shall be commenced." MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 5-101 (1984).





In Booth Glass Co. v. Huntingfield Corp.9 7 the Couit of Appeals
suggested that the "continuation of events" theory may apply to
cases other than medical malpractice. 98 A contractor allegedly was
negligent in installing glasswork in a new building. The contractor
repeatedly attempted to correct latent window leaks which devel-
oped after construction was complete. The Booth court held that the
statute of limitations ran from the time the defect was originally dis-
covered99 and was not tolled by the contractor's efforts.' 0 0 The
court reasoned that because the building owner was suing for negli-
gent installation rather than negligent repair, there was no tort of a
continuous nature. The "continuation of events" theory therefore
was inapplicable.'o'
The Booth courtobserved that the theory had been allowed in
two previous cases. 02 An examination of these cases, however,
demonstrates that they do not support this proposition..
Vincent v. Palmer' 3 involved an employment contract in which
the date for the employee's payment was not specified. The Court
of Appeals held that limitations did not begin to run "until an ac-
counting was made or the employee's services are ended.""° Simi-
larly, Washington, Baltimore & Annapolis Electric R.R. v. Moss' 0 5
concerned a contract between a principal and agent which also
failed to specify a payment date. The court remanded the action to
resolve evidentiary conflicts as to when payment was due.'0 6
Neither of these cases suggests that the outcome in Hilliard
would have been different if section 5-101 rather than section 5-108
had controlled the limitations period. As the Hilliard court noted,
"[Blecause the contracts for the rendering of services in... [Vincent
and Moss] were not specific as to when payment for services was due
to be made, the opinions can be read to stand for no more than that
96. See, e.g., County of Broome v. Vincent J. Smith, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 889, 358
N.Y.S.2d 998 (1974) (applying "continuous treatment" doctrine to architect
malpractice).
97. 304 Md. 615, 500 A.2d 641 (1985).
98. Id. at 621, 500 A.2d at 644.
99. Id. at 622, 500 A.2d at 644.
100. Id. at 624. 500 A.2d at 645.
101. Id. at 622, 500 A.2d at 644.
102. Id. at 621, 500 A.2d at 644.
103. 179 Md. 365, 19 A.2d 183 (1941).
104. Id. at 375, 19 A.2d at 189.
105. 130 Md. 198, 100 A. 86 (1917).
106. Id. at 211, 100 A. at 91.
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limitations did not begin to run until payment was due.' 0 7 Neither
Vincent nor Moss considered postponing the running of limitations
beyond the time when a cause of action accrued; they simply involved
factual disputes as to when the cause of action arose. Conversely, in
Hilliard H & B did not contend that no valid cause of action existed
when the leaks were discovered, but rather argued that the running
of limitations was postponed until some future date. Thus, had sec-
tion 5-101 been controlling in Hilliard, the discovery rule still would
have applied.
Given the Hilliard court's skepticism as to the significance of
Vincent and Moss, the Booth dicta indicating that the "continuation of
events" theory may be applicable outside the context of medical
malpractice cases cannot be given much force. The discovery rule is
firmly entrenched in Maryland law. As the Booth court recognized,
Maryland courts are slow to permit exceptions to the rule:
"[Wihere the legislature has not expressly provided for an excep-
tion in a statute of limitations, the court will not allow any implied
or equitable exception to be engrafted upon it."'
In the second part of its opinion the Hilliard court held that the
statute of limitations did not bar H & B's claim for breach of the
warranty to repair."O9 This decision is consistent with the recent
case of Antigua Condominium Association v. Melba Investors Atlantic,
Inc. 110
In Antigua condominium owners sued the developer of their
condominium complex for failure to correct defects in their homes.
Each contract of sale contained a provision in which the developer
promised to make necessary repairs provided it received notice
within one year of closing. Because the owners brought suit more
than three years after many of them had purchased their units, the
developer asserted the statute of limitations as a defense. The
court, however, held that the repair clause was not simply a warranty
of the condition of the units at closing, but rather a separate cove-
nant to correct any defects discovered within one year."' Conse-
quently, this provision was not breached and the statute of
limitations did not begin to run until the developer received notice
107. 309 Md. at 158, 522 A.2d at 966-67.
108. Booth, 304 Md. at 623, 500 A.2d at 645.
109. 309 Md. at 163, 522 A.2d at 969.
110. 307 Md. 700, 517 A.2d 75 (1986).
III. Id. at 715,,517 A.2d at 83.
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of defects and failed to repair within a reasonable time." 12 Because
the owners filed suit within three years and two months after giving
the developer notice of the defects, the court remanded for a deter-
mination of whether the owners should have discovered the devel-
oper's breach within two months after notice was given." 3
In Hilliard Gardiner promised to repair defects discovered
within one year of the substantial completion date.'. 4 H & B gave
notice of leaks in the project within one year of this date. Because
the notice was less than three years before H & B's demand for' arbi-
tration, 15. the statute of limitations did not bar H & B's claim for
breach of the repair provision.6 This decision logically follows
from Antigua's holding that a repair clause is not breached until no-




112. Section 5-1 01, the general three-year statute of limitations, applied to the breach
of contract claims in Antigua. Id. at 711, 517 A.2d at 80.
113. Id. at 718, 517 A.2d at 84.
114. The warranty to repair by Gardiner read in relevant part:
If, within one year after the Date of Substantial Completion of the Work... any
of the work is found to be defective . . . . the Contractor shall correct it
promptly after receipt of a written notice from the Owner to do so unless the
Owner has previously given the Contractor a written acceptance of such condi-
tion. This obligation shall survive termination of the Contract. The Owner
shall give such notice promptly after discovery of the condition.
309 Md. at 164, 522 A.2d at 969.
115. Fedco certified the date of substantial completion as December 1, 1980, and
H & B gave notice of the defects on February 23, 198 I. Id., 522 A.2d at 970. H & B filed
for arbitration on December 28, 1983. Id. at 154, 522 A.2d at 965.
116. Id. at 164, 522 A.2d at 970.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Maryland Constitution
1. Requirements for Holding Elected Oftice.-In Broadwater v. State'
the Court of Appeals upheld article I, section 12 of the Maryland
Constitution which provides that only registered voters may hold
statewide elective office.2 In so doing, the. court quashed, the at-
tempt of a prominent Prince George's County political figure to
regain a seat in the State Senate while on probation following a fel-
ony conviction.
The appellate challenge was limited to arguments based on the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution. While the court looked to the equal protection
analysis of City of .Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center4 for gui-
dance, the court rested its conclusion on the plurality reasoning in
Clements v. Fashing5 and the relative ease of voter registration in
Maryland .'
Tommie Broadwater, Jr. served in the Maryland Senate for
eight years prior to his 1983 conviction for felonies related to the
unauthorized acquisition of food stamps.7 He was sentenced to
three years' imprisonment and a fine of $20,000. All but six months
of the prison sentence were suspended, and Broadwater was placed
on probation for the four years following his release. The terms of
his probation required him to make restitution in the amount of
1. 306 Md. 597, 510 A.2d 583 (1986).
2. MD. CONST. art. 1. § 12, states:
Except as otherwise specifically provided herein, a person is ineligible to enter
upon the duties of, or to continue to serve in, an elective office created by or
pursuant to the provisions of this Constitution if the person was not a regis-
tered voter in this State on the date of the person's election or appointment to
that term or if, at any time thereafter and prior to completion of the term, the
person ceases to be a registered voter.
3. 306 Md. at 602, 510 A.2d at 585.
4. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
5. 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
6. 306 Md. at 605-06, 510 A.2d at 586-87. The "ease" of registration is empha-
sized throughout the court's opinion, which describes in detail the provisions of MD.
CONST. art. I, § 1. and MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, §§ 3-1 to -25 (1986 & Supp. 1987), gov-
erning voter registration, and discusses how these provisions have been liberalized over
the years.
7. Broadwater v. State, 303 Md. 461, 494 A.2d 934 (1985). The facts recited here
were gleaned from the complaint for declaratory judgment initially filed by Broadwater
in 1984. Id. at 462-65, 494 A.2d at 934-35.
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$18,420 to the United States Department of Agriculture and to com-
plete 1000 hours of community service.
Upon his conviction, Broadwater's name was stricken from the
registry of qualified voters in Prince George's County;8 on sentenc-
ing, he was stripped of his Senate seat.9 Almost immediately, specu-
lation began as to whether Broadwater, the first black senator
outside Baltimore and a force in Democratic Party politics, might re-
enter elective politics in 1986. o Discussion focused specifically on
the absence of any requirement in Maryland law that an independ-
ent candidate for the General Assembly be a registered voter."' It
8. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 3-4(c) (1986), states:
No person shall be registered as a qualified voter if he has been convicted of
theft or other infamous crime, unless he has been pardoned, or, in connection
with his first such conviction only, he has completed any sentence imposed pur-
suant to that conviction, including any period of probation imposed by virtue of
parole or otherwise in lieu of a sentence or part of a sentence.
9. MD. CONST. art. XV, § 2, states:
Any elected official of the State, or of a county or of a municipal corpora-
tion who during his term of office is convicted of or enters a plea of nolo con-
tendere to any crime which is a felony, or which is a misdemeanor related to his
public duties and responsibilities and involves moral turpitude for which the
penalty may be incarceration in any penal institution, shall be suspended by
operation of law without pay or benefits from the elective office. During and for
the period of suspension of the elected official, the appropriate governing body
and/or official authorized by law to fill any vacancy in the elective office shall
appoint a person to temporarily fill the elective office, provided that if the elec-
tive office is one for which automatic succession is provided by law, then in such
event the person entitled to succeed to the office shall temporarily fill the elec-
tive office. If the conviction becomes final, after judicial review or otherwise,
such elected official shall be removed from elective office by operation of Law
and the office shall be deemed vacant. If the conviction of the elected official is
reversed or overturned, the elected official shall be reinstated by operation of
Law to the elective office for the remainder, if any, of the elective term of office
during which he was so suspended or removed, and all pay and benefits shall be
restored.
10. See Smith, Democrats Seek New Senator, The Sun (Baltimore), Oct. 20, 1983, at D5,
col. I.
11. Id. Smith wrote:
Broadwater himself may not be through in elective politics. Though he
will not be eligible to vote then, state law would allow him to run for his old
seat in 1986 as an independent, according to Jack Schwartz, an assistant state
attorney general.
With his sentencing yesterday in a scheme to defraud the federal food
stamp program, Broadwater will be barred from the voting booth until after his
six-month prison term and his four years on probation.
A candidate for governor must be a registered voter, but a candidate for
the state Senate or House of Delegates need not be.
If Broadwater wanted to run in 1986, he would have to prove only that he
was over 25 and a resident of the area he hoped to represent. Since he could
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was precisely that "loop-hole" which the 1984 General Assembly
proposed to eliminate by a constitutional amendment that would be
ratified by the voters in November 1984.12
In September 1984 Broadwater filed a complaint for declara-
tory judgment in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County seek-
ing a prohibition against placing the proposed amendment on the
November ballot, or, alternatively, a ruling that the amendment'vio-
lated provisions of both the state and federal constitutions.13 The
trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss for failur'e to state a
cause of action.1 4
Broadwater appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but the
Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari on its own motion before
argument in the intermediate appellate court. Finding that the trial
court erred in dismissing the suit without declaring the rights of the
parties, the court vacated the judgment below and remanded the
case for further proceedings. 15 On remand, the trial court upheld
the amendment and its application to Broadwater against all of
Broadwater's challenges, 6 concluding that he was not entitled to
run for office in 1986. " Again Broadwater appealed, and again the
Court of Appeals granted certiorari.' 8
For purposes of its decision, the court assumed that Broadwater
had standing to represent the class of all unregistered voters in the
meet those qualifications, he could enter the 1986 race--though he could not
vote for himself.
And he would be obliged to run as an independent. Since he would not be
a registered voter, he could not be a registered Democrat-and therefore could
not run in a Democratic primary, according to Mr. Schwartz of the attorney
general's staff.
Id.
12. In fact, Broadwater alleged that the amendment "was drafted for the sole pur-
pose of preventing this Plaintiff from presenting himself as a candidate to the electorate
in his district." 306 Md. at 600, 510 A.2d at 584. The trial court rejected that conten-
tion as "without merit," pointing out that "the amendment applies equally to all citizens
of this State, not just Tommie Broadwater." Id. at 601, 510 A.2d at 585. The Court of
Appeals did not address the issue in either opinion.
13. 303 Md. at 463, 494 A.2d at 935.
14. Id. at 464-65, 494 A.2d at 936.
15. Id. at 469, 494 A.2d at 938.
16. 306 Md. at 600, 510 A.2d at 584. Broadwater claimed the amendment violated
the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as
article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Alternatively, he urged that the amend-
ment should not apply to his eligibility to seek office in 1986 because prior to its adop-
tion, he already had complied with all the rules and regulations necessary to place his
name on the ballot. Id. at 600-01, 510 A.2d at 584.




State, 9 which Broadwater claimed constituted nearly one-third of
the otherwise eligible population. By precluding members of this
class from seeking elective office, Broadwater contended, the
amendment deprived them of equal protection of the laws.2 '
The court's equal protection analysis began with a lengthy quo-
tation from Justice White's opinion in Cleburne indicating that only
legislation which impermissibly classifies by race, alienation, or na-
tional origin, or. which impinges on personal rights guaranteed by
the Constitution, will be subject to the "strict scrutiny" of a review-
ing court; the court will sustain the legislation if it is "suitably tai-
lored to serve a compelling state interest.1 2 The icourt noted that
Bioadwater sought to equate the right of an unregistered voter to
seek elective office with the personal right to vote protected by the
Constitution.2
In rejecting this argument, the court relied on Justice Rehn-
quist's plurality opinion in Clements v. Fashing24 that "the existence
of barriers to a candidate's access to the ballot 'does not of itself
compel close scrutiny.' "125 Given the evidence that apathy accounts
for most failures to register2 6 and the ease with which one may reg-
ister in Maryland,27 the court determined that the amendment chal-
lenged by Broadwater did not require strict scrutiny. 8
Returning to Cleburne for guidance, the court next considered
whether some lesser, but still "heightened," standard of review
might be required. 9 Following an analysis of that standard,3 ° and
19. Id., 510 A.2d at 584. The trial court so held.
20. Id. at 602, 510 A.2d at 585.
21. Id.
22. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
23. 306 Md. at 604, 510 A.2d at 586. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. Number
15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) ("[Sltatutes distributing the franchise constitute the foun-
dation of our representative society.7').
24. 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
25. Id. at 963 (quotingBullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1982)). Justice Rehn-
quist went on to say that the degree of scrutiny required will depend upon the nature of
the interests affected and the burdens imposed. Id.
26. 306 Md. at 604, 510 A.2d at 586. The court quoted an affidavit of the Deputy
Administrator of Election Laws filed in the trial court which indicated that more than
half of the 243,000 voters removed from state rolls during the 18-month period ending
June 1985 were removed for failure to vote or for some other manifestation of apathy.
Id.
27. See supra note 6.
28. 306 Md. at 606, 510 A.2d at 587.
29. Id.
30. In Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 929
(1981), the Court of Appeals summarized the "heightened" standard of review as
follows:
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again noting the ease of registration, the court declined to apply any
more exacting standard than the traditional "rational basis" test for
equal protection."' Finding a rational basis for the State's interest
in limiting office holders to registered voters,3 2 the court affirmed
the judgment of the trial court."
Although the Court of Appeals noted that the challenged
amendment simply made uniform a requirement that those holding
elective office be registered voters,3 4 it stopped well short of sug-
gesting that some impersonal desire for uniformity in the State's
election laws triggered the amendment's proposal or ratification.
Indeed, it would be naive to deny, as the trial court appeared to do,
that Tommie Broadwater's personal electoral ambition was the sin-
gle motivating factor behind the amendment. 35
That analysis, however, leads to a legal dead end. It is useless
to speculate whether the amendment would have been proposed
and adopted had Broadwater been a powerful white politician in-
stead of a popular black one. A reviewing court has little access to
the unexpressed motives of legislators,36 and it has virtually no ac-
cess to the inner minds of the voters.37 Nor would such access nec-
"Heightened scrutiny" of a legislative classification is a less exacting stan-
dard of review and is applied when a statute impacts upon "sensitive," although
not necessarily suspect criteria of classification (i.e., gender discrimination), or
where a statute affects "important" personal rights or works a "significant" in-
terference with liberty or a denial of a benefit vital to the individual.
Id. at 641, 458 A.2d at 944-45.
31. 306 Md. at 607, 510 A.2d at 588.
32. Id. More precisely, the court endorsed the trial court's findings: "Registration
manifests the fact of residency; it is indicative of the candidate's seriousness .... Regis-
tration also protects against fraudulent voters and candidates, ensuring that the under-
age and convicted felons are disqualified from seeking office." Id.
33. Id. at 608, 510 A.2d at 588.
34. Id.
35. See supra note 12.
36. In his dissent in Edwards v. Aguillard. 107 S.Ct. 2573. 2605 (1987),Justice Scalia
pointed out:
For while it is possible to discern the objective "purpose" of a statute (i.e., the
public good at which its provisions appear to be directed), or even the formal
motivation for a statute where that is explicitly set forth ...discerning the
subjective motivation of those enacting the statute is. to be honest, almost al-
ways an impossible task. The number of possible motivations, to begin with, is
not binary, or indeed even finite.
37. The court noted that the law challenged here is-
not a legislative enactment but a provision of the Constitution of Maryland
adopted by the voters of this State. We agree with the State when it says, "It is
not unreasonable for the voters of this State to decide that those who seek to
govern should be both eligible to register to vote, and, in fact, registered."
306 Md. at 608, 510 A.2d at 588.
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essarily reveal the kind of invidious discrimination required to find
an equal protection violation. For each "improper" General Assem-
bly vote against Broadwater the black politician, there would be a
vote against Broadwater the convicted felon.38 And for each ratify-
ing voter who gave Broadwater a thought, there may be thousands
who never heard of him.
In fact, the amendment was perfectly consistent with then-
existing Maryland election law, and, by the reasoning of the Clements
plurality, imposed only a de minimis burden on Broadwater's own
rights.3 9 For the majority of nonregistered Maryland residents, the
brief stop at the registrar's office presents no substantial obstacle to
candidacy for statewide office.
Nevertheless, the opinion is somewhat disquieting. Perhaps
that is because the court answered, without ever candidly asking, the
real question presented by Broadwater--Can a facially neutral restric-
tion on an important political right survive an equal protection chal-
lenge by the one person whose deeds provoked its enactment and
whose exercise of that right is, as a practical matter, the only one
likely to be affected? The answer, according to the court, is yes, but
the question is more important.4 °
2. Legal Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland.-In Ogrinz
v. James4 1 the Court of Appeals affirmed the constitutionality of leg-
islation creating the Legal Mutual Liability Insurance Society of
Maryland (Legal Mutual) and the lawfulness of Legal Mutual's acti-
vation under the terms of that statute.42 While the opinion broke no
new ground, the result is significant to many Maryland attorneys
and their clients.43
38. The United States Supreme Court has held that disenfranchisement of convicted
felons who have completed their sentences and paroles does not deny equal protection.
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974).
39. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 967 (1982). According to justice Rehnquist:
"A 'waiting period' is hardly a significant barrier to candidacy .... We conclude that
this sort of insignificant interference with access to the ballot need only rest on a rational
predicate in order to survive a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 967-
68.
40. Broadwater has not disappeared from Maryland politics. In July 1988 he accom-
panied the Maryland delegation to the Democratic National Convention to act as a whip
for the supporters of Jesse Jackson. See Broadwater Named Jackson Whip, The Daily Rec-
ord, July 9, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
41. 309 Md. 381, 524 A.2d 77 (1987).
42. Id. at 399, 524 A.2d at 86.
43. According to a form letter which Legal Mutual's plan administrator, Insurance
Planning, Inc., Baltimore, provides with its application forms, the organization now can
offer professional liability coverage to the majority of Maryland attorneys.
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The relevant legislative history of the statute challenged in
Ogrinz dates to 1977, when the General Assembly added a subtitle to
the State's Insurance Code entitled "Legal Mutual Liability Insur-
ance Society of Maryland." 44 The new provision's purpose was to
provide a mechanism through which attorneys in the State could be
assured of obtaining legal malpractice insurance and through which
clients could be assured of compensation when injured by an attor-
ney's malpractice.4" The Act was to become effective upon a finding
by the Insurance Commissioner (the Commissioner) that a substan-
tial number of Maryland attorneys might be or soon become unable
to obtain malpractice insurance. 46 The legislation provided no
means for capitalizing this non-stock corporation,47 however, and
the provisions of the Act never were implemented.48
In 1984 the General Assembly enacted certain insurance re-
forms technically unrelated to the Legal Mutual subtitle. 49 Aimed in
large part at keeping rates down through price competition,50 the
new law included a significant change i the way legal malpractice
and other insurance rates were established. 5 Before this enact-
ment, proposed rates filed with the Commissioner became effective
in thirty days unless the Commissioner specifically disapproved
them." Under the new law, the Commissioner could require prior
approval of all proposed rates53 if insurers failed to demonstrate at a
formal hearing that a reasonable degree of competition existed for
the type of insurance in question.5
Because of growing concern about the cost and availability of
legal malpractice insurance, 55 the Commissioner held a hearing in
November 1984.56 Finding the competition inadequate, the Com-
44. Act of May 26, 1977, ch. 713, 1977 Md. Laws 2886 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 48A, §§ 566-574 (1986 & Supp. 1987)). The Act added subtitle 40 to the Insurance
Code.
45. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 567(a) (1986).
46. Id. at (b).
47. id. § 568(a).
48. 309 Md. at 386, 524 A.2d at 80.
49. Act of May 29, 1984, ch. 737, 1984 Md. Laws 3422 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 48A, §§ 244-244V (1986 & Supp. 1987)). The Act added subtitle 16B to the Insur-
ance Code.
50. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 244(b)(I)-(5) (1986).
51. Id. § 244K.
52. Id. § 242(d).
53. Id. § 244K.
54. id. § 2441(c)(1).
55. 309 Md. at 387, 524 A.2d at 80.
56. II Md. Reg. 1948 (1984).
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missioner invoked the prior approval authority.5 7 Because the law
provided that a finding would remain valid for up to one year,5"
other hearings were held in January 1986 and in March 1987. Each
resulted in a finding of inadequate competition.59
Against this backdrop, the General Assembly resurrected Legal
Mutual in 1986, amending the dormant subtitle to facilitate the So-
ciety's creation and operation.' The new statute provided that the
Legal Mutual subtitle would become effective thirty days after the
Commissioner (1) received a petition from the Maryland State Bar
Association requesting the establishment of Legal Mutual, and
(2) determined through the hearing process that inadequate compe-
tition existed in the legal malpractice market.6 '
On May 14, 1986, the Bar Association petitioned the Commis-
sioner to establish Legal Mutual; within the week the Commissioner
ruled that the then-current finding satisfied the second part of the
statute's triggering mechanism.62 In accordance with other provi-
sions, the Commissioner then authorized Legal Mutual's creation,
the Governor appointed a board of directors, and the Commis-
sioner approved incorporation on July 1, 1986.63
A group of attorneys then filed a declaratory judgment action
broadly challenging the constitutionality of the 1986 Act and the
legality of Legal Mutual's activation.' 4 The Circuit Court for Balti-
more City found the Act constitutional and held that Legal Mutual
had been created lawfully. 65 The Court of Appeals, which granted
certiorari "to consider the significant issue of public importance in-
volved in the case," 6 affirmed the lower court on all issues.67
Organizing the attorneys' arguments into eight broad catego-
ries, the court first rejected any notion that a new determination of
inadequate competition was required before Legal Mutual could be
activated.6" Both the language of the Act and its legislative history
unambiguously indicated that the General Assembly intended the
57. 12 Md. Reg. 741 (1985).
58. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 244K(c) (1986).
59. 13 Md. Reg. 720 (1986); 14 Md. Reg. 1IIi (1987).
60. Act of April 29, 1986, ch. 281, 1986 Md. Laws 1032 (amending MD. ANN. CODE
art. 48A, §§ 566-574 (1986)).
61. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 567(b) (1986).
62. 309 Md. at 389-90, 524 A.2d at 81.
63. Id. at 390, 524 A.2d at 81.
64. Id., 524 A.2d at 81-82.
65. Id., 524 A.2d at 82.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 399, 524 A.2d at 86.
68. Id. at 390, 524 A.2d at 82.
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then-valid finding to suffice. 69 Moreover, the court found the Gen-
eral Assembly's failure to require a new finding "tantamount to a
legislative determination" of inadequate competition. 70 Thus, the
attorneys were not entitled to the procedural due process they
claimed was denied them by lack of notice and opportunity to be
heard prior to the Commissioner's determination.7'
The attormeys' next four arguments were based on the taxing
mechanism chosen by the General Assembly to support Legal Mu-
tual in the absence of general fund appropriations." The law levied
on all attorneys admitted to the Maryland State Bar a one-time,
$150 tax "for the privilege of practicing law in the.State." ' An at-
torney could credit this tax against the "membership fee" required
when applying to Legal Mutual for a malpractice policy or any other
property, casualty, or surety policy authorized by the statute.74
The court rejected the attorneys' contention that the statute vi-
olated article 15 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights by raising tax
revenue solely to support a private entity.75 Conceding that article
15 requires a public purpose for all tax revenues, 76 the court re-
minded the attorneys that the use of public funds to benefit private
institutions does not preclude finding a public purpose. 77 Reaffirm-
ing that the legislature has the primary responsibility for determin-
ing whether a particular revenue measure serves a public purpose, 78
69. Id. at 391, 524 A.2d at 82.
70. Id. at 392, 524 A.2d at 83.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 388, 392-93, 524 A.2d at 81, 83.
73. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 570(b) (1986).
74. Id. at (e).
75. 309 Md. at 392-93, 524 A.2d at 83. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 15 provides in
pertinent part:
[A]II taxes thereafter provided to be levied by the State for the support of the
general State Government, and by the Counties and by the City of Baltimore
for their respective purposes, shall be uniform within each class or sub-class of
land, improvements on land and personal property which the respective taxing
powers may have directed to be subjected to the tax levy; yet fines, duties or
taxes may properly and justly be imposed, or laid with a political view for the
good government and benefit of the community.
76. 309 Md. at 393, 524 A.2d at 83. See Allied Am. Co. v. Commissioner, 219 Md.
607, 616, 150 A.2d 421, 427 (1959) ("It is clearly established that the State may raise
funds by taxation to expend for general welfare, and it is for the Legislature and not the
taxpayers or the courts to choose the methods and subjects of taxation.").
77. 309 Md. at 393, 524 A.2d at 83. See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Williams, 199 Md.
382, 401, 86 A.2d 892, 901 (1952) ("There is no prohibition in the Constitution against
making appropriations to private institutions, provided the purpose is public, or semi-
public .... ").
78. 309 Md. at 393, 524 A.2d at 83.
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the court found the availability of malpractice insurance "important
to the public as well as to lawyers and their clients.""
The challenged revenue-raising mechanisms by which the Gen-
eral Assembly sought to achieve that important purpose "merely
represent permissible legislative choices,"80 the court said. As such,
the mechanisms survive a substantive due process test that gives
deference to the legislature, absent a showing that the statute in
question is "clearly arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable." 8 ' Fur-
thermore, the incentive to join Legal Mutual resulting from the de
facto tax rebate provides the rational basis that.all parties conceded
would suffice to withstand an equal protection attack. 2
The attorneys next argued that the Act unconstitutionally dele-
gated taxing power to Legal Mutual in contravention of article 14 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights.83 In particular, they noted that
application of the mandatory tax to Society membership fees, cou-
pled with a provision authorizing Legal Mutual to refuse to under-
write certain risks, gave Legal Miutual effective discretion to
determine which attorneys would receive tax rebates.8 4 The court
found this argument meritless, noting that Legal Mutual could exer-
cise discretion only within the bounds of statutorily acceptable un-
derwriting practices.85
The court also rejected the attorneys' contention that the tax
was a property tax subject to article 15's uniformity requirement, 6
because nonpayment could result in a lien against real or personal
87property. Pointing out that failure to pay other types of taxes also
79. Id. at 394, 524 A.2d at 83.
80. Id. at 395, 524 A.2d at 84.
81. Id. at 394, 524 A.2d at 84. -he court noted that appellants did not state whether
their due process and equal protection challenges were based on the Maryland Declara-
tion of Rights or the United States Constitution. The standards would be the same in
either case, the court noted, pointing out that it has "consistently considered guarantees
in the Declaration of Rights to be in pan materia with similar provisions of the federal
constitution." Id. at 394 n.3, 524 A.2d at 84 n.3.
82. Id. at 395-96, 524 A.2d at 84. See Nordheimer v. Montgomery County, 307 Md.
85, 102, 512 A.2d 379, 387 (1986) ("[A]s long as the classifications made in imposing
the tax are not utterly arbitrary, the tax statute meets the rational basis test for equal
protection purposes.").
83. 309 Md. at 396, 524 A.2d at 85. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 14 requires that
no tax be levied without the consent of the General Assembly.
84. 309 Md. at 396, 524 A.2d at 85.
85. Id. at 396-97, 524 A.2d at 85. See ME. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 572(c) (1986).
86. 309 Md. at 397,(,524 A.2d at 85. For the relevant text of MD. CONST. DECL. OF
RTS. art. 15, see supra note 75.
87. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 57 0(c) (1986).
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could result in a lien,8 8 the court reaffirmed the legislature's classifi-
cation of the tax as an excise or privilege tax.8 9
Two additional arguments met with equally decisive rejection.
The.court dismissed as without merit the attorneys' argument that
the Act's title was insufficiently descriptive to comply with article III,
section 29 of the Maryland Constitution.9 ° Furthermore, the court
upheld the trial court's entry of summary judgment against the at-
torneys and refused to grant declaratory relief.9 While the attor-
neys claimed that there was a "genuine dispute 9f material fact" as
to the actual degree of competition in the legal malpractice insur-
ance market,9" the trial judge correctly determined that neither the
Commissioner's original finding nor the legislature's implicit en-
dorsement of it could be challenged in the declaratory judgment ac-
tion, since both issues "were solely matters of law."9 "
At first glance, many of the arguments in Ogrinz appear to bor-
der on the frivolous, prompting the question of why the Court of
Appeals so quickly jumped into the fray to painstakingly analyze
each argument, when the principles governing its findings are so
well established. Without speculating as to the motives of the attor-
neys who brought the suit, it is not difficult to see why the court well
might prefer to handle every conceivable challenge to Legal Mutual
at once, before the Society became fully institutionalized and before
too many Maryland attorneys came to rely on it for their malpractice
coverage. To do otherwise might have left Legal Mutual vulnerable
to future piecemeal attacks, jeopardizing its very purpose. Thus,
while Ogrinz contributes little to the substantive body of Maryland
law, it adds an important measure of certainty to Maryland
practice.9 4
88. 309 Md. at 397-98, 524 A.2d at 85. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 322(1),
342(b), 393(b) (1980 & Supp. 1987) (availability of liens for income, sales, and use tax
debts, respectively).
89. 309 Md. at 398, 524 A.2d at 85.
90. Id., 524 A.2d at 86. MD. CONST. art. III, § 29, requires that "every Law enacted
by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its
title."
91. 309 Md. at 398-99, 524 A.2d at 86.
92. Id. at 399, 524 A.2d at 86.
93. Id.
94. After great difficulty in creating an insurance package that would offer attorneys
competitive rates, Legal Mutual finally opened for business on July 1, 1988. See Legal
Alutual Finally Opens, The Daily Record, July 7, 1988, at 5, col. 1.
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B. United States Constitution
1. First Amendment.-a. Obscenity Standard.-In a graphic opin-
ion in United States v. Guglielmi 9 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit rejected a pornography supplier's creative de-
fense and upheld his conviction and sentence on federal obscenity
charges. 96 The supplier asserted that the films depicting various
acts of bestiality could be obscene only if they "appealed to the pru-
rient interest of the average'person in the sense that the average
person viewing the material would experience sexual arousal."97
He argued that the materials at issue in the case were so "disgusting
and repellent that they could not be found to appeal to the prurient
interest of the average person, nor to the average zoophiliac." '9
Speaking through Judge Haynsworth, the Fourth Circuit re-
jected the notion that extremely offensive sexually oriented material
is protected by the first amendment while less offensive pornogra-
phy is not.9 While agreeing with the defense's contention that the
materials in question were disgusting,'0 0 anid noting that the de-
fense was "not without ingenuity,"'o' the appellate court found that
the materials indeed were obscene within the prevailing legal mean-
ing of the term. 0 2
Louis Guglielmi operated a warehouse in Baltimorie which sup-
plied adult bookstores with films, literature, and other sexual para-
phernalia."°3  As part of an ongoing FBI investigation, an
undercover agent purchased several movies, which Guglielmi then
shipped to the agent in North Carolina.'" The films in question,
although primarily depictions of bestiality, also portrayed "a variety
of sex acts among humans."' 0' 5
95. 819 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 731 (1988).
96. The government charged Guglielmi with conspiring to transport obscene materi-
als in interstate commerce, transporting obscene materials in interstate commerce, and
using a common carrier to transport obscene materials. 819 F.2d at 452-53. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 1462, 1465 (1982).
97. 819 F.2d at 454.
98. Id. at 452.
99. Id. at 455.
100. The court stated, "Surely Guglielmi is right that the reaction of most people to
these films would be one of rejection and disgust . . . .." id.
101. Id. at 452. A variation of this defense was proffered and rejected in Mishkin v.
New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966). See infra note 112.
102. 819 F.2d at 454-55.
103. Id. at 452.
104. Id. at 452-53.
105. Id. at 453. The portrayal of sexual acts between humans was significant to the
court's opinion as it lent support to the testimony of the government's expert witness
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The legal standard for obscenity is prescribed by Miller v. Cali-
fornia.'0 6 The United States Supreme Court there set forth criteria
for judging whether or not material is obscene:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; .(b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sex-
ual conduct, specifically defined by the applicable state law;
and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 0 7
The primary argument in Guglielmi concerned the meaning of the
first branch Of this test.'0 8
After describing three of the films in explicit detail,' 09 the Gug-
lielmi opinion turned to the major contention of the defendant's ap-
peal-that the material was so revolting as to be beyond the pale of
the prurient interest branch of Miller. " 0 The District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina had put the question to the jury
in terms of "whether the material was an appeal to prurient inter-
est." ' t Guglielmi contended that this instruction constituted "re-
versible error since it permitted the jury to find the films obscene
without finding that the average person would experience sexual
arousal upon seeing them."" 2 The government had argued that it
"that each of the films would have an appeal to the prurient interest of an otherwise
sexually normal person." Id. at 454.
106. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
107. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
108. 819 F.2d at 454.
109. Id. at 453-54. The films described by the court were entitled "Snake Fuckers,"
"Horny Boar," and "Horsepower." Id. at 453.
110. Id. at 454-55.
111. Id. at 454.
112. Id. This contention is not novel. In Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508
(1966), the Supreme Court declared:
[A]ppellant's sole contention regarding the nature of the material is that some
of the books.., do not satisfy the prurient-appeal requirement because they do
not appeal to a prurient interest of the "average person" in sex, that "instead
of stimulating the erotic, they disgust and sicken." We reject this argument as
being founded on an unrealistic interpretation of the prurient-appeal
requirement.
Although Mihkin was decided under the standard of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957). the first part of the Miller test is derived from Roth, 354 U.S. at 489. See Miller,
413 U.S. at 24. See also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 128 (1974) ("Petitioners
appear to argue that if some of the material appeals to the prurient interest of sexual
deviants while other parts appeal to the prurient interest of the average person, a gen-
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was "enough that the material was directed to sexual arousal."' Is
Reduced to its essentials, Guglielmi's argument on appeal was that
the materials were beyond obscenity, as no finding of obscenity
could be predicated on prurient appeal to a minuscule class of
deviants." 14
One of Guglielmi's expert witnesses had testified that
"zoophiliacs are not fungible.""' 5  In other words, one who
fantasizes about sex with one species of animal would not be
aroused by material depicting sexual activity with a different spe-
cies.II6 This testimony was intended to support the defense's con-
tention that not only would the movies fail to arouse the average
person, but they would not excite the average zoophiliac. Unless the
film depicted sexual activity with the zoophiliac's particular type of
animal, the zoophiliac would not experience sexual arousal; only a
small subclass of zoophiliacs, therefore, actually could enjoy any
particular film. Thus, Guglielmi contended, no finding of obscenity
could be based on prurient appeal to the interests of such a small
group."' Guglielmi argued that if the material is so disgusting that
the average person could not experience sexual arousal upon view-
ing it, then the material is protected by the first amendment even
though other, less "hard-core" material is not."18 While it accepted
Guglielmi's premise that the films were disgusting, the Fourth Cir-
cuit refused to be led to such a paradoxical conclusion." 9
The Fourth Circuit viewed this argument as based on an erro-
neous interpretation of the phrase "average person" as used in
Miller.'2 ' The reference to the average person in Miller is derived
from an earlier attempt to formulate a workable test for identifying
eral finding that the material appeals to a prurient interest in sex is somehow
precluded.").
113. 819 F.2d at 454.
114. Id. ("Guglielmi contends that there is no such thing as an average zoophiliac, and
that the sub-groups are so small that no finding of obscenity can be based upon a finding




118. Id. at 455.
119. Id.
120. Id. The court stated: "The average person would view such materials with an
intellectual curiosity... but not experience a whetting of sexual appetite. So much may
be conceded, but if it appeals to those 'individuals eager for a forbidden look.' it meets
the prurient interest requirements of the Miller test." Id. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 207.10(2) comment, at 10 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957) (defining appeal to the prurient
interest as "the capacity to attract individuals eager for a forbidden look").
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obscenity in Roth v. United States.12' The finder of fact first must de-
termine the appropriate community standard and then apply it to
the material in question. According to the Guglielmi court's
interpretation:
The average person comes into the test not as the object of
the appeal but as its judge. It is he, not the most prudish,
who, applying contemporary community standards, deter-
mines whether or not the work appeals to the prurient in-
terest. There is no explicit requirement that the average
person determine that the material appeals to the prurient
interest of the average person. If that were the case, the
average juror would answer the question by assessing his
own reaction.' 2
2
Under this reading the test for obscenity is not whether the ma-
terial appeals to the average juror, but whether it has "the capacity
to attract individuals eager for a forbidden look,"' 23 regardless of
whether the result of that look is repulsion or stimulation. In fact,
sexual arousal really is incidental in determining obscenity; material
provoking "only normal, healthy sexual desires" is not obscene.'
24
It is material that arouses a "shameful or morbid interest in nudity,
sex or excretion,"'12 1 which satisfies the first branch of the Miller
test.
This case clarifies the legal standard in an area of confusion.'2 6
Defining obscenity always has strained jurists' abilities to articulate,
especially when a trial judge must instruct thejury. 1 7 Nevertheless,
121. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See supra note 112. Roth used the phrase "average person"
as part of its rejection of the British standard for obscenity, first articulated in Regina v.
Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360, 371 (1868), which judged obscenity by the effect of an isolated
excerpt or passage upon particularly susceptible persons.
122. 819 F.2d at 454.
123. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) comment, at 10 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
124. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498 (1985).
125. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
126. See Pope v. Illinois, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1929-30 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("The Constitution cannot tolerate schemes that criminalize categories of speech that
the Court has conceded to be so vague and uncertain that they cannot 'be defined legis-
latively.' " (citation omitted)). See also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 103
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he concept of 'obscenity' cannot be defined with
sufficient specificity . . . to prevent substantial erosion of protected speech as a by-
product of the attempt to suppress unprotected speech."). Typical of the confusion in
this area is United States v. Treatman, 524 F.2d 320 (8th Cir. 1975), upon which Gug-
lielmi sought to rely. The hopelessly muddled instructions to the jury in the Treatman
trial did not yield a beneficial precedent. Id. at 322-23.
127. In Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978), the Supreme Court noted: "The
difficulty of framing charges in this area is well recognized. But the term 'average per-
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at a time when defendants face increasingly severe penalties on fed-
eral obscenity charges, 128 the need for clarification is greater than
ever. Guglielmi, who never before had been convicted of any of-
fense, 129 received a sentence of twenty-five years and fines of
$35,000.Is ° Although the jury instructions were correct under
Miller, the draconian punishment does not comport with the gener-
ally unsatisfactory state of obscenity law.' 3 '
b. Zoning Ordinances Restricting Free Speech.-The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals' decision in 5297 Pulaski Highway, Inc. v. Town of Perry-
Ville' 3 2 represented the first time a Maryland appellate court
considered first and fourteenth amendment challenges to a zoning
ordinance.'" The court upheld a Perryville, Maryland ordinance
which restricted the sale of adult books and magazines, finding that
it did not impermissibly abridge the first amendment freedom of
expression.' 4
Perryville initiated the litigation by seeking an injunction
against the sale of anything "other than woman's [sic] lingerie and
associated woman's [sic] clothing" at the Treasure Lingerie and Gift
son' as used in this charge means what it usually means, and is no less clear than 'reason-
able person' used for generations in other contexts." Id. at 300 (citation omitted).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Meyer, 802 F.2d 348, 351 (9th Cir. 1986) (imposition of
15-year sentence upon conviction of federal obscenity charges upheld); United States v.
Pryba, 675 F. Supp. 1504, 1518 (E.D. Va. 1987) (applying criminal RICO forfeiture pro-
visions against pornographers).
129. 819 F.2d at 457.
130. Id. at 453. On appeal, Guglielmi requested that the court conduct a proportion-
ality analysis of the sentence and find it so disproportionate to the offense as to amount
to cruel and unusual punishment. id. at 456. Although expressing concern, id., the
court was foreclosed by the panel decision in United States v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019,
1027 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 2916 (1986), which held that a proportional-
ity review was nobtrequired unless the defendant had been sentenced to at least life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 819 F.2d at 457.
131. See Pope v. Illinois, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1927-28 n.7 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("It has been recognized recently that 'the bulk of scholarly commentary is of the opin-
ion that the Supreme Court's resolution of and basic approach to the First Amendment
issues' involved in obscenity laws 'is incorrect,' in that it fails to adequately protect First
Amendment values." (quoting ArrORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL
REPORT 261 (1986)); id. at 1923 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("All of today's opinions, I sug-
gest, display the need for reexamination of Aliller.").
132. 69 Md. App. 590, 519 A.2d 206, cert. denied, 309 Md. 521, 525 A.2d 636 (1987).
133. Id. at 592, 519 A.2d at 207. The court stated that it was unaware of "any Mary-
land appellate decision addressing a challenge to a zoning ordinance on the ground that
it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States." Id. at 594, 519 A.2d at 208. Cf. Donnelly Advertising Corp. v. Mayor of Balti-
more, 279 Md. 660, 370 A.2d i 127 (1977) (urban renewal ordinance challenged on first
amendment and equal protection grounds).
134. 69 Md. App. at 606, 519 A.2d at 214.
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Shop, operated by 5297 Pulaski Highway, Inc. (5297).13 5 The shop
had been selling adult literature as well as .lingerie.' 3 6 The town
based its action on an amendment to its zoning ordinance which
prohibited adult bookstores or entertainment centers from operat-
ing "within 1800 feet of the boundary of the property upon which
sets any church, school, hospital, or other similar institution for
human care." 1S7 The trial court granted the injunction and went on
to determine that the literature was obscene.' 5297 appealed both
rulings, contending that the amendment to the zoning ordinance vi-
olated the first amendment.' 3 9
The Court of Special Appeals first considered 5297's argument
that the ordinance was facially violative of the first amendment.
140
Because of the absence of Maryland decisions on the issue, the court
turned to a "plethora of authority" 4 ' from the federal courts, par-
ticularly City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.' 42 and its predecessor
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. I4
Both of these Supreme Court cases focused on the premise that
the first amendment gives at least partial protection to adult movies
as a form of expression.144 Whether the expression is protected de-
pends on whether the regulation of the expression is "content-
based," and hence presumptively violative of the first amend-
ment,' 45 or "content-neutral." "Content-neutral" regulations are
"properly analyzed as a form of time, place and manner regula-
135. Id. at 593, 519 A.2d at 208.
136. Id. at 592, 519 A.2d at 207-08. 5297 had been granted a zoning permit only to
operate a lingerie shop. Id. at 593, 519 A.2d at 209.
137. Perryville, Md., Ordinance No. 84-1 (Mar. 6, 1984) (amending PERRYVILLE, MD.,
ZONING ORDINANCES §§ 7B, 19B (1978)). The zoning ordinances, however, allowed the
zoning board to grant a conditional use permit to establishments wishing to operate in
an otherwise prohibited area. PERRYVILLE, MD., ZONING ORDINANCES § 7A (1978). The
court failed to specify how 5297 violated the ordinance.
138. 69 Md. App. at 593, 519 A.2d at 208.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 594-97, 519 A.2d at 208-10.
141. Id. at 594, 519 A.2d at 208.
142. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
143. 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion).
144. For example, in American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 61, the Court declared: "The
only area of protected communication that may be deterred by these ordinances com-
prises films containing material falling within the specific definitions of 'Specified Sexual
Activities' or 'SpecifiedAnatomical Areas' . . . [Tihe First Amendment protects some.
though not necessarily all, of that material from total suppression... See also Renton,
475 U.S. at 55 (following American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50). Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that obscenity is not protected speech under the first
amendment).
145. Ren on, 475 U.S. at 46-47.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 47:758
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
tion"'4 6 and are acceptable if "they are designed to serve a substan-
tial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative
avenues of communication." 47
With this framework in mind, the Court of Special Appeals con-
sidered Perryville's ordinance.' 48 The preamble to the ordinance,
which states that its object is to "promote the public health, safety,
welfare, morals, order, comfort, convenience, appearance, prosper-
ity or general welfare,"' 4 9 as well as minutes from community meet-
ings,' 50 convinced the court that Perryville had acted not to
suppress speech but to protect "a fundamental interest in protect-
ing the general welfare of the community."'' As in Renton and
American Mini Theatres it was significant that Perryville had not at-
tempted an outright ban on the establishments, but allowed for
their operation as conditional uses in certain areas.'- 2
The court next examined the guidelines for determining
whether zoning officials should grant a conditional use.' 53 The or-
dinance providing for the granting of conditional uses"5 places the
burden of proof on the applicant,' 5 5 but sets forth thirteen guide-
lines which the Board of Zoning Appeals must follow. 56 The ordi-
nance also contains a time limit within which an appeal must be
decided, and provisions for notice to the applicant and a right to be
heard at a public hearing. 57 Finally, the law defines "Adult Book-
store/Adult Entertainment Center," "Specified Sexual Activities,"
and "Specified Anatomical Areas."' 58
The Court of Special Appeals was satisfied that the definitions
and criteria employed by Perryville insulated the ordinances as a
whole from attack on the grounds of vagueness or overbreadth.
The court relied primarily on 15192 Thirteen Mile Road v. City of War-
146. d. at 46.
147. Id. at 47.
148. 69 Md. App. at 595-97, 519 A.2d at 209-10.
149. Id. at 595, 519 A.2d at 209 (quoting the ordinance).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 597, 519 A.2d at 210.
152. Id. at 596-97, 519 A.2d at 210. See American Alini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 82 n.4
(Powell, J., concurring) ("If [the town] had been concerned with restricting the message
purveyed by adult theatres, it would have tried to close them or restrict their number
rather than circumscribe their choice as to location.").
153. 69 Md. App. at 597-602, 519 A.2d at 210-12.
154. PERRYVILLE, MD., ZONING ORDINANCES § 7A (1978).
155. ld.
156. Id.
157. Id. § 10(2).
158. Id. § 19B.
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ren,'5 9 in which the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Michigan determined that language remarkably similar to
that which Perryville employed in defining "Adult Bookstore/Adult
Entertainment Center,',' "Specified Sexual Activities," and "Speci-
fied Anatomical Areas" was sufficiently precise to withstand a due
process challenge. 16 ' The court in 15192, however, added the ca-
veat that "each term is 'readily subject to narrowing construction by
the state courts.' ",16' The Court of Special Appeals did not use
such qualifying language.162
15192 also summarized the first amendment overbreadth doc-
trine.'63 "A challenge on the basis of overbreadth raises. two ques-
tions: whether the language of the statute reaches too broadly and
proscribes protected conduct, and whether too much discretion is
vested in the officials who administer the statute."' 6  Although
neither the 15192 court nor the Court of Special Appeals in the in-
stant case elaborated on their findings regarding the first prong of
the overbreadth analysis, 6 5 presumably the ordinances in question
did not "proscribe" protected conduct butsimply regulated it. As
noted above, 6 6 the justifications for the ordinance were sufficient to
159. 593 F. Supp. 147 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
160. Id. at 150, 155 (noting the similarities between the Warren ordinance and that
upheld in American Mini Theatres); 69 Md. App. at 598 n.3, 519 A.2d at 210 n.3 (noting
the similarities between the Warren ordinance and that of Perryville).
161. 593 F. Supp. at 155 (quoting American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 61)..
162. The Court of Special Appeals did state that had 5297 sought and been denied a
conditional use permit, the Board of Zoning Appeals would have had to justify its deci-
sion. 69 Md. App. at 600 n.5, 519 A.2d at 211 n.5. In Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1, 432
A.2d 1319 (198 1). the Court of Appeals established that
the appropriate standard to be used in determining whether a requested special
exception use would have an adverse effect and, therefore, should be denied is
whether there are facts and circumstances that show that the particular use pro-
posed at the particular location proposed would have any adverse effects above
and beyond those inherently associated with such a special exception use irre-
spective of its location within the zone.
Id. at 22-23, 432 A.2d at 1331. Presumably, Maryland courts reviewing a denial of a
conditional use permit then could apply the "narrowing construction" thought amelio-
rative in 15192.
163. See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844
(1970).
164. 15192, 593 F. Supp. at 155.
165. "[Wlhenever an overbroad law covering first amendment activities and formless
standards of first amendment privilege are conjoined, the result is an operative, injuri-
ous legal reality suffering due process vagueness." Note, supra note 163, at 871 (foot-
note omitted). The overbreadth and void-for-vagueness doctrines thus overlap. "It is a
logical possibility for a statute to be precise in language, yet overbroad." 15192, 593 F.
Supp. at 155. In 5297 it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish the overbreadth
and vagueness arguments.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 148-151.
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convince the 5297 court of its validity as a "content-neutral" time,
place, and manner regulation.' 6 7
The 15192 and 5297 courts took different paths in addressing
the discretion vested in officials charged with administering the or-
dinances in question.' 68 15192 held that "It]he application proce-
dure for a special land use permit and site plan approval leaves an
improper degree of discretion in the local officials." 69 In contrast,
the Court of Special Appeals, examining the procedures at issue in
15192 and relying on Maryland case law for additional safe-
guards, 7 ' held that the Perryville criteria and procedures survived a
facial examination for'the "unbridled discretion" which would vio-
late the first amendment protections.' 7'
Turning to the question of the obscenity vel non of the- material
purveyed by 5297, the Court of Special Appeals applied the three-
part test of Miller v. California.'72 The crux of the application was the
determination of "contemporary community standards.""'" Be-
cause a "community cannot, where liberty of speech and press are at
issue, condemn that which it generally tolerates,""' the Court of
Special Appeals relied on evidence which 5297 adduced at trial that
the same sort of magazines which the trial court found obscene were
sold, not only within the immediate envirions of Perryville, but
within the proscribed boundaries of the .rdinance.' The court
concluded that, judged by the community standards of Perryville,
the material could not be obscene.' 7 6 Nevertheless, because the
trial judge did not include the finding of obscenity within the injunc-
tion forbidding the sale of the magazines, the injunction stood. 177
167. 69 Md. App. at 594-95, 519 A.2d at 209.
168. Id. at 598-600, 519 A.2d at 210-11.
169. 15192, 593 F. Supp. at 156 (citation omitted).,
170. 69 Md. App. at 601-02, 519 A.2d at 212; Schultz v. Prtts, 291 Md. 1, 22-23, 432
A.2d 1319,1331 (1981).
171. 69 Md. App. at 599-600 & n.5, 519 A.2d at 211 & n.5.
172. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Miller test requires the trier of fact to consider:
a) Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
b) Whether the work depicts, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct as
specifically defined by state law; and c) Whether the work taken as a whole lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
173. 69 Md. App. at 603-06, 519 A.2d at 213-14.
174. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 171 (1959) (Harlan,J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
175. 69 Md. App. at 603, 519 A.2d at 213.




This opinion is rather cryptic and unsatisfactory. The reasons
for the ordinance related in the opinion are vague and con-
clusory.17 8 Perhaps Perryville was motivated by the requisite con-
cern for the secondary effects of unregulated adult bookstores
rather than by an impermissible desire to censor the first amend-
ment materials themselves; nevertheless, this "substantial govern-
mental interest" should be articulated more clearly.' 79 Although the
opinion mentions minutes of community meetings at which towns-
people voiced their concerns, ,'o it is silent as to what those concerns
were. These minutes, along with a vague and all-encompassing
statement of purpose,' 8 ' serve as Perryville's only justification for
regulating material that, if not obscene, is presumptively protected
by the first amendment.'812 This same justification can be the only
reason for the court's otherwise unexplained finding that the ordi-
nance in question does not proscribe protected conduct. The opin-
ion lacks a substantial discussion of the overbreadth doctrine.'8 "
If the Renton doctrine regarding "content-neutral" regulations
is not to become a vehicle for censorship,' 4 its application by local
officials must be subject to a stricter scrutiny. Because 5297 did not
attempt to obtain a conditional use, perhaps this case was devoid of
the more specific record which would have rendered it appropriate
for consideration by the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, it is ques-
tionable whether, in view of similar attempts by Maryland localities
to restrict the-distribution of adult literature and entertainment,18 5
the public interest was well served by a denial of certiorari. Consid-
178. See supra text accompanying notes 148-149.
179. Young v. American Mini Theatres, inc., 427 U.S. 50, 76 (1976) (Powell, J., con-
curring) (noting that "a substantial burden rests upon the State when it would limit in
any way First Amendment rights").
180. 69 Md. App. at 595, 519 A.2d at 209.
181. Id.
182. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986).
183. See supra note 163.
184. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54; American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 84 (Powell, J., concur-
ring) ("[Clourts must be alert to the possibility of direct rather than incidental effect of
zoning on expression, and especially to the possibility of using the power to zone as a
pretext for suppressing expression ....").
185. On April 15, 1988, Judge Kaufman of the United States District Court for Mary-
land held that Prince George's County's zoning restrictions on adult bookstores violate
the first amendment. 11126 Baltimore Blvd., Inc. v. Prince George's County, 684 F.
Supp. 884 (D.Md. 1988), appeal docketed. No. K-86-1411 (4th Cir. May 12, 1988). Judge
Kaufman found that the county had enacted the ordinance without sufficiently establish-
ing its "substantial interest" in regulating the bookstores; moreover, the ordinances
granted "overbroad discretion" to zoning officials. Id. at 899.
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eration by the Court of Appeals could have provided an opportunity
to place such restrictions on a firmer footing.
2. State Action.--a. Issuance of Public Rally Permits .- The United
States District Court for the District of Maryland held in NAACP,
Frederick County Chapter v. Thompson 186 that a county zoning adminis-
trator may be enjoined from issuing a permit for a public rally on
private property which would exclude members of the public based
on race or ethnic background.'"" The court concluded that the
county's issuance of a permit and the presence of state and county
law enforcement officers 'at the rally indicated governmental in-
volvement significant enough to constitute state action, thus violat-
ing the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution.' 8
Frederick County requires an individual to obtain a temporary
use permit from the county zoning administrator before holding a
public rally on private property,18 9 Pursuant to the county ordi-
nance, Roger Kelly obtained a temporary use. permit to hold a pub-
lic Ku Klux Klan (Klan)190 rally on private property belonging to his
father. 9 ' The zoning administrator previously had issued five simi-
lar permits to the Klan for rallies which admitted "white gentile per-
sons only," and thus was aware of the Klan's plans to exclude all
non-white members of the public from the rally.' 9'
The promotion of the Klan's discriminatory racial and religious
views is the primary purpose of its public rallies.' 93 To enforce these
policies, armed' Klansmen escort from the premises all non-whites
who attempt to attend the rallies.' 94 As a general practice, state and
186. 648 F. Supp. 195 (D. Md. 1986).
187. Id. at 225.
188. Id. at 224-25.
189. FREDERICK CouNrrY, MD., CODE § 1-19-213(a) (Supp. 1987).
190. As stipulated in the facts of the case, "the Ku Klux Klan is an organization com-
prised of individuals who promote and practice racial discrimination. The Klan's policy
of excluding all non-whites from public and private rallies is codified in its constitution,
bylaws and operating procedures." 648 F. Supp. at 224-25.
191. Id.
192. Id. The previously issued permits had been issued under an earlier ordinance
which differed from the one applicable to the permit in question. Pursuant to the ordi-
nance, each of the five earlier permits declared, "The issuance of this permit shall in no
way be construed as the approval of any Frederick County Governmental Agency or
official of the purpose of the meeting or of the organization holding the activity." Id.
The parties stipulated that the permit in question also contained this disclaimer, but the
court noted that the record indicated otherwise. Id. at 197 n.5.




county law enforcement officers would fmonitor the rallies to assist
with traffic control, ensure compliance with the conditions of the
permit, and maintain the peace.' 95 While present at the rallies, the
law enforcement officers witnessed the Klan's exclusionary prac-
tices, but absent any breach of the peace, the officers would refrain
from interfering with the actions of the armed Klansmen. 9 '
Members of the Frederick County Chapter of the National As-
sociation for the Advancement of Colored People (the NAACP)
brought suit against the County Zoning Administrator seeking a
permanent injunction' 9 7 barring the administrator from issuing per-
mits for future Klan rallies which would exclude non-white and non-
gentile members of the public.' 98 The primary issue before the
court was whether the state and county involvement in the Klan ral-
lies amounted to state action.' 99 Private conduct which denies an
individual's rights does not violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment unless the state has been significantly in-
volved in the discrimination.'" 0 The NAACP did not challenge the
constitutionality of the zoning ordinance, as the group agreed that
the law was facially neutral as to race.20' Nor did the NAACP ques-
tion the Klan's right to hold private, segregated meetings on private
20property. 02 The NAACP did contend, however, that the county's
granting of the required rally permit coupled with the state and
county law enforcement officers' acquiescence in the forced exclu-
sion of non-whites and non-gentiles from Klan rallies constituted
state action. 0 3
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 196. Several individual plaintiffs joined the NAACP in bringing the action.
The NAACP originally sought a temporary restraining order declaring the permit void.
Following a hearing, the NAACP withdrew its request for a restraining order and
amended the complaint to seek the permanent injunction. Id. at 197.
198. Id. at 200.
199. Id. at 203. As a threshold issue the court found that both the NAACP and the
individual plaintiffs had standing to sue. Id. at 201-02.
200. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-22 (1961) (finding that
the relationship between a state-owned parking building and the building's privately-
owned restaurant which discriminated against blacks was mutually beneficial, or symbi-
otic; hence, the discrimination constituted state action).
201. 648 F. Supp. at 202.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 202-03. State action includes action by a subdivision of a state, such as
Frederick County. Id. at 202. "[AIII problems relating to the existence of government
action-local, state or federal-which would subject an individual to constitutional re-
strictions comes under the heading of 'state action.' " J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YouNG, CONSTiTUTIONAL LAW § 12.1, at 422 (3d ed. 1986).
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Before delving into the question of state action, the court ad-
dressed the zoning administrator's contention that it would violate
the Constitution to condition the issuance of a permit to hold a pub-
lic rally on private property on the permit holder's admission of all
members of the public to the rally. 20 4 The court responded by com-
paring Kelly's private property with the shopping center property in
three well-known Supreme Court cases.2 0 5
In Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. 20 6
the Supreme Court held that a privately owned shopping center was
the functional equivalent of a business district and should be treated
as public property for first amendment purposes. 20 7 It was uncon-
stitutional, therefore, for the shopping center's owner to invoke
state trespass laws in an effort to bar peaceful union picketing of one
of the center's stores.2 °8
Four years later in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner209 the Court held that
anti-war activists could be prohibited from distributing handbills in
a shopping center.2 t0 According to the Court, there was no first
amendment right to protest in a shopping center if the speech did
not relate to the shopping center's operations. 21 1
Finally, in Hudgens v. NLRB 21 2 the Supreme Court concluded
that Lloyd overruled Logan Valley and that the first amendment did
not guarantee a right of access to privately owned shopping cen-
ters.21 - The Hudgens Court determined that although federal consti-
tutional principles did not require a shopping center to permit
protesting on its premises, federal statutes could so mandate.2 1 4
The NAACP court compared the Kelly property to the shopping
centers, conceding that the Kelly property had even fewer of the
attributes of public property than the shopping centers.2 5 Ex-
204. 648 F. Supp. at 203. The zoning administrator also argued that Frederick
County lacked power to place conditions on the issuance of a rally permit by virtue of
the limited authority granted to the county by the State. The court, assuming arguendo
that that contention had merit, stated that Maryland could empower the county to condi-
tion the issuance of a permit upon lack of racial discrimination at the rally. Id.
205. Id. at 203-05.
206. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
207. Id. at 325.
208. Id. at 318.
209. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
210. Id. at 570.
211. d. at 561-67.
212. 424 U.S. 507 (1986).
213. Id. at 518.
214. Id. at 518-20.
215. 648 F. Supp. at 205.
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tending Hudgens to the NAACP case, the court stated that if federal
statutes could require the shopping centers to permit protesting on
the premises, there was no reason why Frederick County and the
State of"Maryland could not condition the grant of a permit for a
rally on private land upon opening the rally to all members of the
public. 16
In analyzing the question of state action, the court focused on
two landmark Supreme Court cases, Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co."3 7
and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority."1 8 The issue in Adickes was
whether a state-enforced custom compelling'segregation in restau-
rants constituted state action for fourteenth amendment pur-
poses.9 The Adickes Court recognized that the fourteenth
amendment does not forbid a private party who acts without state
involvement from discriminating on the basis of race. 2 0 As the
Court had pointed out in Shelley v. Kraemer,22 1 the fourteenth amend-
ment "erects no shield against merely private conduct, however dis-
criminatory or wrongful." 222 The Adickes Court determined,
however, that if the racially discriminatory act by the private party is
either compelled by statute or by "custom having the force of law,"
the state has commanded the result by its law. 2
Neither a Frederick County statute nor a state-enforced custom
compelled discrimination at the Klan rally. The NAACP court there-
fore had to resolve whether, in the absence of a discriminatory stat-
ute or custom, the issuance of the rally permit and the participation
by county and state law enforcement officers amounted to "signifi-
cantly sufficient state action to trigger the bar of the fourteenth
amendment against governmental involvement in the Klan's dis-
criminatory actions. 224
The county ordinance requiring a permit for a rally such as that
held by the Klan was a response to a perceived need to establish
controls in connection with public rallies on private property. 225
The permit ordinance was facially neutral regarding race; moreover,
the language of the permit declared that its issuance was not to be
216. Id.
217. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
218. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
219. Adiches, 398 U.S. at 169.
220. Id.
221. 334 U.S. I (1948).
222. Id. at 13.
223. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 171.
224. 648 F. Supp. at 214.
225. Id. at 199.
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construed as the county's approval of the purpose of the rally or of
the sponsoring organization.226
The state and county law enforcement officials who were on
hand at the rally to monitor traffic and .security did not affirmatively
act to enforce the Klan's discriminatory policies. 227 Nevertheless,
they did tolerate the forcible exclusion of non-whites from the rally
and passively supervise the activities of the armed Klansmen.22 8 As
stated by the court, police protection to prevent members of an ex-
cluded group from entering private property being used for private
purposes would not violate the equal protection clause. 229 The con-
duct more closely approaches significant state involvement when
police assist at a public function held on private property pursuant
to a governmental permit when conditions strongly indicate a need
for police involvement. 3 °
Neither the issuance of the permit nor the police involvement
endorsed the Klan's policy to bar potential attendees from the rally
on racial or religious grounds. 23  Nonetheless, the permit coupled
with police services enabled the Klan to hold its discriminatory rally
and were symbols of the county's tolerance of the Klan's exclusion-
ary practices. 232
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority2 "3 a restaurant's refusal
to serve blacks constituted state action because the 'restaurant leased
space in a government parking facility.234 The Burton Court stated
that private conduct abridging individual rights does not violate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment unless "to
some significant extent the state in any of its manifestations has
been found to have become involved in it. "235 A parallel may be
drawn between the public parking facility in Burton and the zoning
administrator in NAACP. By their inaction the state agencies in both
cases made themselves parties to the discriminatory activity and
placed their "power, property and prestige behind the admitted
discrimination. "236
226. Id. at 197. While the parties had stipulated that the permit contained this lan-
guage, the record seemed to indicate that the permit lacked such a disclaimer. Id. at n.5.
227. Id. at 214.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 215.
230. Id. at 215-16.
231. Id. at 217.
232. Id.
233. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
234. Id. at 717.
235. Id. at 722.
236. Id. at 725.
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The NAACP court therefore found that a significant degree of
state involvement existed by virtue of the county's establishment of
a permit system which allowed discriminatory rallies, the zoning ad-
ministrator's issuance of the permit for the rally, and the law en-
forcement officials' passive supervision of the Klan's discriminatory
practices at the rally.2"' While significant affirmative encourage-
ment of discrimination by the State was absent, the involvement of
the State and its tolerance of the discrimination was enough to con-
stitute state action.2 3 8
The court pointed out that state and local governments have
other choices with regard to public rallies which would avoid the
constitutional issue at hand.2 9 The Frederick County government,
however, chose to maintain a permit system which allowed private
actors to engage in racially discriminatory practices of which the
government was aware. Therefore, the county placed itself in the
position of tacitly approving discriminatory actions that violated the
equal protection clause.2 40 Because of this constitutional violation,
the court found that the zoning administrator may be enjoined from
issuing future permits if the administrator knows, or has cause to
know, that the permit applicant proposes to exclude members of the
public from public rallies on the basis of race.2 4 '
b. Bail Bondsmen.-In Jackson v. Pantazes142 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a bail bondsman
was a state actor. 243 Therefore, the bondsman could be subject to
suit under title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code. 4 4
Betty Jackson claimed that bondsman Nicholas Pantazes and
237. 648 F. Supp. at 224.
238. Id. at 224-25.
239. Id. at 225. For example, the government could allow public rallies to be held on
private property without governmental regulation, could ban the rallies for safety rea-
sons, or could authorize the rallies to take place under a permit entitling all members of
the public to attend. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. 810 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1987).
243. A state actor may be a state official, one who has acted together with or has
obtained significant aid from state officials, or one whose conduct otherwise is charge-
able to the State. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
244. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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police officer Allan Goldberg inflicted personal injuries and prop-
erty damage when they forcibly entered her home to apprehend her
son.245 Ms. Jackson's son, FrankJackson, had employed Pantazes as
surety on a bond for his appearance in court to answer criminal
charges.2 46 When Jackson failed to appear in court, Pantazes and
two poiice officers appeared at the Jackson home and sought per-
mission to enter to search for him. 247 Ms. Jackson repeatedly de-
nied that her son was at home, but Pantazes and Goldberg forcibly
entered the home, causing Ms. Jackson to sustain personal inju-
ries.2 48 When Ms. Jackson attempted to stop Pantazes and
Goldberg from searching her home, Pantazes kicked her; Goldberg
did not intervene.24 9 Pantazes then searched the home, breaking
dbwn unlocked doors in the process, while Goldberg physically re-
strained Ms. Jackson. 5 ° Pantazes and Goldberg left the premises
after failing to find Johnson, but Pantazes then followed Ms. Jackson
and her husband to the police station and repeatedly threatened
them with physical violence.2 5'
Ms. Jackson filed suit against Pantazes and Goldberg in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland under title
42, section 1983 of the United States Code. 2  The federal court
granted summary judgment for Pantazes and Goldberg on the
ground that Pantazes was not a state actor and therefore could not
be liable under section 1983.253 The court further found that
Goldberg was not at fault with regard to the use of excessive force
alleged by Ms. Jackson.2 54
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment, de-
claring that Pantazes was a state actor who could be sued under sec-
tion 1983 and that Goldberg might be liable under section 1983 for
participating in Pantazes' alleged deprivations of Ms. Jackson's con-
245. 810 F.2d at 428.
246. Id. at 427.
247. Id. at 428.




251. Id. Ms. Jackson went to the police station to swear out an arrest warrant for
Pantazes. Pantazes filed criminal charges against Ms.Jackson for assault and battery and
for harboring a fugitive. Ms. Jackson was acquitted of all charges at trial. Id.





stitutional rights.2 5 In reversing the lower court's decision, the
Fourth Circuit found that the bondsman met the requirements used
to determine when the conduct of an actor is so fairly attributable to
the state as to render the wrongful conduct actionable under section
1983.256
The court relied on two Supreme Court decisions, Lugar v. Ed-
monson Oil Co. 257 and Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.,258 which estiablished
the test for determining whether a party is a state actor subject to
suit under section 1983.259 The test consists of two parts:
[F]irst, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of
some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of
conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the
State is responsible .... Second, the party charged with
the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to
be a state actor. This may be because he is a state official,
because he 'has acted together with or has obtained signifi-
cant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is
otherwise chargeable to the State.26 °
Both prongs of this test are satisfied when a private party and public
official act together to produce a constitutional violation 26 ' even in
the absence of a state statute, custom, or policy authorizing the pri-
vate party's conduct. 262 It is clear from the facts in Jackson that
Goldberg's aid to Pantazes in the search of the Jackson home quali-
fies as this type ofjoint participation. Goldberg assisted Pantazes in
gaining entrance to Ms. Jackson's home, dragging her from her
doorway, and restraining her while Pantazes conducted his
search.263
The court noted that both parts of the Lugar test also are satis-
fied when an independent or symbiotic relationship exists between
255. Id. The court recognized that Goldberg, as a state officer exercising official pow-
ers, was indeed a state actor. Id. at 428.
256. Id. at 429.
257. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
258. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
259. The Supreme Court delineated cle two-part test in Lugar. 457 U.S. at 937, deriv-
ing it from Adickes, 398 U.S. at 169-74. .Idickes was a § 1983 action brought against a
private party, based on a claim of racial discrimination in violation of the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court held that the private party's partic-
ipation with a state official in a conspiracy to discriminate constituted both the state
action essential to a constitutional violation and action under color of law for purposes
of § 1983.
260. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
261. Id. at 931.
262. Id.
263. 810 F.2d at 429.
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the state and a private actor, as in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author-
ity. 2" According to theJackson court, the symbiotic relationship be-
tween bail bondsmen and the criminal court system sufficed to
satisfy both parts of the test and constitute state action on Pantazes'
part.265 Therefore, Pantazes could be classified as a state actor.266
The effect of Jackson is to limit the broad power of bail bonds-
men to capture and arrest a fugitive, especially if receiving assist-
ance from state officials. Acting alone, professional bondsmen have
enjoyed extraordinary powers to capture and use force to compel
peremptory return of a bail jumper.26 7 Courts traditionally have
viewed recapture as a private remedy which arises from a private
action. 268 Nevertheless, when bondsmen licensed by the State ob-
tain significant aid from police officers exercising state authority, the
bondsmen become state actors, and therefore are constrained both
by the Constitution and by federal statutes such as section 1983.
3. Jury Selection.-The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held in United States v. Ricks 269 that in a criminal trial,
selection of a jury by the "struck jury" method27 ' requires certain
264. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). In Burton a restaurant's refusal to serve blacks constituted
state action for fourteenth amendment purposes when the restaurant leased space in a
public parking facility under an arrangement with the State that conferred on each a
variety of mutual benefits. The Court found that if there are extensive contacts between
a state and a private discriminator in such a way that each benefits from the other's
conduct, the requisite state involvement may be found. id. at 726.
265. 810 F.2d at 430. Bondsmen are licensed by the State and depend on the judicial
use of a bail bond system for their livelihood. In turn, bondsmen facilitate pretrial re-
lease of accused persons, monitor their whereabouts, and retrieve them for trial. Id. See
MD. R. 4-217, 1285 (bail bond system and licensing of bondsmen, respectively).
266. 810 F.2d at 429. Upon ruling that Pantazes was a state actor, the court con-
cluded that Ms. Jackson had established sufficient evidence of violations of her constitu-
tional fights to withstand Pantazes' motion for summary judgment. The powers
conferred on a bondsman by state law include the right to arrest a fugitive without legal
process and the fight to break and enter on private property to effect the arrest. Never-
theless, theJackson court believed that based on Ms. Jackson's evidence a trier of fact
might find that Pantazes used excessive force and unnecessarily destroyed property in
violation of Ms. Jackson's constitutional rights. The court also ruled that evidence of
Goldberg's participation in Pantazes' search and his failure to protect Ms. Jackson from
the alleged illegal excesses perpetrated by Pantazes might lead to a finding that
Goldberg helped to deny Ms. Jackson's constitutional rights. Id. at 429-30.
267. See Kear v. Hilton, 699 F.2d 181, 182 (4th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that profes-
sional bondsmen enjoy extraordinary powers to capture and use force to compel return
of a bail jumper, but permitting extradition of a bondsman to Canada for kidnapping a
bail jumper).
268. Id.
269. 802 F.2d 731 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. King v. United States, 107 S.Ct. 650
(1986).
270. In jurisdictions using the "struck jury" method, the trial court gives each party a
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safeguards to prevent the "dilution" of a defendant's peremptory
challenges.2 7 ' The venire list given to counsel for purposes of exer-
cising peremptory challenges must "contain only the approximate
number of necessary potential jurors.127 2 Alternatively, if a larger
list is provided, the court must give "clear, unambiguous instruc-
tions" identifying an appropriately limited portion of the list from
which the jury will be selected.27 3
Affirming the majority decision of a three-judge panel one year
earlier,2 7 4 over a vigorous dissent in both instances,2 7 5 the Fourth
Circuit sitting en banc held that the trial court's failure to limit the
venire list in a complex Baltimore drug trafficking prosecution was
reversible error warranting a new trial for the defendants. 276 The
court found that failure to limit the list, while not rising to the level
of a constitutional violation,2 77 "hinders the full, unrestricted exer-
cise of peremptory challenges and violates an essential part of the
right to trial by jury. 271
Thomas Calvin Ricks and seven other defendants were con-
victed in the United States District Court for the District of Mary-
land of conspiring to possess and distribute heroin and cocaine, as
well as other federal narcotics offenses.279 The jury which convicted
list of prospective jurors who have not been challenged and excused for cause. Each
side exercises its peremptory strikes against the names on the list. If afterwards more
than twelve jurors remain on the list, the trial judge selects the actual jury. The other
common method of exercising peremptory challenges is called the "jurybox" method,
in which the parties challenge jurors already seated in the box. As each prospective
juror.is challenged and excused, another is seated. When both sides have exhausted all
peremptory challenges, the twelve persons seated in the box serve as jurors. For a dis-
cussion ofjury selection methods, see United States v. Blouin, 666 F.2d 796, 797-98 (2d
Cir. 1981).
271. 802 F.2d at 734. "It is self-evident that the right to a given number of peremp-
tory challenges becomes less and less effective as the list of potential jurors against
which the challenges must be exercised grows larger than the approximate number of
veniremen needed to comprise a jury." Id. at 733.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. United States v. Ricks, 776 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1985). The court also held that a
conviction for conspiracy to possess and distribute narcotics under 21 U.S.C. § 846
(1982) could serve as one of the three requisite narcotics violations upon which there
could be a conviction for conducting a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 848 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987). This note will not address that aspect of Ricks.
275. 776 F.2d at 466 (Wilkinson. J., dissenting from panel decision); 802 F.2d at 737
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting from en banc decision). Chief Judge Winter wrote the major-
ity opinions for both the panel and the full court;Judge Wilkinson wrote both dissents.
276. 802 F.2d at 732.
277. Id. at 733.
278. Id. at 734.
279. 776 F.2d at 458. Only the panel decision fully set forth the facts of the case.
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the defendants was selected from a list of fifty-seven names280 given
to counsel for the purpose of marking peremptory strikes.2 8 1
Before voir dire began, a government attorney asked which
portion of the list the trial court planned to use in drawing a jury.
The court's response was ambiguous, and was apparently construed
differently by opposing counsel.282 The defense exercised all of its
twelve challenges within the first twenty-seven persons on the list;
the government's six challenges were dispersed throughout.282
Without further explanation, the court passed over the first
fourteen persons remaining eligible on the list and selected the fif-
teenth to be jury foreman. The judge drew the balance of the panel
from among persons listed still further down on the list. Defense
counsel promptly and strenuously objected that they had been mis-
led into wasting their peremptory challenges, 2 .4 but the judge over-
ruled their objections and swore in the jurors as selected.2 5 The
280. In fact, 75 persons reported for jury duty on the day that the trial began. The
record suggested that other juries were to be selected later in the day. The 75 were
divided into a group of 66 from which active jurors would be chosen, and a group of 9
from which alternates were to be selected. In the course of voir dire, 9 of the active
group and I of the alternates were excused for cause. That left 57 on the list of active
jurors submitted to counsel for peremptory strikes. The alternate list played no part in
this controversy. Id. at 458-59.
281. Because the offenses charged were punishable by imprisonment for more than
one year, the government was entitled to six peremptory challenges and the defendants
jointly to no fewer than 10. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). The trial court granted the defend-
ants jointly 12 peremptory challenges under the authority of FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c).
282. 776 F.2d at 459. The inquiry and the court's response were as follows:
MR. ULWICK [the government attorney]: Your Honor, may I assume that
we'll be-or the Court will be picking from the top of the list?
THE COURT: Well, of course I can't tell at this point, as far as strikes and
so forth, but ordinarily I start from the top, not any rigid number, counting
from the top, so I think it would be reasonably fair to say, if you want to exer-




284. "We relied on the Court's statement that it was going to start from the too of the
list. We feel as though we've been led astray." Id.
285. Id. at 460. In a brief oral opinion overruling the objections, the judge declared:
It seems to me that the Government followed my instructions. If counsel
misunderstood them, I think that is unfortunate. I don't think that you can say
the strikes were not effective because it could have been that I would have
picked one of these people that you struck as the foreman. I don't know any-
thing about any of these people. I don't think counsel does either, but at this
point, to say, "We don't like the composition of the jury and therefore we
ought to pick another jury because we think those people are going to be one
way or the other," I don't think is the proper way to do it and I think that the
Government properly followed my instructions. Defense counsel didn't. So
your exceptions will be noted and we're going to swear the jury.
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jury convicted the defendants after a five-week trial. 286
On appeal two Fourth Circuit judges found that defense coun-
sel's belief that the court would select the jury from the beginning of
the list was not unreasonable in view of the court's advice before the
voir dire.218 7 Nor was it unreasonable for defense counsel to have
enough faith in their interpretation to relieve them of any duty to
seek further clarification. The practical effect of this "not unreason-
able belief" was to "frustrate the exercise of their peremptory
strikes. 288 Interpreting United States Supreme Court decisions on
point to say that "denial or impairment of the right to peremptory
strikes is reversible error per se," 289 the panel majority reversed the
district court and remanded the case for a new trial.
Judge Wilkinson focused his arguments in dissent both on the
unreasonableness of defense counsel's reading of the trial court's
advice, "given the ambiguities in the court's statement," and on the
unreasonableness of relying on such an ambiguous statement. 290
Turning the majority's own reasoning against the holding, the dis-
sent urged that the very importance of the peremptory challenge
should give "special force" to an attorney's "usual duty of
circumspection." 91
On rehearing, the full court not only reaffirmed the panel's con-
clusion, 92 but also determined that a limitation on the effective size
of the venire was "essential to the validity of a jury chosen by the
'struck jury' system."293 Conceding that no appellate decision "ac-
tually holds that it is error for a district court to submit a jury list to
counsel with more names than required, '2 9 4 the court noted that
every appellate decision upholding the "struck jury" system in-
volved a venire no larger than necessary to seat a jury after all chal-
Id. at 460 n.8.
286. Id. at 458.
287. id. at 460.
288. Id. at 461.
289. Id. In particular, the court looked for authority to Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 218 (1965) (finding that racially discriminatory jury selection procedures, including
discrimination in the use of the peremptory strike system, violated the right to equal
protection of the laws), and Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) (noting
that the peremptory challenge is one of the most important of the sixth amendment
rights). Swain's holding that a black defendant could not make out a prima facie case of
impermissible discrimination solely on the facts of the defendant's particular case was
overturned in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-94 (1986).
290. 776 F.2d at 466 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
291. Id. at 469.
292. 802 F.2d at 732.
293. Id. at 733.
294. Id. at 736.
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lenges were exhausted. 295  The court found the jury selection
process in Ricks to be "without precedent" and asserted, without
more clearly developing the logical rationale for this historical cir-
cumstance, that it also was impermissible. 96
Judge Wilkinson, again dissenting, examined the cases the ma-
jority used to support its decision 2 9 7 and reached an entirely differ-
ent conclusion: a defendant "cannot succeed in his claim simply by
showing that he could, under some procedure, have made more ef-
fective use of his peremptories. -2" The dissent also emphasized
the discretion given to trial courts in thejury selection procedure, 299
and suggested that a larger venire could have the salutary effect of
increasing minority representation on juries.3 00
The Fourth Circuit's holding does not purport to elevate any
aspect of the peremptory challenge to a constitutional right, despite
its obvious link to the sixth amendment.3 0 ' Nor does it require that
trial courts maximize the effectiveness of a defendant's peremptory
challenges by eliminating any possibility of a "wasted" strike.3 0 2
Rather, the holding invests the conceptually exclusionary device of
peremptory challenge with greater utility as a tool for determining
which jurors will be included on a particular jury. 30 3
Unasked and unanswered in Ricks is when the inescapable
"wasting" of peremptory challenges might constitute a violation of
procedural due process. It is not enough to aver that the peremp-
295. Id.
296. Id. at 736-37.
297. Judge Wilkinson relied most heavily on Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396
(1894), which, in Judge Wilkinson's words, "directly refutes the majority's premise that
the right to a specific number of peremptory challenges implies a right to the greatest
possible power of exclusion." 802 F.2d at 738.
298. 802 F.2d at 739 (Wilkinson, J.. dissenting).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 740.
301. Id. at 733.
302. 802 F.2d at 738 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). The dissent demonstrated that both
the "struck jury" system and the "jury box" system could result in "wasted" peremptory
challenges. For example, the "struck jury" system upheld in United States v. Pointer,
151 U.S. 396, 412 (1894), required the defendant to exercise peremptory strikes without
knowing whom the government would challenge. "The defendant would have enjoyed
an 'undiluted' influence if the prosecution had first used its challenges," potentially sav-
ing the defense one or more strikes against mutually unacceptable chndidates. 802 F.2d
at 738. Similarly, the "jury box" system upheld in United States v. Blouin, 666 F.2d 796
(2d Cir. 1981), required the defendant to exercise the last peremptory challenge before
learning who would be the last replacement juror. Id. at 798.
303. "it has long been settled that '[tihe right of peremptory challenge is not, of itself,
a right to select, but a right to reject jurors.' " 802 F.2d at 738 (Wilkinson, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting United States v. Marchant & Colson, 25 U.S. 480, 482 (1827)).
1988]
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tory challenge is not a constitutionally protected right. Established
by statute to help ensure the guaranteed right to a fair trial by jury,
the peremptory challenge becomes part of the process to which a
defendant is constitutionally entitled under the fifth amendment. 0 4
At some point, the "dilution" of peremptory challenges must rise to
the level of a constitutional violation. It is hard to imagine a'better





304. In Spencer v. State, 20 Md. App. 201, 314 A.2d 727 (1974), a Maryland court
found just such a violation. The parties exercised their peremptory challenges under a
"jury box" system, with replacements called in order from the top of the list to the
bottom. When the defense had exhausted its final challenge, however, the clerk "sud-
denly departed from the standard operating procedure and jumped over the next three
names on the list, calling the name of the fourth person down the line" to fill the re-
maining seat. Id. at 208, 314 A.2d at 732. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the
subsequent conviction, declaring:
Under the peculiar circumstances of the case at bar, we see a violation of the
due process of law to which the appellant was entitled by the arbitrary and
capricious action of the court clerk. We do not establish any ironclad ritual to
govern the calling of prospective jurors. We simply hold ... that where the
rules have been agreed upon .. .a defendant is entitled to rely upon those




1. Exclusionary Rule.-a. Illegal Arrests.-The Court of Appeals
examined the role of the exclusionary rule in guaranteeing a de-
fendant's fourth amendment rights' in Trwty v. State.' The court
reaffirmed its position that the erroneous admission of evidence at a
criminal trial requires a reversal of all related convictions unless the
prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did
not influence each verdict.'
Tyrone Trusty was charged with various drug possession of-
fenses, resisting arrest, and assaulting the arresting officer.' Trusty
claimed that the exclusionary rule applied to the drugs and para-
phernalia recovered from him,5 arguing that the police lacked prob-
able cause to effectuate the warrantless arrest6 which uncovered the
evidence, and thereby violated his fourth amendment right to be
free of unreasonable searches and seizures.' In the pretrial hearing
the circuit court denied Trusty's motion to suppress the evidence,
finding probable cause to support the arrest. A jury subsequently
1. The fourth amendment provides in pertinent part: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated .... U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. 308 Md. 658, 521 A.2d 749 (1987).
3. Id. at 668, 521 A.2d at 754. See Craddock v. State, 64 Md. App. 269, 494 A.2d
971 (1985) (applying harmless error test to erroneously admitted evidence).
4. 308 Md. at 660, 521 A.2d at 750.
5. Id. at 661, 521 A2d at 750. A search conducted after the arrest revealed heroin,
cocaine, marijuana, and a spoon, all of which were admitted into evidence. Id. at 665,
521 A.2d at 752.
6. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 594B, 594C (1987) (authority to arrest without a
warrant). For a detailed account of the events leading to Trusty's arrest, see Trusty v.
State, 67 Md. App. 620, 623-25, 508 A.2d 1018, 1019-20 (1986).
7. 308 Md. at 661, 521 A.2d at 750. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 117
(1986) (test for reasonableness usually means search conducted pursuant to warrant
backed by probable cause); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (war-
rantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable); Stanley v. State, 230
Md. 188, 192, 186 A.2d 478, 481 (1962) (searches incident to an illegal arrest are neces-
sarily unreasonable).
Although it is unclear whether Trusty relied on the federal or state constitution, the
Court of Appeals noted that the fourth amendment and article 26 of the Maryland Dec-
laration of Rights consistently have been held in pari materia. 308 Md. at 660 n.1, 521
A.2d at 750 n. . See Potts v. State, 300 Md. 567, 576, 479 A.2d 1335, 1340 (1984)
("[W]e have said on numerous occasions that Article 26 is in pari materia with its federal
counterpart and decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the Fourth Amendment
are entitled to great respect.").
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convicted Trusty on all counts.8
The Court of Special Appeals found that at the pretrial hearing
the State failed to meet its burden of establishing probable cause to
arrest.9 Because the narcotic convictions clearly were based on the
evidence that was seized after an illegal arrest, the court held that
these convictions must necessarily be reversed.' 0 The intermediate
appellate court, however, refused to reverse the assault and resisting
arrest convictions," holding that Trusty failed to object to the evi-
dence with the particularity required by Maryland Rule 4-324(a).12
It thus affirmed these convictions without considering the possible
effects that the excluded evidence may have had on the verdicts.
On review the Court of Appeals examined the extent to which
the erroneously admitted evidence influenced the rendition of the
verdicts at issue.'3 In Dorsey v. State ' 4 the court had established the
test for determining whether reversible error had occurred:
[W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error,
unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent review
of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reason-
able doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict,
such error cannot be deemed "harmless" and a reversal is
8. 308 Md. at 661. 521 A.2d at 751. Trusty did not renew his motion to suppress at
trial and the pretrial ruling therefore was binding. See MD. R. 4-252(g)(2).
9. 67 Md. App. at 629, 508 A.2d at 1022.
10. Id at 630, 508 A.2d at 1022.
11. Id.
12. Id. At the end of the State's case, Trusty moved for judgments of acquittal on the
assault and resisting arrest counts based on the contention that the arrest was illegal. Id.
at 622-23, 508 A.2d at 1019-20. MD. R. 4-324(a) provides:
(A] defendant may move for judgment of acquittal on one or more counts, or
on one or more degrees of an offense which by law is divided into degrees, at
the close of evidence offered by the State and, in a jury trial, at the close of all
the evidence. The defendant shall state with particularity all reasons why the motion
should be granted. No objection to the motion for judgment of acquittal shall be
necessary. A defendant does not waive the right to make the utotion by intro-
ducing evidence during the presentation of the State's case.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Lyles v. State, 63 Md. App. 376, 492 A.2d 959 (1985), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 308 Md. 129, 517 A.2d 761 (1986) (construing rule 4-324(a)).
13. 308 Md. at 669, 521 A.2d at 754.
14. 276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976). The Court of Appeals established this test
following the Supreme Court's decision in Chapman v. California. 386 U.S. 18. 22
(1967). In Chapman the prosecutor had commented impermissibly on the defendant's
failure to testify at trial, yet the Supreme Court dismissed the constitutional violation as
harmless error. In two previous situations, however, the Court had found that the con-
stitutional violation is per se reversible error. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503
(1963) (reversible error to use an involuntary confession); Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60 (1942) (deprivation of the right to counsel at.trial never can be construed as
harmless error).
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mandated. Such reviewing court must thus be satisfied that
there is no reasonable probability that the evidence com-
plained of-whether erroneously admitted or excluded-
may have contributed to the rendition of the guilty
verdict.'
Applying this test, the Trusty court reviewed the trial record 6 and
determined that the erroneously admitted evidence was the "life-
blood" of the State's case which "permeated the entire proceed-
ings."17 Thus, the court was unable to declare that the error did not
influence the rendition of the guilty verdicts. The error, therefore,
was not harmless; it followed that these convictions must be
reversed. 18
The court indicated that the Court of Special Appeals had failed
to address the correct issue. Determinative of the validity of the as-
sault and resisting arrest convictions was the legality of the arrest,
not the sufficiency of any collateral evidence to support these con-
victions.t 9 Absent a finding of harmless error, the convictions must
be reversed, regardless of the defendant's failure to correctly phrase
the motion for acquittal. Although the exclusionary rule "does not
confer a constitutional right .. .to have evidence excluded, it has
the salutary effect of assuring that certain constitutional guarantees
and prohibitions may not be violated to the detriment of a criminal
defendant."2 o
15. Dorsey, 276 Md. at 659, 350 A.2d at 678. The prosecution bears the burden of
proving the "innocuous nature" of the erroneous proceeding. Hilliard v. State, 286 Md.
146, 155, 406 A.2d 415, 421 (1979). The Trusty court declared that it would not distin-
guish between constitutional, evidentiary, and procedural errors when applying the
harmless error test. 308 Md. at 668 n.6, 521 A.2d at 754 n.6. For a comprehensive
discussion of Chapman and related Maryland cases, see Dorsey, 276 Md. at 642-46, 350
A.2d at 668-70.
16. 308 Md. at 664-68, 521 A.2d at 752-54.
17. Id. at 669, 521 A.2d at 754.
18. Id. at 670, 521 A.2d at 755.
19. Id. at 670 n.7, 521 A.2d at 755 n.7.
20. Id. at 673, 521 A.2d at 756. In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
the Supreme Court stated for the first time that the exclusionary rule is not a constitu-
tional right of the aggrieved party but rather a deterrent to future police misconduct. d.
at 347-48. Maryland has adopted this construction of the rule. See Whitaker v. Prince
George's County, 307 Md. 368, 381, 514 A.2d 4, 11 (1986) (exclusionary rule is an
evidentiary rule, not a constitutional right); Potts v. State, 300 Md. 567, 582, 479 A.2d
1335, 1343 (1984) (rule is a prophylactic device and does not confer right upon individ-
ual to have evidence excluded as a matter of constitutional law); Randall Book Corp. v.
State, 64 Md. App. 589, 603, 497 A.2d 1174, 1180 (1985), cert. denied, 305 Md. 175, 452
A.2d 187 (1986) (rule is ajudicially created remedy rather than constitutional right). See
also Comment, Blessed Are the Faithful: An Analysis of the Scope and Applicability of the Good
Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 15 U. BALT. L. REv. 496, 525.(1986) (authored by
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The court flatly rejected the State's argument that a deficiency
of evidence at the pretrial hearing to support probable cause could
be cured by evidence introduced at the trial on the merits,"' noting
the obvious unfairness this proposition would work on the defend-
ant. 2 Likewise, the court rejected the argument that, assuming that
the existence of probable cause had been proven at trial, the rever-
sal of the convictions was unwarranted because it would not serve to
deter future police misconduct. 23
In Trusty the Court of Appeals found that the exclusionary rule
serves as an effective tool in guaranteeing a defendant's constitu-
tional rights, and is not, as the State argued, solely a "prophylactic
device."2 '4 Thus the court has signalled its intent to use the rule to
regulate the means, by which the State administers criminal justice.
Notwithstanding its declaration that the rule itself is not a constitu-
tional right under either the federal or state constitution,25 the court
concluded that the rule promotes the end of allowing a defendant to
have "guilt proved through a. fair trial in accord with the due
processes of the law of the land."2 6 The Supreme Court, however,
recently reaffirmed its conviction that the exclusionary rule is, in-
deed, solely a deterrent to police misconduct. 7 By rejecting this
Thomas Page Lloyd) (Maryland courts consistently have followed Supreme Court inter-
pretations of the fourth amendment).
21. 308 Md. at 670-72, 521 A.2d at 755-56.
22. Id. at 671-72, 521 A.2d at 755-56. The court quoted extensively from 4 W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.7(c) (2d ed. 1987). Professor LaFave puts forth the
proposition endorsed by Maryland courts that in reviewing a denial of a pretrial motion
to suppress, the appellate court should not consider evidence produced at the trial on
the merits. Id.
23. 308 Md. at 672-74, 521 A.2d at 756-57.
24. Id. at 672, 521 A.2d at 756. The State relied on Potts v. State, 300 Md. 567, 582,
479 A.2d 1335, 1343 (1984), which maintained that "the exclusionary rule is a prophy-
lactic device designed to deter police misconduct." See supra note 20.
25. 308 Md. at 673, 521 A.2d at 756.
26. Id. at 674, 521 A.2d at 757.
27. Maryland v. Garrison, 107 S. Ct. 1013 (1987) (extending the good faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule to a factual mistake by police concerning nature of prem-
ises). The constitutional stature of the exclusionary rule has been debated ever since its
creation in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Miller, The Exclusionary Rule:
Where Are We Now?, PROSECUTOR 15 (Spring 1987). The Supreme Court has offered
three theories to justify the use of the rule: (1) it is essential to protect the fourth
amendment right to privacy, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 657 (1961); (2) it is
necessary to maintain judicial integrity, see McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345
(1943); and (3) it acts to deter future police violations of the fourth amendment, see
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974). The characterization of the rule
in Mapp as an essential element of an individual's fourth amendment right has been
displaced .by subsequent Supreme Court decisions during the Burger and Rehnquist
eras which have declared that the exclusionary rule is simply a police deterrent. See, e.g.,
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narrow construction of the rule, the Court of Appeals has construed
the function of the exclusionary rule differently than the Supreme
Court.2 3 By reading due process implications29 into the exclusion-
ary rule, the Court of Appeals effectively enlarged the arsenal of ar-
guments available to criminal defendants, and also suggested a
means to isolate judgments protective of the defendant's rights
from review by the relatively conservative Supreme Court.30 In this
Illinois v. Krull, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 1167 (1987) (holding that exclusionary rule does not
apply when police conduct a warrantless administrative search in reliance on unconstitu-
tional statute); Garrison, 107 S. Ct. at 1018 ("The validity of the warrant must be assessed
on the basis of the information that the officers disclosed, or had a duty to discover and
disclose, to the issuing magistrate."); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)
(holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply when a police officer, acting in good
faith, relies on defective warrant issued by a magistrate); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
492 (1976) (holding that exclusionary rule issues may not be litigated in federal habeas
corpus review of state conviction); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976)
(holding that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in a civil proceeding). See generally
Comment, supra note 20. The exceptions to the exclusionary rule are so numerous that
they now define the rule. Miller, supra note 27, at 20.
28. Trusty was decided less than one month after the Supreme Court issued its opin-
ion in Garrison. State appellate courts increasingly have refused to follow the construc-
tions of the fourth amendment set forth by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, relying on
their state constitutions as bases for a more liberal interpretation of the search and
seizure provision. See Blodgett, Liberal Trend?, 72 A.B.A. J. 20, 20-21 (Jan. 1, 1986).
For example, in Stringer v. State, 491 So. 2d 837 (Miss. 1985), the Mississippi
Supreme Court refused to accept the Supreme Court's good-faith exception to the ex-
clusionary rule formulated in Leon and stated that "[hiowever passe the idea may be in
other circles, some of us still regard it as important that our citizens be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures .... [W]e perceive no vehicle for protecting these rights
of our citizens ... other than continued enforcement of this state's exclusionary rule." Id. at 849
(emphasis in original). The court stated that, although the rule was not a constitutional
right per se, it was a "logical and necessary corollary" to the search and seizure provi-
sion of the state constitution. Id. at 847. Other states have rejected the Supreme
Court's characterization of the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d
417, 427, 488 N.E.2d 451, 458, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 637 (1985) (declining to apply on
state constitutional grounds the good-faith exception to the rule); State v. Grawein, 123
Wis. 2d 428, 432, 367 N.W.2d 816, 818 (1985) (same).
29. The Court of Appeals invoked the fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments to the
federal constitution, and articles 16 through 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
308 Md. at 673, 521 A.2d at 756. Primary reliance, however, appears to be placed on
Maryland's due process clauses, articles 19 and 24, and the fourteenth amendment to
the federal constitution. Id. The court concluded that "[n]o matter how culpable an
accused may appear to be, he is entitled io have his guilt proved through a fair trial in
accord with the due processes of the law of the land. As long as the exclusionary rule is
in effect, it tends to this end." Id. at 674, 521 A.2d at 757. The opinion omits citation to
Maryland's article 26, the warrants clause, which has been consistently held in pan
materia with the fourth amendment. See supra note 7.
30. If the court concludes that it is the state constitution that it is construing, the
decision is " 'impervious to review by the U.S. Supreme Court.' " Blodgett, supra note
28, at 21 (quotingJoseph Cook of the University of Tennessee Law School). This rests
on the principle that as long as the state constitution gives greater protection to the
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way, defense attorneys may look to the state constitution for a more
expansive view. of the protection provided by the exclusionary rule
when seeking its shelter.3 '
b. Probation Revocation Hearing.-In Chase v. State 2 the Court of
Appeals considered whether illegally seized evidence may be used in
a probation revocation hearing.. The court concluded that as a
general rule the exclusionary rule does not apply to bar illegally
seized evidence from probation revocation hearings.3 4 The court,
however, qualified this principle by mandating application of the ex-
clusionary rule upon an unrebutted showing of bad faith on the part
of law enforcement officers.3 5
Jerome Chase pleaded guilty to robbery and was sentenced to
ten years in prison.3 6 After fifty-five days of incarceration, he was
placed on conditional probation for five years." One year later,
Chase violated the conditions of probation and his prior ten-year
sentence was reimposed. The court again suspended the sentence
and placed him on five years probation s.3  Two years later, law en-
forcement officials arrested Chase for drug trafficking. During the
search incident to the arrest, the police seized marijuana, drug para-
phernalia, and money.39 At the criminal trial on the charges, the
judge sustained Chase's motion to suppress the evidence and the
charges were dismissed.40
individual than the United States Constitution, it is not in conflict with the supremacy
clause. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038-39 (1983).
3 1. Sidney Bernstein, former chair of the Criminal Law Section of the Association of
Trial Lawyers of America contends that the differences between state and federal con-
stitutions are " 'window[s] of opportunity' " for the criminal defense bar and that failure
to seek out these distinctions would constitute legal malpractice. Blodgett, sumpra note
28, at 20.
32. 309 Md. 224, 522 A.2d 1348 (1987).
33. For a discussion of other evidentiary issues involving probation revocation pro-
ceedings, see the analysis of State v. Fuller, 308 Md. 547, 520 A.2d 1315 (1987), infra at
869-72.
34. 309 Md. at 251, 522 A.2d at 1362.
35. Id. at 253-54, 522 A.2d at 1362-63. The court feared that per se admissibility of
evidence in a probation revocation hearing would "derogate due process of law to pre-
sume conclusively that in such cases the police officer acted in good faith." Id. at 253,
522 A.2d at 1363.
36. Id. at 228, 522 A.2d at 1350.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 229, 522 A.2d at 1350.
40. Id. The circuit court found that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest
Chase. Id.
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At his probation revocation hearing,4' Chase again moved to
suppress the seized evidence. 42 Both the circuit court and the Court
of Special Appeals held that the exclusionary rule does not bar ad-
mission of illegally seized evidence in a probation revocation hear-
ing.43 The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, but modified
the harshness of the rule by allowing a court to bar evidence upon a
showing that law enforcement officers acted in bad faith in effecting
the search and seizure.44
The Supreme Court has yet to determine whether the exclu-
sionary rule applies in probation revocation hearings.45 The Mary-
land Court of Appeals, in addressing the issue, balanced two
41. Id. The probation revocation hearing 'was biphasal: a preliminary hearing to
rule on the admissibility of evidence seized and a hearing on the merits. Id. at 230, 522
A.2d at 1351.
42. Id. The court ruled that, under the circumstances, the exclusionary rule did not
apply to Chase's probation revocation hearing. At this point Chase admitted possessing
the controlled substance. Chase v. State, 68 Md. App. 413, 416, 511 A.2d 1128, 1130
(1986).
43. 68 Md. App. at 425, 511 A.2d at 1134; 309 Md. at 229-30, 522 A.2d at 1350-51.
44. 309 Md. at 254, 522 A.2d at 1363. The Court of Appeals also considered
whether the record's failure to show that Chase was physically present at his revocation
hearing was enough to establish a knowing waiver of his right to be present and the right
to contest the charges against him. Id. at 233-37, 522 A.2d at 1352-54. In refusing to
reverse the judgment, the court determined that Chase effectively waived his right of
presence; moreover, because his absence did not influence the verdict, any error was
harmless. Id. at 236-37, 522 A.2d at 1354..
45. Id. at 248-49, 522 A.2d at 1360. This issue, however, has been the subject of
continuing controversy in other jurisdictions. The majority of courts have held that the
exclusionary rule is inapplicable to probation revocation hearings. See, e.g., United
States v. Frederickson, 581 F.2d 711, 713 (8th Cir. 1978) ("All reported cases which
have considered the question have held the fourth amendment exclusionary rule inap-
plicable to probation revocation proceedings."); United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d
1019, 1020 (9th Cir. 1975) (collecting cases); United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 53-
55 (9th Cir. 1975) ("[T]o apply the exclusionary rule to probation revocation hearings
would tend to frustrate the remedial purposes of the probation system."). The minority
view allows the application of the exclusionary rule to probation revocation hearings.
See, e.g., United States v. Rea, 678 F.2d 382, 388-90 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[E]vidence seized
by a probation officer in an illegal warrantless search of a probationer's home is inadmis-
sible at a subsequent probation revocation hearing."); United States v. Workman, 585
F.2d 1205, 1211 (4th Cir. 1978) ("[T]he Supreme Court has never exempted from the
operation of the exclusionary rule any adjudicative proceeding in which the government
offers unconstitutionally seized evidence in direct support of a charge that may subject
the victim of a search to imprisonment."); Adams v. State, 153 Ga. App. 41, 42, 264
S.E.2d 532, 533 (1980) ("[l]llegally seized evidence may not be used to revoke proba-
tion."); State ex rel Piccarillo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 48 N.Y.2d 76, 81, 397
N.E.2d 354, 356-57, 421 N.Y.S.2d 842, 845 (1979) (holding exclusionary rule applicable
to administrative proceedings including probation revocation hearings). For a discus-
sion of the policy considerations inherent in this question, see Note, The Excusionary Rule
In Probation and Parole Revocation: A Policy Appraisal, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1115, 1126-28
(1976).
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concepts: the nature of a probation revocation hearing46 and the
goal of deterrence. 47 In so doing, the court significantly limited an
individual's protection against governmental use of illegally seized
evidence in probation revocation hearings.
The Chase court began its analysis by comparing probation rev-
ocation hearings and criminal trials. In Maryland a probation revo-
cation hearing is a civil proceeding,48 not a criminal prosecution. 49
Moreover, the nature of a civil action does not necessitate the pro-
tection of "the full panoply of constitutional rights and procedural
safeguards enjoyed by a defendant in a criminal cause... ."50 For
example, a probationer has no right to ajury trial,5 cannot assert all
rules of evidence,5" has no absolute right to confront witnesses, 53
and has no absolute federal constitutional right to court-appointed
46. 309 Md. at 238-42, 522 A.2d at 1355-57. See infra notes 48-54 and accompanying
text.
47. 309 Md. at 249-51, 522 A.2d at 1360-61. See infra text accompanying note 57.
48. 309 Md. at 238, 522 A.2d at 1355. A court may suspend a sentence, grant proba-
tion, or revoke probation under MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 641A (1987). Probation is a
rehabilitative measure. The court, however, may revoke this grant of liberty if the condi-
tions of probation are not met. Id.
49. Howlett v. State, 295 Md. 419, 424, 456 A.2d 375, 378 (1983) (probation revoca-
tion proceeding not a new criminal prosecution, since no new charges are filed and the
probation violation "is not punishable beyond the reimposition of the original sentence
imposed").
50. 309 Md. at 239, 522 A.2d at 1355. See also Howlet, 295 Md. at 424, 456 A.2d at
378. The Supreme Court has examined the constitutional rights of a probationer in a
revocation of probation proceeding. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), a
felony probationer had his probation revoked without a hearing after he admitted com-
mitting a subsequent crime. Id. at 780. The Court held that although revocation of
probation is not part of the criminal prosecution, the probationer must be afforded due
process by means of a preliminary hearing to determine probable cause and a final revo-
cation hearing on the merits. Id. at 781-82. A right to be represented by counsel, how-
ever, remains in the discretion of the body conducting the hearings. Id. at 790. But see
infra note 54 and accompanying text.
The Court reiterated the necessary due process procedures for revocation of proba-
tion in Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606 (1985). The Court's list of procedures included
written notice to the probationer of the claimed probable violations of his pro-
bation; disclosure of the evidence against him, an opportunity for the proba-
tioner to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary
evidence, a neutral hearing body; and a written statement by the factfinder as to
the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation .... The proba-
tioner is also entitled to cross-examine adverse witnesses, unless the hearing
body specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation. Finally, the
probationer has a right to the assistance of counsel in some circumstances.
Id. at 612 (citations omitted).
51. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 (1984).
52. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 789. See State v. Fuller, 308 Md. 547, 553, 520 A.2d 1315,
1317 (1987) ("reasonably reliable hearsay may be received").
53. 309 Md. at 240, 522 A.2d at 1356. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786.
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The court also weighed the individual's and the State's interests
in the probation revocation system. 55 A probationer has a vital in-
terest in maintaining his or her liberty as well as in having the op-
portunity to enjoy due process before losing that liberty.5 6 The
State, on the other hand, has an interest in quickly and expeditiously
incarcerating delinquent probationers without the burdensome pro-
cedure of a new criminal trial. Moreover, the State has a fundamen-
tal interest in its need to revoke probations when the commnity's
safety is threatened. 7
After assessing the nature of a probation revocation hearing,
the court invoked the Supreme Court's fourth amendment method-
ology. The court noted that "the. application of the exclusionary
rule has been confined to criminal trials, and within those trials, to
the prosecution's case in chief on the merits of guilt or inno-
cence."5 8 Utilizing the balancing test enunciated by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Calandra,9 the Chase court weighed the costs
and benefits of allowing evidence to be excluded from the trial
against the potential deterrence of unconstitutional police con-
duct.60 The court found that the community's interest in safety out-
weighed the rehabilitative goals of the probation system, 6' and thus
refused to apply the exclusionary rule. Moreover, the court rea-
soned that applying the rule to probation revocation hearings would
not further the rule's primary purpose of deterring unconstitutional
law enforcement misconduct.62
Recognizing that the balance did not tip completely toward law
enforcement goals, the court refined the blanket rule to permit ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule under certain circumstances. If
the probationer can establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that there was lack of good faith on the part of the law enforcement
54. Gagnon. 411 U.S. at 790.
55. 309 Md. at 241-42, 522 A.2d at 1356-57.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 241, 522 A.2d at 1356-57.
58. Id. at 245-46, 522 A.2d at 1359.
59. 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (exclusionary rule inapplicable in grand jury proceedings).
The Supreme Court determined that the exclusionary rule should be utilized whenever a
court finds that the potential deterrence of police misconduct outweighs the harm
caused by the exclusion of the evidence. Id. at 350-52.
60. 309 Md. at 249-50, 522 A.2d at 1360-61.
61. id. at 250, 522 A.2d at 1361.
62. Id See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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officer, a probationer may invoke the exclusionary rule.6"
The Chase court set forth the procedure for demonstrating that
a law enforcement officer acted in bad faith. The probationer must
produce credible evidence making a prima facie showing that the
officer's conduct was not consistent with reasonable law enforce-
ment activities. ' The State then must refute the challenge with evi-
dence that the law enforcement officer acted in good faith.6 5 Good
faith must be evaluated on an objective rather than subjective
basis.66
In setting forth its guidelines, the court properly weighed the
competing interests of the probationer and the State. While recog-
nizing the importance of a probationer's liberty interests, the court
correctly refused to apply the exclusionary rule in probation revoca-
tion hearings based on the rule's deterrent purpose, the State's sub-
stantial interest in insuring the community's safety, and the need to
determine quickly and efficiently whether the probationer should be
incarcerated.67 Moreover, the court strove to extend a limited
amount of protection to a probationer who is a victim of police mis-
conduct by not absolutely barring use of the exclusionary rule under
these circumstances.
2. Exculpatory Evidence.-In Bloodsworth v. State" the Court of
Appeals examined a criminal defendant's due process right in hav-
ing the State divulge exculpatory materials in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Bagley.69 The court also ad-
dressed the applicable standard for determining the admissibility of
expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness
identification."
63. 309 Md. at 253-54, 522 A.2d at 1363. The court held that the officer's conduct
in the instant case did not amount to bad faith. Id. at 256, 522 A.2d at 1364.
64. Id. at 254, 522 A.2d at 1363.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 255, 522 A.2d at 1363. See also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919
(1984) (objective assessment of good faith required in evaluating application of the ex-
clusionary rule).
67. In addition, Chase's rehabilitative process was unsuccessful, further justifying
reimposition of his criminal sentence. See 309 Md. at 228-30, 522 A.2d at 1350-51.
68. 307 Md. 164, 512 A.2d 1056 (1986).
69. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
70. 307 Md. at 177-86, 512 A.2d at 1062-67. In the interest of "judicial economy,"
the court considered several other issues which, because the case was to be retried, it
was under no obligation to decide. The most important issue not addressed here con-
cerns the admissibility of a victim impact statement (VIS) at sentencing proceedings pur-
suant to MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(c) (1986). Required in all felony cases, a VIS
reports the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family. The Bloodtworth
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Bloodsworth was convicted of first degree murder, first degree
rape, and a first degree sexual offense; he was sentenced to death.'
During discovery, Bloodsworth filed a motion requesting informa-
tion concerning all persons arrested or taken into custody as possi-
ble suspects, as well as for "any and all information of which [the
State] is aware ... identifying or suggesting that someone other
than the Defendant ... was the perpetrator of [the] crime." 72 The
State failed, however, to disclose the contents of a confidential re-
port written by a detective 3 which indicated that an individual
named Richard Gray had been found at the scene of the crime
under suspicious circumstances.7 4. The report concluded that Gray
should be considered a possible suspect.75
In the hearing on a motion for a new trial, Bloodsworth relied
on Brady v. Maryland71 to support his argument that.the State's sup-
court upheld the constitutionality of the statute, reaffirming its decision in Booth v.
State, 306 Md. 172; 222-23, 507 A.2d 1098, 1123-24 (1986). Since Bloodfworth, the
Supreme Court has decided Booth on appeal, holding that the use of a VIS at the sen-
tencing phase of a capital proceeding violates the eighth amendment. The Court found
that "its admission creates a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury may impose
the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner." Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct.
2529, 2533 (1987). For a thorough analysis of the Supreme Court's decision, see Booth
v. Maiyland Death Knel for the Victim Impact Statement?, 47 MD. L. REV. 701 (1988) (au-
thored by Chariton T. Howard III).
71. 307 Md. at 166, 512 A.2d at 1057. The Court of Appeals must review the sen-
tence whenever the death penalty is imposed. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 414 (1987).
72. 307 Md. at 171, 512 A.2d at 1059.
73. Id. at 172, 512 A.2d at 1059. Detective Mark Bacon, the author of the report, was
one of the officers who discovered the body of the nine-year-old victim. The court was
unsure how Bloodsworth eventually secured the evidence, although it was clear that the
report was not discovered until after the guilty verdict had been returned. Id.. 512 A.2d
at 1059-60.
74. Gray was found in the vicinity of the victim's body and was very dirty except for
his "meticulously clean" hands. There appeared to be a blood stain on his shirt. Upon
questioning, Gray seemed nervous and vomited as the officer searched his car. The
search uncovered a pair of girl's underwear which Gray said he had found in the woods.
Although the police had not yet found the girl's body, Gray correctly indicated that the
victim wore a purse over her left shoulder. A background check revealed that Gray had
been convicted previously of indecent exposure and further investigation revealed that
he had failed a polygraph test in connection with the present case. Id. at 173, 512 A.2d
at 1060. Detective Bacon reported that Gray had "a great deal more information than
he [was] releasing." Id at 172, 512 A.2d at 1059.
75. Id, 512 A.2d at 1060.
76. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady and his partner, Boblit, were found guilty of first
degree murder and sentenced to death. Id. at 84. Although Boblit had confessed to the
actual murder before Brady's trial, the State withheld this information from Brady. Id.
Affirming the decision of Maryland's highest court, the Supreme Court found that the
withholding of evidence which would tend to exculpate a defendant or reduce the sen-
tence is a violation of due process. Id. at 86. It concluded that"[slociety wins not only
when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the admin-
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 47:793
pression of this exculpatory evidence denied him due process under
the fourteenth amendment. 77 In Brady the Supreme Court held that
"the suppression .. .of evidence favorable to an accused upon re-
quest violates due process when the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment."7 8  In United States v. Bagley79 the Supreme
Court clarified the meaning of materiality. Evidence is material, in
retrospect, if there was a "reasonable probability" that the outcomq
of a proceeding would have been different had the evidence been
disclosed to the defendant.8 ° The Supreme Court defined "reason-
able probability" as "probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome" of the proceeding.8 '
The Court of Appeals rejected the State's contention that it had
fulfilled its duty under Brady and Bagley by listing Gray on the indict-
ment as a State's witness.8 2 The court remanded for a new trial find-
ing that the suppression of the report led to a denial of due process
because it sufficiently undermined its confidence in the verdict.8 "
Bloodsworth also contested the trial court's refusal to allow the
expert testimony of Dr. Robert Buckhout84 concerning the reliabil-
ity of eyewitness identification. 5 Bloodsworth argued that the court
istration ofjustice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly." Id. at 87. The unfair-
ness resulted from the facts that, because of the materiality of the evidence, the result of
the trial was probably incorrect and that the State contributed to this inaccuracy. Both
elements of unfairness were essential to Brady's holding. Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to
Disclose to Defendants Pleading Guilty, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1004, 1005 (1986). See Brady v.
State, 224 Md. 422, 430, 174 A.2d 167, 171 (1961) (concluding that suppression of
evidence was prejudicial to the defendant).
77. 307 Md. at 172, 512 A.2d at 1059. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 86.
78. 373 U.S. at 87. It is immaterial whether the prosecutor withheld the evidence in
good or bad faith. Id. In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), the Supreme
Court found that the Brady test applies whether the exculpatory evidence was requested
specifically, generally, or not at all. Id. at 682.
79. 473 U.S. 667 (1985). The prosecutor failed to disclose impeachment evidence to
the defendant. Id. at 669-70. The Supreme Court refused to distinguish between im-
peachment and exculpatory evidence with regard to Brady violations, holding that the
touchstone was whether the evidence, if used effectively, would make a difference be-
tween conviction and acquittal. Id. at 676.
80. Id. at 667.
81. Id.
82. 307 Md. at 172, 512 A.2d at 1060.
83. Id. at 175-76, 512 A.2d at 1061.
84. Id. at 177, 512 A.2d at 1062. Dr. Buckhout, a psychology professor from Brook-
lyn College who has testified in over 60 cases, is a leading scholar and expert witness in
the field of eyewitness testimony. See Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal
Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934, 964 n.179 (1984).
85. 307 Md. at 172-86, 512 A.2d at 1062-67. Increasingly, criminal defendants have
used the testimony of psychologists to show how the processes of memory, perception,
and information retrieval operate and how certain circumstances surrounding an identi-
fication tend to affect its accuracy. See Comment, Admission of Expert Testimony on Eyewit-
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had erred in applying the traditional Frye-Reed8 6 test, which de-
mands that the basis of a scientific opinion be generally accepted in
the expert's particular field, rather than the more liberal standard of
admissibility for expert testimony set forth in rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.""7 The Court of
Appeals held that the Frye-Reed test was inapplicable, albeit on un-
certain grounds, 8 yet upheld the trial court's decision to exclude
ness Identification, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1402, 1407 (1985). The psychologists usually focus
on the unreliability of cross-racial identifications and identifications made under a great
deal of stress. See id. See generally Comment, Do the Eyes Have It? Psychological Testimony
Regarding Eyewitness Accuracy, 38 BAYLOR L. REv. 169 (1986) (review of the history of
exclusion of expert psychological testimony, concluding that exclusion should be based
on evidentiary standards, not on the historical fear of a battle of the experts); E. LoFrus,
EYEwTNESS TESTIMONY (1979) (extensive discussion of psychological studies); EYEwrr-
NESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (G. Wells & E. Loftus eds. 1984) (collec-
tion of psychological data on reliability of eyewitness identification).
86. 307 Md. at 179, 512 A.2d at 1063. This traditional test for the admissibility of
scientific testimony was set forth in the case of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014
(D.C. Cir. 1923), which involved the forerunner of the modem polygraph test. Mary-
land adopted the Frye standard for admissibility in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 389, 391
A.2d 364, 372 (1978). The merits of the Frye test have been debated since its inception.
See Reed, 283 Md. at 384-85, 391 A.2d at 369 (Smith, J., dissenting). See generally Gianelli,
The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States a Half-Century Later, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980). McCormick argues that the Frye standard is too conserva-
tive and that the correct test should be whether or not the particular evidence will, in
fact, help the jury decide the issue. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 206, at 624-25 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCoRMiCK's]. See generally Mc-
Cormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IowA L. REV. 879
(1982) (tracing erosion of adherence to the Frye standard and return to the traditional
evidentiary analysis).
87. FED. R. EvID. 702 (emphasis added). See 307 Md. at 179-80, 512 A.2d at 1063-
64. See also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985) (rejecting Frye
and construing rule 702 as the correct "balancing test"). Since the adoption of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence in 1975, many legal scholars have sought to amend rule 702 to
include some type of standard for "novel" scientific evidence. For examples of pro-
posed amendments, see Annual Meeting Program Preview of the Legal Reception of Scientific
Evidence Committee of the ABA Section of Science and Technology, 26 JURIMETmICs J. 235 passim
(1986) [hereinafter Annual Aeeting].
88. 307 Md. at 184, 512 A.2d at 1066. The court cited People v. McDonald, 37 Cal.
3d 351, 373, 690 P.2d 709, 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 251 (1984), which listed the type of
techniques that would lend themselves to the Frye test (e.g., lie detectors, truth serum,
Nalline testing, voiceprints), and noted that use of the Frye-Reed test in Maryland has
been "confined" to voiceprints in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 389-400, 391 A.2d 364,
372-77 (1978), and hypnosis in State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 681,464 A.2d 1028, 1034
(1983). It then abruptly concluded that the Frye test was inapplicable to the expert testi-
mony at issue. 307 Md. at 184, 512 A.2d at 1066. It is possible that the majority consid-
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the expert testimony based on the trial court's wide discretion over
such matters.8 9
Notwithstanding the evidence's failure to pass the Frye-Reed test,
the trial judge was concerned that the proffered testimony would
tend to confuse, rather than aid, the jury.90 Moreover, the trial
court believed that this particular type of expert opinion would in-
vade an. area that traditionally has been considered the exclusive
province of the jury.9 ' In Shivers v. Carnaggio9" the Court of Appeals
adopted McCormick's view that an expert's opinion should be ad-
missible if it will assist the trier of fact, as well as McCormick's posi-
tion that the exclusion of expert testimony on the grounds that it
somehow invades the province of the jury lacks merit.93 Citing Shiv-
ers, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court was well within the
bounds of its discretion in deciding to exclude the testimony on the
ground that the evidence would not help the jury in deciding the
issues at hand.94
The court noted that the majority of jurisdictions which have
ruled on the admissibility of this type of expert testimony have
excluded it,95 quoting extensively from decisions which articulated
ered the Frye test inapplicable under the circumstances because it did not believe that
the expert's testimony was based on a novel, and possibly unsound, scientific theory.
This reasoning, however, was not made explicit.
89. 307 Md. at 186, 512 A.2d at 1067.
90. Id. at 178, 512 A.2d at 1063.
91. See id at 179, 512 A.2d at 1063. See alfo United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148,
1153 (9th Cir. 1973) ("[T]he effects of stress on perception can be effectively communi-
cated to the jury by probing questioning of the witnesses."); State v. Porraro, 121 R.I.
882, 892-93, 404 A.2d 465,471 (1979) ("[T]he trustworthiness in general of eye-witness
observations, was not beyond the ken of the jurors .. "). But see United States v. Smith,
736 F.2d 1103, 1106 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868 (1984) (accepting testimony
concerning cross-racial identification as outside the "ken" ofjury); State v. Chapple, 135
Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983) (agreeing that testimony Would aid the jurors in their
evaluation of the identifications); People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709,
208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984) (same).
92. 223 Md. 585, 588-89, 165 A.2d 898, 900 (1960).
93. Id. See McCORMICK'S, supra note 86, § 206,.at 623-25.
94. 307 Md. at 184-86, 512 A.2d at 1066-67. This reason, however, clearly was
subordinate to, if not based upon. the trial court's belief that this type of testimony
failed the Frye test and invaded the province of the jury. See id. at 177-79, 184, 512 A.2d
at 1062-63, 1066.
95. Id. at 181, 512 A.2d at 1064. See. e.g., United States v. Brewer, 783 F.2d 841, 843
(9th Cir. 1986) (holding that trial court acted within its discretion in excluding expert
testimony on accuracy of eyewitness identifications); United States v. Purham, 725 F.2d
450, 454 (8th Cir. 1984) (same). But see United States v. Smith, 739 F.2d 1103, 1106 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868 (1984) (admitting expert testimony on eyewitness identifi-
cation after weighing relevance and danger of unfair prejudice); State v. Chapple, 135
Ariz. 281, 290-97, 660 P.2d 1208, 1219-20 (1983) (admitting expert testimony on eye-
witness identification after determining it would assist the trier of fact).
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the lower court's rationale that the jury was sufficiently equipped to
decide the reliability of an eyewitness identification with the aid of
effective cross-examination.9" Following the lead of other jurisdic-
tions, the Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's decision.97
By following the Brady-Bagley test, the Court of Appeals reaf-
firmed its conviction that the State's business is "not to achieve vic-
tory but to establish justice.""8 The court's conclusion that the
prosecution violated Bloodsworth's due process rights was sound
considering the materiality of the Gray report coupled with the re-
sulting prejudice caused by its suppression.
The court's treatment of the trial court's decision to exclude
Dr. Buckhout's testimony, however, was less than satisfactory. The
Court of Appeals agreed that the Frye test was inapplicable, yet
failed to articulate its reasons.99 More importantly, the court failed
to recognize that the trial court refused to admit the expert testi-
mony because to do so would "invade the province of the jury," a
basis which under Shivers is unacceptable.' °°
Testimony that could prevent wrongful convictions is of obvi-
ous value to our criminal justice system.' While it is clear that,
upon review, a trial court's evidentiary rulings must be accorded
great deference, the Court of Appeals' automatic acceptance of the
trial judge's rote response that proffered testimony would "tend to
confuse or mislead the jury"'012 amounts to no review at all. If the
Court of Appeals is truly concerned with establishing justice, it
should rely on reason as well as precedent and formulate a specific
96. See 307 Md. at 182-83, 512 A.2d at 1065-66. See also cases cited supra note 91.
97. 307 Md. at 186, 512 A.2d at 1067. The court outlined the well-settled rule for
appellate review of the exclusion of expert testimony, concluding that, unless the trial
court erred on a question of law or " 'clearly abused its discretion,' " the lower court
decision must be upheld. Id. at 185-86; 512 A.2d at 1066-67 (quoting Raithal v. State,
280 Md. 291. 301, 372 A.2d 1069, 1074-75 (1977) (excluding or admitting expert testi-
mony seldom. constitutes grounds for reversal)). For a compilation of recent cases up-
holding the trial court's decision to exclude this type of expert testimony, see
Commonwealth v. Francis, 360 Mass. 89, 92, 453 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (1983).
98. Biller v. Director, 22 Md. App. 375, 377, 322 A.2d 899, 901 (1974) (quoting
Judge Simon E. Sobeloff, Address to theJudicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit Uune
29, 1954)).
99. 307 Md. at 184, 512 A.2d at 1066. Perhaps the court agreed with the reasoning
in McDonald that Frye was to be applied to scientific, not psychological, testimony. See Peo-
ple v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 377, 690 P.2d 709, 723, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 254
(1984).
100. See supra note 94.
101. In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967), the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that "the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification"
and that "[tihe identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy."
102. 307 Md. at 178, 512 A.2d at 1063.
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rule for the admission of expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identifications. 103.
3. Immunity from Prosecution.-In re Criminal Investigation No. 1-
162 104 presented the Court of Appeals with the issue of whether a
witness compelled to testify before a grand jury during the course of
a gambling investigation may assert the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination t 5 and refuse to testify, notwithstanding
the immunity provided by article 27, section 262.'06 By determining
that section 262 confers transactional immunity, 0 7 the court found
that the protection provided is sufficient to overcome a witness' fifth
amendment right to remain silent.'0 8
103. For examples of possible standards, see McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 377, 690 P.2d at
727, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 254; United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973);
Annual Meeting, supra note 87, passim.
104. 307 Md. 674, 516 A.2d 976 (1986).
105. Although it is unclear whether the witnesses invoked their state or federal right
against self-incrimination, the Court of Appeals has "consistently construed Article 22
[of the Maryland Declaration of Rights] to be in pari materia with the fifth amendment."
307 Md. at 683 n.3, 516 A.2d at 981 n.3. See also Richardson v. State, 285 Md. 261, 265,
401 A.2d 1021, 1023-24 (1979) (noting that "the privilege against self-incrimination
contained in Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights ... has long been recog-
nized as being in pari materia with its federal counterpart").
106. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 262 (1987). The statute provides:
No person shall refuse to testify concerning any gaming or betting because
his testimony would implicate himself and he shall be a competent witness and
compellable to testify against any person or persons who may have committed
any of the offenses set forth under this subtitle, provided that any person so
compelled to testify in behalf of the State in any such case shall be exempt from
prosecution, trial and punishment for any and all such crimes and offenses of
which such person so testifying may have been guilty or a participant and about
which he was so compelled to testify.
107. There are three types of statutory immunity:
Use immunity protects against the future use of the witness' compelled testi-
mony in a criminal prosecution of the witness; use and derivative use immunity
prohibit the use of the witness' testimony to uncover other evidence for use
against the witness; and transactional immunity bars any future prosecution of
the witness for offenses based on the compelled testimony.
307 Md. at 684, 516 A.2d at 98 1.
108. The Supreme Court first considered the issue of immunity as it relates to a per-
son's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547 (1892), in which it struck down a federal use immunity statute which pro-
hibited the actual use of compelled testimony, yet allowed the prosecution to use evi-
dence derived from the testimony in a subsequent prosecution of the witness. The
Court stated that "no statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution
after he answers the incriminating question put to him, can have the effect of sup-
planting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 585.
Although the Court did not explicitly state that transactional immunity was required to
replace the fifth amendment privilege, succeeding Supreme Court cases reflected this
position. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1959) (immunity under
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Eleven witnesses summoned before a grand jury impaneled to
investigate gambling and related tax violations invoked the fifth
amendment privilege on the ground that section 262 did not protect
them from prosecution for crimes other than gambling offenses.' 0 9
The State sought to compel testimony, but the circuit court denied
the motion." 0 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the lower
court's judgment,' " concluding that section 262 conferred immu-
nity only for gambling violations and that a broader construction
would "convert specific witness immunization statutes into fishing
expeditions in matters extraneous to the express purpose of the par-
ticular statute." ' 12 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari in order
the Motor Carrier Act); United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 428 (1943) (immunity
under the Sherman Act).
In 1972, however, the Supreme Court upheld a federal use and derivative use im-
munity statute in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, '453'(1972), finding that this
type of immunity was coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination. The
Court also noted that transactional immunity affords greater protection than that pro-
vided by the fifth amendment. Id. The dissent reacted withi shock at the majority's rejec-
tion of over 75 years of fifth amendment jurisprudence. See id. at 462-71 (Douglas and
Marshall, JJ., dissenting). See generally Mykkeltvedt, Ratio Decidendi or Obiter Dicta : The
Supreme Court and Modes of Precedent Transformation, 15 GA. L. REv. 311 (1981) (discussing
how the Supreme Court manipulated precedent to attenuate the fifth amendment privi-
lege). Subsequent state decisions have rejected the result of Kastigar while striking down
state use and derivative use immunity statutes by relying on their state constitutions.
See, e.g., State v. Miyasaki, 62 Haw. 269, 282, 614 P.2d 915, 923 (1980) (finding transac-
tional immunity to be part of the "fabric" of the state consrtuition); Attorney General v.
Colleton, 387 Mass. 790, 800. 444 N.E.2d 915, 921 (1982) (stressing difference in lan-
guage of state and federal constitutions); State v. Soriano, 68 Or. App. 642, 684 P.2d
1220, 1234, aff'd, 298 Or. 392, 693 P.2d 26 (1984) ("Only transactional immunity is
constitutional in Oregon."). See also infra note 136.
Section 262 was adopted in 1957, prior to Kastigar. The General Assembly has not
revised the statute since that time.
109. 307 Md. at 679, 516 A.2d at 979. The witnesses were concerned that the modi-
fier "such" in the wording of the statute limited the crimes for which they had been
"exempted from prosecution, trial and punishment" to gambling offenses. Id. at 686,
516 A.2d at 983. For the exact wording of the statute, see supra note 106. The witnesses
feared that the investigation also would reveal their involvement in tax fraud. 307 Md.
at 691, 516 A.2d at 985.
110. 307 Md. at 679-80, 516 A.2d at 979.
111. In re Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 66 Md. App. 315, 503 A.2d 1363 (1986).
The Court of Special Appeals did not discuss the specific type of immunity conferred by
section 262; rather, it simply decided that the immunity only applied to gambling of-
fenses. Id. at 319, 503 A.2d at 1364.
112. Id. at 320, 503 A.2d at 1365. A specific witness or crime immunization statute
applies to the investigation and prosecution of particular crimes. The legislature has
refused to enact a general use and derivative use immunity statute which a prosecutor
could employ in any type of investigation. See S.B. 1285 (1978); H.B. 981 (1979); H.B.
197 (1980); H.B. 519 (1981); S.B. 482 (1981). Each of these bills either died in commit-
tee or received an unfavorable report. See supra note 107 for a definition of use and
derivative use immunity.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VoL. 47:793
to decide the precise scope of immunity provided by section 262
and thus determine whether the statute preempts the need to invoke
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination." n3
Citing Kastigar v. United States,'" 4 the court established that the
government may compel a witness to disclose potentially self-in-
criminating information if the witness obtains protection coexten-
sive with the fifth amendment; transactional immunity provides such
protection." 5 Following well-established rules of statutory con-
struction, the court found that the legislature intended section 262
to confer transactional immunity."16 The next question, then, was
whether the statute conferred immunity for crimes other than gam-
bling offenses. Acknowledging that the language of the statute was
ambiguous, the court looked beyond the words and "examine[d the
purpose of the statute and the consequences of different construc-
tions."'"1 7  The court concluded that the narrow interpretation
urged by the witnesses would render the statute virtually useless and
"significantly hamper the State's ability to pursue gaming investiga-
tions."" 8 A broader construction of the scope of the immunity al-
113. 307 Md. at 680, 516 A.2d at 979. Before addressing the substantive issue, the
court reaffirmed its constitutional authority to decide moot cases since the instant inves-
tigation had been concluded. Id., 516 A.2d at 980. Although there is no textual support
in the state constitution for this proposition, the court has found "no constitutional bar
to the rendering of an advisory opinion." Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md.
279, 297, 380 A.2d 12, 23 (1977).
The court found that the rule it had established in Lloyd v. Supervisors of Elections,
206 Md. 36, 111 A.2d 379 (1954), afforded a justification for hearing this case:
[I]f the public interest clearly will be hurt if the question is not immediately
decided, if the matter involved is likely to recur frequently, and its recurrence
will involve a relationship between government and its citizens, or a duty of
government, and upon any recurrence, the same difficulty which prevented the
appeal at hand from being heard in time is likely again to prevent a decision,
then the Court may find justification for deciding the issues raised by a question
which has become moot, particularly if all these factors concur with sufficient
weight.
Id. at 43, 1i A.2d at 382. Noting that "the public has an interest in the effective investi-
gation of this State's criminal laws," and recognizing that the issue of the scope of im-
munity could recur with respect to numerous other statutes, the Court of Appeals opted
to decide the case, even though the term of the grand jury in question had expired. 307
Md. at 681-82, 516 A.2d at 980.
114. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
115. 307 Md. at 683, 516 A.2d at 981 (citing Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 449 (1972)). In fact,
the Supreme Court found that "[transactional immunity, which accords full immunity
from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates, affords the
witness considerably broader protection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege."
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.
116. See 307 Md. at 685-86, 516 A.2d at 982-83.
117. Id. at 686, 516 A.2d at 983.
118. Id. at 687, 516 A.2d at 983.
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lows the State to "use section 262 to facilitate gaming investigations
and prosecutions, as the legislature intended, and the witness would
not lose the protection of the fifth amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination."" 9
Refuting the contention that a broad construction would turn a
crime-specific immunity statute into a prosecutorial. "fishing expedi-
tion," the court maintained that the witnesses and'the lower courts
had failed to differentiate between the application of section 262
and the scope of immunity it provides.' 2 ° Whereas the immunity
described under section 262 applied only in the event of a "bona
fide" gambling investigation, the scope of the immunity would pro-
vide protection from prosecution for any and all offenses revealed
by the witness' testimony,' 2 ' including crimes. other than gambling
offenses. In order to comply with the legislative intent, therefore,
the prosecution must limit itself to questions relating solely to the
gambling investigation at hand. 22
The court also rejected the witnesses' argument that in 1937
the legislature had demonstrated its intent to constrict the broad
scope of immunity granted by the precursor of section 262 by sub-
stantially altering the statute's language.'2" While "[g]enerally, a
substantive amendment to an existing statute indicates an intent to
change the meaning of the statute,"'2 4 the court found that the cir-
cumstances surrounding the 1937 amendments warranted the con-
clusion that the changes were simply a part of a comprehensive
statutory revision.' 2 5 Thus, the court concluded that the meaning
of the statute was unaffected by the alteration. 2 6
119. Id.
120. See id. at 686-89, 516 A.2d at 983-84.
121. Id.
122. See supra note 112. In this way, the legislature limits the prosecution's use of
immunity to investigations involving specific kinds of crimes. See infra note 128.
123. Section 262 amended MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 258 (1924)
by changing the last phrase of the statute from "he shall not be prosecuted for
any offense to which his testimony relates" to "any person so compelled to
testify ... shall be exempt from prosecution.., for any and all such crimes and
offenses of which such person so testifying may have been guilty or a partici-
pant and about which he was compelled to testify."
307 Md. at 688-89, 516 A.2d at 984 (emphasis added). See Act of May 18, 1937, ch. 438,
1937 Md. Laws 873. See also supra note 109.
124. 307 Md. at 689, 516 A.2d at 984.
125. Id. at 689-90, 516 A.2d at 984. The court bolstered its conclusion by noting that
the amendment was not enacted in response to a judicial interpretation with which the
legislature disagreed. It also noted that the legislature reworded the entire provision,
not merely the final phrase. Id.
126. See id., 516 A.2d at 984-85.
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Finally, the court cited its decision in Brown v. State, 27 in which
it determined that article 27, section 23, conferred transactional im-
munity to a witness in a bribery investigation. Because section 262
contains language similar to section 23,2 and because both stat-
utes provide crime-specific immunity, the court reasoned that its de-
cision in Brown controlled.12 9 It followed, then, that section 262
provides protection that is at least coextensive with the scope of the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and is suffi-
cient, therefore, to compel testimony over a claim of that
privilege. 3 0
By construing the immunity granted by section 262 broadly,' 3 '
the Court of Appeals sought to preclude further challenges to the
constitutionality of compelling disclosure of information in the
course of gambling investigations. Although the holding necessarily
was narrowed to apply to section 262, the court's reference to the
similar language of other crime-specific immunity statutes, 3 2 as well
as its reliance on Brown, indicates that it will interpret the language
of similar statutes to confer transactional immunity.
It is unlikely, however, that the court has heard the last of the
fifth amendment claim under the immunity statutes. The litigable
issue now will be whether the questions posed by the prosecutor
during an investigation relate to the specific probe for which the
grand jury was impaneled. If they do not, the State can neither com-
pel testimony nor grant immunity.' 3 3 Moreover, considering the
Supreme Court's determination that a use and derivative use immu-
127. 233 Md. 288, 196 A.2d 614 (1964).
128. Section 23 provides in pertinent part: "[A]ny person so compelled to testify...
shall be exempt from prosecution, trial and punishment for any such crime of which such
person so testifying may have been guilty or a participant therein, and about which he
was so compelled to testify." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 23'(1987) (emphasis added).
129. 307 Md. at 690, 516 A.2d at 985. See also State v. Loscomb, 291 Md. 424, 432,
435 A.2d 764, 768 (1981) ("It is a general rule of statutory construction that statutes
that deal with the same subject matter, share a common purpose, and form part of the
same general system are in pan materia and must be construed harmoniously in order to
give full effect to each enactment.").
130. See supra notes 108 & 115.
131. Actually, the court's analysis was concluded once it determined that the statute
granted transactional immunity since transactional immunity absolutely exempts a wit-
ness from future prosecution related to crimes uncovered by the testimony. See Feldman
& Ollanik, Compelling Testimony in Alaska: The Coming Reection of Use and Derivative Use
Immunity, 3 ALAsKA L. REV. 229, 230 (1986). See also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441, 453 (1971).
132. The court referred to the language of various crime-specific immunity statutes.
See 307 Md. at 681, 516 A.2d at 980; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 298(c), 371, 540 (1987)
(narcotics, lotteries, and sabotage, respectively).
133. See 307 Md. at 688, 516 A.2d at 983-84. See also supra note 122.
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nity statute sufficiently protects a witness' fifth amendment privi-
lege' 3 4 and the Court of Appeals' decisions which hold Maryland's
privilege against self-incrimination in pari materia with that of the
federal constitution,' 5 it is likely that Maryland courts will be forced
to confront the issue of whether the state constitution in fact pro-
vides greater protection than its federal counterpart.'3 6
4. Right to Counsel.--a. Hybrid Representation.-The Court of
Appeals held in Parren v. State ' 37 that although a criminal defendant
has a constitutional right to self-representation as well as a right to
counsel, a defendant has no corresponding constitutional right to
"hybrid" representation.' 38 Nevertheless, the trial court's failure to
comply with the exact terms of Maryland Rule 4-215 rendered the
defendants' waiver of counsel ineffective.'
39
134. See supra note 108.
135. See supra note 105.
136. Curiously, the court made no reference to this discrepancy. See 307 Md. at 684,
516 A.2d at 981-82. It is not clear, however, whether the Court of Appeals realized that
Kastigar determined that transactional immunity provides protection beyond that man-
dated by the fifth amendment. See id. For example, the court referred to transactional
immunity and cites Kastigar for the proposition that "in any subsequent prosecution of
the witness" the government has the burden of proving that its evidence is derived from
an independent source. Id. at 684 n.4, 516 A.2d at 982 n.4. The Supreme Court in
Kastigar, however, was referring to the congressional use and derivative use statute at issue.
When a transactional immunity statute is in force the witness can never be prosecuted for
crimes to which the testimony refers. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.
The highest courts in Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Oregon have struck down state
statutes which have offered only use and derivative use immunity to potential witnesses
as violating the state constitution's privilege against self-incrimination. See supra note
108. For a comprehensive review of the history of immunity and the fifth amendment
along with a detailed account of the development of this issue in Alaska, see Feldman &
Ollanik, supra note 131.
137. 309 Md. 260, 523 A.2d 597 (1987).
138. Id. at 264-65, 523 A.2d at 599. In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), the
Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment affords an independent right to .self-
representation. Thus, a state cannot force a defendant to have a state-appointed public
defender. "The Sixth Amendment does notprovide merely that a defense shall be made
for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense." Id. at
819.
The Court, however, did not address the question of hybrid representation. Justice
Blackmun, in dissent, wondered whether the Court's ruling permitted an accused to
switch modes of representation mid-trial, or whether a right to standby counsel exists-
questions the Court clearly left unanswered. Id. at 846-53.
The Parren court concluded that hybrid representation is too ambiguous a concept
to apply. As the Court of Appeals observed, it would be impossible in many cases to
determine whether a defendant had exercised the right to counsel, self-representation,
or a hybrid of the two until after trial. 309 Md. at 269, 523 A.2d at 601.
139. 309 Md. at 282, 523 A.2d at 608. The court noted that the trial judge failed to
comply with MD. R. 4-215(a)(3), which requires the court to "[aidvise the defendant of
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David Bright and Marvin Parren were convicted in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City of various offenses stemming from an at-
tack on guards at the Maryland Penitentiary. 40 At trial, the defend-
ants were provided public defenders. Nevertheless, Bright and
Parren asserted their right to self-representation and discharged
their counsel, even though counsel, family members, and the trial
judge warned them against doing So.141
Bright and Parren subsequently appealed their convictions.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, characterizing what had oc-
curred at trial as "hybrid representation."'' 42 The intermediate ap-
pellate court stressed that the defendants had requested to conduct
their own defense "with the assistance of counsel," and that the trial
judge had permitted the defendants to consult with counsel
throughout the trial.' 4 3
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, found "hybrid repre-
sentation" a highly misleading term because it has been used to
characterize both the participation of defendants in their trials when
they have not waived counsel, and the assistance of counsel during
trials when defendants represent themselves.' 44 The-court recog-
nized that borderline situations arise, but nonetheless held that
there is no constitutional right to hybrid representation.
41
Thus, only one question remained: Had the defendants effec-
tively waived their right to counsel before they represented them-
selves? In response, the court declared that the procedures
enumerated in rule 4-215 regarding the waiver of counsel are
mandatory. The court stressed that the stringent nature of the rule
the nature of the charges in the charging document, and the allowable penalties, includ-
ing mandatory penalties, if any." Id. See MD. R. 4-215(a)(3).
140. 309 Md. at 266, 523 A.2d at 600. Parren and Bright were charged with a variety
of misdemeanors and felonies that included assault with intent to murder, attempted
murder, and common-law assault. Parren was already serving a 15-year sentence, to
which 20 years were added for his convictions for an assault on one guard with intent to
murder, assault on another guard, and carrying a deadly weapon with intent to injure.
Bright was already serving a life sentence plus five years, to which six years were added
for assaults on both guards. Id. at 292, 523 A.2d at 612-13 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 267-68, 523 A.2d at 600-01.
142. See Bright v. State, 68 Md. App. 41, 46, 509 A.2d 1227, 1230 (1986).
143. Id.
144. 309 Md. at 264, 523 A.2d at 599.
145. d. The court stated:
[Tlhe right to counsel and the right to defend pro se cannot be asserted simulta-
neously. The two rights are disjunctive. There can be but one captain of the
ship, and it is he alone who must assume responsibility for its passage, whether
it safely reaches the destination charted or founders on a reef.
d. See supra note 138.
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was necessary "to protect that most important fundamental right to
the effective assistance of counsel."' 46 Allowing an ad hoc applica-
tion of the rule's procedures would open the door to administrative
unfairness and procedural inefficiency. I47Moreover, the Supreme
Court has noted:
To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehen-
sion of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses in-
cluded within them, the range of allowable punishments
thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circum-
stances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to
a broad understanding of the whole matter.' 48
Thus, the trial judge's failure to comply with the requirement that
defendants be told the exact penalties they faced for the charges
against them constituted reversible error.1 49
The Court of Appeals' holding in Parren helped to clarify its
recent rulings in Colvin v. State o and Leonard v. State.'' In Colvin
the defendant sought to dismiss the public defender assigned to him
and requested the appointment of counsel of his choice at the
State's expense. After determining that Colvin's reasons for the re-
quest were insufficient, the trial court denied his motion. Colvin
then asked that he be permitted to defend himself "to a degree."
The Court of Appeals determined, however, that at most Colvin was
seeking hybrid representation; thus the request failed to trigger the
rule concerning waiver of counsel. 52 The defendant in Leonard in-
dicated a desire to represent himself, but the trial court then failed
to conduct the necessary inquiry concerning the waiver. Finding
that this failure was reversible error, the Court of Appeals ruled that
a defendant is "not required to utter a talismanic phrase so as to
146. 309 Md. at 281, 523 A.2d at 607.
147. Id., 523 A.2d at 608.
148. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948). The Supreme Court first
enunciated the standard for effective assistance of counsel in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938). There the Court required that a trial judge determine whether a defendant
has "competently and intelligently" waived the sixth amendment right. Id. at 468.
149. 309 Md. at 282, 523 A.2d at 608. For the text of MD. R. 4-215(a)(3), see supra
note 139. Subsection (a)(4) requires the trial court to conduct a waiver inquiry if the
defendant indicates'a desire to waive counsel. The purpose of the inquiry, which is
covered by subsection (b), is to ensure that there has been an intelligent and voluntary
waiver. In addition, subsection (a)(2) requires that the defendant be informed of the
right to counsel and of the importance of counsel's assistance. 309 Md. at 282, 523 A.2d
at 608.
150. 299 Md. 88, 472 A.2d 953 (1984).
151. 302 Md. 111, 486 A.2d 163 (1985).
152. Colvin, 299 Md. at 100-01, 472 A.2d at 959.
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place the court on notice that he desires self-representation. ' 153
The court stressed that the defendant's statements "dispel[led] any
contention that Leonard was seeking hybrid representation. "154
As a result of Parren, there is no longer any middle ground in
Maryland between the constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel and the right of individuals to represent themseives. The
court refused to recognize "hybrid representation" as a third classi-
fication of the right to counsel, 155 explaining that "there are only
two types of representation constitutionally, guaranteed-represen-
tation by counsel and representation pro se-and they are mutually
exclusive."' 56
Maryland trial courts therefore must ensure that defendants
either have effective assistance of counsel or have knowingly and in-
telligently waived this right pursuant to rule 4-215. In Leonard the
court merely held that the trial court must be alert to a defendant's
expressed desire for self-representation; such an expression should
trigger an inquiry that meets the requirements of the waiver rule. '57
In Parten the court took a further step by holding that the rule's
procedures for conducting that inquiry are to be followed strin-
gently.15 The majority applied this holding so strictly to the facts
of Parren that the case was reversed because the trial judge did not
inform the defendants word for word what the penalties would be
for the charges against them.' 59
Judge Rodowsky's dissent decried the majority's "formalistic"
approach, declaring: "What is important under the majority analysis
is rites and not rights."'" The dissent argued that by mandating
such strict compliance with rule 4-215, the majority itself violated
rule 1-201(a), which provides that consequences for rule violations
are to be determined "in light of the totality of the circumstances
and the purpose of the rule."'' 6'
The dissent argued that if the majority were correct that the
153. Leonard, 302 Md. at 124, 486 A.2d at 169.
154. Id. at 126, 486 A.2d at 170.
155. 309 Md. at 265, 523 A.2d at 599.
156. Id.
157. Leonard, 302 Md. at 124, 486 A.2d at 172.
158. 309 Md. at 280, 523 A.2d at 607.
159. The trial judge's failure to comply with the letter of MD. R. 4-215(a)(3) rendered
the defendants' waiver ineffective, denying them assistance of counsel as a matter of law.
309 Md. at 282-83, 523 A.2d at 608.
160. 309 Md. at 298, 523 A.2d at 616 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 283, 523 A.2d at 608; MD. R. 1-201(a). As Judge Rodowsky noted, rule 1-
201 also expresses an overall purpose for the Maryland Rules: to -secure simplicity in
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purpose of rule 4-215 is to protect the fundamental, constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel,162 then the trial court had
not thwarted that purpose. The transcript of the hearing on the de-
fendants' new trial motion, from which Judge Rodowsky quoted at
length, strongly suggested that the defendants knew they were waiv-
ing counsel and understood the implications of their choice. 63 The
dissent also reasoned that the technical violation itself was not seri-
ous enough to require reversal because the trial judge had in fact
pointed out that one of the offenses could lead to life imprisonment.
Judge Rodowsky concluded, "It is immaterial that the trial judge did
not specify which offense potentially carried a life sentence."' 6 4 It
was enough that "they certainly knew how serious the charges were
when the court told them they potentially faced life sentences.', 65
Panr'en simplifies the right to counsel in Maryland by making it
clear that a defendant is entitled to either effective assistance of
counsel or to self-representation, but not a hybrid of the two. To
soften the impact of this all-or-nothing choice, the Court of Appeals
has mandated strict compliance with Maryland Rule 4-215 in the be-
lief that justice will best be served by strict application of procedures
which were designed to ensure that defendants understand the dan-
procedure, fairness in administration, and elimination of unjustifiable expense and de-
lay." 309 Md. at 283, 523 A.2d at 608.
The Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), recognized that
"[tihe determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to
counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances sur-
rounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused."
162. 309 Md. at 281-82, 523 A.2d at 607.
163. Id. at 296, 523 A.2d at 615. At one point, Parren admitted to the trial judge,
"You did everything, you practically begged me to get a lawyer." Id. at 298, 523 A.2d at
616 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the defendants took advantage of a tech-
nical failure to state the possible penalties. As Bright said to the judge: "[Y]ou, Your
Honor, didn't go through the procedures." Id. This led Judge Rodowsky to conclude,
"All of these facts, in my view, demonstrate a knowing and voluntary election of self-
representation and waiver of counsel." Id. at 298, 523 A.2d at 616. Judge Rodowsky
criticized the majority for not deciding whether rights in fact had been violated. "All
that matters (to the majority] is that there has been a departure from the ordained rit-
ual." Id.
164. Id. at 293, 523 A.2d at 613.
165. Id. The dissent also cited cases from other jurisdictions "upholding waivers
without any recital in the operative facts that the trial court had explained to the accused
on the record the range of possible punishments." Id. at 287, 523 A.2d at 610. See, e.g.,
King v. State, 55 Ala. App. 306, 314 So. 2d 908, 909 (1975) ("The question is not
whether the trial judge adhered to a specific procedure but whether accused was compe-
tent to exercise an intelligent, informed judgment."); Burton v. State, 260 Ark. 688, 690,
543 S.W.2d 760, 761 (1976) (noting that "the record indicates that the court thoroughly
acquainted appellant with his rights and the nature of the charges against him," but
makes no mention of possible penalties).
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gers and consequences of waiving right to counsel. As the dissent
pointed out, however, an application of the majority's interpretation
might defeat the rule's underlying purposes of simplifying proce-
dure and protecting fundamental rights. Through these stringent
technical requirements, the holding could lead to a nightmare of
loopholes of which Parren was merely the first example.
b. Effective Assistance of Counsel.-In Clark v. State' 66 the Court of
Appeals held that the right to effective assistance of counsel consti-
tutionally entitles attorneys for criminal codefendants to communi-
cate with one another concerning matters of strategy in the jury
selection process.' 6 7 Therefore, the trial judge's prohibition against
conferring with cocounsel during the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges constituted reversible error. 6 '
A Baltimore City grand jury indicted Steven Clark and Jonathan
Hemphill for various drug offenses. 169 During the voir dire examina-
tion of prospective jurors, the trial judge asked the defense attor-
neys whether they- wanted to combine their peremptory challenges
or exercise them individually.' 70 The attorneys decided to exercise
them individually, prompting the judge to inform them that they
could not confer during the selection process.' 7 ' When Hemphill's
attorney challenged the judge's decision, the court responded, !'I
am instructing you, you get 20 challenges, and you get 20 chal-
lenges. Let's not play this game of saying you will exercise it inde-
pendently, but yet you want to confer on it.' 172
Following Clark's conviction, the Court of Appeals granted a
166. 306 Md. 483, 510 A.2d 243 (1986).
167. Id. at 489, 510 A.2d at 246.
168. Id. at 491-92, 510 A.2d at 247.
169. Id. at 484, 510 A.2d at 243.
170. Id. Former MD. R. 753(a)(1) provided that when a defendant was potentially
subject to a sentence of death, life imprisonment, or 20 years or more of imprisonment,
the defendant was permitted 20 peremptory challenges. Because both Clark and Hemp-
hill were subject to more than 20 years' imprisonment, each qualified for the 20 chal-
lenges. Currently, if the defendant is subject to life imprisonment or death, the
defendant has 20 peremptory challenges while the State is permitted only 10. A defend-
ant subject to 20 years or more of imprisonment is permitted 10 challenges, while the
State is allowed five. In all other cases, each party is permitted four peremptory chal-
lenges. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 8-301 (Supp. 1987); MD. R. 4-313.
171. 306 Md. at 485, 510 A.2d at 244.
172. Id. The defense attorneys noted their objections and eventually requested a mis-
trial. The trial judge denied the request, the jury was selected, and Clark was convicted
of possessing heroin. Clark appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, asserting that the
trial court erred in refusing to allow the attorneys to communicate. The intermediate
appellate court affirmed the trial judge's decision in an unreported per curiam opinion.
1d.a( 486, 510 A.2d at 244-45. The case does not reveal what happened to Hemphill.
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writ of certiorari to consider whether "fundamental fairness and due
process dictate that co-defendants who have been forced to accept
the disadvantage of a joint trial may not be deprived of one of its
few benefits--consultation between counsel for co-defendants on
matters of trial strategy."'73 The court held that the action of the
trial court violated the defendant's right to effective assistance of
counsel,' 74 reasoning that "effective representation means repre-
sentation in which the attorney is unhindered in the lawful pursuit
for knowledge which may benefit the client."' 7 5 Even though it was
possible that one attorney "might have been aware of sound reasons
to strike a particular juror, those reasons might have become much
less sound when viewed in light of co-counsel's trial strategy."' 7 6
Thus, when the trial judge forbade the two attorneys 'to communi-
cate, he deprived Clark's counsel of valuable information and advice
concerning the exercise of the peremptory challenges. 77
The sixth amendment provides that "in all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense."' 7 ' The Supreme Court has recognized
that the government violates this right when it interferes with an
attorney's ability to decide independently how best to defend a cli-
ent.17' Therefore, "there can be no restrictions upon the function
of counsel in defending a criminal prosecution in accord with the
traditions of the adversary factfinding process."' 80 State action that
interferes with counsel's making full use of traditional trial proce-
dures thus may deny a defendant the effective assistance of counsel.
173. Id., 510 A.2d at 245. Clark reasoned that the manner in which peremptory chal-
lenges are exercised is strategically important. The State rejoined that the court acted
within its sound discretion since no statute or court rule prohibited the trial judge's
conduct. The State further maintained that Clark's right to exercise his peremptory
challenges was not impaired so as to deny him a fair trial. d. at 486-87, 510 A.2d at 245.
174. Id. at 488, 510 A.2d at 245. For interesting discussions of the right to effective
assistance of counsel, see generally Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 346-49 (1983); Note, A Functional
Analysis of the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1053, 1066-68 (1980); Note,
Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Lingering Debate, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 681-88 (1980);
Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Counrel: A New Look
After United States v. Decoster, 93 HARv. L. REV. 752, 756-58 (1980); Note, Effective Assistance
of Counsel: The Sixth Amendment and the Fair Trial Guarantee, 50 U. Cxi. L. REV. 1380, 1386-
87, 1399-1401, 1408-10 (1983).
175. 306 Md. at 489, 510 A.2d at 246.
176. Id. at 490, 510 A.2d at 246.
177. Id. at 489, 510 A.2d at 246.
178. U.S. CONST. amend. V1I.
179. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
180. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 857 (1975).
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If the interference had such an effect, then prejudice to the defend-
ant's case may be presumed.
In Cronw v. United States ' the Supreme Court illustrated in-
stances in which this presumption is justified: (1) a situation in
which "counsel was either totally absent or prevented from assisting
the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding"; i' 2 and (2)
occasions when, although counsel was available to assist the accused
during trial, "the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent
one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presump-
tion of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual con-
duct of the trial."' 83 Abgent circumstances of such magnitude, there
is generally no basis for finding a sixth amendment violation unless
the defendant can show how a specific error undermined the relia-
bility of the finding of guilt.'
8 4
The Court of Appeals recognized that the trial judge's action
constituted a form of state interference with Clark's right to counsel;
therefore, it declared that there was no need for Clark to establish
that he was prejudiced by the interference.'8 5 The court did state,
however, that the prosecution could have attempted to show beyond
a reasonable doubt that the prejudice was harmless error.'8 6 Had
the State met this burden, Clark's conviction would have stood.,8 7
While the Court of Appeals acknowledged the scope of the
181. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
182. Id. at 659 n.25.
183. Id. at 659-60.
184. Id. at 658.
185. 306 Md. at 491, 510 A.2d at 247. A number of Supreme Court decisions illus-
trate various kinds of state-imposed restrictions which violate the sixth amendment. See
Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 82 (1975) (defendant prohibited from consulting
with counsel during an overnight recess); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 863
(1975) (counsel prohibited from delivering a closing argument before the jury); Brooks
v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1972) (statute requiring the defendant to testify as
the first defense witness or not at all); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596 (1961)
(statute prohibiting defense counsel from questioning the defendant on direct
examination).
186. 306 Md. at 491, 510 A.2d at 247. The harmless error doctrine came to fruition
in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-26 (1967), in which the Supreme Court noted
that although it was true that constitutional errors previously had warranted automatic
reversal, this did not mean that constitutional errors could never be harmless. Under
Chapman, an appellate court must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the al-
leged error did not contribute to the verdict. Id. at 24.
187. 306 Md. at 491, 510 A.2d at 247. The State failed to file a cross petition for
certiorari asserting harmless error as an issue. In accordance with Maryland Rule 813,
the court therefore refused to consider the effect of the error. Id. at 492, 510 A.2d at
247 (declaring that the Court of Appeals "will ordinarily consider only the issues which
have been raised in the petition and any cross petition for certiorari"); see MD. R. 813(a).
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right to effective assistance of counsel,' 8 it incorrectly concluded
that the trial court's actions deprived Clark of these rights. While
Clark could have benefitted considerably had his counsel been al-
lowed to confer with Hemphill's attorney, the court did not demon-
strate how this presumptively impaired Clark's counsel from
effectively assisting Clark. A consideration of the examples of pre-
sumed prejudice in Cronic reveals that there was no need to apply
the presumption to Clark's situation. ' 9 First, the trial court im-
paired neither the opportunity nor the ability of Clark's counsel to
exercise the permitted peremptory challenges during voir dire.'90
Clark's attorney was present at every juncture; only Hemphill's
counsel was prevented from assisting Clark. Moreover, it is unlikely
that a restriction such as that which the trial court imposed upon
Clark's counsel would prevent a competent attorney from effectively
assisting a client. The inability of Clark's attorney to consult with a
codefendant's counsel should not have prevented the attorney from
conducting voir dire proceedings so as to protect Clark's interests.' 9'
0
c. Breathalyzer Tests.-In Brosan v. Cochran 192 the Court of
Appeals was asked to refine its holding in Sites v. State'"3 that a
drunk driving suspect be afforded a reasonable opportunity to com-
municate with an attorney before deciding whether to submit to a
chemical sobriety test. '94 The court found that face-to-face consul-
188. 306 Md. at 487, 510 A.2d at 245.
189. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.25 (1984). See also supra notes
181-182 and accompanying text.
190. The record disclosed that each defendant exhausted his allotted 20 peremptory
strikes. 306 Md. at 486 n.2, 510 A.2d at 244 n.2.
191. In Vaccaro v. Caple, 33 Md. App. 413, 418, 365 A.2d 47, 50 (1976), the Court of
Special Appeals determined that a waiver of the right to peremptory challenge may oc-
cur when a party fails to exercise due diligence. Clark's counsel, therefore, had to use
due diligence to discover relevant facts concerning the jury selection; otherwise, he
would waive the right to peremptory challenges. When a juror who might otherwise be
disqualified for cause is permitted to serve on a jury because of the aggrieved party's
failure to use due diligence in discovering the irregularity, the court will not disturb the
judgment. Id.
192. 307 Md. 662, 516 A.2d 970 (1986).
193. 300 Md. 702, 481 A.2d 192 (1984). See Survey of Developments in Maryland Law,
Criminal Law, 45 Mn. L. REv. 634, 687 (1986).
194. Sites, 300 Md. at 717, 481 A.2d at 200. In Maryland all drivers impliedly consent
to submit to a state-administered chemical sobriety test if apprehended on suspicion of
drunk driving. See MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1(a) (1987). Subsection (b)(i) pro-
vides that refusal to take the test will result in suspension of the suspect's driver's license
for not less than 60 days nor more than six months for the first offense. For a compre-
hensive analysis of Sites, along with a brief history of case law concerning the right to
counsel under other "'implied consent" laws, see Note, The Ever Evasive Right to Counsel
Under Implied Consent: Sites v. State, 1985 DET. C.L. REV. 903.
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tation,' 95 as well as the administration of a private breathalyzer test
by a suspect's attorney,' 96 was well within the constitutional due
process right to attorney-client communication contemplated by
Sites. The court emphasized that the touchstone Of constitutionality
is whether the requested communication would unreasonably inter-
fere with the State's administration of the breathalyzer test. 9 7
Attorney Gill Cochran and one of his former clients challenged
the constitutionality of guidelines promulgated by the Superinten-
dent of the Maryland State Police Department establishing the pro-
cedures governing the right of a drunk-driving suspect to consult
with counsel before deciding whether or not to take a breathalyzer
test. 9 ' Specifically, the defendants challenged the provisions which
limited attorney-client contact to a single telephone call and which
prohibited the administration of a separate sobriety test by the at-
torney prior to the'one given by the State.' 99 The Superintendent
argued that a single telephone call would satisfy the requirements of
Sites; moreover, even if in-person communication were required, the
private administration of a breathalyzer test was a scientific test and
therefore not within the ambit of communication permitted by
Sites.200
In Sites a suspected drunk driver sought to consult an attorney
before consenting to the State's sobriety test.20' The Court of Ap-
peals determined that due process may entitle the driver to contact
an attorney prior to submitting to the test.202 The Brosan court ex-
amined Sites and reaffirmed that although there was no sixth amend-
ment right to consult with counsel prior to submitting to a
breathalyzer,2 °3 there did exist a due process guarantee allowing a
195. 307 Md. at 669-70, 516 A.2d at 974-75.
196. Id. at 672-73, 516 A.2d at 976-77.
197. Id. at 670-71, 516 A.2d at 974.
198. Id. at 665, 516 A.2d at 972. On March 12, 1984, the Superintendent issued Gen-
eral Order No. 01-84-73, establishing these guidelines. Id.
199. 307 Md. at 666, 516 A.2d at 972. The order provided that a suspect would be
given "a brief opportunity to make telephone contact with his attorney." Id. at 665, 516
A.2d at 972. Even though Cochran arrived at the police barracks four minutes after his
client called him, he was not allowed a face-to-face consultation. Id. at 665-66, 516 A.2d
at 972.
200. ItL at 671, 516 A.2d at 975.
201. Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 708, 481 A.2d 192, 195 (1984).
202. Id. at 718, 481 A.2d at 200.
203. 307 Md. at 668, 516 A.2d at 973-74. In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682. 689-90
(1972), the Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel does not
attach until the initiation of formal judicial proceedings by way of, inter alia, an indict-
ment, information, or other formal charge. See also Sites, 300 Md. at 712, 481 A.2d at
197. These proceedings are "critical stages" in the evidence gathering process to which
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suspect to communicate with counsel upon request. 0 4 This due
process right was limited only to the extent it "substantially" or
"unreasonably" interfered with the State's interest in obtaining an
accurate sobriety test.20 5 The court agreed with the trial judge that
" 'the operative question is whether the requested communication
would unreasonably impede police processing.' -206 Thus, the
court reiterated its finding in Sites that the unreasonableness of the
requested communication must be determined on a case-by-case ba-
sis, but that under no circumstances could the consultation delay the
the absolute right to counsel necessarily extends. Id. In Maryland, however, a statutory
right to counsel by virtue of the Public Defender Law, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, §§ 1-14
(1986 & Supp. 1987). attaches at the moment when the suspect is taken into custody. See
id. § 4(d). See also Webster v. State, 299 Md. 581, 603-04, 474 A.2d 1305, 1316-17
(1984). In Sites the suspect was not formally charged until 20 minutes after he had taken
the test. This part of the arrest procedure, therefore, is not a critical stage within the
context of the sixth amendment. Sites, 300 Md. at 712, 481 A.2d at 197. The majority of
other jurisdictions likewise have refused to label this stage as "critical." See, e.g., State v.
Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Iowa 1978) (right to prior consultation with an attorney is
limited to circumstances when doing so will not materially interfere with administering a
blood test within the specified time limits); State v. Petkus, 110 N.H. 394, 269 A.2d 123,
125 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971) (taking defendant's blood under an implied
consent law is not a critical stage). This line of cases is criticized in Williams, DWI Breath
Testing and the Right to Counsel, 30 ARz. B.J. (Feb.-Mar. 1986). Maryland allows a police
officer to request that a suspect submit to a breathalyzer test before making an arrest or
issuing a citation. See MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.2(a) (1987). In the instant case,
because the suspect refused to take the test, his license was suspended. See supra note
194.
204. 307 Md. at 668, 516 A.2d at 974. The Sites court based its holding on several
Supreme Court decisions which recognize the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment as a broader source of a right to counsel than the sixth amendment. Sites,
300 Md. at 716, 481 A.2d at 200. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970)
(holding that welfare recipient is entitled to presence of privately retained counsel at
hearing to terminate benefits); In re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 36 (1967) (holding that juvenile is
entitled to assistance of counsel in delinquency proceedings). While this due process
right is not precisely definable, it is one that assures "that convictions cannot be brought
about by methods that offend 'a sense ofjustice.' " Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,
173 (1952) (quoting Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936)).
In Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112-13 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a
person's driver's license may not be revoked without the processes due under the four-
teenth amendment. See also Sites, 300 Md. at 717, 481 A.2d at 200. At least three other
states have recognized a due process right to counsel before submission to a state sobri-
ety test. See, e.g., People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, 227-28, 239 N.E.2d 351, 352-53, 292
N.Y.S.2d 416, 418-19 (1968) (right of access to counsel violated when defendant was
denied the right to telephone attorney before taking test); Troy v. Curry, 36 Ohio Misc.
144, 147, 303 N.E.2d 925, 927 (1973) (refusal to allow accused to consult with counsel
violates sixth and fourteenth amendments); State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788, 807, 636 P.2d
393,406 (198 1) (threatening defendant with adverse consequences if defendant called a
lawyer before breathalyzer test restricted accused's freedom).
205. 307 Md. at 668-70, 516 A.2d at 974.
206. Id. at 670, 516 A.2d at 974 (quoting the trial judge).
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administration of the test beyond the statutory two-hour time
limit.207
The private administration of the breathalyzer was considered
in light of the "operative question" of interference with police pro-
cedures. Considering the importance of a driver's license in today's
society, 20 the court determined that a suspect had a '"significant in-
terest at stake in deciding whether to submit to the state-adminis-
tered chemical sobriety test. ' 20 9 Recognizing that assistance of
counsel impliedly entails effective assistance, the court noted that the
result of a privately administered sobriety test, although non-verbal,
was a type of attorney-client communication, and that this informa-
tion would aid in making an informed decision whether or not to
submit to the State's test. 2 '0 To establish the requirements of fair-
ness imposed by the due process clause a court must balance the
competing interests of the individual and the State.21 t Therefore,
the Court of Appeals weighed the individual's interest in communi-
cating with an attorney against the competing state interest in effi-
cient administration of its test, which also includes the avoidance of
unnecessary increases in administrative and fiscal burdens. 21 2
Rather than alleging that the private test would in any way impair
these legitimate interests, however, the Superintendent's argument
revolved around the belief that the private test would result in fewer
drunk driving convictions.2 1 The court concluded that the genera-
lized interest in convicting drunk drivers could not override the con-
stitutional right to communicate with counsel concerning the
decision whether to submit to the state test.21 4 Finally, the court
noted that its conclusion was limited to situations in which the deci-
sion to take the state test was of "critical importance.- 21 5
The Court of Appeals set forth a common-sense construction of
due process as it relates to effective attorney-client communication
in drunk driving representation. The court refused, however, to
give a fuller explanation of what constitutes unreasonable interfer-
207. Id., 516 A.2d at 975. See MD. CTS. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-303 (1984).
208. 307 Md. at 672, 516 A.2d at 975.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 672-73, 516 A.2d at 976.
211. Id. at 671, 516 A.2d at 975.
212. Id. at 671-72, 516 A.2d at 975-76.
213. Id at 671, 516 A.2d at 975. It is unclear whether the court would have reached
the same decision had the Superintendent argued this point.
214. Id at 673, 516 A.2d at 976.
215. Id. at 673-74, 516 A.2d at 976. The court neglected, however, to explain the
kind of situation in which the decision would be "critically important."
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ence with police procedures than it had in Sites. By maintaining that
unreasonableness must be determined on a case-by-case basis and
continuing to give great deference to the police interpretation of
what actually is unreasonable,' t 6 the court in effect is letting the fox
guard the chicken coop. Considering the Superintendent's obvious
attempt to circumvent the spirit of Sites, it is not unlikely that the
majority of police reports will characterize the attempted attorney-
client consultation as unreasonable.2 1 Although the State has an
important interest in keeping drunk drivers off the road, the exer-
cise of its police powers should not rise above the requirements of
the Constitution. It-may well be that the only way to guarantee that
a suspect be afforded the right to counsel is to attach the sixth
amendment right at this arguably "critical" stage."1 '
B. Sentencing
1. Increased Sentence on Retrial.-The Court of Appeals held in
Jones v. State2 19 that section 12-702 of the Courts and Judicial Pro-
ceedings Article prohibits a court from increasing a defendant's sen-
tence on retrial for crimes committed before the first trial but for
which convictions occurred later.22° In so holding, the court con-
cluded that the meaning of the statutory language, adopted nearly
verbatim from the Supreme Court's holding in North Carolina v.
Pearce , was not affected by subsequent Supreme Court decisions
modifying Pearce.222
In 1982 a Montgomery County jury convicted Darryl Jones of
216. Id. at 670, 516 A.2d at 974-75. See Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 718, 481 A.2d
192, 200 (1984).
217. In Sites the suspect alleged that he requested counsel three separate times, yet
the arresting officer said he had "no recollection" of these requests. Sites, 300 Md. at
708, 481 A.2d at 195.
218. Some courts in fact have labeled this stage "critical." See, e.g., State v. Welch,
135 Vt. 316, 321, 376 A.2d 351, 355 (1977) ("[l]t seems clear that when a serious crimi-
nal case is involved, the request to submit to a chemical test can rise to the level of a
.critical stage' in the proceedings."); State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d 436, 445, 610
P.2d 893, 898.(1980) ("[T]he period immediately after arrest and charging in a driving
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor case is a 'critical stage' because of the
unique character of the evidence to be obtained and the trial strategy decisions which
must be made then, if at all.").
219. 307 Md. 449, 514 A.2d 1219 (1986).
220. Id. at 456, 514 A.2d at 1222.
221. 395 U.S. 711, 725-26 (1969).
222. See Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986) (holding that Pearce did not pre-
vent a judge from imposing a 50-year sentence at resentencing, even though the original
sentence was only 20 years); Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 (1984) (holding that
Pearce did not prevent a resentencing judge from considering an intervening conviction).
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robbery with a deadly weapon.223 The Court of Special Appeals re-
versed the conviction a year later.224 In 1985 another Montgomery
County jury reconvicted Jones of the same crime.225 The trial judge
increased Jones' sentence, aware that the defendant had committed
crimes before his first trial for which he was not convicted until after
that trial. 226 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the sentence,
and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari.227
In 1973 the General Assembly enacted section 12-702(b) of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,228 which provided that on
remand a trial court cannot impose a sentence greater than that
originally handed down unless certain criteria are met. The General
Assembly lifted the wording containing the'limitations on increased
sentences from the language of the Supreme Court's 1969 opinion
in Pearce. As the Court of Appeals recognized, the trial court's im-
position of an increased sentence in this case clearly violated the
"literal language" of section 12-702;229 thus, it also violated the
Supreme Court's initial ruling in Pearce. The Supreme Court has
since modified its ruling in Pearce, however, determining that due
process does not preclude increased sentencing if on review the
original sentence is overturned and the defendant appears again for
resentencing.2 ° Because the General Assembly relied on Pearce in
enacting section 12-702(b), the Court of Appeals faced the question
of whether or not it was obliged to engraft the Supreme Court's
modification of Pearce onto the Maryland statute.2s ! The court prop-
223. 307 Md. at 451, 514 A.2d at 1220. The court sentenced Jones to nine years'
imprisonment. Id.
224. Id. The Court of Special Appeals' opinion was unreported.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 451-52, 514 A.2d at 1220.
227. Id. at 452, 514 A.2d at 1220.
228. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-702(b) (1984). The statute provides:
If an appellate court remands a criminal case to a lower court in order that the
lower court may pronounce the proper judgment or sentence, or conduct a new
trial, and if there is a conviction following this new trial, the lower court may
impose any sentence authorized by law to be imposed as punishment for the
offense. However, it may not impose a sentence more severe than the sentence
previously imposed for the offense unless:
(1) The reasons for the increased sentence affirmatively appear;
(2) The reasons are based upon objective information concerning identi-
fiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the original sen-
tence was imposed; and
(3) The factual data upon which the increased sentence is based appears
as a part of the record.
229. 307 Md. at 452, 514 A.2d at 1220-21.
230. Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 571-72 (1984).
231. 307 Md. at 451, 514 A.2d at 1220.
CRIMINAL LAW
erly refused to do so.2 -12
In North Carolina v. Pearce 2 " the Supreme Court reviewed the
resentencing of two defendants. 23 4 Two district courts had con-
victed the defendants and sentenced them to prison. 235 After the
original convictions were set aside on grounds of constitutional er-
ror, the two were reconvicted. 23 6 One defendant received a sen-
tence greater than that originally imposed. 3 7 The other defendant
not only received a longer sentence, but was denied credit for time
already served.23 8
The Supreme Court held that the imposition of a harsher sen-
tence on retrial violates neither the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment nor the constitutional provision against
double jeopardy.2 3 9 Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the trial
court must set forth in the record its reasons for imposing a heavier
sentence so that the decision can be reviewed on appeal.2 40 The
Court emphasized that the reasons for an increased sentence must
be based on objective information concerning the defendant's iden-
tifiable conduct after the original sentencing proceeding.24 1
Left unresolved in Pearce was whether fourteenth amendment
due process limitations applied to a defendant who, following con-
viction by a lesser court, seeks a horizontal appeal of right to a supe-
rior trial court by a trial de novo. In Chery v. State 2 4 2 the Court of
Special Appeals squarely addressed this issue, holding that the prin-
ciples pronounced in Pearce applied equally to a trial de novo. 243
While the legislature considered whether to expand section 12-
232. Id.
233. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
234. Id. at 713-14.- Pearce consolidated two cases for the purposes of appeal.




239. Id. at 723.
240. Id. at 726. The Supreme Court stated:
In order to assure the absence of [vindictiveness], we have concluded that
whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a
new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons
must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on
the part of the defendant occurring after 4he time of the original sentencing
proceeding. And the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based
must be made part of the record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of the
increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal.
Id.
241. Id.
242. 9 Md. App. 416, 264 A.2d 887 (1970).
243. Id. at 425-26, 264 A.2d at 892.
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702(b) to incorporate Cherry's holding, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the same issue in Colten v. Kentucky.244 Contrary to the
Maryland court's holding in Cherry, the Supreme Court in Colten de-
cided that Pearce did not apply when a superior court resentenced a
defendant on a de novo appeal from an inferior court.2 45 The Court
reasoned that there was little danger that a defendant seeking a trial
de novo would face judicial vindictiveness merely for exercising the
right of appeal. 246 After the Colten decision, the General Assembly
adopted the Court of Special Appeals' holding in Cherry and applied
the Pearce rule to de novo appeals, even though the Supreme Court's
ruling meant that it was not constitutionally required to do so.2 47
Thus, the Maryland rule at that time afforded more protection to the
defendant convicted after a trial de novo than the rule of the
Supreme Court.
In subsequent decisions both the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court have emphasized the importance of identifiable con-
duct by the defendant occurring after the imposition of the original
sentence in justifying an increased sentence. In Briggs v. State2 4 8 the
Court of Appeals stressed that in enacting section 12-702 the
legislature intended to prohibit a harsher sentence upon resentenc-
ing, unless the sentencing judge possesses objective information
concerning conduct by the defendant which occurred after the trial
court imposed the original sentence.24 9 Yet in Wasman v. United
244. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
245. Id. at 118.
246. Jd. at 116.
247. A reviser's note appended to the text of § 12-702 stated:
[W]e have a constitutional limitation on increase of sentence if there is an ordi-
nary appeal and either a remand for sentencing or a re-conviction after a new
trial. And we have a statutory limitation on increase of sentence if there is a
conviction after a de novo appeal. What § 12-702 proposes is the codification
of the case law, and the retention of the existing statutory law, thus providing a
uniform approach to the problem, and one readily accessible to and under-
standable by those involved in criminal sentencing.
Act of Aug. 22, 1973, ch. 2, 1973 Md. Laws 4376 (ist Special Session). In 1983 the
General Assembly amended subsection (c) of the statute to permit an appellate court to
impose a greater sentence following a trial de novo than that originally imposed by the
district court. The legislature did not alter the rest of the statute. Act of May 24, 1983,
ch. 294, 1983 Md. Laws 1042. See MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-702(c) (1984
& Supp. 1987).
248. 289 Md. 23, 421 A.2d 1369 (1980).
249. Id. at 32-33, 421 A.2d at 1374-75. The district court convicted Briggs of assault-
ing a correctional officer. When he committed the assault, Briggs was serving time for
armed robbery. The court sentenced him to 30 days to run consecutively following his
term for armed robbery. Briggs then appealed to the circuit court. Between the time of
the district court and circuit court trials, Briggs was convicted of three other assaults. At
828 [VOL. 47:793
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States250 the Supreme Court held that after a defendant is retried
and convicted, a court may justify an increased sentence by affirma-
tively identifying relevant conduct or events, including convictions,
that occurred after the original sentencing proceedings.2 1 1 The
Court asserted that "any language in Pearce suggesting that an inter-
vening conviction for an offense committed prior to the original
sentencing may not be considered upon sentencing after retrial, is
inconsistent with the Pearce opinion as a whole." 25 2
TheJones court held that although in enacting section 12-702
the General Assembly had adopted almost verbatim the language of
Pearce, Maryland courts were not obligated to follow subsequent
Supreme Court decisions modifying the Pearce doctrine. 5 3 The
Court of Appeals construed the statute as the legislature's refusal to
follow Supreme Court decisions which provided minimal constitu-
tional rights by enacting a law that provides extra protection. 5 4
The court stressed that in section 12-702(b)(2), the phrase "conduct
on the part of the defendant occurring after the original sentence
was imposed" does not include a conviction occurring after the origi-
nal sentence based on actions which occurred earlier. 55
A state is perfectly free to adopt measures that provide protec-
tions beyond those mandated by the Constitution. 5 6 As the Court
of Appeals recognized, the legislature was well aware of the
Supreme Court's decisions in Colten and Wasman yet it did not move
to modify the statute to correspond with the Supreme Court hold-
ings.2 57 This inaction is a clear indication of the legislative will to
leave matters unchanged. The Court of Appeals, recognizing its
proper function, did not attempt to thwart this intent.
the trial de novo, the circuit court judge convicted Briggs and sentenced him to 10 years'
imprisonment. Id. at 24-25, 421 A.2d at 1370-71.
250. 468 U.S. 559 (1984).
251. Id. at 572.
252. Id.
253. 307 Md. at 454-55, 514 A.2d at 1221-22.
254. Id. at 455, 514 A.2d at 1222. In decidingJones, the Court of Appeals concluded
that the Maryland legislature enacted a "clear and specific law" independent of Supreme
Court rulings. Id. at 454, 514 A.2d at 1222.
255. Id. at 452-53, 517 A.2d at 1221; MD. CTS. & JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 12-
702(b)(2) (1984) (emphasis added).
256. See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982) ("(A] State may confer procedural
protection of liberty interests that extend beyond those minimally required by the Con-
stitution of the United States. If a State does so, the minimal requirements of the Fed-
eral Constitution would not be controlling .... (emphasis in original)).
257. 307 Md. at 455, 514 A.2d at 1222. TheJones court neglected to take into account




2. Habitual Offender Statute.-In Montone v. State 2 5 the Court of
Appeals clarified the meaning of the statutory mandate that in order
to be sentenced as an habitual offender pursuant to Maryland's Ha-
bitual Criminal Statute,259 a criminal must have received three pre-
vious, separate convictions for crimes of violence. 26° The court
further emphasized that the criminal must have served three uncon-
nected rather than concurrent or consecutive terms of confinement
in a correctional institution.26' In reaching its conclusion, the court
declared that the statute's purpose is not only to punish, but also
"to identify individuals incapable of rehabilitation and lock them up
forever.' '262
In 1977 Santo Louis Montone was convicted of daytime house-
breaking and was incarcerated. 6 3 Montone conceded that this qual-
ified as the first period of confinement under the repeat offender
21statute. 64 In 1979 he was convicted of nighttime housebreaking
and the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of vio-
lence. 265 He was sentenced to two to seven years on the former
count and five years on the latter, sentences to be consecutively
served. 2 66 After reconsideration, the trial court suspended the exe-
cution of the balance of both sentences and placed Montone on con-
current five-year terms of probation. 67 Montone already had
served nineteen months, making this the second term of confine-
ment.2 68 Probation was revoked; the sentences for the nighttime
housebreaking and handgun offenses were reduced to eighteen
months each, to be concurrently served.26 9 The State contended
that this constituted Montone's third period of confinement. 7 °
In 1983 Santo Louis Montone pleaded guilty to felony theft and
daytime housebreaking. Acting pursuant to article 27, section
258. 308 Md. 599, 521 A.2d 720 (1987).
259. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B(b) (1987).
260. 308 Md. at 606, 521 A.2d at 723.
261. Id. at 613-14, 521 A.2d at 727.
262. Id. at 612-13, 521 A.2d at 726-27.
263. 308 Md. at 603, 521 A.2d at 722. In fact, Montone had been convicted of night-
time housebreaking exactly one year earlier. In 1983 the State, however, did not list the
1976 conviction and any resulting incarceration in its notice that it would seek to invoke
the habitual offender statute. Therefore, the trial court considered the 1977 events as
the first conviction and confinement. Id.




268. Id. at 604-05, 521 A.2d at 722.
269. Id., 521 A.2d at 722-23.
270. id. at 605, 521 A.2d at 723.
830 [VOL. 47:793
CRIMINAL LAW
643B, the judge sentenced Montone to life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole.27 ' One month later, Montone was con-
victed of robbery and the use of a handgun in the commission of a
crime of violence; again, the sentence was life without parole.
27 2
Following a reduction of the sentence to one life term without possi-
bility of parole, Montone appealed.2 7 - The Court of Appeals
granted certiorari to determine if Montone's life sentence violated
section 643B(b).27 4
The statute declares, "Any person who has served three separate
terms of confinement in a correctional institution as a result of three
separate convictions of any crime of violence shall be sentenced, on
being convicted a fourth time of a crime of violence, to life impris-
onment without the possibility of parole. '2 75 The Court of Appeals
in Montone defined what constitutes three "separate" terms of con-
finement and three "separate" convictions.
Montone presented three arguments to the Court of Appeals to
persuade it that the trial court erred in sentencing him as an habit-
ual offender.2 7 6 First, Montone contended that he did not receive
"three separate convictions" as required by the Statute because he
was convicted simultaneously of both the second and third
crimes. 77 Thus, the criminal justice system did not have an oppor-
tunity to reform him between the commission of the second and
third offenses. Second, Montone asserted that he did not serve
"three separate terms of confinement" because the period of im-
prisonment resulting from his third conviction was concurrent with
the term of confinement resulting from his second conviction. 78 Fi-
nally, Montone maintained that he did not serve three separate
terms of confinement "as a result of three separate convictions" be-
cause his last term of imprisonment resulted from a probation
violation.
2 79
271. Id. at 602-03, 521 A.2d at 721. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B(b) (1987).
272. 308 Md. at 603, 521 A.2d at 721-22.
273. In an unreported per curiam opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed
Montone's conviction but vacated the sentence. Accordingly, the intermediate appellate
court remanded the cases for appropriate sentencing. On remand the trial judge re-
duced the sentence for felony theft and housebreaking but left in place the sentence of
life imprisonment without possibility of parole for the robbery conviction. Id., 521 A.2d
at 722.
274. Id.
275. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B(b) (1987) (emphasis added).






While the Court of Appeals acknowledged that many states
have habitual offender statutes, it determined that Maryland's is
unique:
The Maryland statute requires more than merely "previ-
ous" convictions; it requires separate convictions. More-
over, the statute's scope is narrowed by the fact that it
requires not only that an individual shall have received sep-
arate convictions, but that he shall have been sentenced to,
and shall have actually served, three separate terms of con-
finement under the jurisdiction of the correctional
system.28 0
Nevertheless, the court found it instructive to consult the law of
other states in construing the meaning of "separate." ' 8 '
If the primary purpose of a state's statute is deemed to be reha-
bilitative, a court generally requires sequential terms of confine-
ment.2 82 Thus, two convictions handed down on the same day may
not serve as predicate convictions for each other. Courts reason
that the criminal has not had an opportunity to be rehabilitated be-
tween the first conviction and the commission of the crime upon
which the second conviction is based.2 8 3
280. Id. at 606, 521 A.2d at 723 (emphasis in original).
281. Id. at 608, 521 A.2d at 724.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 609, 521 A.2d at 724-25. For example, in State v. Carlson, 560 P.2d 26
(Alaska 1977), Alaska's Supreme Court construed the habitual offender statute as re-
quiring that predicate convictions pursuant to the statute occur in sequence. The court
reasoned that it was the "accumulation of prior offenses, indicating the defendant has
not reformed his behavior, rather than merely the gross number of offenses, which
should be determinative of habitual criminal status." Id. at 30. The court added that
"[w]here, as in the case of [the defendant], two convictions occur on the same day, the
opportunity for reformation is afforded to him only once, not twice." Id.
Likewise, in State v. Ellis, 214 Neb. 172, 333 N.W.2d 391 (1983), the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that not only are recidivist statutes enacted to deter and punish
repeat offenders, but that they also are intended to apply to persistent offenders who do
not respond to the influence of conviction and imprisonment. Id. at 175, 333 N.W.2d at
394. The court stated that " '[ilt is the commission of the second felony after conviction
for the first, and the commission of the third felony after conviction of the second that is
deemed to make the defendant an incorrigible.' " Id. at 176, 333 N.W.2d at 394 (quot-
ing Coleman v. Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 807, 125 S.W.2d 798 (1939)). The court held
that in order to warrant the imposition of Nebraska's habitual offender statute, each
conviction, except for the first conviction, must be for crimes committed after a preced-
*ing conviction. Moreover, all prior convictions must precede the commission of the
principal crime. Id.
Finally, in Combs v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 859 (Ky. 1983), the Supreme
Court of Kentucky considered whether concurrent sentences for two crimes could serve
as separate convictions under the habitual offender statute. The court focused on the
statute's purpose to rehabilitate criminals, and stressed that if a court convicts an of-
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If, on the other hand, the statute is intended to be a deterrent
by mandating punishment for the repeat offender, then the court
will hold that confinement may be concurrent and convictions may
occur on the same day." 4 These courts, therefore, declare the se-
quence of the predicate crimes to be irrelevant.28 5
The Montone court concluded that two convictions must be sep-
arated by an intervening term of imprisonment before each can be
counted as a predicate conviction under section 643B(b). 28' The
court stressed that the statute's purpose is to identify criminals inca-
pable of rehabilitation. It would circumvent this purpose to allow
two convictions without an intervening term of confinement to
count separately because the criminal would be "deprived of an in-
tervening exposure to the correctional system."12 87 As the Court of
Appeals declared in Hawkins v. State,288 the purpose of section
643B(b) "is to protect the public from assaults upon people and in-
jury to property and to deter repeat offenders from perpetrating
other criminal acts of violence under the threat of an extended pe-
riod of confinement.1 289 Moreover, the Montone court stressed that
if a court imposes either a concurrent or a consecutive sentence for
two convictions, the resulting terms of confinement cannot be con-
sidered separate. 290 To do so would frustrate the legislative intent
"that the conviction and confinement for one predicate crime be
separate from the other."12
9
'
In a brief concurrence, Chief Judge Murphy stressed that in
Hawkins the Court of Appeals defined the aims of section 643B(b) as
deterrence of crime and protection of the public. 92 Judge Murphy
fender twice before any prison time is served, the convictions must be considered a
single conviction for purposes of the statute. Id. at 862. The court nevertheless af-
firmed the defendant's conviction as a habitual offender; while the two sentences over-
lapped, the defendant already had served part of the first sentence before being
convicted of the second felony. Id.
284. 308 Md. at 611, 521 A.2d at 726. See, e.g., Watson v. State, 392 So. 2d 1274,
1279 (Ala. 1980) (purpose of statute was to prevent crime by imposing greater penalties
upon repeat offenders); Washington v. State, 273 Ark. 482, 485, 621 S.W.2d 216, 218
(1981) (statute had only a punitive purpose); State v. Montague, 671 P.2d 187, 190
(Utah 1983) (statute designed to subject repeat offenders to increased sentences).
285. 308 Md. at 611, 521 A.2d at 726.
286. Id. at 613, 521 A.2d at 727.
287. Id.
288. 302 Md. 143, 486 A.2d 179 (1985).
289. Id. at 148, 486 A.2d at 182.
290. 308 Md. at 613, 521 A.2d at 727.
291. Id. at 614, 521 A.2d at 727.
292. Id. at 617, 521 A.2d at 728 (Murphy, C.J., concurring). See Hawkins, 302 Md. at




I do not believe that the legislature intended-irrespective
of the number of separate crimes of violence perpetrated
by an offender-that one continuous term of imprisonment
under consecutive sentences for separate qualifying of-
fenses would count as but one separate term of imprison-
ment under the statute. As I see it, the legislative purpose
permits the imposing of a life sentence without parole
upon a fourth conviction of a crime of violence where the
qualifying convictions were coupled with a period of actual
confinement. separately imposed.29 3
Judge Murphy further asserted that consecutive sentences are "sep-
arate within the contemplation of the statute, even though the total
period of imprisonment under separate and consecutive sentences
is continuous. 2
9 4
Judge Murphy's rationale appears to conform more to the stat-
ute's language than does the majority's opinion. Nowhere in the
statute is it suggested that one of the statute's objectives is to afford
the offender an opportunity to reform. Although the statute speaks
of three separate convictions resulting in three separate terms of
imprisonment, the court has distorted the statute's meaning by dab-
bling in semantics. "Separate" for the purposes of section 643B(b)
should include consecutive sentences for crimes of violence. To in-
sure that Maryland has the type of habitual offender statute that it
needs, the legislature should amend the statute to leave no room for
misinterpretation.
C. Procedure
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction .- The Court of Appeals in Pen-
nington v. State295 addressed the issue of subject matter jurisdiction
over the offense of obstruction ofjustice.296 Because obstruction of
justice is a crime against the State itself,2 97 the court determined
that a Maryland court could exercise jurisdiction over the crime,
even though the criminal act took place outside the State.2 98
Jean Pennington was convicted in the Circuit Court for Balti-
293. 308 Md. at 617, 521 A.2d at 729.
294. Id.
295. 308 Md. 727, 521 A.2d 1216 (1987).
296. Id. at 728, 521 A.2d at 1216.
297. Id. at 739, 521 A.2d at 1222.
298. Id. at 746, 521 A.2d at 1225.
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more City for obstruction ofjustice. "99 The charge originated when
she stabbed another woman in the District of Columbia in order to
discourage her from testifying in a pending Maryland assault
case.300 Ms. Pennington asserted that the Maryland courts had no
subject matter jurisdiction over the offense because the actions at-
tributed to her occurred in the District of Columbia. 30 ' The Court
of Special Appeals rejected this argument and affirmed her convic-
tion. 02 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and likewise
affirmed. 30 3
In Maryland the principal basis for subject matter jurisdiction
over crimes is the common-law theory of territorial jurisdiction: 30 4
"a state has power to make conduct or the result of conduct a crime
if the conduct takes place or the result happens within its territorial
limits." ' 5 Many states have created statutory extensions of territo-
rial jurisdiction modeled after the Model Penal Code.30 6 Maryland,
however, has not statutorily expanded the scope of the State's crimi-
299. id. at 728, 521 A.2d at 1216. The defendant violated MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 27 (1982), which states: "If any person by corrupt means or by threats or force en-
deavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, or court officer of any
court of this State in the discharge of his duty ... he is liable to be prosecuted."
300. 308 Md. at 728, 521 A.2d at 1216.
301. Id.
302. 66 Md. App. 710, 505 A.2d 895 (1986).
303. 308 Md. at 728, 521 A.2d at 1216. The Court of Appeals recognized that the
issue presented was one of first impression not only in Maryland, but in other states as
well. Id.
304. According to MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1-501 (1984), criminal subject
matter jurisdiction is conferred by the common law unless otherwise provided.
305. 1 W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 2.9, at 180 (1986) (foot-
note omitted). See also R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW at 38-45 (3d ed. 1982).
The situs, or locus, of a crime is the place of the act (or omission) constituting the crime.
The place of the result of a crime only matters if the definition of the crime expressly
includes such a result as an element. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr § 2.9, at 180-81. For exam-
ple, criminal jurisdiction exists over the crime of murder in the state in which the fatal
force was inflicted on the victim, rather than that in which the force is discharged or the
victim dies. Stout v. State, 76 Md. 317, 323, 25 A. 299, 301 (1892). In the case of
larceny, however, prosecution is permitted in any state into which the goods may be
brought subsequently. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr § 2.9, at 182. See also Worthington v.
State, 58 Md. 403, 409 (1882) (every asportation deemed to be a new taking).
306. Several states' statutes predate the Model Penal Code while 29 others have ex-
pressly adopted it. 308 Md. at 729 n.2, 521 A.2d at 1216-17 n.2. The Model Penal Code
expands jurisdiction over crimes by providing "that a state has jurisdiction when 1) con-
duct or a result that is an element of the offense occurs within the state; 2) conduct
outside the state constitutes an attempt or conspiracy within the state or is prohibited by
a statute of the state specifically directed at such out-of-state conduct." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 1.03 explanatory note (1985).
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nal jurisdiction,3 0 7 instead retaining the common-law concepts.3 0 8
Initially the court reasoned that causing or attempting to cause
the obstruction of justice constituted an essential element of the
crime.30 9 Therefore, the locus of the act's result is the more impor-
tant element of the crime.310 Essentially, the defendant committed
two crimes: assault against the individual and obstruction ofjustice
against the State.31 ' The injury to the State constituted a justifica-
tion for Maryland to assume jurisdiction over the crime.31 2
For persuasive support, the court considered cases arising
under the federal obstruction of justice statutes3 s concerning venue
and cases involving the concept of constructive contempt. The fed-
eral circuits are divided on the venue issue, with some courts hold-
ing that venue lies in obstruction cases only in the district in which
the threatening actions occur."s 4 Other courts of appeal have re-
jected this theory, declaring that in obstruction of justice cases,
venue is proper in the district in which justice is impeded."s 5 The
Court of Special Appeals had determined that the better reasoned
cases were those holding that venue lies in the district influenced by
the obstructive acts.' 1 6
307. A provision similar to the MODEL PENAL CODE was considered but rejected in
Maryland. 308 Md. at 729 n.2, 521 A.2d at 1216-17 n.2.
308. Id. at 730, 521 A.2d at 1217. See supra note 304 and accompanying text. Accord
Urciolo v. State, 272 Md. 607, 325 A.2d 878 (1974) (jurisdiction conferred over the
crime of embezzlement in state in which the act occurred); Grindstaff v. State, 57 Md.
App. 412, 470 A.2d 809, cert. denied, 299 Md. 655, 474 A.2d 1344 (1984) (gravamen of
the crime of bribery was the intended result in Maryland).
309. 308 Md. at 734-35, 521 A.2d at 1219-20. Accord Romans v. State, 178 Md. 588,
16 A.2d 642 (1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 695 (1941) (stressing importance of result ele-
ment absent enumerated acts amounting to obstruction of justice).
310. 308 Md. at 739, 521 A.2d at 1222.
311. Id.
312. "It thus would appear to make sense to view the gravamen of those crimes [ob-
struction of justice] as being the injury to the State and to conclude that jurisdiction
exists where the offended agency of the State is located." Id.
313. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1982).
314. United States v. Nadolny, 601 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1979) (venue proper although
actual act of obstruction of justice did not take place where criminal investigation was
proceeding); United States v. Swann, 441 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (venue in District
of Columbia improper when defendant committed criminal obstruction ofjustice acts in
Maryland).
315. United States v. Kibler, 667 F.2d 452 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 961 (1982)
(venue proper in district in which the obstruction of justice would take effect); United
States v. Tedesco, 635 F.2d 902 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981) (defend-
ant convicted in Massachusetts for obstruction ofjustice for acts occurring in New York);
United States v. O'Donnell, 510 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975)
(venue proper in Tennessee although defendant's conduct to attempt to kill witness for
pending Tennessee trial occurred in Texas).
316. 308 Md. at 735 n.8, 521 A.2d at 1220 n.8.
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Moreover, constructive contempt' 1 7 cases are analogous in
their analysis of the territorial jurisdiction of a court. " 'The fact
that the offense was committed at a point remote from the court, in
an adjoining State, is of no importance.' ,',1 The court cited cases
which have noted that an indirect contempt insults the court's dig-
nity; prohibiting a court from punishing an indirect contempt be-
cause the acts occurred outside the jurisdiction would undermine
the court's power."s
9
Pennington significantly extends the territorial boundaries of
subject matter jurisdiction to include not only the'situs of the crimi-
nal act but also the forum affected by the act's results in criminal
obstruction of justice cases. Predictably, the Court of Appeals con-
ferred jurisdiction over the person whose acts prevented the admin-
istration of justice in a Maryland court. The court correctly
concluded that the result element was by far the most important ele-
ment of the crime.
The court, while recognizing the General Assembly's refusal to
enact an overall extension32 of territorial jurisdiction, believed that
the crime of obstruction of justice warranted the extension. In the
future the court may be persuaded to extend criminal jurisdiction
for other crimes which affront the judicial administration of a forum.
In obstruction of justice cases, the ultimate victim is the court,
even if the act was committed outside the forum state's borders. Es-
sential to the foundation of ajudicial administration is the assurance
that acts committed against a court are within the purview of its ju-
risdictional reach.
2. Courtroom Misconduct.-In Collins v. States 2 1 the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals discussed the measures that a trial court may take to
prevent a criminal defendant from disrupting courtroom proceed-
317. A constructive contempt is a willful disregard or disobedience of a public author-
ity committed outside the presence of the court. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoT'n, supra note 305,
§ 1.7, at 62. A number of courts have determined that a court has jurisdiction over
constructive contempt acts committed outside the state's borders. See, e.g., Snow v.
Hawkes, 183 N.C. 365, 368, 111 S.E. 621, 623 (1922) (holding defendant in contempt
for coercing plaintiff in another state to dismiss the suit); Farmers' State Bank of
Texhoma v. State, 13 Okla. Crim. 283, 284-85, 164 P. 132, 132 (1917) ("[Cjontempt is
an offense against the dignity and authority of the particular court to which the affront is
offered.").
318. 308 Md. at 742, 521 A.2d at 1223 (quoting Hunter v. United States, 48 App. D.C.
19, 24-25 (1918)).
319. Id. at 743-45, 521 A.2d at 1224-25.
320. See supra notes 306-07 and accompanying text.
321. 69 Md. App. 173, 516 A.2d 1015 (1986).
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ings. After considering the options available to a judge, the inter-
mediate appellate court determined that the trial judge had acted
properly in delaying removal of the defendant from the
courtroom.
3 22
Daniel Collins was convicted in the Circuit Court for Howard
County of kidnapping, rape, robbery, and assault with intent to mur-
der.3 23 Collins' speech and conduct throughout his trial and sen-
tencing hearing was so disruptive that it was virtually impossible to
conduct the proceedings in his presence. 32 4 . The trial court judge
took several measures to attempt to alleviate Collins' interruptions,
but eventually had to remove him from the courtroom.3 2 5 On ap-
peal Collins argued that he was deprived of a fair trial because he
was not removed from the courtroom soon enough.32 6 He con-
tended that the effect of this prejudice was to deny him his constitu-
tional right to a fair trial.32 7
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."328 The
Supreme Court has interpreted this confrontation clause as granting
a defendant in a criminal proceeding the right to be present in the
courtroom at every stage of the trial.3 2 9 The Court, however, also
has held that this right can be waived by a defendant's inappropriate
conduct. In Illinois v. Allen" 0 the Court provided trial judges three
options for dealing with an unruly defendant: (1) bind and gag the
defendant; (2) cite the defendant for contempt; and (3) remove the
defendant from the courtroom until he or she promises to
behave.33'
322. Id. at 189, 516 A.2d at 1023.
323. Id. at 178-79, 516 A.2d at 1018.
324. Id. at 179, 516 A.2d at 1018.
325. Id. The measures included taking a recess, warning Collins verbally out of the
jury's presence, and eventually binding and gagging him. Once Collins had been re-
moved, he refused repeated invitations to return to the courtroom. During most of this
voluntary absence, however, Collins viewed his trial on a closed-circuit television in a
courthouse cell. Id. at 181-82, 186, 516 A.2d at 1019, 1021.
326. Id. at 186-87, 516 A.2d at 1022.
327. Id.
328. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Supreme Court held this clause applicable to the
states via the fourteenth amendment in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
329. See Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892).
330. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
331. Id. at 343-44. In Allen the defendant was repeatedly warned by the trial judge
that he would be removed if he persisted in his unruly conduct and was constantly in-
formed that he could return to the trial when he agreed to conduct himself in an orderly
manner. Id. at 340-41.
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The Court of Special Appeals has held that the choice of action
taken in dealing with a disruptive defendant is solely within the dis-
cretion of the trial judge, since the judge is best able to assess the
situation. 32 The court has suggested, however, that before sanc-
tions are employed against the defendant, the trial judge first should
excuse the jury from the courtroom and then warn the defendant
that further disruption will lead to sanctions.333
As the Court of Special Appeals recognized, the Collins case rep-
resented a new twist to the appeals normally raised by a disruptive
defendant who has been excluded from courtroom proceedings.
334
Usually a misbehaving defendant will claim that the removal was a
deprivation of the constitutional right to a fair trial; Collins, how-
ever, claimed that he was deprived of a fair trial because he was not
removed.335 Collins argued that the trial judge "abused his discre-
tion in refusing requests to remove him from the courtroom before
he disrupted the trial and antagonized and prejudiced the jury. "336
When Collins initially interrupted the trial, the judge ordered
that a recess be taken.3 37 Soon thereafter, the trial judge excused
the jury and warned Collins that he might be removed from the
courtroom, subsequently receiving an assurance from Collins that
the disruptions would cease. 338 "It was only after Collins reneged
on this assurance that the court employed Allen-like sanctions, first
handcuffing, then gagging, then excluding Collins. 313 9 Therefore,
the trial judge properly admonished Collins before expelling
him. 34
0
Nor did the trial judge abuse his discretion in refusing to ex-
clude the defendant from the proceedings sooner than he did. Col-
lins' defense relied upon the premise that the victims had
332. Dixon v. State, 27 Md. App. 443, 451, 340 A.2d 396, 401 (1975).
333. Jones v. State, I1 Md. App. 686, 694, 276 A.2d 666, 670 (1971).
334. 69 Md. App. at 186, 516 A.2d at 1022.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 186-87, 516 A.2d at 1022.
337. Id. at 180, 516 A.2d at 1019.
338. Id. at 181, 516 A.2d at 1019.
339. Id. at 188, 516 A.2d at 1023.
340. This preference also has been expressed in the A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, Standard 6-3.8 commentary, at 6.44 (2d ed. 1986):
Public confidence in the trial process requires that removal of defendants be
limited to cases urgently demanding that action be taken, that it be done only
after explicit warning, that there be a standing opportunity for the defendant to
return to the courtroom, and that the burden that absence creates for the de-
fense be kept to the unavoidable minimum.
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misidentified him.34 1 Thus, in-court identification was the crux of
the State's case. Once the identification was completed, the trial
judge granted Collins' request to leave the courtroom.342 The
Court of Special Appeals reasoned that if the trial judge had ex-
cluded Collins earlier and then brought him back for the identifica-
tion, Collins' reappearance might have affected the credibility of the
in-court identification.3 43
The Collins court reaffirmed that the trial judge's discretion over
courtroom proceedings extends to determining how to control an
obstreperous defendant. Moreover, the court made it clear that a
misbehaving defendant's right to a fair trial is not violated by the
defendant's own inappropriate actions in the courtroom.
D. Elements of Crimes
1. Mens Rea.-In Glenn v. State- 4 4 the Court of Special Appeals
thoroughly analyzed the mental element of the crime of assault with
intent to murder. With the goal of "housecleaning ' ' in mind, the
court sought not only to provide a better definition of the crime but
also to elaborate on the dangers inherent in using the ambiguous
term "malice." In an opinion written by Judge Moylan, the Court of
Special Appeals held that (1) "[a]ssault with intent to murder is an
assault with intent to kill under circumstances such that if the victim
should die, the crime would be murder";34 6 (2) it is the absence of
mitigation, not malice, that separates murder from manslaughter;3 47
and (3) it is the intent to kill, rather than malice, that may be in-
ferred from the directing of a dangerous weapon at a vital part of
the human anatomy. 48
Britt Glenn was convicted in a nonjury trial of assault with in-
tent to murder and possession of marijuana. 4 9 On appeal he
claimed he lacked the mens rea necessary for assault with intent to
murder .3 " The Court of Special Appeals agreed, finding that there
341. 69 Md. App. at 189, 516 A.2d at 1023.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. 68 Md. App. 379, 511 A.2d I 110, cert. denied, 307 Md. 599, 516 A.2d 569 (1986).
345. Id. at 381, 511 A.2d at 1112.
346. Id. at 398, 511 A.2d at 1120.
347. Id. at 405, 511 A.2d at 1124.
348. Id. at 411, 511 A.2d at 1127.
349. Id. at 380, 511 A.2d at II11.
350. Id. at 381, 511 A.2d at 1 11. The facts were undisputed. An altercation occurred
in which the assault victim, Rizo, and his friends attacked Glenn outside of a nightclub.
After nightclub bouncers separated the men, Glenn followed Rizo in his car, went over
to the car in which Rizo sat, and stabbed him four times. Id. at 406-07, 511 A.2d at
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were facts establishing provocation legally sufficient to provide a
mitigating factor that would have prevented Glenn from being con-
victed of murder had the victim died.3 5 ' The court concluded that
in convicting Glenn of assault with intent to murder the trial judge
had "erred by following time-honored but misleading appellate
road signs."3 52
The court characterized pre-1975 law on criminal homicide as a
"Kafkaesque hall of mirrors.""5 3 The Supreme Court's 1975 opin-
ion in Mullaney v. Wilbur 3 54 "set out to clean the Augean Stables of
the accumulated semantic debris and outworn linguistic usages of
three centuries."'35 5 The Court struck down ajury instruction to the
effect that the defendant bore the burden of establishing that justify-
ing or mitigating circumstances reduced an intentional and unlawful
homicide from manslaughter to murder. Also in 1975, the Court of
Special Appeals reversed the conviction of the defendant in Evans v.
State.3 5 6 In that opinion, also written by judge Moylan, the court
struck down a jury instruction which declared that malice was to be
presumed from the pointing of a deadly weapon at a vital part of the
human body. The court characterized the instruction as unconstitu-
tional because the State bears the burden of proving lack of mitiga-
tion beyond a reasonable doubt.
35 7
Despite Evans, certain "elusive" and "tenacious" misconcep-
tions have persisted since 1976 concerning the distinctions between
the various forms of homicide, the role of "malice" in deciding
which offenses have been committed, and the nature of assault with
1125. Glenn did not challenge his conviction for possession of marijuana, nor did he
deny committing simple assault. Id. at 380-81, 511 A.2d at lIIl. As Judge Moylan
stated, "Criminal agency was clear. The only issue is whether [Glenn] stabbed his victim
with that aggravating mens rea that raises the common law misdemeanor of simple assault
to the statutory felony of assault with intent to murder." Id. at 382, 511 A.2d at 1112.
351. Id. at 406-07, 511 A.2d at 1125.
352. Id. at 381, 511 A.2d at 1111.
353. Id. Judge Moylan subsequently traced much of the confusion to the "chronic
failure to distinguish between the evidentiary significance of the intent to commit griev-
ous bodily harm and the legal significance thereof." d. at 390-91, 511 A.2d at 1116.
While proof of an intent to inflict grievous harm may support an inference of an intent
to kill, in theory the two intents are quite different. Id. at 391, 394, 511 A.2d at 1116,
1118.
In a long footnote, the court pointed to a "glaring misstatement" in case law that
first appeared in Webb v. State, 201 Md. 158, 93 A.2d 80 (1952). In Webb the court held
that a specific intent to kill is not necessary to support a charge of assault with intent to
murder. Id. at 161-62, 93 A.2d at 82. See 68 Md. App. at 391 n.7, 511 A.2d at 1116 n.7.
354. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
355. 68 Md. App. at 381, 511 A.2d at 1111.
356. 28 Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 (1975), aff'd, 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976).
357. Id. at 730-31, 349 A.2d at 354.
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intent to murder.3 5 8 It is to these misconceptions, which the court
characterized as "half-truths," that the court's opinion' was
addressed.
The first "half-truth" which the court attacked declared: "As-
sault with intent to murder is an assault under circumstances such
that if the victim should die, the crime would be murder.-3 59 The
court considered this statement incomplete because it failed to take
into account the existence of four types of murder: (1) intent to kill
murder, (2) intent to commit grievous harm murder, (3) felony mur-
der,. and (4) depraved heart murder. Each type of murder has its
own distinct mens rea;3 6 ° each exists in both the first and second de-
gree.3 6  The old definition of assault with intent to murder, which
turned on the end result being termed "murder" if the victim died,
thus failed to distinguish between eight homicidal intents.
To clarify this maze, the court focused on the mens rea necessary
for assault with intent to murder, identifying it as the specific intent
to cause the victim's death. 62 Moreover, the court stated, this spe-
cific intent to kill is a required element only for the intent to kill
murders.3 63
Intent to kill is not an element of an assault with intent to com-
mit grievous bodily harm, because the victim's death is not the end
goal of such an act. While the perpetrator would be charged with
murder should the victim die, a specific intent to cause death is not
necessary."' Likewise, when victims of depraved heart acts or felo-
358. 68 Md. App. at 382, 511 A.2d at 1112. Assault with intent to murder was first
recognized in Maryland in 1809 and is now classified as a felony in MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 12 (1987).
The court went on to trace the development of homicide law and to explain the
distinctions, which it found are no longer valid, between express and implied malice, as
well as the evolution of concepts of mitigation and manslaughter after "malice afore-
thought" gradually became meaningless. See 68 Md. App. at 384-85, 401-05, 511 A.2d
at 1119-14, 1122-24.
359. 68 Md. App. at 382, 511 A.2d at 1112.
360. Id. at 385. 511 A.2d at 1113-14.
361. Id. at 386, 511 A.2d at 1114.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 388, 511 A.2d at 1115.
364. Id. at 389-90, 511 A.2d at 1116. Both intent to kill murder and intent to commit
grievous harm murder require specific intents, but they are different specific intents. As
Judge Moylan put it, "The critical distinction that needs to be made, however, is be-
tween the results specifically intended, not between the presence or absence of a specific intent." Id. at
390, 511 A.2d at 1116 (emphasis in original). Thus, "the inchoate form of intent-to-kill
murder is assault with intent to murder, whereas the inchoate form of intent-to-commit-
grievous-bodily-harm murder is assault with intent to maim, disfigure, or disable." Id.
In Sangster v. State, 70 Md. App. 456, 478-80, 521 A.2d 811,822-23 (1987), afV'don
other grounds, 312 Md. 360, 541 A.2d 637 (1988), the Court of Special Appeals refused to
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nies die, perpetrators are held accountable for murder without a
prerequisite specific intent to kill. 65 Murder, therefore, can be
committed without a specific intent to kill, whereas assault with in-
tent to murder cannot.3 66
The court concluded that assault with intent to murder is the
inchoate form only of the intent to kill murders.367 The court opined
that the Maryland legislature must have intended that assault with
the intent to murder be restricted to the intent to kill murders.
Otherwise, every assault with intent to commit any felony automati-
cally would constitute an assault with intent to murder.3 68
Therefore, the proper definition requires the words "with in-
tent to kill" to eliminate the three other types of murder. Moreover,
the words "under circumstances such that if the victim should die,
the crime would be murder" must be retained to Weed out justifi-
able or excused homicides.3 69 The court's first complete definition
is then: "Assault with intent to murder is an assault with intent to
kill under circumstances such that if the victim should die, the crime
would be murder.13 7 0
The court next addressed the common misconception that
"[m]alice is that which separates murder from manslaughter."13 7 1
Courts have had difficulty distinguishing these crimes because of the
word "malice" itself. Originally courts created the crime of man-
slaughter to separate deliberate killings from those mitigated by on-
the-scene provocation, as the phrase "malice aforethought" gradu-
ally lost its significance. 7 2 When the term "malice" remained and
expanded in application, the result was "a semanticist's
nightmare. 3 7 3 While malice often is used to denote intent, intent
apply Glenn to overturn a jury instruction that defined assault with intent to murder as
"'an assault that is committed with a specific intention to kill that particular person, or
with a specific intention to do what we call grievous bodily harm so that death would be
the likely result of that bodily harm." The court held that this instruction sufficiently
distinguished between the two mental states. Id. at 480, 521 A.2d at 823.
365. With felony murder, there is no specific intent that harm should come to anyone,
but merely a general intent to commit a felony. Depraved heart murder is also a general
intent crime: there is required an intent to do a reckless life-endangering act without
regard for the consequences. 68 Md. App. at 388-89, 511 A.2d at 1115.
366. Id. at 396, 511 A.2d at 1119.
367. Id. at 397, 511 A.2d at 1120.
368. Id. at 395, 511 A.2d at 1119.
369. Intended murder is "more than a simple intent to kill. It is the unjustified, unex-
cused and unmitigated intent to kill." Id. at 388 n.6, 511 A.2d at 1 15 n.6.
370. Id. at 398, 511 A.2d at 1120.
371. Id., 511 A.2d at 1121.
372. Id. at 401-04, 511 A.2d at 1122-24.
373. Id. at 398, 511 A.2d at 1121.
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does not separate murder from manslaughter. In the heat of sud-
den provocation, a person might intend to kill, yet the killing would
not be murder. The court concluded, therefore, that it is "absence
of mitigation," rather than "malice," which separates murder from
manslaughter.37 4
The word "malice" also caused the flaw in the third misconcep-
tion that the court dismantled: "One may infer malice from the di-
recting of a deadly weapon at a vital part of the human anatomy." 375
In examining this "half-truth," the court considered what may be
inferred from the directing of a dangerous weapon at a person.
According to the court's analysis, only one component of mal-
ice-intent to kill-may be inferred from such action. "Malice, like
Gaul, is divided into three parts":3 76 intent to kill, absence of miti-
gation, and absence of justification or excuse.3 7 7 Attacking some-
one with a knife several times, as Glenn did, would indeed
demonstrate an intent to kill,3 78 but would say absolutely nothing
about the absence of mitigation, which separates murder from man-
slaughter, or the absence ofjustification or excuse.3 7 9 Nevertheless,
because one component of malice could be inferred from a knife
attack, a court might erroneously convict a defendant like Glenn of
assault with intent to murder 8 0 despite the presence of legally suffi-
374. Id. at 405, 511 A.2d at 1124.
375. Id. at 408, 511 A.2d at 1126.
376. Id. at 398, 511 A.2d at 1121.
377. Id. at 404, 511 A.2d at 1123-24.
378. In Cox v. State, 69 Md. App. 396, 518 A.2d 132 (1986), af'd, 311 Md. 326, 534
A.2d 1333 (1988). the Court of Special Appeals used its Glenn holding regarding the
difference between murder and manslaughter to support its affirmation of a conviction
for "attempted voluntary manslaughter." id. at 401-04, 518 A.2d at 135-37. The de-
fendant had argued that a specific intent is necessary for attempt, which is precluded
from the sudden provocation element of voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 399, 518 A.2d
at 134. Applying Glenn, the Court of Special Appeals reiterated the holding that it is not
malice, nor even specific intent to kill, that separates murder from manslaughter, as
there can be intent to kill with manslaughter. Id. at 404, 518 A.2d at 136-37.
379. 68 Md. App. at 410, 511 A.2d at 1126-27. "Although the intent may be inferred
from the act itself, it may not be inferred that the intent was unexcused or unjustified or
that the intent was unmitigated." Id.
380. The court observed:
(Ejrror was almost inevitable. The court was looking for malice. The case law
told the court that malice may be inferred from the directing of a deadly
weapon at a vital part of the human anatomy. Therefore, malice was found to
be present. Therefore, the verdict was guilty of assault with intent to murder.
Id. See also Hall v. State, 69 Md. App. 37,46-47, 516 A.2d 204, 208-09 (1986), cert. denied,
308 Md. 382, 519 A.2d 1283 (1987) (applying Glenn to reverse the defendant's convic-
tion for assault with intent to murder on the ground that use of a deadly weapon by itself
does not establish intent to murder).
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cient provocation.3 8 ' To correct the faulty inference, the court sub-
stituted "intent to kill" for "malice." Therefore, the court
explained that "[t]he intent to kill may be inferred from the di-
recting of a dangerous weapon at a vital part of the human
anatomy. ' 13
2
In Glenn the Court of Special Appeals made an admirable at-
tempt to remedy the confusion created by tl'e amorphous legal con-
cept of malice. With its holding, it was the court's hope that trial
courts no longer would be tempted to slip "on the linguistic banana
peel of 'malice.' "383
2. Merger.-The Court of Appeals clarified concepts of crimi-
nal intent in State v. Jenkins."' The court determined that even
though the mentes reae of assault with intent to murder and assault
with intent to maim differ, the offenses themselves are not inconsis-
tent because one act of criminal assault may lead to either the death
or disablement of the victim.3 85 Therefore, it is possible to harbor
both types of intent as "conditional alternatives" simultaneously, 8 6
The court held, however, that because the legislature did not intend
to compound an offender's punishment when the two offenses arise
out of the same criminal act, assault with intent to maim merges into
assault with intent to murder.3 8 7
A jury in the Circuit Court for Calvert County convicted Tony
Jenkins of assault with intent to murder and assault with intent to
maim, disfigure, or disable as a result of an incident in which one
shot was fired.s88  Jenkins received separate but concurrent
sentences for each offense.3 8 9
381. The court overturned Glenn's conviction for assault with intent to murder and
remanded the case for sentencing for simple assault and battery. 68 Md. App. at 412,
511 A.2d at 1127.
382. Id. at 411, 511 A.2d at 1127.
383. Id. at 408, 511 A.2d at 1126.
384. 307 Md. 501, 515 A.2d 465 (1986).
385. Id. at 516, 515 A.2d at 472. Assault with intent to murder requires a specific
intent to kill. Assault with intent to maim involves an intent to inflict grievous bodily
harm, but does not require a purpose that the victim die. Id. at 515, 515 A.2d at 472.
386. Id. at 516, 515 A.2d at 472.
387. Id. at 517, 515 A.2d at 473.
388. Id. at 503-04, 515 A.2d at 466. An altercation outside of a store in Sunderland,
Maryland, began when the victim, Claggett, told Jenkins not to lean on his car. When
the two squared to fight, Jenkins drew a gun and shot Claggett, wounding him in the leg
and hip. Jenkins also was charged with simple assault and carrying a handgun. Id.
389. Id. at 504, 515 A.2d at 466. Jenkins was sentenced to 25 years for assault with
intent to murder, 10 years for assault with intent to maim, five years for simple assault,
and five years for carrying a handgun. Id.
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The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that assault
with intent to murder and assault with intent to maim are inconsis-
tent offenses because their intent elements differ. Jenkins, there-
fore, could not be held accountable for both. The intermediate
appellate court thus resolved the perceived inconsistency in favor of
the defendant, vacating the conviction for assault with intent to
murder.3 90
The Court of Appeals agreed that the intent elements for each
offense were inconsistent, because assault with intentto murder re-
quires a specific intent to kill while assault with intent to maim does
not.39 ' The Court of Appeals diverged from the intermediate ap-
pellate court, however, in its holding that despite different intent
elements, the crimes themselves are consistent. The court stated
that a criminal may "harbor both intents at the time of the assault,"
with the intent to maim "conditioned upon the first intent [i.e., the
intent to kill] not being achieved. 3 92
Nevertheless, the court found a legislative intent to preclude
separate punishment for the two crimes when they arise from the
same criminal attack. 93 When the legislature intends to punish one
crime instead of two, the lesser offense merges into the greater.3 94
The court thus declined to apply the required evidence test, which it
390. Jenkins v. State, 59 Md. App. 612, 624, 477 A.2d 791, 797 (1984).
391. 307 Md. at 515, 515 A.2d at 472.
392. Id. at 516, 515 A.2d at 472. In its petition for certiorari, the State claimed that
the Court of Special Appeals' characterization of assault with intent to murder was in-
correct, in that a specific intent to kill is not an element of the offense which the prosecu-
tion must prove. Rather, the State claimed, intent to kill may be inferred by evidence
showing an intent to inflict grievous bodily harm. The State therefore reasoned that
since an intent to inflict grievous bodily harm and an intent to maim are not mutually
exclusive, neither are the mentes reae of assault with intent to murder and assault with
intent to maim. The State further claimed that as a result, an offender may be found
guilty of both crimes. Id. at 507-08, 515 A.2d at 468.
The Court of Appeals, however, upheld the intermediate appellate court's charac-
terization of assault with intent to murder, stating that the prosecution must establish
the specific intent to kill. The Court of Appeals saw the State's definition as an attempt
to equate that crime with an assault with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm. The
court pointed out that while the facts showing an intent to inflict grievous bodily harm
might support an inference that an intent to murder existed, the mentes reae for the two
crimes need not be equivalent. Nonetheless, while the Court of Appeals rejected the
State's attempt to reconcile the two intents, it did accept the State's conclusion that an
offender may harbor both intents at the time of one criminal attack. Id. at 515-16, 515
A.2d at 472.
393. Id. at 517, 515 A.2d at 473.
394. Id. The Court of Appeals found the Court of Special Appeals in error for vacat-
ing Jenkins' conviction and sentence for assault with intent to murder, ruling that his
conviction and sentence for assault with intent to maim, disfigure, or disable should
have been remanded for entry of a new judgment. Id. at 523-24, 515 A.2d at 475-76.
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conceded is the general test for determining whether offenses
merge. s95
The Supreme Court enunciated the required evidence test in
Blockburger v. United States .s3 Applying this test, assault with intent
to murder and assault with intent to maim do not merge because
assault with intent to murder requires proof of a specific intent to
kill while assault with intent to maim does not. 9 7 The Court of Ap-
peals, however, declined to apply Blockburger, asserting instead the
doctrine of merger by legislative intent.3 98
The court indicated that whenever a single criminal act results
in several charges, there are several considerations: (1) whether the
offenses are inconsistent, thereby precluding conviction for both;
(2) if not, whether the offenses merge for the purposes of conviction
and sentencing; and (3) if they merge, whether Blockburger or the
doctrine of merger by legislative intent applies.3 99
In considering the consistency of the two crimes, the Court of
Appeals agreed with the Court of Special Appeals' characterization
of the mens rea of assault with intent to murder as a specific intent to
kill.400 Unlike the intermediate appellate court, however, the Court
of Appeals did not have difficulty envisioning a case in which a crim-
inal could simultaneously harbor both an intent to kill and an intent
to maim.401 Such an offender, according to the court, would desire
the victim's death. In the event that death did not occur, the of-
fender would have an alternative intent that the injuries be at least
395. Id. at 518, 515 A.2d at 473. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299
(1932), discussed infra at note 396.
396. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). The test is as follows:
Each of the offenses created requires proof of a different element. The applica-
ble rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there
are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not.
Id. at 304. See also Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 268, 373 A.2d 262, 266 (1977) (apply-
ing Blockburger to merge attempted robbery into felony murder). Because the Blockburger
Court decided the case on federal statutory, rather than constitutional grounds, a state
court is not obliged to use the test.
397. 307 Md. at 517, 515 A.2d at 473.
398. Id. at 517-18, 515 A.2d at 473.
399. Id. at 516-21, 515 A.2d at 472-75.
400. Id. at 515, 515 A.2d at 472. In Glenn v. State, 68 Md. App. 379, 511 A.2d 11 10,
cert. denied, 307 Md. 506, 516 A.2d 569 (1986). the Court of Special Appeals held that
assault with intent to murder is an assault with intent to kill under circumstances such
that if the victim should die, the crime would be murder. Id. at 382-98, 511 A.2d at
1112-20. The Jenkins court left the Glenn definition undisturbed. 307 Md. at 515, 515
A.2d at 472. For an analysis of Glenn, see supra notes 344-383 and accompanying text.
401. 307 Md. at 516, 515 A.2d at 472.
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disabling. The court stated that although these ultimate goals are
inconsistent as well as mutually exclusive in that both results cannot
be achieved against a single victim in one assault, the existence of
both purposes in the offender's mind at the time of the act is not
impossible. 40 2  Therefore, the crimes themselves are not
inconsistent.40
3
The court contrasted this situation with the crimes of larceny
and receiving." The men rea of larceny, the intent to steal, is in-
consistent with that of receiving, in which the intent is to obtain an
item from someone who has stolen it. Although these intents like-
wise may exist as conditional alternatives, the crimes of larceny and
receiving cannot share a common actus reus.405 According to the
Court of Appeals, the impossibility of executing both intents by
means of the same act makes the crimes of larceny and receiving
inconsistent.4 °6
Even though the Court of Appeals reasserted Blockburger as the
general standard to be applied in Maryland, 40 7 it nevertheless de-
clined to follow the required evidence rule inJenkins, noting that the
Blockburger test has not been the exclusively applied standard.40 8
Two Maryland statutes define assault with intent to murder and as-
sault with intent to maim, disfigure, or disable.4 9 Despite the exist-
ence of separate statutes and different elements. for these crimes,
the Court of Appeals determined that the General Assembly in-
tended to prohibit the imposition of separate convictions and
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 516-17, 515 A.2d at 472-73.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 517, 515 A.2d at 473. Compare Whack v. State, 288 Md. 137, 416 A.2d 265
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 990 (1981) (legislature intended that multiple punishments
be imposed for robbery with a deadly weapon and use of a handgun in the commission
of a felony; offenses did not merge) with Brooks v. State, 284 Md. 416, 397 A.2d 596
(1979) (Blockburger test generally applied; assault with intent to murder and carrying a
weapon with intent to injure did not merge).
408. 307 Md. at 518, 515 A.2d. at 473. The court cited Whack, 288 Md. at 143, 416
A.2d at 268, in which the Court of Appeals upheld the imposition of dual punishments
for robbery and illegal use of a handgun. The Whack court declared that "even though
two offenses may be deemed the same under the required evidence test, separate
sentences may be permissible, at least where one offense involves a particularly aggra-
vating factor, if the Legislature expresses such an intent." Id. (footnote omitted). The
Whack court found it significant that the General Assembly, in enacting the handgun
control bill now codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B (1987), did not amend the
robbery statute to "delete handguns from the coverage." Whack, 288 Md. at 146, 416
A.2d at 270.
409. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 12, 386 (1987).
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sentences "where there is but a single act of assault.14 '0 The court
reasoned that if the Blockburger standard were applied, all assault
with intent crimes would be considered separate from each other
even when occurring during one criminal attack, rather than as vari-
ous ways of aggravating the underlying criminal act.4 " Instead, the
Court of Appeals concluded that "one aggravated assault should be
viewed as merging into the other aggravated assault. 41 2
Once a court determines that the crimes for which a defendant
has been convicted merge, the court must decide which offense
merges into the other. In the required evidence test, the elements
of each offense, rather than the relative sentences for the crimes,
determine which offense merges into the other.4' ,By contrast, if
various aggravated assault offenses merge as a result of the court's
construction of legislative intent, "the offense carrying the lesser
maximum penalty merges into the offense carrying the greater pen-
alty. ' '41 4 Because Jenkins' crimes merged by legislative intent, the
court concluded that his conviction and sentence for assault with
intent to murder should not have been reversed; rather, his convic-
tion and sentence for assault with intent to maim should have been
vacated due to its merger into the greater offense.4'5
Since Jenkins the Court of Appeals has had the opportunity to
consider similar questions and to refine its holding. The court has
indicated that it still relies primarily on the Blockburger required evi-
dence test. For instance, one month after Jenkins, the court in Robin-
son v. State4 '6 ruled that the intent element of assault with intent to
disable is not inconsistent with that of depraved heart murder.4 , 7
410. 307 Md. at 517, 515 A.2d at 473.
411. Id. at 520-21, 515 A.2d at 475. The court quoted Manigault v. State, 61 Md.
App. 271, 486 A.2d 240 (1985), in which Judge Moylan wrote:
A defendant who has assaulted his victim with the concomitant specific intents
to rape her, to rob her, and to kill her, has committed not three cimes but one.
That one has simply been aggravated upward to the felony plateau in three
different ways. An uncritical application of the Blockburger test, simply compar-
ing elements, might make it appear that assault with intent to rob, assault with
intent to murder, and assault with intent to rape are all separate crimes because
each possesses a distinct element. It is not a proper occasion to apply the Block-
burger test, however, because these are but various forms of aggravating a com-
mon undergirding offense.
Id. at 285 n.2, 486 A.2d at 247 n.2.




416. 307 Md. 738,,517 A.2d 94 (1986).
417. Id. at 744, 517 A.2d at 97.
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Because the court did not face the problem of alternative inconsis-
tent intents, it found that the Jenkins analysis was inapplicable.41 1
In Dillsworth v. State4t 9 the defendant was convicted of both as-
sault with intent to maim and a third degree sexual offense. On ap-
peal he claimed that the offenses should have merged. The Court of
Appeals reaffirmed the Blockburger test as the generally applicable
standard, 420 and concluded that because each offense at issue re-
quired proof of an element that the other did not require, the two
crimes would not merge under Blockburger.42'
The Dillsworth court next considered whether the doctrine of
merger by legislative intent would supersede the Blockburger test.422
Examining the two statutes at issue,423 the court explained, "The
doctrine of merger by legislative intent operates as a rule of statu-
tory construction and is not constitutionally mandated.1 42 4 That
the statute for assault with intent to maim had been enacted more
than a century before the sexual offense legislation aided the court
in concluding that the legislature had not considered the question of
multiple punishment when "a consummated sexual offense embod-
ies an assault with intent to maim, disfigure or disable. '42 5 An ex-
amination of legislative history gave the court no reason to conclude
that the legislature intended to prohibit multiple punishment, nor
did the court find any statutory ambiguity that would preclude the
imposition of multiple sentences. Unlike Jenkins, therefore, which
also involved two separate statutes, the doctrine of merger by legis-
lative intent was not triggered. 426
Finally, in State v. Holmes427 the Court of Appeals again indi-
cated that Blockburger generally applies in Maryland, holding that the
crimes of assault with intent to murder and attempted murder in the
first degree are not the same.428 CitingJenkins, the court concluded
that the elements of each offense differ in that assault with intent to
murder requires an assault and an intent to murder, whereas at-
tempted murder in the first degree requires a wilful, deliberate, and
418. Id.
419. 308 Md. 354, 519 A.2d 1269 (1987).
420. Id. at 361, 519 A.2d at 1272.
421. Id. at 360, 519 A.2d at 1272.
422. Id. at 361-67, 519 A.2d at 1272-76.
423. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 386, 464B (1987).
424. Dilsworth, 308 Md. at 364, 519 A.2d at 1274.
425. Id. at 367, 519 A.2d at 1276.
426. Id.
427. 310 Md. 260, 528 A.2d 1279 (1987).
428. Id. at 267-72, 528 A.2d at 1282-85.
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premeditated intent to kill. The crimes, therefore, did not merge
under the required evidence test.
42 9
The Jenkins holding leaves room for advocating the use of the
doctrine of merger by legislative intent. Although Maryland courts
generally follow Blockburger, whenever multiple charges arise from
one criminal act, the Court of Appeals will consider construing the
statutes in question to find a legislative intent that separate penalties
not be imposed.
E. Defenses
1. Necessity.-The Court of Appeals held in State v. Crawford430
that necessity may be a valid defense to the unlawful possession of a
handgun. The court articulated a five-part test that a defendant
must satisfy in order to justify the unlawful possession of a hand-
gun.4 3 ' If the defendant faces a threat of mere property damage or
future, rather than imminent, personal injury, or if the defendant's
conduct creates the emergency, the defense is unavailable.43 2
The sequence of events on the night that defendant Leonard
Crawford was arrested was "nothing less than bizarre. '43 3 Two as-
sailants attacked and shot Crawford in his own apartment. 43 4 He
struggled for possession of one assailant's handgun. 43 In the pro-
cess of grabbing the gun, Crawford fell through his second story
apartment window. 436 When he'realized that the gun was on the
ground next to him, he picked it up.4 7 His assailants followed,
shooting him in the leg repeatedly and trying to hit him with their
car.438 Crawford staggered wounded and dazed, seeking assistance
and safety. Finally, the police arrived, shot Crawford in the arm and
chest, and then arrested him.439
429. Id. at 272, 528 A.2d at 1285.
430. 308 Md. 683, 521 A.2d 1193 (1987).
431. Id. at 698-99, 521 A.2d at 1200-01.
432. Id. at 699, 521 A.2d at 1201.
433. Id. at 686, 521 A.2d at 1194.
434. Id. at 686-87, 521 A.2d at 1194-95. The court quoted extensively from Craw-
ford's testimony. Id. at 686-90, 521 A.2d at 1194-96.
435. Id. at 687, 521 A.2d at 1195. When Crawford first realized that intruders were in
his apartment, he attempted to call the police, but found that his telephone had been
disconnected because he had failed to pay his bill. Id. at 686, 521 A.2d at 1194.
436. Id. at 687, 521 A.2d at 1195.
437. id. The defendant stated, "I picked up the gun to defend myself." Id.
438. Id. at 688, 521 A.2d at 1195.
439. Id. at 690, 521 A.2d at 1195-96. Crawford was charged in Prince George's
County with two counts of assault on a police officer and one count of unlawful posses-
sion of a handgun pursuant to MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(b) (1987).
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The jury found Crawford not guilty of assault but convicted him
of unlawful possession of a handgun.440 The trial judge, however,
refused to instruct the jury regarding the defense of necessity.44 '
The Court of Special Appeals reversed and remanded the case, find-
ing that the defense of necessity is valid for the offense of unlawful
possession of a handgun and that the defendant was entitled to a
jury instruction to that effect.442 The Court of Appeals affirmed,
formulating strict guidelines to which a defendant must adhere in
order to successfully invoke the defense of necessity.4
4
The defense of necessity may arise when an individual in a per-
ilous situation confronts environmental forces which require a
choice between two evils. 4 " The person must choose between vio-
lating the criminal law or abiding by the law and producing an even
greater harm. Public policy recognizes the difficulty of this di-
lemma; an individual therefore is justified in violating the literal lan-
guage of the law when to do so promotes a greater good for
society.445
440. 308 Md. at 691, 521 A.2d at 1196. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Any person who shall wear, carry, or transport any handgun, whether con-
cealed or open, upon or about his person, and any person who shall wear, carry
or knowingly transport any handgun, whether concealed or open, in any vehicle
traveling upon the public roads, highways, waterways, or airways or upon roads
or parking lots generally used by the public in this State shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor; and it shall be a rebuttable presumption that the person is know-
ingly transporting the handgun....
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(b) (1987).
441. 308 Md. at 691, 521 A.2d at 1196. The judge declared that the handgun statute
provided no necessity exception. Id.
442. 61 Md. App. 620, 629-31, 487 A.2d at 1214, 1219-20 (1985).
443. 308 Md. at 698-99, 521 A.2d at 1200-01.
444. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). See also Hitchler,
Necessity as a Defense in Criminal Cases, 33 DICK. L. REV. 138 (1929); Arnolds & Garland,
The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law. The Right to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 289 (1974). See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 305, § 5.4, at
627; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 305, at 1065-67.
The court recognized that "[wihen the pressure causing a defendant to commit a
criminal act is caused by human beings, his defense will usually be 'duress' rather than
'necessity.' " 308 Md. at 691 n.l, 521 A.2d at 1197 n.I. Nevertheless, as commentators
have pointed out:
The typical duress case, however, has involved a situation in which .4 has or-
dered B to engage in certain conduct prohibited by the criminal law or else
suffer certain consequences. It might well be argued that when an individual
acts to avoid a greater harm from a person who has not given such an order...
the situation ought to be dealt with as a form of necessity rather than duress.
W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 305, § 5.4, at 628 n.3 (citations omitted). Thus, the
Crawford court declared, "We will refer to the defense in this case as necessity." 308 Md.
at 691 n.I, 521 A.2d at 1197 n.l.
445. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScOT-, supra note 305, § 5.4, at 627. The Supreme Court
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The Court of Appeals first recognized the possibility of the de-
fense of necessity in Sigma Reproductive Health Center v. State.446 The
defense applies when: "1) the act charged was done to avoid signifi-
cant evil; 2) there was no other alternative means of escape; and 3)
the remedy was not disproportionate to the evil to be avoided."44
After examining the necessity defense under Maryland law, the
court considered the legislative history of the reformed handgun
control legislation.44 In prohibiting the carrying of any hand-
gun," 9 this stringent legislation aimed "to discourage and punish
the possession of handguns on the streets and public ways." 45 The
statute, however, did not refer expressly to situations that may war-
rant the use of a handgun in the event of impending danger to life
or limb.45 '
The Court of Appeals reasoned that it was within the mandate
of the handgun legislation to allow temporary possession of a hand-
gun when an individual is in imminent danger of death or serious
bodily harm.452 The court noted that it would have been unreason-
able for the General Assembly to intend that an individual facing
life-threatening danger surrender to an attacker rather than act in
self-defense.453
Consistent with the Crawford decision are a number of cases
considered the general rules regarding the defense of necessity in United States v. Bai-
ley, 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
446. 297 Md. 660, 679, 467 A.2d 483, 490 (1983) (defense of necessity not available
in a prosecution for trespass at an abortion clinic). See also Robinson v. State, 42 Md.
App. 617, 621-22, 402 A.2d 115. 117 (1979) (defense of necessity available to defendant
charged with prison escape); Frasher v. State, 8 Md. App. 439, 448-49, 260 A.2d 656,
662, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 959 (1970) (defense of necessity unavailable in prosecution for
narcotics violations).
447. Arnolds & Garland, supra note 444, at 294.
448. 308 Md. at 692-96, 521 A.2d at 1197-99. Before 1972, handgun control legisla-
tion prohibited possession of a weapon with the intent to injure. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 36 (1971). In 1972, however, the General Assembly reformed the handgun legislation
and disallowed carrying of any handgun. Act of Mar. 27, 1972, ch. 13, 1972 Md. Laws
38. For the text of the current statute, see supra note 440.
449. Persons exempt from the prohibition against handgun possession include law
enforcement personnel, members of the armed forces, correctional facility personnel,
persons with permits, persons transporting handguns for legitimate purposes, and per-
sons on their own property. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(c) (1987).
450. 308 Md. at 695, 521 A.2d at 1199. The General Assembly recognized that there
had been a significant increase in the number of crimes committed by persons carrying
handguns in public. Id. at 693, 521 A.2d at 1198.
451. Id. at 696, 521 A.2d at 1199. The statute, however, does allow the issuance of
permits for handgun possession when it is "'necessary-as a reasonable precaution against
apprehended danger." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36E(a)(6) (1987).
452. 308 Md. at 696, 521 A.2d at 1199.
453. Id. The court pointed out that it would be "utter folly to talk of requiring a man
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from other jurisdictions which allow the necessity defense to the
charge of unlawful possession of a handgun.454 Persuaded by this
case law, the Court of Appeals articulated a. five-part test which per-
mits the defense of necessity in a prosecution for the illegal posses-
sion of a handgun:455
(1) [T]he defendant must be in present, imminent, and im-
pending peril of death or serious bodily injury, or reason-
ably believe himself or others to be in such danger; (2) the
defendant must not have intentionally or recklessly placed
himself in a situation in which it was probable that he
would be forced to choose the criminal conduct; (3) the de-
fendant must not have any reasonable, legal alternative to
possessing the handgun; (4) the handgun must be made
available to the defendant without preconceived design,
and (5) the defendant must give up possession of the hand-
gun as soon as the necessity or apparent necessity ends.4 56
Applying this test to the facts of the case, the court determined that
Crawford was entitled to invoke the defense of necessity.4 57
The court articulated a stringent test presumably to prevent an
onslaught of necessity defenses in the trial courts. Elaborating a
five-part standard should dissuade frivolous attempts to shield de-
fendants from criminal liability. Moreover, the test does not under-
mine the policies articulated by the General Assembly in its attempt
.to control crimes perpetrated by means of handguns. 45 1 Thus,
there now exists a defense for situations like that faced by Crawford
in which self-preservation and unusual circumstances warrant tem-
porary possession of a handgun.
to get a permit to carry a handgun when threatened with death or serious bodily harm
under such circumstances" as those faced by Crawford. Id. at 701, 521 A.2d at 1202.
454. See, e.g., People v. King, 22 Cal. 3d 12, 24, 582 P.2d 1000, 1006, 148 Cal. Rptr.
409, 415 (1978) ("Use of a concealable firearm in self-defense is neither a crime nor an
unlawful purpose."); State v. Blache, 480 So. 2d 304, 308 (La. 1985) ("[W]hen a felon is
in imminent peril of great bodily harm, or reasonably believes himself or others to be in
such danger, he may take possession of a weapon for a period no longer than is neces-
sary to use it in self-defense, or in defense of others.").
455. 308 Md. at 698-99, 521 A.2d at 1200-01.
456. Id. at 699, 521 A.2d at 1200-01. In devising its five-part test, the Court of Ap-
peals relied on two other cases each of which sets forth a four-pronged analysis. The
test set forth in United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 1982), contains
all but the fifth element of the Crawford test. The test described in King, 22 Cal. 3d at 24,
582 P.2d at 1007, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 416, omits Crawford's second prong. See 308 Md. at
697-98, 521 A.2d at 1200.
457. 308 Md. at 699, 521 A.2d at 1200-01.
458. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27. § 36B(a) (1987) (declaring policy to prevent violent
crimes resulting from the use of handguns in public).
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2. Voluntary Intoxication.-In Shell v. State4 5 9 the Court of Ap-
peals analyzed the distinction between specific and general intent
crimes 460 and examined the relevance of voluntary drug intoxication
as a defense to various charges. 46 ' The court held that the wilful
and malicious destruction of another's property is a specific intent
crime, and therefore is subject to a defense of voluntary intoxication
if the intoxicated state negates the offender's intent.462 The court
found, however, that the General Assembly intended the unlawful
transportation of handguns to be a general intent crime, making its
mens rea incapable of negation by voluntary intoxication.4 63 In addi-
tion, the court determined that a defendant cannot be convicted of
using a handgun to commit a felony or crime of violence if the de-
fense of voluntary intoxication as to the felony or crime of violence
is successful. 4
A trial judge in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County con-
victed James Shell of using a handgun in the commission of a felony
or crime of violence, knowingly transporting a handgun, and mali-
ciously destroying property. The criminal activity occurred one eve-
ning after Shell had ingested PCP and other drugs.4 6 5 After the
Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction,466 Shell peti-
tioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari, claiming that his
convictions for destroying property and transporting a handgun
459. 307 Md. 46, 512 A.2d 358 (1986).
460. Id. at 62-63, 512 A.2d at 366.
461. Id. at 63-65, 512 A.2d at 367.
462. Id. at 68, 512 A.2d at 369.
463. Id. at 68-70, 512 A.2d at 369-70. See infra note 487 for the relevant text of the
statute.
464. 307 Md. at 58, 512 A.2d at 364. The court found that the trial judge had ren-
dered inconsistent verdicts in finding Shell guilty of use of a handgun in the commission
of a felony or crime of violence, when Shell had been acquitted of the underlying felo-
nies of attempted murder and assault with intent to maim. The court declared that even
if inconsistent jury verdicts are sometimes accepted, inconsistent verdicts from a trial
judge are unjustifiable. Id. at 55-57, 512 A.2d at 362-63.
465. Id. at 48-50, 512 A.2d at 359-60. Shell had been in his van, stuck in the snow
near his house, when a man approached and offered to help him. Shell told him to go
away and then fired two shots at him, wounding the man with both bullets. Half an hour
later, Shell forced his way into a nearby house demanding to use a telephone, which he
then broke. After the occupants of the house succeeded in transporting Shell to a hospi-
tal, he broke some telephones there. Hospital security guards found PCP in his pocket.
Shell also was convicted of breaking and entering and possessing controlled dan-
gerous substances. The trial judge did not convict him of charges of attempted murder
or shooting with intent to maim because of a finding that Shell had been so intoxicated
from the drugs that he lacked the intent necessary for these crimes. Id.
466. The Court of Special Appeals opinion was unreported. Id. at 51, 512 A.2d at
360.
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were improper because his drug-induced intoxication prevented
him from forming the necessary intent for these crimes.4 6 7 The
Court of Appeals granted certiorari to clarify a "confusion in the law
as to the relevance of voluntary intoxication to various criminal
charges."468
After examining prior Maryland cases, the court concluded that
voluntary intoxication is a defense only to specific intent crimes. 469
The court cited Brown v. State4 70 and Rosenberg v. State4 7' to support
its position that when a statute contains both the words "wilful" and
"malicious," as does the destruction of property statute,472 the leg-
islature intended to require as a mens rea nothing less than a specific
purpose to accomplish that particular crime.473 The court therefore
reversed Shell's conviction for malicious destruction of property,
stating that even though his intoxicated state was voluntarily in-
duced, it nevertheless made him incapable of forming the requisite
467. Id. at 51-52, 512 A.2d at 360-61.
468. Id. at 47, 512 A.2d at 358.
469. Id. at 63, 512 A.2d at 366-67. In Smith v. State, 41 Md. App. 277, 398 A.2d 426,
cert. denied, 284 Md. 748 (1979), the Court of Special Appeals defined and enumerated
specific intent crimes:
The larger class "specific intent" includes such other members as 1) assault
with intent to murder, 2) assault with intent to rape, 3) assault with intent to
rob, 4) assault with intent to maim, 5) burglary, 6) larceny, 7) robbery and 8)
the specific-intent-to-inflict-grievous-bodily-harm variety of murder. Each of
these requires not simply the general intent to do the immediate act with no
particular, clear or undifferentiated end in mind, but the additional deliberate
and conscious purpose or design of accomplishing a very specific and more
,remote result.
Id. at 306, 398 A.2d at 443.
The Shel court relied particularly on Avey v. State, 249 Md. 385, 240 A.2d 107
(1968), and State v. Gover, 267 Md. 602, 298 A.2d 378 (1973). In Avey the defendant,
who had been convicted of assault with intent to murder, obtained a remand for a new
trial because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication. The Avey
court ruled that intoxication--to the extent that it renders it impossible for a defendant
to form a specific intent-is a defense to a crime requiring a specific intent. Avey, 249
Md. at 389, 240 A.2d at 108.
In Cover the Court of Appeals delineated the degree of intoxication required before
it becomes a defense to a crime. After determining that robbery required a specific
larcenous intent, Cover, 267 Md. at 606, 298 A.2d at 381, the court remanded the case
for a new trial to determine whether the defendant was "so drunk as to paralyze his
mental faculties and render him incapable of entertaining the design to take and perma-
nently convert the property of another to his own use." Id. at 608, 298 A.2d at 382.
470. 285 Md. 469, 475, 403 A.2d 788, 792 (1979) (distinguishing between malice and
wilfulness in determining that arson is a specific intent crime).
471. 164 Md. 473,476, 165 A. 306, 307 (1933) (determining that removal offence is a
specific intent crime).
472. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § III (1987).
473. 307 Md. at 68, 512 A.2d at 369.
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intent.4 74
On the other hand, because the statute prohibiting the trans-
portation of handguns 475 aims to "curb the transportation of hand-
guns in vehicles by persons drunk or sober,14 71 the court concluded
that the legislature must not have intended to create a specific, intent
crime. The court noted that the statute defines a defendant as guilty
of transporting a handgun if the individual knows that he or she is
doing so; thus, the offense is a general intent crime for which intoxi-
cation is no defense. The court therefore upheld Shell's conviction
for transporting a handgun.4 77
While the Shell decision clearly aligns Maryland with the major-
ity of jurisdictions concerning the availability of voluntary intoxica-
tion as a defense to specific intent crimes, 478 the process of deciding
which statutes create specific intent rather than general intent of-
fenses is much less clearly understood. The Maryland destruction
of property statute reads: "Any person who shall wilfully and mali-
ciously destroy, injure, deface or molest any real or personal prop-
erty of another shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. '479 The
majority believed that the words "wilfully" and "maliciously" in the
statute mean that a specific intent to destroy property is an essential
element of the offense. The court cited Brown and Rosenberg for the
proposition that when both words occur in a statute, "effect must be
given to both the element of wilfulness and the element. of
malice." 4
8 1
In Brown the court concluded that a wilful act is one done "in-
tentionally," whereas a "malicious" act "is one intended to bring
harm to another person.""4 8 The defendant in Brown deliberately
set fire to a building in order to save demolition costs. The court
ruled that while the element of wilfulness was present, malice was
474. Id.
475. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B (1987).
476. 307 Md. at 69, 512 A.2d at 370.
477. Id. at 69-70, 512 A.2d at 369-70.
478. Id. at 63, 512 A.2d at 367. For example, in People v. Watts, 133 Mich. App. 80,
348 N.W.2d 39 (1984), the Court of Appeals of Michigan asserted the unavailability of a
defense of voluntary intoxication to general intent crimes and held that receiving and
concealing stolen property is a general intent crime. The statute in question in that case
contained the word "knowingly." Like the Shell court, the Watts court recognized that
while sometimes that word can describe a specific intent crime, it is to legislative intent
that attention must be paid in determining whether a specific criminal intent is required.
Id. at 82-83, 348 N.W.2d at 41.
479. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 111 (1987).
480. 307 Md. at 65, 512 A.2d at 368.
481. Brown v. State, 285 Md. 469, 474, 403 A.2d 788, 791 (1979).
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not.482 in Rosenberg a malicious act was described as a wrongful act
done "deliberately and without legal justification. 48 3 The defend-
ants claimed to have destroyed a post on a third party's land only to
protect a bona fide right to an easement. At trial, the judge prohib-
ited the defendants from introducing evidence to support this claim.
The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, stating that such evi-
dence was relevant to the element of malice and therefore was
admissible.4" 4
In Shell the Court of Appeals concluded that the destruction of
property statute requires "both a deliberate intention to injure the
property of another and malice. ' 4 5 Therefore, according to the
court, a statute such as article 27, section 111 creates a specific in-
tent offense.486
On the other hand, the statute proscribing transportation of
handguns contains only the word "knowingly" with regard to mens
rea.4s 7 Recognizing that this word sometimes denotes a specific in-
tent crime, the Court of Appeals stated that "the particular language
and purpose of each statute must be considered. 4 8 The court dis-
cussed the legislative history of the statute and concluded that be-
cause the "knowledge element of the offense was included largely to
prevent unwitting violations, and the purpose of the criminal provi-
sion as a whole is to curb the transportation of handguns in vehicles
by persons drunk or sober, the General Assembly did not intend to
482. Id. at 476, 403 A.2d at 792. The arson statute in Brown, now MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 7 (1987), contained the words "wilfully and maliciously."
483. Rosenberg v. State, 164 Md. 473, 476, 165 A. 306, 307 (1933). In Rosenberg the
defendant had removed a post from the property of another landowner. The post had
prevented the defendant from using a legitimate right of way over the other property.
Id. at 475, 165 A. at 306.
484. Id. at 477, 165 A. at 307.
485. 307 Md. at 68, 512 A.2d at 369.
486. Id. See also Paschall v. State, 71 Md. App. 234, 244, 524 A.2d 1239, 1244 (1987)
(citing Shell and declaring that "[mere reckless or wanton disregard of property by the
offender will not support a conviction for malicious mischief"); Smith v. State, 69 Md.
App. 115, 119, 516 A.2d 985, 987 (1986) (holding that defendant was entitled to a jury
instruction on the defense of voluntary intoxication to specific intent crimes).
487. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B (1987). The statute provides:
Any person who shall wear, carry, or transport any handgun, whether con-
cealed or open, upon or about his person, and any person who shall wear, carry
or knowingly transport any handgun, whether concealed or open, in any vehicle
traveling upon the public roads, highways, waterways, or airways or upon roads
or parking lots generally used by the public in this State shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor; and it shall be a rebuttable presumption that the person is know-
ingly transporting the handgun. ...
Id. at (b).
488. 307 Md. at 69, 512 A.2d at 370.
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create a specific intent crime." '489 The court therefore deemed the
required mens rea to be only a general awareness that the action is
illegal; voluntary intoxication cannot negate this awareness. 9 °
In contrast, the dissent did not believe that the words "wilful"
and "malicious" in the destruction of property statute created a spe-
cific intent crime. Judge McAuliffe pointed out that while the his-
tory of the offense shows that the intent may be specific, it also may
be implied.49 ' He believed that the word "wilful" implies at most an
"evil intent" or an intent to do something illegal. Judge McAuliffe
equated this evil intent with general criminal intent.492 As for the
word "malicious," Judge McAuliffe discussed situations, such as fel-
ony murder and depraved heart murder, in which malice is im-
plied.493  He concluded that the words "wilful" and "malice"
require no more than a general intent to do something illegal with-
out the existence ofjustifying or mitigating circumstances.49 4 Judge
McAuliffe therefore would have found destruction of property a
general intent offense to which voluntary intoxication would pro-
vide no excuse.
As the dissenting opinion reveals, recognizing the availability of
voluntary intoxication as a defense to specific intent crimes does not
aid in determining how to characterize various offenses as either
general or specific intent crimes. Other jurisdictions have exper-
ienced difficulty in applying the specific/general intent distinction,
yet have not considered the presence of the words "wilful" and
"malicious" in the statutes to be determinative.49 5 In Shell the Court
489. Id.
490. Id. at 69-70, 512 A.2d at 370. Earlier, the court also had observed, regarding the
specific intent/general intent classification, "While the distinction may be illogical and
somewhat arbitrary, it does serve to reconcile fairness to the accused with the need to
protect the public from intoxicated offenders and to deter such persons." Id. at 65, 512
A.2d at 367.
491. Id. at 70, 512 A.2d at 370 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
492. Id. at 71, 512 A.2d at 371.
493. Id. at 71-72, 512 A.2d at 371.
494. Id. at 72, 512 A.2d at 371.
495. For example, in Linehan v. State. 476 So. 2d 1262, 1265 (Fla. 1985), the combi-
nation of "wilful" and "malicious" in an arson statute did not connote specific intent to
the Supreme Court of Florida. The court found that the statute in question required
only a general intent, as was true of the common-law crime of arson; as a result, volun-
tary intoxication would not be a defense. The Florida court also recognized that courts
"are having difficulty determining whether a particular offense is a specific or general
intent crime." Id. Considering that the Linehan court analyzed the same statutory words
yet reached a conclusion opposite to that of the Maryland court in Shell, it is ironic that
the Maryland court cited Linehan for the proposition that distinguishing between specific
and general intent might be difficult. 307 Md. at 64-65, 512 A.2d at 367.
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of Appeals seemed to sanction the use of the voluntary intoxication
defense whenever the words malicious and wilful occur together in a
criminal statute, thereby increasing its availability. The majority,
however, also believed that in labelling a particular crime a specific
or general intent offense, a court should consider the legislature's
purpose in enacting the statute. It is questionable whether the legis-
lature would desire that all intoxicated persons be acquitted of any
offense defined using these words, for the terms frequently occur
together in statutes.496 In the future, the Court of Appeals might
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1. Expert Testimony on Psychological Disorders.-In State v. Al-
lewalt' the Court of Appeals held that expert testimony regarding
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)2 was admissible to establish
that a rape victim had not consented to sexual intercourse.
Through this decision the court expanded the range of expert testi-
mony permissible in a rape case by admitting evidence of a disorder
originally defined for therapeutic use.'
William Allewalt was charged with raping Mary Lemon, his girl-
friend's mother. Allewalt, who lived with his girlfriend and her
mother, returned home from a bar intoxicated and engaged in sex-
ual intercourse with Ms. Lemon. Ms. Lemon reported the incident
to the police as rape, but Allewalt claimed Ms. Lemon had
consented.4
In its rebuttal case the State called a psychiatrist as an expert
witness who testified that Ms. Lemon suffered from PTSD and that
in his opinion the cause of the disorder was the alleged rape.5 The
1. 308 Md. 89, 517 A.2d 741 (1986).
2. The American Psychiatric Association has classified post-traumatic stress disor-
der (PTSD) as an anxiety disorder whose "essential feature . . . is the development of
characteristic symptoms following a psychologically distressing event that is outside the
range of usual human experience." AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC & STA-
TISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, category 309.89, at 247 (rev. 3d ed. 1987).
"[Sluch common experiences as simple bereavement, chronic illness, business losses,
and marital conflict" will not trigger PTSD; classic examples of events which will induce
the syndrome include natural disasters, military combat, torture, and rape. Id. at 247-
48. Some authorities recognize rape trauma syndrome as a subset of PTSD. 308 Md. at
104, 517 A.2d at 748.
The expert in Allewalt defined PTSD as "a condition recognized in psychiatry as the
emotional reaction to a traumatic event." Id. at 94, 517 A.2d at 743. The syndrome's
symptoms include insomnia, exaggerated startle response, feelings of guilt, loss of appe-
tite and of weight, avoidance of reminders of the traumatic event, fearfulness, and night-
mares and flashbacks. Identified as early as the turn of this century, PTSD may be
caused by a physical or an emotional trauma. Id. at 94-95, 517 A.2d at 743-44.
3. 308 Md. at 116, 517 A.2d at 751 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). While states have
reached various conclusions regarding the syndrome's admissibility in criminal trials, see
generally Annotation, Admissibility, at Criminal Prosecution, of Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma
Syndrome, 42 A.L.R.4th 879 (1985), AlLewalt was Maryland's first consideration of the is-
sue. The case also presented two sentencing issues which are not addressed here.
4. 308 Md. at 92-93, 517 A.2d at 742-43.
5. Id. at 95, 517 A.2d at 744. The expert noted that a diagnosis of PTSD is predi-
cated on the assumption that some traumatic incident had occurred previously.
Although Ms. Lemon recently had experienced the breakup of her 16-year marriage, the
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trial court admitted the testimony, reasoning that it would assist the
jury in determining Ms. Lemon's state of mind at the time of the
event.6 On appeal the Court of Special Appeals held the testimony
inadmissible, finding the evidence's limited probative value out-
weighed by its prejudicial effect.7 The intermediate appellate court
explained that when the expert stated a rape could cause the syn-
drome, he implicitly verified the victim's claim that rape was in fact
the cause of the disorder.8 Consequently, his view "unduly cor-
roborates the victim's rendition of the incident."' Because the pres-
ence of PTSD did not "conclusively establish" the type of trauma
which caused it, the court prohibited admission of the testimony.'0
The Court of Appeals reinstated the conviction," holding that
a trial court may admit expert medical testimony regarding the pres-
ence and cause of PTSD in a victim.'" The court held that the ex-
pert's testimony of PTSD in Alewalt satisfied the general test of
admissibility in that it had a natural tendency to establish the fact at
issue-whether a rape had occurred-and thereby would aid the
trier of fact.'" Consequently, the trial court had not abused its dis-
cretion in admitting evidence of the existence of PTSD.' 4
The court first determined that the admissibility of the expert's
testimony was controlled by Beahm v. Shortall.'5 The Court of Ap-
peals held in Beahm that a physician may present both medical con-
clusions and information, including the history and subjective
doctor'opined that only the alleged rape was sufficiently traumatic to cause PTSD, not-
ing that a marital separation "doesn't cause nightmares and flashbacks and [avoidance]
behavior and being uncomfortable around young males and so on." Id.
6. Id. at 94. 517 A.2d at 743.
7. Allewalt v. State, 61 Md. App. 503, 514, 487 A.2d 664, 669 (1985).
8. Id. at 516, 487 A:2d at 670.
9. Id
10. Id
11. 308 Md. at 91, 517 A.2d at 742.
12. Id. at 98-99, 517 A.2d at 745-46.
13. Id. at 102, 517 A.2d at 747. The Court of Appeals reasoned that adopting the
Court of Special Appeals' standard that the expert testimony must "conclusively estab-
lish" the rape effectively would eliminate most evidence at trials of all kinds. Id. at 101,
517 A.2d at 747.
14. Id. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751. A concurring opinion proposed that the expert be
allowed to offer no conclusions, but only information on PTSD and responses to hypo-
thetical situations. Id at 127-28, 517 A.2d at 760 (McAuliffe, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 98, 517 A.2d at 745. In Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 327. 368 A.2d
1005, 1009 (1977), the Court of Appeals overruled Parker v. State, 189 Md. 244,249, 55
A.2d 784, 786 (1947), which had limited the admissibility of medical opinions based
upon the patient's narrative of subjective complaints to those rendered by an attending
physician, thus excluding opinions of physicians engaged to testify, such as the expert in
Allewalit 308 Md. at 98. 517 A.2d at 745.
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symptoms described by the patient, which forms the basis for those
conclusions."6 The expert in Beahm was a neurosurgeon testifying
concerning injuries the plaintiff suffered in an automobile acci-
dent.' 7 The expert drew conclusions as to the nature and extent of
the injuries from the plaintiff's subjective symptoms.'
Allewalt moved beyond these limits by permitting expert testi-
mony in reference to a syndrome designed for therapeutic purposes
to establish the factual basis of a prior event. The court noted that
PTSD is a well-recognized anxiety disorder, 9 but the dissent
stressed that the syndrome never had been shown to indicate relia-
bly that a rape in fact had occurred. 0 Although the expert identified
rape as the trauma involved, the diagnosis rested-on the presump-
tion that the act of sexual intercourse actually had been rape.' The
decision in All walt thus allows an expert's testimony to establish
what the expert presumes to be true-that a particular trauma
occurred.
The Court of Appeals found the prejudice feared by the inter-
mediate appellate court insufficient to outweigh the evidence's pro-
bative value.22 Because the psychiatrist did not purport to have a
scientific test for determining consent, his opinion neither proved a
fact not properly at issue nor unfairly excited the emotions of the
jury against the defendant.2" The court stressed that the trial judge
properly instructed the jury that it must evaluate the credibility of
both the victim and the doctor in determining what weight to give
the expert opinion.24
In admitting the expert's testimony on PTSD, the court indi-
cated that certain "baggage" necessarily accompanied the evi-
dence." A defendant not only could cross-examine the expert
generally about PTSD, but also could question both the expert and
the victim concerning possible causes of the victim's disorder other
16. Beahm, 279 Md. at 327, 368 A.2d at 1009.
17. Id. at 328, 368 A.2d at 1009.
18. Id., 368 A.2d at 1009-10.
19. 308 Md. at 99, 517 A.2d at 746. There are four diagnostic criteria: 1) the exist-
ence of a recognizable stressor; 2) re-experiencing the trauma; 3) numbing of respon-
siveness to the external world; and 4) at least two additional symptoms that did not exist
prior to the trauma (e.g., sleep disturbance, memory impairment, or guilt). Id. at 100 &
n.6, 517 A.2d at 746 & n.6.
20. Id. at 115, 517 A.2d at 754 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 96, 517 A.2d at 744-45.
22. Id. at 102, 517 A.2d at 747-48.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 103, 517 A.2d at 748.
25. Id. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751.
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than the alleged assault.2 6 Additionally, because the defendant
might wish to counter the State's PTSD evidence, the court foresaw
that the defendant might seek to compel the victim to undergo a
psychiatric examination by the defense's expert. 7 Finally, the court
acknowledged that "[lI]urking in the background is the nice question
of whether the absence of PTSD is provable by the accused in de-
fense of a rape charge, as tending to prove that there was con-
sent."2" Thus, when the admissibility of PTSD evidence arises, the
trial judge must balance "the benefit of the evidence not only
against potential unfair prejudice, but also against the complexity of
possibly accompanying issues and against the time required prop-
erly to try the expanded case." 29
The court expressly limited its holding to the facts of Allewalt,
stressing that admissibility is a matter for trial court discretion on a
case-by-case basis." It further limited the breadth of its decision by
identifying several factors that contributed to the admissibility of the
testimony under the facts of Allewalt.3s First, the expert did not use
the term "rape trauma syndrome," thereby avoiding any unneces-
sary prejudice associated with that phrase.- 2 Second, the doctor
carefully pointed out that other traumas can produce the disorder.33
Third, the expert expressed no personal opinion as to Ms. Lemon's
credibility, but did indicate that the validity of his opinion depended
on the truth of her representations.3 4 Finally, the expert testified
only after Allewalt acknowledged having had intercourse with Ms.
Lemon.s s
In a strong dissent, Judge Eldridge declared that the "relevant
question" is whether the presence of PTSD in the alleged victim is
reliable evidence that a rape in the legal sense occurred.36 Implicitly
rejecting application of the Beahm standard to the admissibility of
expert testimony regarding PTSD,Judge Eldridge advocated a stan-
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 109-11, 517 A.2d at 751.
29. Id. at 110, 517 A.2d at 751-52.
30. Id. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751.
31. Id. at 108, 517 A.2d at 751.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 108-09, 517 A.2d at 751.
35. Id. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751.
36. Id. at 115. 517 A.2d at 755 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). But see id. at 103, 517 A.2d at
748 (statement by the majority that the dissent's argument erects a strawman; the real
issue is whether an expert may express an opinion as to the cause of a diagnosis of
PTSD).
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dard requiring "that the scientific process be shown to be 'generally
accepted as reliable within the expert's particular scientific field' "
before the expert's opinion based on the process or method can be
admitted.37 In concluding that PTSD did not satisfy this test, the
dissent emphasized that the disorder is not a legal factfinding tool,
but rather a therapeutic device.18 Moreover, even scientific litera-
ture does not claim that PTSD is a reliable method of establishing
that a rape occurred. 9
The dissent further reasoned that the expert's testimony implic-
itly and improperly expressed an opinion regarding the credibility
of Ms. Lemon's testimony, and thus invade the province of the
jury.4" The psychiatrist's training in evaluating a patient's verbal
and nonverbal responses lent an aura of reliability to the expert's
testimony.4 ' Moreover, the psychiatrist's testimony regarding the
presence and cause of PTSD essentially expressed an opinion that
the victim was telling the truth about the rape.42 The combined
force of the psychiatrist'.s status as an expert and the testimony itself
thus could have caused the jury to give the doctor's testimony un-
due weight.4 s
The vehement dissent and the majority's cautionary limitations
on Allewalt's holding make clear that unless circumstances are nearly
identical to Allewalt, courts should be reluctant to allow testimony on
PTSD. Based on the court's reasoning, a psychological profile of an
alleged rape victim's reaction is admissible only regarding a subjec-
tive issue such as consent, and other evidence first must establish
that an act of intercourse in fact occurred. 44 Even with these limita-
tions, the Allewalt holding provides the potential for another type of
therapeutic device to be admissible evidence in establishing the oc-
currence of a prior event.
37. Id. at 112, 517 A.2d at 752-53 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Wash-
ington, 229 Kan. 47, 53, 622 P.2d 986, 991 (1981) (method of blood analysis)). This
standard was set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and
was adopted by Maryland in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 389, 391 A.2d 364, 372 (1978).
The State argued that the dissent's test was inapplicable because it "applied to tests or
techniques used primarily to measure or identify something," and PTSD was a mental
disorder, not a scientific test. 308 Md. at 112, 517 A.2d at 752 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
38. 308 Md. at 116, 517 A.2d at 755 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 120, 517 A.2d at 757.
41. Id. at 120-21, 517 A.2d at 757.
42. Id. at 121, 517 A.2d at 757.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 108-09, 517 A.2d at 751.
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2. Testimony Following Hypnoss.-The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held in Harker v. Maryland4" that the
admission of testimony by a witness who previously had been hyp-
notized was not a per se violation of either the defendant's sixth
amendment right to confrontation or fourteenth amendment right
to due process. 46 The testimony is admissible if it has a reliable ba-
sis independent of hypnosis.47 In so holding, the court affirmed the
denial of the defendant's petition for habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for -the District of Maryland. 4 .
The victim in Harker, Mervyn Thompson, was interviewed by a
deputy sheriff three days after being shot.49 Thompson described
the assailant's physical features, clothing, and automobile.5 0 With
Thompson's cooperation, the police prepared a composite sketch of
the assailant.5 ' An individual driving the described vehicle and re-
sembling the composite -sketch was observed by police and identi-
fied as David Harker, the defendant.5 2
Prior to Harker's arrest the police had Thompson undergo hyp-
nosis.5 ' During his hypnotic trance, Thompson gave a.very detailed
45. 800 F.2d 437 (4th Cir. 1986).
46. id. at 438. Harker also contended that testimony of a fellow inmate was im-
proper because'the inmate was mentally incompetent and was a government agent who
extracted an uncounseled confession from Harker. Id. at 444. The Fourth Circuit found
that the admission of the inmate's testimony did not violate Harker's sixth amendment
right to counsel because the inmate, although an informant, was not a government
agent. Id. at 444-45.
47. Id. at 438, 441. Under current Maryland law, onlytestimony which originated
prior to the hypnosis or which concerns topics not addressed in the hypnotic session is
admissible. See State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983); Note, State v. Col-
lins-Limiting the Admission of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony, 43 MD. L. REV. 595 (1984).
Although the present case was tried before the decision in Collins and thus applied crite-
ria set forth in Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (1981), the Court of
Special Appeals found that the testimony of the hypnotized witness was admissible
under Collins. The appellate court therefore affirmed Harker's state conviction for as-
sault with intent to murder. Harker v. State, 55 Md. App. 460, 475, 463 A.2d 288, 297,
cert. denied, 297 Md. 312 (1983). See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
48. 800 F.2d at 438-39. Harker had petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982), alleging that the state court had violated his constitutional
rights. 800 F.2d at 438-39.
49. 55 Md. App. at 463, 463 A.2d at 290.
50. 800 F.2d at 439; 55 Md. App. at 463, 463 A.2d at 290.
51. 800 F.2d at 439; 55 Md. App. at 463, 463 A.2d at 290-91.
52. 800 F.2d at 439; 55 Md. App. at 463, 463 A.2d at 291. The license tag number
was registered to David Harker. Harker's father, in fact, indicated that the composite
sketch was similar to his son's appearance. 800 F.2d at 439, 443; 55 Md. App. at 463,
463 A.2d at 291.
53. 800 F.2d at 439; 55 Md. App. at 464, 463 A.2d at 291. The hypnosis was con-
ducted by a police officer from another county and was audiotaped. 800 F.2d at 439.
The police hoped to clarify a discrepancy in the victim's statement as to his physical
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description of his assailant. 54 Four days later, Thompson identified
Harker in a photo array.5" Subsequently Thompson was taken to
the county courthouse where he positively identified Harker after
seeing him face-to-face. 56 Harker was arrested; during the trial,
Thompson once again identified him as the assailant.
Harker attempted to suppress Thompson's identifications made
after the hypnosis, claiming that they were tainted. 58 Harker con-
tended that his sixth amendment right to confront witnesses was vi-
olated because hypnosis so influences a witness' perceptions that
effective cross-examination becomes impossible.59 In addition, he
claimed that his fourteenth amendment right to due process was vi-
olated because the hypnosis session was impermissibly suggestive
and thus tainted the subsequent photo array and courtroom identifi-
cations.' The trial court, however, admitted the post-hypnotic tes-
timony after finding that it met the reliability standards of Polk v.
State,6 1 the then-existing Maryland rule concerning hypnotically en-
hanced testimony.6 2
After the trial but before the appeal, the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals established a new rule concerning hypnotically enhanced testi-
mony in State v. Collins.6" Under the new rule, because hypnotically
enhanced testimony generally is not accepted in the scientific com-
munity, it is not admissible unless the testimony could be attributed
to pre-hypnotic statements.' The Court of Special Appeals in
location at the time of the shooting and to obtain the license plate number of the assail-
ant's vehicle. The hypnosis was unsuccessful in eliciting this information. 55 Md. App.
at 464, 463 A.2d at 291.
54. 55 Md. App. at 464-66, 463 A.2d at 291-92.
55. 800 F.2d at 439; 55 Md. App.. at 466, 463 A.2d at 292. Prior to the hypnosis,
Thompson had been shown a different photo array which did not contain Harker's pic-
ture. Thompson did not select any of those photographs as that of his assailant. 800
F.2d at 439.
56. 800 F.2d at 439; 55 Md. App. at 466, 463 A.2d at 292.
57. 55 Md. App. at 466-67, 463 A.2d at 292.
58. 800 F.2d at 439, 441; 55 Md. App. at 466, 463 A.2d at 292.
59. 800 F.2d at 442.
60. Id. at 443.
61. 48 Md. App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (1981) (holding that to admit hypnotically in-
duced testimony, hypnosis must be generally accepted in the relevant scientific commu-
nity, pursuant to the rule set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923)).
62. 800 F.2d at 441 & n.l; 55 Md. App. at 470, 463 A.2d at 294.
63. 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983).
64. Id. at 702, 464 A.2d at 1044. In Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987), the
Supreme Court held that a state rule which per se excluded all post-hypnotic testimony
infringed impermissibly on a defendant's right to testify on his or her own behalf, particu-
larly when there was evidence corroborating the post-hypnotic testimony and when re-
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Harker considered the Collins rule and concluded that the post-hyp-
notic identifications were attributable to Thompson's pre-hypnotic
statement and therefore were admissible.6 5 The state court found
no violation of Harker's sixth amendment right of confrontation.
The court noted that the defense counsel's ability to cross-examine
Thompson had not been impaired "because the manner in which
Thompson made the photographic and confrontational identifica-
tion (not positive as to the photograph; hesitant at the confronta-
tion) indicated that he retained critical judgment, unimpaired by the
hypnosis."' Likewise, there was no abridgement of Harker's four-
teenth amendment right to due process because Thompson had a
good opportunity to see his assailant on the night of the crime and
his description of the assailant was accurate.67
In Harker the Fourth Circuit focused on the constitutional issues
in determining whether the defendant was entitled to habeas corpus
relief.68 The federal court first determined that Harker's sixth
amendment right to confrontation was not violated. Experts from
each side informed the jury of the uses and dangers of hypnosis,69
the questioning of witnesses fully explored the circumstances of the
hypnotic session, and defense counsel cross-examined Thompson
concerning his opportunity for pre-hypnotic observation of the as-
sailant. 70 The court also held that the post-hypnotic identifications
did not violate Harker's fourteenth amendment right to due process
cordings of the hypnotic session demonstrated that responses were not suggested by
leading questions. Id. at 2714-15. This case has enormous implications for the Mary-
land rule, in that Collins' narrow exception for post-hypnotic testimony may have to be
expanded when a defendant has been hypnotized or when the independent corroborat-
ing testimony arises from a source other than the hypnotized witness.
65. 55 Md. App. at 470, 463 A.2d at 294.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 473, 463 A.2d at 296.
68. 800 F.2d at 441 n.l.
69. The Court of Appeals discussed in detail the weaknesses of refreshing a witness'
recollection through hypnosis. Id. at 441. The drawbacks of hypnosis are threefold:
(1) suggestibility, whereby a hypnotist may lead the hypnotized subject by suggestion;
(2) confabulation, whereby the subject fabricates missing details; and (3) memory hard-
ening, whereby the subject remembers being hypnotized, but cannot distinguish be-
tween events recalled before hypnosis and those recalled during hypnosis, and thus may
be more convinced than ever of the accuracy of post-hypnotic testimony. Id. at 439-4 1.
The danger of misidentification is enhanced when the witness reconstructs the memory
of the crime through suggestibility or confabulation and then becomes absolutely con-
vinced of the accuracy of the memory through memory hardening. Id. at 440-4 1.
70. Id. at 442-43. In noting these requirements for complying with the sixth amend-
ment right to confrontation, the court stressed that memory hardening, a danger in all
eyewitness identifications, does not pose a per se violation of the sixth amendment. Id.
at 442.
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because the in-court identification had a basis which was independ-
ent from the hypnotic session.7 ' This independent basis compen-
sated for any deficiencies in the hypnotic session.72
Although the Maryland rule set forth in Collins is generally one
of exclusion, it does allow admission of post-hypnotic testimony
when there is an independent basis for the evidence, such as a pre-
hypnotic statement.7 3 The Harker decision serves as an example of
how the exception to the rule can be applied; thus, the case will
serve as a benchmark for other cases in which post-hypnotic testi-
mony is offered into evidence.
B. Hearsay
1. Probation Revocation Hearing.-In State v. Fuller7 4 the Court
of Appeals held that a respondent in a probation revocation hearing
has the same right to confront witnesses as that guaranteed to de-
fendants in criminal proceedings, unless the State demonstrates
good cause for dispensing with confrontation and the trial judge
sets forth a specific finding of good cause in the record of the revo-
cation proceeding.7" Fuller also establishes the procedure to be fol-
lowed when a party to a probation revocation hearing objects to the
admission of hearsay evidence.76
Respondent Solomon Fuller faced probation revocation pro-
71. Id. at 443. Thompson had a good opportunity to see his assailant at the time of
the assault due to lighting and the passage of time. Thompson also prepared a pre-
hypnosis composite which Harker's father said resembled his son. Thompson's descrip-
tions of the assailant were consistent before, during, and after hypnosis. Id.
72. Id. No video tape was available because the lens cap was not removed from the
video camera. Id. An audio tape was made, however, and the trained hypnotist was a
disinterested law enforcement officer from another county who did not excessively guide
or direct the victim during the hypnosis. Id. at 444. The concurring opinion, while
recognizing the value of hypnosis as an investigatory tool, expressed grave misgivings
about the procedures used by the police in administering the hypnosis and noted that
the record was so flawed as to make it impossible to determine whether the circum-
stances of the session were in fact suggestive. Id. at 445 (Murnaghan, J., concurring).
Judge Murnaghan suggested that the State should bear the burden of proving that the
hypnosis was conducted and the statements were elicited under tightly controlled and
neutral conditions. Id. at 446-47.
73. State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 702, 464 A.2d 1028, 1044 (1983).
74. 308 Md. 547, 520 A.2d 1315 (1987).
75. Id. at 549, 520 A.2d at 1316. This holding "drastically weakened" the Court of
Appeals' holding in Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 208 A.2d 575 (1965). 308 Md. at 551-
52, 520 A.2d at 1317. For a discussion of other evidentiary issues involving probation
revocation hearings, see the analysis of Chase v. State, 309 Md. 224, 552 A.2d 1348
(1987), supra at 798.
76. 308 Md. at 552-53, 520 A.2d at 1317-18.
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ceedings when the question of the admissibility of hearsay testimony
arose. At the probation revocation hearing, a police officer testified
concerning out-of-court statements made to him during his investi-
gation of a charge against Fuller for uttering a bad check." Fuller
objected to the testimony on grounds that it was hearsay78 and that
it violated his fourteenth amendment due process right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses, 9  basing his argument upon the
Supreme Court's decisions in Morrissey v. Brewer8 ° and Gagnon v.
Scarpelli.8s
The petitioners in Morrissey claimed that their due process
rights were violated when their paroles were revoked without a
hearing.8 2 In considering this claim, the Supreme Court held that at
a minimum, due process in a parole revocation hearing includes
"the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless
the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation)."8 " In Gagnon the Supreme Court extended Moris-
sey's due process requirements for parole revocation hearings to
probation revocation hearings.8
The State relied upon the Maryland case of Scott v. State,85 con-
77. id. at 550-51, 520 A.2d at 1316-17. Revocation of Fuller's probation arising
from two separate convictions was at issue during the consolidated hearing. Id., 520
A.2d at 1316. The hearing judge also admitted docket entries for a criminal conviction
on four counts of "bad checks." Id. at 550, 520 A.2d at 1316.
78. The officer testified that he "had been told" certain information by employees of
the business at which the check allegedly was uttered. The employees did not appear at
the probation revocation hearing. Id. at 551, 520 A.2d at 1317.
79. Id.
80. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
81. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
82. Morrissey. 408 U.S. at 475.
83. Id. at 490. This requirement was one of six provided by the Morrissey Court. The
other requirements are not pertinent here.
84. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 783.
85. 238 Md. 265, 208 A.2d 575 (1965). While on probation, the accused in Scott was
charged with assault with intent to rape an elderly woman and with common assault
upon her. Id. at 269, 208 A.2d at 577. When leaving the scene of the crime the accused
left behind his hat, which was later identified by his mother. Prior to trial, however, the
prosecution learned that the mother had recanted her story and, if called as a witness,
would deny ever having seen the hat. Despite this, the prosecution called the mother to
testify, claiming surprise and trying to impeach her testimony when she denied recogniz-
ing the hat. The trial judge ruled that the attempted impeachment was improper be-
cause the prosecution knew before trial of the mother's probable testimony. As an
alternative, the prosecution offered the testimony of the police officer to whom the
mother had originally identified the hat as that of her son. The judge excluded this
testimony as hearsay and the jury acquitted the accused. Id.
Despite the acquittal, the judge believed the accused in fact had committed the
crime, and therefore revoked the accused's probation. The judge based his decision on
870
tending that the admission of hearsay testimony did not offend pro-
cedural due process and that Morrissey and Gagnon did not
"undermine the continued viability of Scott." 6 TheCourt of Ap-
peals held in Scott that a judge in a probation revocation hearing
may use extrajudicial information, including hearsay and informa-
tion not subject to cross-examination, as long as certain safeguards
exist.8 7 These safeguards include notice of the charges against the
accused and the opportunity to answer or explain the facts known to
the judge.8 " The court found these safeguards present and there-
fore upheld the trial judge's revocation of the accused's probation. 9
The Fuller court rejected the State's argument and found that
Morrissey and Gag'on "drastically weakened" the previous procedure
set forth in Scott." The Court of Appeals noted that in determining
the admissibility of hearsay evidence at a probation revocation hear-
ing, the judge must first decide whether the- evidence is admissible
under the Maryland law.9" At the same time, the judge must re-
member that probation revocation proceedings do not mandate ad-
herence to formal rules of evidence; consequently, the judge may
admit reasonably reliable hearsay evidence.9 2 If a confrontation
clause issue is present, however, the trial judge should first deter-
mine whether the evidence falls within a recognized exception to the
hearsay rule; next the judge should examine both the evidence and
the exception to see whether the criteria necessary to satisfy the
confrontation clause are met. 93 If the confrontation clause's re-
quirements are satisfied, the judge need not make a specific finding
of good cause before admitting the evidence.94 On the other hand,
if the evidence fails to satisfy the rules of evidence or the require-
ments of the confrontation clause, then the evidence is inadmissible
unless it "satisfies the standard of reasonable reliability and the trial
the facts of the case, including the identification of the hat which had not reached the
jury. Id.
86. 308 Md. at 551, 520 A.2d at 1317.
87. Scott, 238 Md. at 275-76, 208 A.2d at 581.
88. Id. at 275, 208 A.2d at 580.
89. Id. at 277-78, 208 A.2d at 582.
90. 308 Md. at 551-52. 520 A.2d at 1317.
91. Id. at 552-53, 520 A.2d at 1317.
92. Id. at 553, 520 A.2d at 1317 (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789
(1973)).
93. Id., 520 A.2d at 1317-18. For a discussion of the constitutional requirements
mandated by the confrontation clause, see United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986)
(no requirement of unavailability prior to admitting out-of-court statement of nontesti-
fying co-conspirator), and Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (requirements of unavail-
ability of witness, need for testimony, and adequate "indicia of reliability").
94. 308 Md. at 553, 520 A.2d at 1318.
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judge makes, and states in the record, a specific finding of good
cause."
95
The recQrd in the instant case contained no finding of good
cause for denying Fuller the opportunity to confront and cross-ex-
amine the employees interviewed by the investigating officer. Fur-
thermore, the evidence did not fall within any exception to the
hearsay rule. Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that the trial
court erred in admitting the police officer's hearsay testimony at the
probation revocation hearing.96
The court next considered whether the error was harmless
under the circumstances of the case.97 Fuller faced revocation of
probation arising from two separate convictions for theft.9s In a
consolidated hearing, the judge presiding over the first case ex-
pressly stated that he relied on the hearsay evidence in concluding
that Fuller had violated the terms of his probation.9 9 The second
judge relied on other evidence." ° The Court of Appeals therefore
concluded that the judge should make a new determination of
whether probation had been violated in the first case,' 0 ' but that the
admission of the hearsay was harmless error in the second case.'
0 2
Fuller ensures that due process protections are afforded Mary-
land probationers before they are deprived of their liberty. The de-
cision preserves the informal nature of probation revocation
hearings while at the same time providing a procedural structure for
making the important decision to revoke probation.'
2. Party Opponent Exception.-The Court of Appeals held in
Holcomb v. State '0 4 that a contemporaneous memorandum of a de-
fendant's confession, prepared by a police officer, could be pro-
duced as evidence at trial. The defendant's failure to attest to the
accuracy of the memorandum did not affect the admissibility of the
95. Id. See Wilson v. State, 70 Md. App. 527, 533-34, 521 A.2d 1257, 1260-61 (1987)
(finding that the prohibitive cost of calling a witness from Virginia was good cause).
96. 308 Md. at 554, 520 A.2d at 1318.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 550, 520 A.2d at 1316.
99. Id. at 554-55, 520 A.2d at 1318.
100. Id.
101. ld. at 554, 520 A.2d at 1318.
102. Id. at 555, 520 A.2d at 1318.
103. For more detailed information on the revocation hearing process, see Little,
Rights of the Mayland Probationer: A Primer for the Practitioner, 11 U. BALT. L. REV. 272, 296-
308 (1982).
104. 307 Md. 457,515 A.2d 213 (1986).
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writing. o
On October 22, 1982, police interviewed the defendant, Ken-
neth Holcomb, in connection with the murder of Tanea Rothschild
the day before. At that time Holcomb offered an exculpatory state-
ment. Four days later Holcomb agreed to undergo a polygraph test.
During the test, a Baltimore County detective asked Holcomb a se-
ries of questions and then accused him of lying about the murder.
Holcomb confessed to the murder, answered the questions, and
agreed to repeat his confession to another detective. After receiving
a Miranda 106 warning, however, Holcomb refused to comment any
further.10 7
The detective transcribed the discussion with Holcomb into
longhand within fifteen minutes after the examination ended.' 0 8
Although the report later was typed, there was no evidence that
Holcomb ever saw the document or acknowledged its accuracy.10 9
Holcomb was charged with first degree murder."o
At the trial, the detective related Holcomb's oral confession by
reading the document prepared on the day of the polygraph test.
The State then entered an edited transcript of the contemporaneous
memorandum of the oral confession into evidence."' The court ad-
mitted the exhibit as a business record over the defense's objec-
tion.' 1 2 Testifying in his own defense, Holcomb denied the validity
of the detective's testimony." 3 Holcomb was convicted and sen-
tenced to life imprisonment." 4
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed Holccmb's conviction,
finding that two levels of hearsay were involved.." The detective's
narration of what the original declarant, Holcomb, had said was the
first level of hearsay. The recounting of Holcomb's statement from
105. Id. at 459, 515 A.2d at 214.
106. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
107. The description of the facts of the case derives from the Court of Appeals' read-
ing of testimony given at the hearing on Holcomb's motion to suppress the oral confes-
sion. 307 Md. at 459 n.1, 515 A.2d at 214 n.1.
108. Id. at 460, 515 A.2d at 214.
109. Id.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. The edited version contained no references to the polygraph examination.
d.
112. Id.
113. Id. Holcomb claimed that he had not confessed to the detective, and that the
detective "had screamed accusations at him until Holcomb threatened to punch [him] in
the face." Id.
114. Id. at 461, 515 A.2d at 214-15.
115. Id., 515 A.2d at 215.
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a written memorandum represented the second level." 6 Yet the
Court of Special Appeals held the evidence admissible, finding both
that the detective's memorandum was a business record and that the
contents of the document fell under the party opponent exception
to hearsay. I
Holcomb -made two arguments before the Court of Appeals.
First, he asserted that the memorandum was not admissible as a
business record" 8 because as the original declarant he had no duty
to be truthful." 9 Holcomb based his argument on the rule handed
down in Aetna Casualty & Surety v. Kuhl,' 20 in which the court held
that for a memorandum to be admissible as a business record, the
original declarant must have had an affirmative duty to report events
faithfully.' 2 1 For example, descriptions by firefighters of what took
place at a fire, as later related to a fire marshall and then recorded in
an official report, would be admissible even though the descriptions
involve two levels of hearsay.' 22  Both "links" in the hearsay
"chain"-the firefighters and the fire marshall-are bound by a
business duty to report events observed in a truthful manner.12 3
Holcomb claimed that because he had no duty to be truthful,
the memorandum did not properly fall under the business record
exception to the hearsay rule.' 24 Although Holcomb had no duty of
truthfulness, the court found that because the memorandum was a
record of a party speaking about his own actions, the party oppo-
nent exception applied. 2
5
Holcomb also argued that the trial judge should not have ad-
mitted his alleged confession into evidence because Holcomb never
116. Id. at 460, 515 A.2d at 214.
117. Id. at 461, 515 A.2d at 215.
118. This exception to the hearsay rule is codified at MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 10-101(b) (1984).
119. 307 Md. at 461, 515 A.2d at 215.
120. 296 Md. 446, 463 A.2d 822 (1983). Aetna, as an auto insurer, sought a declara-
tory judgment against the person claiming against its insured. Aetna argued that there
was no coverage because the insured struck the claimant on purpose. The claimant tried
to introduce a police statement in which the insured stated the collision was accidental.
Although the statement was clearly a business record, the Kuhl court found the hearsay
exception did not apply because the insured did not have a duty to tell the truth. Id. at
454-55, 463 A.2d at 827.
121. Id.
122. This example was taken from an actual Maryland case, Aravanis v. Eisenberg,
237 Md. 242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965).
123. Id. at 261-62, 206 A.2d at 159.
124. 307 Md. at 461, 515 A.2d at 215.
125. Id. at 464, 515 A.2d at 216. For a discussion of the party opponent rule, see
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE ch. 26, at 774-818 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
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confirmed the memorandum's veracity.' 26 He urged the court to:
adopt the rule fashioned by a substantial number of other
jurisdictions that if an oral statement purporting to be the
accused's confession is reduced to writing by a third per-
son, until the statement is signed or its correctness is ac-
knowledged in some fashion by the accused, the written
instrument is not admissible in evidence as the written con-
fession of the accused and the oral testimony of the witness
is only admissible evidence of the purported confession.12 7
The Court of Appeals refused to adopt this view,' 2 8 instead applying
the longstanding Maryland rule that "a memorandum recording
past recollection may be admitted into evidence as a document. "129
The court relied on the ruling in Hall v. State, ' ° in which a defend-
ant convicted of murder challenged the admissibility of statements
made by a police officer and a stenographer as to what the defend-
ant had said during questioning.'"' The police officer and the ste-
nographer were allowed to read contemporaneous notes during the
trial. -2 The Court of Appeals found the reading of the memoranda
proper, stating that the trial court could have admitted the actual,
memoranda into evidence."' The Holcomb court saw no reason to
make the standard for admissibility of a memorandum of an oral
confession any more stringent than that for the admissibility of any
recording of past recollections.1 3 4
In this decision the Court of Appeals applied longstanding
Maryland rules and cases to a fact pattern of first impression.' 35
Holcomb tried to use the basic rules of the business exception to the
hearsay rule to carve out more protection for persons whose confes-
sions become part of a business record. The court, however, aptly
126. 307 Md. at 461, 515 A.2d at 215.
127. Id. at 464, 515 A.2d at 216. Holcomb's submission parrots the Court of Special
Appeals' synthesis of the cases used by Holcomb in his first appeal. The Court of Ap-
peals noted that it did not find the synthesis an accurate interpretation of the case law.
Id.
128. Id. at 468, 515 A.2d at 218.
129. Id. at 464, 515 A.2d at 216.
130. 223 Md. 158. 162 A.2d 751 (1960).
131. Id. at 161-62, 162 A.2d at 753.
132. Id. at 162, 162 A.2d at 753.
133. Id. at 177, 162 A.2d at 761.
134. 307 Md. at 468, 515 A.2d at 218. The court followed the precedent of Hau. The
procedure in federal court is not to admit the memorandum into evidence, but to have
the declarant read from the memorandum in open court. See FED. R. EvID. 803(5).
135. See MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-101(b) (1984); Aetna Casualty & Sur.




refused to accept Holcomb's argument because a party's own state-
ments fall under a separate exception to the hearsay rule, the party
opponent exception..' Thus, Holcomb reaffirms both the business
record and the party opponent exceptions to the hearsay rule.
As to Holcomb's second argument, the court simply refused to
overrule the longstanding rule of Hall '17 that a contemporaneous
memorandum may be used to refresh the memory of a witness. The
Court of Appeals noted that many jurisdictions allow the witness to
read from a contemporaneous memorandum but not to admit the
document into evidence.' 8 Yet several other jurisdictions look at
"the writing as part of the testimony of the witness."' 3 9 The court
found no policy reason to distinguish between the reading of a
memorandum and the entry of the actual document into evi-
dence. 140 Considering that under either approach the information
reaches the jury,' 4 ' it would appear that a more expansive rule in
Maryland would have little practical effect.
C. Plea Agreements
In Wright v. State ' 42 the Court of Appeals held that statements
made by a defendant pursuant to a plea agreement may be used
later against the defendant if the defendant breaches the agreement.
The plea agreement specifically must provide that upon the defend-
ant's breach of the agreement, the defendant's statements are ad-
missible as evidence.'
43
Kenneth Coley, the defendant, was arrested on suspicion of
homicide following a grocery store shooting. 144 He waived his Mi-
randa '45 rights and on the night of his arrest gave a written state-
ment denying all knowledge of the shooting.' 46 When police
136. 307 Md. at 464, 515 A.2d at 216.
137. 223 Md. at 176-77, 162 A.2d at 761.
138. 307 Md. at 464-67, 515 A.2d at 216-18.
139. Id. at 467, 515 A.2d at 218.
140. Id. at 468, 515 A.2d at 218.
141. Id. at 465-66, 515 A.2d at 217.
142. 307 Md. 552, 515 A.2d 1157 (1986).
143. Id. at 586-87, 515 A.2d at 1174-75. The Court of Appeals also considered
whether the trial court's prior acquittal of the other defendant, Joseph Wright, on a
felony charge precluded his subsequent conviction for felony-murder, based on that fel-
ony. Id. at 554-55, 515 A.2d at 1158. The court held that to convict a defendant of
felony-murder after acquittal on the felony charge would violate both the fifth amend-
ment's double jeopardy clause and Maryland common-law double jeopardy principles.
Id. at 577-78, 515 A.2d at 1170. This issue will not be discussed here.
144. Id. at 555, 515 A.2d at 1158.
145. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
146. 307 Md. at 578, 515 A.2d at 1170.
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unraveled his alibi and advised him that he would be charged with
homicide, Coley struck a plea agreement with the prosecution. 47
The agreement provided that in exchange for the State's acceptance
of Coley's plea of guilty to second degree murder, Coley would give
a full statement and testify before the grand jury. Furthermore, the
agreement stated that if Coley breached the agreement, all state-
ments made pursuant to the agreement would be admissible against
Coley in court.' 48
Coley later reneged on the plea agreement and chose to stand
trial on a plea of not guilty.' 49 He moved to suppress his statements
as involuntary, claiming that by offering the plea agreement the
State induced him to confess.' 50 The trial court admitted the plea
agreement, confession, and grand jury testimony over Coley's ob-
jections.' 5 ' Coley was convicted of felony murder and was sen-
tenced to life in prison." 2 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed
his conviction.'"
Coley appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the
State improperly induced him to make incriminating statements
while under the plea agreement; therefore, the statements were
inadmissible. ' 54 Coley based his argument on the inducement rule
laid down in Hillard v. State,15 5 which provides that if a defendant
confesses in response to police or prosecutorial promises of special
help or favors, the defendant's declaration will be considered invol-
untary and therefore inadmissible.' 56 Police arrested the suspect in
147. Id. at 578-79, 515 A.2d at 1170-71. Coley asserted that his mother and cousin
could provide him with an alibi, but in interviews with police they failed to do so. Id. at
578, 515 A.2d at 1170.




152. Id. at 559-60, 515 A.2d at 1160-61. Coley's original sentence was life, 15 years of
which purportedly were suspended. This sentence was vacated for uncertainty in Ball v.
State, 57 Md. App. 338, 369, 470 A.2d 361, 377 (1984).
153. Ball, 57 Md. App. at 389, 470 A.2d at 388. The appeal reviewed the convictions
of three codefendants: Coley, Joseph Wright, and Sheldon Ball.
154. 307 Md. at 560, 515 A.2d at 1161. Coley claimed that the prosecution's promise
not to try him for first degree murder induced him to speak. Id. Coley also challenged
the use of his inculpatory statements on the ground that it violated the fifth amendment
of the United States Constitution. Id. at 587, 515 A.2d at 1175. The Court of Appeals
did not consider the fifth amendment issue because it was not included in either Coley's
petition for a writ of certiorari or the court's order granting the petition. Id.
155. 286 Md. 145, 406 A.2d 415 (1979).
156. Id. at 153, 406 A.2d at 420. ,There is considerable Maryland case law in accord
with Hillard. See, e.g., Stokes v. State, 289 Md. 155, 162,423 A.2d 552, 556 (1980) (hold-
inginadmissible defendant's inculpatory sta'tement made in reliance on a police promise
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Hillard in connection with a robbery and murder.' 57 The accused
and his lawyer submitted a typed inculpatory statement to the police
in reliance upon a police officer's statement that he would "go to
bat" for the accused.' 58 The Court of Appeals found the police of-
ficer's statement an improper inducement. 59 Coley attempted to
compare general police or prosecutorial inducement to the plea
agreement into which he had entered."
The court recognized that Coley's confessions would have been
inadmissible had the prosecution simply promised not to try Coley
for first degree murder if he pleaded guilty to a lesser crime.' 6 ' The
court, however, distinguished Coley's situation as being "quite dif-
ferent" from cases falling under the Hillard rule. 6 '
The court acknowledged that Hillard and similar Maryland
cases' 6 3 have held that promises or inducements made by the State
in order to get a confession were improper." In Wright, however,
the discussions between the prosecution and Coley were conducted
in accordance with Maryland Rule 4-243, which expressly authorizes
and governs plea bargaining;' 65 thus the negotiations were permis-
sible. '6 Additionally, the court found that under rule 4-243 plea
bargaining negotiations cannot be per se involuntary because sub-
section (d) of the rule permits judicial inquiry into the voluntariness
of plea agreements.' 6 7 The court further stressed that the agree-
ment specified that the inculpatory statements could be used against
Coley if he reneged, noting that no other case relying on the induce-
not to arrest the defendant's wife); Streams v. State, 238 Md. 278, 281, 208 A.2d 614,
615 (1965) (finding inadmissible confession elicited by police promises to attempt to get
defendant probation); Edwards v. State, 194 Md. 387, 398-99, 71 A.2d 487, 492 (1950)
(finding confession involuntary when police showed a defendant a letter from a prison
convict expressing regret about not having confessed); Lubinski v. State, 180 Md. 1. 5,
22 A.2d 455, 458 (1941) (dictum that statement by police that if defendant confessed, it
would help him a lot, was enough to make defendant's confession involuntary); Dobbs v.
State, 148 Md. 34, 61, 129 A. 275, 286 (1925) (finding improper inducement when pros-
ecutor said to defendant: "Tell the truth about it. You've got nothing to fear if you tell
the truth and you weren't in it.").
157. Hillard, 286 Md. at 147, 406 A.2d at 417.
158. Id. at 147-48, 406 A.2d at 417.
159. Id. at 153, 406 A.2d at 420.
160. 307 Md. at 579, 515 A.2d at 1171.
161. Id at 583, 515 A.2d at 1173.
162. Id.
163. See upra note 156.
164. 307 Md. at 580, 515 A.2d at 1171.
165. MD. R. 4-243.
166. 307 Md. at 585, 515 A.2d at 1174,
167. 1Id; MD. R. 4-243(d) ("[llnquiry into the voluntariness of the plea or a plea agree-
ment shall be on the record.").
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ment rule involved a similar agreement. 1
6
The court next addressed Coley's policy argument that his situ-
ation should fall within the Hillard rule in order to encourage plea
bargaining.' 69 Coley asserted that as a matter of policy other juris-
dictions protect all discussions related to a plea bargain from use at
trial.' 70 The court agreed that under many circumstances, admit-
ting into evidence offers and discussions made in the process of plea
bargaining negotiations would be detrimental. 17' Furthermore, the
court made it clear that discussions leading to plea agreements and
plea agreements themselves would be admissible only upon a de-
fendant's breach of a valid, consummated agreement' 72 If there
were no breach at all, or if the State breached or rescinded the
agreement, statements made pursuant to a plea.agreement could
not be used. 173 In the instant case, however, strict adherence to the
agreement would not be detrimental to plea bargaining in gen-
eral.' 74 Coley entered into an agreement which expressly stated
that a breach by Coley would result in the State being able to use
Coley's own statements against him.'7 5 The court found this to be a
valid, binding, and enforceable part of the agreement.' 76 In fact,.
the court speculated that its decision would foster the plea bargain-
ing process since a contrary decision would encourage defendants
to rescind agreements "without justification."
168. 307 Md. at 585, 515 A.2d at 1174.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 585-86, 515 A.2d at 1174. See, e.g., Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S.
220 (1927) (finding that statements made in connection with withdrawn guilty pleas
should not be admitted); United States v. Grant, 622 F.2d 308, 311-12 (8th Cir. 1980)
(noting that under FED. R. CRiM. P. I (e)(6) statements made during plea bargaining
negotiations are inadmissible); Ashby v. State, 265 Ind. 316, 354 N.E.2d 192 (1976)
(holding that inculpatory statements should not be admitted without showing defendant
breached or rescinded agreement).
171. 307 Md. at 586, 515 A.2d at 1174-75.
172. Id.
173. Id. In Allgood v. State, 309 Md. 58, 522 A.2d 917 (1987), the Court of Appeals
refused to extend the Wright holding to a case in which the State rescinded a plea agree-
ment and then sought to use the defendant's statements at trial. Id. at 82, 522 A.2d at
928. The State entered into a plea agreement with Allgood, a murder suspect. The
agreement provided that Allgood would testify to a grand jury; in return the State would
press only manslaughter charges against Allgood. When AIlgood subsequently failed a
lie detector test regarding the murder, the State withdrew from the agreement. Id. at 74,
522 A.2d at 924. The State used Allgood's own statements against him at trial, invoking
Wright as legal authority. The Court of Appeals overturned Allgood's conviction, refus-
ing to extend the Wright exception to the Allgood fact pattern. Id. at 82, 522 A.2d at 928.
174. 307 Md. at 587, 515 A.2d at 1175.
175. Id. at 586, 515 A.2d at 1174-75.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 587, 515 A.2d at 1175.
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Judge Cole vigorously dissented from the majority's holding. 178
Arguing that plea agreements involve a quid pro quo, Judge Cole ex-
plained that a defendant gives up incriminating information in re-
turn for leniency from the State. 179 This trade-off is "allowed
primarily because it necessarily engages the supervision of the trial
court, which must determine if the defendant entered the agree-
ment voluntarily and appreciates the nature of the charge and the
consequences of his admission of guilt. ' ' 8O According to Judge
Cole, rather than addressing Coley's right to back out of the agree-
ment, the majority used Maryland Rule 4-243 to determine that the
agreement's terms were valid.' 8 ' Judge Cole, however, found this
reasoning untenable; in his view, rule 4-243 only applies to agree-
ments that have been presented to the court for approval. 8 2 Be-
cause Coley rejected the terms of the plea agreement before the
court could approve the agreement, Coley was "reclad... with all
the constitutional safeguards-including presumption of inno-
cence-he temporarily had sacrificed under his guilty plea agree-
ment. Thus, because there is no plea agreement to moot the issue of
inducement, Coley's statements are required to pass the same test
of admissibility as any other inculpatory statement."'8 3
As to the terms of the agreement which provided that Coley's
statements would be admissible if he reneged, Judge Cole declared
that a mere contract cannot outweigh an individual's constitutional
rights.'8 4 Coley had rights to be free of improper inducements to
confess,' 8 5 to enjoy confidentiality in the plea bargaining process, 186
and to reassert his right to plead innocent without having his state-
ments made pursuant to prosecutorial promises used against
him.18 7
The court has made it possible for the State to fashion plea
agreements that effectively make a recision by the defendant a guar-
antee of conviction. To secure a plea bargain, a defendant normally
must admit complicity in a crime. Under Wright, once this admission
is made and the plea bargain is struck, a defendant who rescinds or
178. Id. at 588, 515 A.2d at 1175 (Cole, J, dissenting).
179. Id., 515 A.2d at 1176.
180. Id. at 588-89, 515 A.2d at 1176.
181. Id. at 589, 515 A.2d at 1176.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 594, 515 A.2d at 1178-79.
185. Id. at 591-92, 515 A.2d at 1177.
186. Id. at 592, 515 A.2d at 1177.
187. Id. at 595, 515 A.2d at 1179.
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breaches the agreement may face his or her own testimony in court.
All that the prosecution must do to ensure this result is to include a







In Bruce v. Dyer' the Court of Appeals held that absent specific
language of intent, a separation agreement does not sever a tenancy
by the entireties. Furthermore, heirs of a party to a property settle-
ment agreement may enforce the agreement.
In 1984 a husband and wife executed a voluntary separation
and property settlement agreement.2 Shortly after the execution of
the agreement and before the sale of the marital home, the husband
died. His estate claimed a fifty-five percent interest in the home.
The widow sought a declaratory judgment that she was the sole
owner of the entire parcel of real estate. The estate, on the other
hand, claimed that the separation agreement converted the tenancy
by the entireties into a tenancy in common, thereby entitling the
heirs to their proportionate interest in the property. In addition,
the estate argued that the separation agreement itself was enforcea-
ble by the heirs of a party to the agreement.3
The trial court ruled that the contractual agreement between
the parties terminated the tenancy by the entireties. Reversing the
lower court, the Court of Special Appeals determined that the exe-
cution of the separation and property settlement agreement did not
convert the tenancy by the entireties into a tenancy in common.4
The court found, however, that the wife's contractual obligation
with respect to the property did not terminate upon the death of her
spouse. Thus, the estate could compel the sale of the home and
receive a division of the proceeds in accordance with the terms of
the agreement.' The wife and the estate then filed cross-petitions
for certiorari.6
The Court of Appeals considered two questions: (1) whether
the separation and property settlement agreement converted the
I. 309 Md. 421, 524 A.2d 777 (1987).
2. The agreement acknowledged that the parties held their marital home as tenants
by the entireties. By the terms of the agreement, the parties agreed to sell their home at
a mutually acceptable price, cooperate as needed in the sale, and divide the net proceeds
of the sale 55% to the husband and 45% to the wife. Id. at 425, 524 A.2d at 779.
3. The widow argued that the tenancy by the entireties never terminated during the
lifetime of the parties and thus sole ownership in the home vested with her by right of
survivorship upon her husband's death. id.
4. Bruce v. Dyer, 67 Md. App. 499, 502-03, 508 A.2d 510, 512 (1986).
5. Id. at 507, 508 A.2d at 514.
6. 309 Md. at 426, 524 A.2d at 780.
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tenancy by the entireties into a tenancy in common; and (2) if not,
whether the estate of the deceased partner could enforce the provi-
sions of the separation and property settlement agreement against
the surviving spouse."
The court noted that Maryland law retains the estate of tenancy
by the entireties in its traditional form and that the estate can be
terminated during the spouses' lifetimes only by divorce or joint ac-
tion by the husband and wife.8 The separation and property settle-
ment agreement lacked the specific language necessary to satisfy
statutory requirements for severance of a tenancy by the entireties
by grant.9 The court concluded that to read the property settlement
agreement as severing the tenancy by the entireties would extend
the agreement beyond the parties' intent; particularly in light of the
court's presumption in favor of tenancies by the entireties and the
court's reliance on principles of objective contract construction.
Rather, the court found that at most the agreement evidenced an
intent that the tenancy by the entireties not control division of the
7. Id.
8. Id. In reality, Maryland does not retain the estate of tenancy by the entireties in
its traditional form. Traditionally, a wife had only a survivorship interest in property
held by the entireties; the husband's rights were paramount to those of his wife with
respect to possession, control, and revenue derived from the property. For example, a
wife had no legal right to income received from rental of the property during her hus-
band's lifetime. See Columbian Carbon Co. v. Kight, 207 Md. 203, 209, 114 A.2d 28, 30
(1955). Since the enactment of the Married Women's Property Act, a wife shares
equally with the husband in the income from a tenancy by the entireties. See Colburn v.
Colburn, 262 Md. 333, 337, 278 A.2d 1, 3 (1971), on appeal after remand, 265 Md. 468,
290 A.2d 280 (1972).
9. 309 Md. at 428, 432, 524 A.2d at 781, 783. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 4-
108(b) (1988) provides:
Any interest in property held by a husband and wife in tenancy by the entirety
may be granted, (1) by both acting jointly, to themselves, or to themselves.and
any other person, in joint tenancy or tenancy in common; (2) by both acting
jointly, to either husband or wife and any other person in joint tenancy or ten-
ancy in common; and (3) by either acting individually to the other in tenancy in
severalty, without the use of a strawman as an intermediate grantee-grantor.
These grants, regardless of when made, are ratified, confirmed and declared
valid as having created the type of ownership that the grant purports to grant.
This statute is in derogation of the common law, which requires the use of a straw man
as an intermediary to create or terminate an estate by the entireties that did not arise or
terminate by operation of law. 309 Md. at 431, 524 A.2d at 782. Because statutes in
derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed, the court referred to §§ 5-
103 and 1-103 of the Real Property Article for assistance in construing the separation
agreement. Section 5-103 requires conveyances to be in writing; § 1-103 defines the use
of the terms "grant," "conveyance," "assignment," and "transfer." The court deter-
mined that the separation agreement did not satisfy these statutory requirements. 309
Md. at 432, 524 A.2d at 783.
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proceeds arising from sale of the marital home.' 0
Next the court considered whether the husband's death termi-
nated the contract obligations of the property settlement agree-
ment. Unless a contract is for personal services or otherwise is
expressly limited, it survives the death of a party and is binding
upon the deceased's estate." Furthermore, Maryland statute binds
heirs and estates to the contractual obligations of the decedent.' 2
The court concluded that the surviving spouse likewise was bound
by the terms of the separation agreement. 3 The court distin-
guished Beau v. Beall,' 4 which the widow had cited as controlling.'"
The promise sought to be enforced in Beau was a "bare offer" which
was unsupported by consideration and which terminated with the
10. 309 Md. at 434, 524 A.2d at 783. In Eastern Shore v. Bank of Somerset, 253 Md.
525, 532, 253 A.2d 367, 371 (1969), the court noted that during the lifetime of tenants
by the entireties, an estate can be terminated by the tenants'joint action. A conveyance
by both to a third person terminates the tenancy by the entireties in the land, but not in
the proceeds, which ordinarily continue to be held by the entireties. The Bruce court did
not have to decide whether the terms of the separation agreement would have con-
trolled division of proceeds from the sale of the marital home because the husband died
prior to the sale of the property.
11. 309 Md. at 439, 524 A.2d at 786. The court cited 18 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CoNTRAcTs (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1978), which states: "Unless a contractual
obligation is personal in character, death of the obligor will not discharge it, although no
right of action had accrued prior to the death, and although the obligation is a guaranty
where the only consideration was the credit given to the principal debtor." Id. § 1945,
at 75-76 (footnote omitted). The court also cited Burka v. Patrick, 34 Md. App. 181, 366
A.2d 1070 (1976), which held that a contract that is not for personal services or ex-
pressly intended to terminate upon the death of a party survives the death of a party and
is binding upon the party's estate. Id. at 185, 366 A.2d at 1072.
12. MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 1 (1986) states:
Where two or more persons are jointly bound by bond, promissory note or
by any other writing, whether sealed or unsealed, to pay money or do any other
thing and one or more of such persons shall die, his or their executors and
heirs shall be bound in the same manner and to the same extent as if the person
so dying had been bound severally as well as jointly.
13. 309 Md. at 440, 524 A.2d at 786-87. The language of the separation agreement
itself supported this conclusion. The contract concluded: "As to these covenants and
promises, the parties hereto severally bind themselves, their heirs, personal representa-
tives and assigns." Id. at 425, 524 A.2d at 779.
The court cited decisions from other states in support of the proposition that the
death of a spouse does not terminate a separation agreement. See, e.g., In re Estate of
Loughmiller, 229 Kan. 584, 592-93, 629 P.2d 156, 162 (1981); Pavluvcik v. Sullivan, 22
Mass. App. Ct. 581, 583-84. 495 N.E.2d 869, 872 (1981); In re Estate of Nelson, 85
Wash. 2d 602, 609-10, 537 P.2d 765, 771 (1975).
14. 291 Md. 224, 434 A.2d 10iS (1981). In Beall the Court of Appeals held that a
widow was not bound by the terms of an option agreement executed jointly with her late
husband, when the option was for the purchase of property held by the couple as tenants
by the entireties and the option had not been exercised prior to the husband's death. Id.
at 235-36, 434 A.2d at 1021-22.
15. 309 Md. at 441, 524 A.2d at 787.
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death of the offeror. By contrast, the separation agreement in the
instant case was embodied in a fully formed contract, binding upon
the widow and enforceable by her husband's estate.' 6
The court's ruling in Bruce reaffirms the basic property law pre-
sumption in favor of a tenancy by the entireties by holding that a
separation agreement which does not satisfy statutory requirements
for a conveyance of real property is insufficient to terminate an es-
tate held by the entireties. 7 The case provides important guide-
lines for practitioners endeavoring to structure property settlement
agreements. When a husband and wife wish to dissolve a tenancy by
the entireties, drafters must utilize language indicative of both par-
ties' intent to terminate their estate and must comply with statutory
requirements for performing a present conveyance, transfer, or as-
signment of interest in the real property.' 8
More importantly, Bruce declares that property settlement
agreements constitute contracts which will bind the parties' heirs
and assigns when such intent is expressed in the document. The
court will enforce a clear statement of intent contained in a contract,
even if that intent overrides the survivorship rights inherent in a
tenancy by the entireties. Therefore, a practitioner must carefully
select and include legal terms that best express the client's intent,
and must thoroughly explain to a client the legal implications and
options associated with real property ownership before finalization
of the agreement. Furthermore, the attorney must anticipate the cli-
ent's estate planning desires and assist the client in formulating an
agreement that will best reflect these wishes. To do less may jeop-
16. The court did not address dicta in Beall regarding the court's strong interest in
protecting the widow's equitable interests following the death of her spouse. The court
in BeaU stated:
[The widow's] responsibilities, both legal and personal, are vastly different to-
day. For example, the rights of her individual creditors, if any, may now attach
to the subject property, which, before [her husband's] death, could only be
attached by creditors of both. In view of such changed conditions, at least
some of which pertain in the case of every widowed spouse, we think that to
hold a surviving widow to the terms of an unsupported offer to sell property
held by the entirety, made jointly with her husband before his death, would not
be in the interest of equity.
291 Md. at 236, 434 A.2d at 1022.
Thus, the BeaU court was reluctant to enforce an agreement pertaining to a property
transfer when the party against whom enforcement was sought was in a more vulnerable
position than when the contract was made. The Bruce court did not apply the BeaU ra-
tionale to the facts of the case.
17. See 309 Md. at 432-33, 524 A.2d at. 783.
18. See MD. R.AL PROP. CODE ANN. § 5-103 (1988).
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ardize the client's property interests and fail to dispose of the prop-
erty in accordance with the client's intent.
B. Alimony
The Court of Appeals held in Turrisi v. Sanzaro' 9 that the Ali-
mony Act"0 has not abolished the inherent power of an equity court
to reserve jurisdiction over alimony when it grants a divorce.
Although considerations such as monetary awards, rights to the
family home, or the awarding of reasonable and necessary expenses
may affect the propriety of any reservation when grounds for di-
vorce definitely exist, a chancellor has discretion to reserve jurisdic-
tion if the spouse can show that circumstances will change in the
reasonably foreseeable future so as to justify an award of rehabilita-
tive or indefinite alimony. 2'
A wife sued her husband for a divorce on grounds of voluntary
separation after four years of marriage. Both spouses are medical
doctors. The wife was diagnosed as having multiple sclerosis
shortly after the couple married. At the time of the divorce hearing,
she was able to practice medicine only on a part-time basis.2 2 Nev-
ertheless, based upon her admission that she was then self-support-
ing and not seeking immediate alimony, the chancellor determined
that the wife had waived an immediate award of alimony."3 Further-
more, relying on Quigley v. Quigley,24 the chancellor held that he
19. 308 Md. 515, 520 A.2d 1080 (1987).
20. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 to -111 (1984 & Supp. 1987).
21. 308 Md. at 528-30, 520 A.2d at 1086-87.
22. Id. at 517, 520 A.2d at 1081. Multiple sclerosis is a progressive neuromuscular
disease that causes loss of voluntary muscle control. Once diagnosed, the course of the
disease is difficult or impossible to predict. The court reported conflicting trial court
testimony with respect to the wife's prognosis. There was clear evidence that the disease
had forced her to convert her practice from surgery to family practice, and to reduce her
employment from full-time to part-time. Her physician testified at trial that she would
be unable to work as a physician within the next two to ten years, but noted that at the
time she was without voluntary bowel or bladder control and was unable to walk without
a cane. Id. at 518-19, 520 A.2d at 1081-82.
23. Id. at 520-21, 520 A.2d at 1082-83.
24. 54 Md. App. 45, 456 A.2d 1305 (1983). In Quigley the court dismissed the case
for lack ofjurisdiction. Nevertheless, in a lengthy memorandum accompanying its dis-
missal, the court rejected the wife's request that the court reserve jurisdiction to award
alimony at some future time. The wife, age 61, claimed that although she was presently
employed and earning an annual salary of $21,800, she would be eligible for a monthly
retirement sum of only $383. At the time of the divorce, her husband, age 60, was
surviving on only $96 earned income per month, but would be eligible for two retire-
ment incomes totalling $1700 per month by age 65.
In rejecting the wife's request, the court questioned its statutory authority for reser-
vation ofjurisdiction to award alimony generally. It specifically rejected the concept of
886
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lacked power to reserve jurisdiction over the question of future ali-
mony. The Court of Special Appeals vacated and remanded the
chancellor's decision with respect to the award of immediate ali-
mony and ordered the chancellor to evaluate other factors, in addi-
tion to the wife's waiver, in reconsidering an immediate alimony
award.2 5 The intermediate appellate court declined to address the
reservation of alimony issue, although it implied an inclination to
adopt Quigley. 6
On appeal the Court of Appeals considered whether the wife
waived an immediate award of alimony and whether a chancellor
may reserve jurisdiction to award alimony in the future. With re-
spect to the first issue, the court reversed the decision of the Court
of Special Appeals, finding that the chancellor was not clearly erro-
neous in concluding that the wife had waived her claim to immediate
alimony.27
With respect to the second issue, the court noted that equity
courts traditionally reserved jurisdiction to award alimony long after
the grant of an absolute divorce. 2' The passage of the Alimony
Act 29 raised the question whether the chancellor's power to reserve
jurisdiction over alimony still existed. The court agreed with
reserving jurisdiction to award alimony indefinitely as a hedge against unexpected
changes in a spouse's standard of living. Relying on the facts unique to Quigey, the court
stated:
The statute does permit an indefinite award or extension to an aging or infirm
spouse in need whose transition cannot reasonably be expected to progress; or
one who having exhausted his or her capacity still remains desperately out of
proportion with the standard of living to which he or she had been accustomed.
Nothing, however, was included (despite its having been considered) that
would ever permit a chancellor to use an errant spouse as a guaranior for the
pecuniary well-being of a self-sufficient-albeit virtuous-one.
Id. at 55, 456 A.2d at 1311. The court, however, acknowledged that the chancellor may
reserve a ruling on an alimony award for a reasonable contemplative period following
the granting of a divorce. Id. at 56, 456 A.2d at 1311-12.
25. 308 Md. at 520, 520 A.2d at 1082. The opinion of the Court of Special Appeals
is unreported.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 520-21, 520 A.2d at 1082-83. The court based its holding on the wife's
trial testimony, in which she expressly stated that she was not claiming any alimony
"right now." Id. at 519, 520 A.2d at 1082. The court rejected the continued claim of
the wife's counsel for immediate alimony, stating: "[I1n a matter of this sort, it is the
client, not the counsel, who decides what is or is not waived." Id. at 520-21, 520 A.2d at
1082-83.
28. Id. at 522, 520 A.2d at 1083.
29. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 tO -111 (1984 & Supp. 1987). Maryland's
alimony laws were changed substantially by statute in 1980, when the General Assembly
enacted the recommendations concerning alimony of the Governor's Commission on
Domestic Relations Laws.
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Quigley's conclusion.that the legislature did not intend to make ali-
mony either a lifetime annuity or an insurance policy against-unfore-
seeable future setbacks or disasters.3 0 The court, however, rejected
dicta in Quigley that prohibited the reservation of jurisdiction to
award alimony for an indefinite period of time, finding that the
Quigley court misinterpreted the legislative intent.3'
Upon conducting its own analysis of the Alimony Act,"2 the
court concluded that circuit courts have inherent authority to award
alimony.33 Further, failure of the legislature to address the reserva-
tion ofjurisdiction over alimony did not support a conclusion that
the legislature intended to, repeal the court's power to reserve juris-
diction over alimony.3 4 Absent specific legislative guidelines to the
contrary, a reservation of jurisdiction is not inconsistent with the
purpose of the Alimony Act.35
Having established the court's authority to reserve jurisdiction
to award alimony, the court in Turrisi set forth guidelines for exercis-
ing the authority. The chancellor's power to reserve jurisdiction is
discretionary; exercise of this discretion in favor of reservation de-
pends on both statutory and nonstatutory considerations.3 6 First,
30. 308 Md. at 525, 520 A.2d at 1085.
31. Id. at 527, 520 A.2d at 1086.
32. Statutory standards for awarding alimony are set forth in MD. FAM. LAW CODE
ANN. § 11-106(c) (1984):
The court may award alimony for an indefinite period if the court finds that:
(1) due to age, illness, infirmity, or disability, the party seeking alimony
cannot reasonably be expected to make substantial progress toward becoming
self-supporting; or
(2) even after the party seeking alimony will have made as much progress
toward becoming self-supporting as can reasonably be expected, the respective
standards of living of the parties will be unconscionably disparate.
Because the principal function of alimony is rehabilitation, the court in awarding ali-
mony must consider a party's ability to become self-supporting and the time deemed
necessary to do so. Holston v. Holston, 58 Md. App. 308, 321, 473 A.2d 459, 465-66
(1984).33. 308 Md. at 526, 520 A.2d at 1086. The court found statutory support for the
circuit courts' authority to award alimony in MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 1-201 (a) (1984
& Supp. 1987), which affirms that an equity court has jurisdiction over alimony. The
court also found case law supporting equity jurisdiction to award alimony. See Thomas
v. Thomas, 294 Md. 605, 613, 451 A.2d 1215, 1219 (1982) ("[Tlhe power to grant ali-
mony was deemed to be within the inherent authority of Maryland equity courts.").
34. 308 Md. at 527, 520 A.2d at 1086.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 528, 520 A.2d at 1086. The court indicated a willingness to uphold the
conclusion reached in Abell v. Abell, 12 Md. App. 99, 106-07, 277 A.2d 629, 634, cert.
denied, 263 Md. 709 (1971), that a court has the same judicial discretion to reserve juris-
diction over alimony as it has to award alimony at the time of granting a divorce. Abell
qualified the scope of this authority by noting that if a divorce decree is granted without
FAMILY LAW
according to the Alimony Act, a spouse must demonstrate that he or
she is entitled to alimony. 37 Second, if a case involves both a mone-
tary award and alimony, reservation of jurisdiction over alimony
"demand[s] the most careful exercise of discretion. "3 8 Finally, the
claimant must produce evidence that circumstances will change in
the reasonably foreseeable future so as then to justify an award of
rehabilitative or indefinite alimony.39 The court remanded the case
for a determination consistent with the guidelines set forth in the
40opinion.
The holding in Turrisi has implications for practitioners who
seek or oppose the court's reservation of jurisdiction to award ali-
mony. An attorney who anticipates that a client might require ali-
mony at some future time can protect the Client's interest by seeking
reservation of jurisdiction. The practitioner should be prepared to
show that while the client currently may be ineligible for alimony by
virtue of present earning capacity, reservation of jurisdiction to
award rehabilitative or indefinite alimony would not be an abuse of
the court's discretion. The attorney also must demonstrate that
other factors such as monetary, personal, and real property awards
do not offset the client's foreseeable future need for alimony. 4 , Be-'
cause the court will not reserve jurisdiction if the only basis for res-
ervation is some vague expectation of changed circumstances, the
practitioner should be prepared to enumerate the reasons underly-
ing the contention that a foreseeable change in circumstances may
necessitate future alimony.
Conversely, the attorney opposing reservation ofjurisdiction to
award alimony should demonstrate that the facts of the case under
consideration do not justify reservation. The attorney should show
that the request for reservation of jurisdiction is based solely on a
possible change in the spouse's circumstances due to age, infirmity,
an award of alimony or reservation ofjurisdiction to award alimony, the court is not free
to make a later alimony award. Id.
37. 308 Md. at 528, 520 A.2d at 1086.
38. Id. at 529, 520 A.2d at 1087.
39. Id., 520 A.2d at 1088.
40. id. at 530, 520 A.2d at 1088.
41. In McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 469 A.2d 1256 (1984), the court discussed
the distinction between a monetary award and an award of alimony. A monetary award
typically is made to achieve an equitable distribution of property acquired during the
marriage and to compensate for the monetary and nonmonetary contributions made by
the spouses before the dissolution of the marriage. An alimony award provides for ap-
propriate spousal support after dissolution of the marriage. A monetary award is an
adjustment of the marital property interests of the spouses and is not enforceable by
contempt proceedings as are alimony awards. Id. at 348-52, 469 A.2d at 1270-73.
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disability, or disparity in living standards which neither presently ex-
ists nor is foreseeable. According to Turrisi, the court will not grant
a request for reservation of jurisdiction premised on these grounds
alone.
C. Child Support
In Knill v. Knill42 the Court of Appeals refused to apply the doc-
trine of equitable estoppel against a husband who denied the duty
to support a child who, though born to his wife during wedlock, was
not his natural son.43 In a four-to-three decision, the court adopted
the view of the majority ofjurisdictions, which have refused to apply
equitable estoppel in similar situations.44 The court's, holding
rested on its finding that the child incurred no financial detriment
because the husband willingly had provided support prior to the
divorce. 5
The couple married in 1960 and had two children before the
husband underwent a vasectomy in 1968. In 1970 the wife gave
birth to a son whom both parties agreed was not the husband's natu-
ral child. Nonetheless, the marriage continued for another twelve
years with the couple rearing the child as a member of the family.46
The husband's name appeared as father on the child's birth certifi-
cate, and the husband's will named the child as his son and chief
beneficiary. 47 At no time did the wife attempt to receive any support
from the child's natural father. According to the record, the hus-
band neither encouraged nor discouraged her from seeking such
support.4 8
42. 306 Md. 527, 510 A.2d 546 (1986).
43. Id. at 539, 510 A.2d at 552.
44. See, e.g., Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 114, 429 A.2d 833 (1980); Fuller
v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767-(D.C. 1968); R.D.S. v. S.L.S., 402 N.E.2d 30 (Ind. App. 1980);
Berrisford v. Berrisford, 322 N.W.2d 742 (Minn. 1982); Walton v. Walton, 282 S.C. 165,
318 S.E.2d 14 (1984).
California and New Jersey have applied equitable estoppel to prevent a husband
from denying paternity and a support obligation. See In re Marriage ofJohnson, 88 Cal.
App. 3d 848, 152 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1979) (applying equitable estoppel); Clevenger v.
Clevenger, 189 Cal. App. 2d 658. II Cal. Rptr. 707 (1961) (establishing criteria for
applying equitable estoppel, but not applying the doctrine to the facts of the case);
Miller v. Miller, 97 NJ. 154,478 A.2d 351 (1984) (finding that although equitable estop-
pel may apply to step-parent, not applicable to case at bar); M.H.B. v. H.T.B., 100 N.J.
567, 498 A.2d 775 (1985) (per curiam) (Handler, J., concurring) (applying equitable
estoppel to step-parent).
45. 306 Md. at 537, 510 A.2d at 551.
46. Id. at 529, 510 A.2d at 547.
47. Id. at 540, 510 A.2d at 552 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 530, 510 A.2d at 547.
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The child was unaware of his illegitimacy until the age of
eleven, when his mother told him the truth after a family argument.
Nevertheless, the husband continued to support the child for the
next two years. When the wife sued for divorce in 1984, she re-
quested support for the child. Her husband asserted in turn that
because the child was not his natural son, he had no legal duty to
support him.49
At trial, a man whom the mother had identified as the child's
natural father testified that while he knew the mother, because of his
alcoholism, he could neither admit nor deny paternity. The evi-
dence indicated that the alleged father was at all relevant times both
available for process and financially able to support the child.50
The trial court issued a final decree of divorce and concluded
that the husband was equitably estopped from denying an obliga-
tion to support the child. The husband appealed to the Court of
Special Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari
prior to argument in the intermediate appellate court.5'
The husband denied that there existed any legal basis for im-
posing an obligation upon him to support a child not his own. At
most he stood in loco parentis to the child during the time that he
voluntarily supported him; such a relationship, being temporary in
character, gave rise to no legal duty after the couple separated.
Under Maryland law, because the husband was not the natural fa-
ther, he bore no general obligation to support the child. The wife
countered that by representing himself to her son and the commu-
nity as the child's father, her husband now was equitably estopped
to deny paternity.52 Furthermore, she argued that it would be "in-
equitable and unconscionable" to allow her husband to deny his
duty to support her son after doing so since the child's birth. 53
The court applied a three-pronged test to determine the appli-
cability of equitable estoppel to this situation. First, there must be
"voluntary conduct" or a representation by the party sought to be
estopped. Second, the estopping party must have relied on the rep-
resentation. Finally, the reliance must result in detriment to the es-
topping party.54
Both the majority and dissent agreed that the elements of rep-
49. Id. at 529-30, 510 A.2d at 547.
50. Id. at 520, 510 A.2d at 547.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 530-31, 541, 510 A.2d at 548, 553.
53. Id. at 532, 510 A.2d at 548.
54. Id. at 535, 510 A.2d at 550.
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resentation and reliance were present in the case at bar.5 5 A repre-
sentation that the husband was the child's father was implicit in the
twelve years during which the husband fully supported the child as a
member of the family.56 The child relied on that representation,
using his supposed father's surname and living in the community as
a member of the family.5 7 Furthermore, the child believed the hus-
band was his father until the day his mother told him the truth.5 8
The majority and dissent disagreed, however, over the nature
of detriment necessary to trigger equitable estoppel. The majority
focused on the lack of evidence demonstrating any financial detri-
ment incurred by the child as a result of the husband's course of
conduct during their relationship. There was no evidence that her
husband's voluntary support caused the wife to forego the possibil-
ity of seeking support from the child's natural father.5 9 The major-
ity further concluded that the lack of any statute of limitations in
paternity cases 60 and the availability and accuracy of genetic test-
ing 6 l still allowed the wife the opportunity to bring suit against the
natural father. Thus, the majority concluded that the wife was
obliged to look to her son's natural father for support.62 The "hu-
miliation of having no support from a man who for all purposes was
his father for fourteen years" did not constitute the type of detri-
ment to the child which gives rise to equitable estoppel in the ab-
sence of financial loss.63
The dissent, on the other hand, initially maintained that the
child did suffer "obvious financial detriment."'  It viewed a success-
ful paternity action against the child's natural father'after so many
55. Id. at 536, 553, 510 A.2d at 551, 559.
56. Id. at 536-37, 510 A.2d at 551.
57. Id. at 537, 510 A.2d at 551.
58. id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 537 & n.1, 510 A.2d at 551 & n.l. The court cited Frick v. Maldonado, 296
Md. 304, 462 A.2d 1206 (1983). in which the Court of Appeals found that Maryland's
then existing two-year statute of limitations in paternity cases unconstitutionally denied
equal protection to illegitimate children. The General Assembly repealed the unconsti-
tutional provision in 1985. Act of May 21, 1985, ch. 451, 1985 Md. Laws 2440.
61. 306 Md. at 538 & n.2, 510 A.2d at 551 & n.2. In 1982 the General Assembly
authorized the use of blood testing that is "sufficiently extensive to exclude 97.3% of
alleged fathers who are not biological fathers and the statistical probability of the al-
leged father's paternity is at least 97.3%." See MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-1029(e)
(1984).
62. .306 Md. at 538, 510 A.2d at 551.
63. Id., 510 A.2d at 551-52.
64. Id. at 541, 510 A.2d at 553 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
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years as unlikely.6" Furthermore, the dissent maintained that even
without financial detriment the doctrine of equitable estoppel
should apply in this case.66 The child suffered sufficient harm in
being suddenly bereft of both paternal support and community ac-
ceptance as a legitimate member of the family. 67
The Family Law Article provides that the parents of a minor
child are "jointly and severally responsible for the child's sup-
port."168 The term "parents of a minor child" encompasses both
natural and adoptive parents,69 but while the duty of child support
extends to the natural parents of an illegitimate child, it does not
extend to step-parents.7 ° Accordingly, the responsibility for child
support rests squarely on the shoulders of the.natural parents. 7'
The court's holding affirms this responsibility.
On its face, the holding indicates that equitable estoppel only
will assist the natural parent of an illegitimate child in-seeking child
support from a former spouse when there is financial harm to the
child. 7' Furthermore, the other natural parent may have to begin
supporting the child financially many years after the child's birth,
even if the spouse has assumed that responsibility in the meantime.
The split of the court and the dissent's vigor, however, suggest
that the court may be willing to confine this holding to its facts:
cases in which the child's father is ascertainable and financially able
to support his child,73 and in which the record gives no indication
65. Id. at 553, 510 A.2d at 559.
66. Id. at 541, 510 A.2d at 553.
67. Id. at 553, 510 A.2d at 559. The dissent also noted that "it is not reasonable to
expect [the child], after the passage of sixteen years, to establish a paternal relationship
with another man who, because of his alleged drunkenness, has no recollection one way
or the other whether he ever engaged in sexual intercourse with [the child's] mother."
Id.
68. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-203(b)(1) (1984 & Supp. 1987).
69. d. § 5-308(b).
70. See Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 193-94, 448 A.2d 353, 359 (1982) (step-
parent owes no duty); Commonwealth of Virginia v. Autry, 293 Md. 53, 61, 441 A.2d
1056, 1060 (1982) (natural parent owes duty to illegitimate child); Brown v. Brown, 287
Md. 273, 284, 412 A.2d 396, 402 (1980) (step-parent owes no duty).
71. See Bledsoe, 294 Md. at 193-94, 448 A.2d at 359; Brown, 287 Md. at 284, 412 A.2d
at 402.
72. 306 Md. at 546, 510 A.2d at 556 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting). The dissent noted
that the majority of jurisdictions also have refused to apply the doctrine of equitable
estoppel in cases in which a child suffered little emotional damage from learning of his
or her illegitimacy. Id. at 546-47, 510 A.2d at 556.
73. The majority noted that the natural father was "at all times available for process
and financially able to support Stephen." d. at 530, 510 A.2d at 547. The dissent
pointed out that other jurisdictions have not conducted such inquiries. Id. at 546, 510
A.2d at 555-56.
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that the former husband prevented the mother from obtaining sup-
port from the natural father.
Both the majority and dissent advanced public policy reasons
for their respective positions. The dissent characterized the hus-
band's silence regarding the child's illegitimacy as being "in itself,
neither wrongful nor unconscionable. ' 74 The effect of the hus-
band's voluntary assumption of the parental role over such an ex-
tended period, however, would render it inequitable for him now to
deny the child's legitimacy and his responsibility for support until
the child's eighteenth birthday.75 The majority, on the other hand,
concluded that when the husband knew the child was not his son,
yet treated him as a member of the family, such conduct was "con-
sistent with this state's public policy of strengthening the family, the
basic unit of civilized society.'7 6 The court sought to encourage
spouses to undertake, when feasible, the support, guidance, and
rearing of each other's children so long as their conduct does not
deprive the children of the right to support from the natural par-
ents. 77 The majority did not wish to penalize the husband for his
conduct.7' Thus Maryland law now provides a person who is con-
sidering whether to support a spouse's illegitimate child with an in-
centive to do so without fear of continued support obligations in the
event of divorce.
D. Paternity
The Court of Appeals declared in Adams v. Mallory' that a trial
court may not enter an ex parte default judgment on the issue of pa-
ternity against an alleged father as a sanction for his failure to re-
spond to interrogatories which include questions concerning
paternity. 0 In so holding, the court extended the protection which
the Family Law Article already provides an alleged father in a pater-
nity proceeding. 8 1
In July 1984 a single mother filed a paternity petition in which
she named Kevin Adams as the father of her child born the previous
month. Adams repeatedly denied paternity during pre-trial court
74. Id. at 554, 510 A.2d at 559-60.
75. Id., 510 A.2d at 560.
76. Id. at 538, 510 A.2d at 552.
77. Id. at 538-39, 510 A.2d at 552.
78. Id. at 539, 510 A.2d at 552.
79. 308 Md. 453, 520 A.2d 371 (1987).
80. Id. at 467, 520 A.2d at 378.
81. See infra notes 104-110 and accompanying text.
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appearances.8 2 The State's Attorney for Baltimore City, acting as
counsel for the mother,8 3 sent interrogatories to Adams three
months before the scheduled trial date. After receiving no response
despite the attorney's subsequent warning to Adams, the mother
filed a motion for default judgment or sanctions. 84 On the sched-
uled trial date, Adams appeared without counsel and requested a
postponement. The trial judge denied Adam's request and later
granted the mother's request for a default judgment against Adams
for failure to answer the interrogatories.85
A month later a decree determining paternity was signed, de-
claring Adams to be the father of the child and awarding custody to
the mother. Adams was not present at this ex parte hearing.8 6 When
all parties appeared in circuit court three months later, Adams in-
sisted that he was not the child's father and that he never had re-
ceived a jury trial on that issue. The court indicated that it was too
late for him to raise the issue, because he had failed to appeal the
default judgment within thirty days.8 7 After hearing testimony on
the remaining issues, the court issued a modified paternity decree
which obligated Adams to pay child support and hospital costs. 88
Adams appealed to the Court of Special Appeals on the issue of
paternity, but the court concluded that the appeal was untimely.8 9
The Court of Appeals, however, granted Adam's petition for a writ
of certiorari and determined that the appeal in fact was timely, as it
was filed within thirty days from the order that determined the last
open claim. 90
82. 308 Md. at 455-56, 520 A.2d at 372-73. Adams first denied paternity before a
hearing examiner at the Domestic Relations Division following the filing of the petition.
In October Adams again denied paternity before a circuit court judge and requested a
blood test. InJanuary 1985, after the blood test results indicated an 83.44% probability
of paternity, Adams repeated his denial of paternity and requested a jury trial. Id. at
455-57, 520 A.2d at 372-73.
83. See MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-1011 (a) (1984 & Supp. 1987).
84. 308 Md. at 457, 520 A.2d at 373.
85. d. The court considered arguments before entering a default judgment pursu-
ant to MD. R. 2-433(a).
86. The decree ordered that "all other issues, including visitation, child support,
[and] reimbursement of hospital costs" be postponed until a later hearing with Adams
present. 308 Md. at 458, 520 A.2d at 373-74.
87. Id., 520 A.2d at 374.
88. The modified decree also stated that the mother would retain custody and guard-
ianship of the minor child, subject to reasonable visitation rights. The decree further
required Adams to reimburse the city for the costs of the blood test. Id. at 458 n.7, 520
A.2d at 374 n.7.
89. Id. at 458, 520 A.2d at 374. The per curiam opinion of the Court of Special
Appeals was unreported. Id.
90. Id. at 463, 520 A.2d at 376. The mother relied on Himes v. Day, 254 Md. 197,
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Adams argued that the Family Law Article, which establishes
the scheme for resolving the issues involved in paternity proceed-
ings,9 ' prohibits propounding any interrogatories to an alleged fa-
ther. The mother countered that since paternity proceedings are
civil in nature, interrogatories are available."2
The Maryland Rules permit a discovering party to move for
sanctions without. first obtaining an order compelling discovery
when the opposing patty fails to file a response to interrogatories
after proper service.93 A trial court has the discretion to enter a
judgment by default against a party who fails to comply with discov-
ery requests. 4 The Court of Appeals noted that a complete prohi-
bition against interrogatories would forbid questions concerning
the alleged father's financial status and fitness for custody.9 5 Find-
ing it unnecessary to reach this broad issue, the court narrowed its
inquiryto the propriety of enteing a default judgment for failure to
answer interrogatories directed at the issue of paternity.96
The court embarked upon an analysis.of the Family Law Article,
noting that procedural rules apply to paternity proceedings only to
the extent that they are practical and consistent with the statutes.
9 7
Many of the article's provisions are designed to ensure that an al-
leged father is not compelled to present evidence.98 An alleged fa-
ther is under no obligation to file a written answer to the
complaint.99 If he does not respond in writing or admit any of the
material allegations of the complaint in open court, the court then
must enter a general denial of the complaint on his behalf.' 0 Thus,
254 A.2d 181 (1969), which held that under the then-existing rules of procedure a de-
fault judgment on the issue of liability alone, when entered for failure to respond to a
complaint, was a final judgment. The Court of Appeals noted that under the current
rules of procedure, such a default judgment is now an "order of default" and is no
longer appealable as a final judgment. Therefore, the rule of Himes did not apply to an
order of default entered as a discovery sanction under rule 2-433. 308 Md. at 459-61,
520 A.2d at 374-75.
91. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. §§ 5-1001 to -1048 (1984 & Supp. 1987).
92. 308 Md. at 466, 520 A.2d at 378.
93. MD. R. 2-432(a).
94. Id. 2-433.
95. 308 Md. at 466, 520 A.2d at 378.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 467, 520 A.2d at 378. See MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-1007 (1984).
98. 308 Md. at 466,,-520 A.2d at 378.
99. Mo. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-1012(a), (c) (1984). If the alleged father appears
for trial without filing a written answer or files.a written answer admitting the complaint,
and is not represented by counsel, the court must read or explain the complaint to him
to ensure that he understands the nature and substance of the allegations. Id. at (d).
100. id. at (c).
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a trial court may not enter a default order or a default judgment if
the alleged father does not answer the complaint.'°'
The court reasoned that because there can be no default judg-
ment for failure to respond to the complaint, it would be inconsis-
tent to permit a default judgment for failure to answer
interrogatories on the issue of paternity. 0 2 The court thus con-
cluded that Adams was entitled to a trial on the issue of paternity
and directed a remand.1
0 3
As the court noted, the General Assembly has provided an al-
leged father with many protections in a paternity proceeding under
the Family Law Article."0 4 A notice that the defendant has the right
to a jury trial on the issue of paternity must accompany the com-
plaint. 0 5 If the defendant undergoes a blood test, the State's Attor-
ney may issue a summons requiring a third party to appear, to
testify, and to produce documents connected with the examina-
tion.' 0 6 The State's Attorney then must notify thedefendant of the
time and place of such a pretrial inquiry and of his right to appear
and present evidence."0 " The alleged father faces no compulsion to
present evidence at the trial itself,'08 and no inference may be drawn
from his failure to testify.'0 9 The mother bears the burden of estab-
lishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is the
child's father. I0
The court's holding is consistent with these statutory protec-
tions and the explicit provision that a rule of procedure applies only
to the extent that it is not inconsistent with statute. Because failing
to answer the complaint may not trigger a default judgment, refus-
ing to answer an interrogatory concerning paternity should not trig-
101. 308 Md. at 464, 520 A.2d at 377.
102. Id. at 467, 520 A.2d at 378.
103. Id., 520 A.2d at 378-79. The court ordered that if on remand the circuit court
found that Adams was the child's father, it should enter judgnent accordingly. If, on
the other hand, the mother failed to prove that Adams was the father, the court should
strike all orders entered against Adams which depended upon a determination of pater-
nity. Adams did not challenge the awarding of custociy to the mother. Id., 520 A.2d at
379.
104. Id. at 463-66, 520 A.2d at 376-78.
105. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-1010(d)(l) (1984).
106. Id. § 5-1019(b)(1). The State's Attorney also has the power to administer oaths,
examine witnesses, and receive evidence. Id. at (b)(2)-(4).
107. Id. § 5-1020(1), (2). At the pretrial hearing, the alleged father also has a right to
testify on his own behalf, subject to his signing a waiver that permits his testimony to be
used against him in the paternity proceeding. Id. at (3).
108. Id. § 5-1028(d).
109. Id. § 5-1027(c).
110. Id. § 5-1028(a).
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ger one either. Unfortunately, the court's narrow holding provides
little guidance for parties in future paternity cases.
The court assumed that interrogatories, including those di-
rected to the paternity issue, are permitted in paternity actions."'
The court further assumed that the privilege against compulsory
testimony does not excuse the failure to answer interrogatories.' 12
A mother today will be unsure as to whether she can expect a re-
sponse to an interrogatory directed at the issue of paternity. Fur-
thermore, she is unsure what, if any, sanctions will deter an alleged
father from evading such an interrogatory. Although the court did
hint that interrogatories directed to issues of financial status and fit-
ness for custody may be proper, it avoided determining whether any
interrogatories in fact are permitted in a paternity proceeding.
Similarly, an alleged father who receives interrogatories is un-
sure to which, if any, he must respond. Furthermore, he is uncertain
as to what, if any, penalties he might face for refusing to answer any
of the interrogatories. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals explicitly
has held that an alleged father who has refused to answer interroga-
tories concerning paternity still is entitled to a trial on the issue of




111. 308 Md. at 466, 520 A.2d at 378.
112. Id. at 466-67, 520 A.2d at 378.




1. Interaction of State and Local Regulations.-In Ad + Soil v.
County Commissioners' the Court of Appeals held that compliance with
local zoning ordinances was an implicit condition of the Maryland
statute authorizing permits for sludge storage facilities.2  By so
holding, the court defined a two-tiered system of permit regulation,
in which local authorities may enact stringent zoning ordinances tai-
lored to theirjurisdiction's needs without conflicting with state law.3
Because the conditional use provisions of the sludge storage ordi-
nances were reasonable and consistent with state requirements, the
court mandated compliance with the county's guidelines. 4
Ad + Soil, Inc. was engaged in the business of disposing of
processed sewage sludge. Ordinarily, Ad + Soil would remove the
sludge from the treatment plants and apply it as a fertilizer in the
fields of cooperating farmers.5 When weather conditions did not
permit the application of fertilizer, Ad + Soil stored the sludge at
facilities such as the one at issue in Queen Anne's County, Mary-
land.' Ad + Soil obtained the necessary state approval for the stor-
age facility's site and construction plans from the Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene in June 1983 and began operations im-
mediately.7 It did not seek approval from the county zoning board.8
In August 1983 the Zoning Administrator for Queen Anne's
County ordered Ad + Soil to cease all activity at the site until Ad +
1. 307 Md. 307, 513 A.2d 893 (1986).
2. Id. at 335-38, 513 A.2d at 907-09.
3. Id.
4. id.
5. Ad + Soil's contract with the District of Columbia required the disposal of "at
least" 200 tons of sludge per day. Id. at.310, 513 A.2d at 894.
6. Id. Ad + Soil actually began operations earlier in Queen Anne's County. In
1982 operations commenced at another site that Ad + Soil later learned was zoned
exclusively for agriculture. It moved to the location at issue in early 1983. Id. at 311,
513 A.2d at 895.
7. Id. at 312, 513 A.2d at 895. See MD. Ervr. CODE ANN. § 9-231 (1987) (permit
required for sewage sludge utilization facility).
8. 307 Md. at 312, 513 A.2d at 895. Queen Anne's County derives its enabling
authority in land use and zoning from MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 4.01(a)-(b) (1983),
which empowers the county "to regulate and restrict . .. the location and use of...
structures and land," and to "impose such additional restrictions, conditions, or limita-
tions as may be deemed appropriate to . . . protect the general character . . . of the
surrounding or adjacent lands."
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Soil obtained the requisite county zoning permits.9 The county also
required Ad + Soil both to obtain a release from the existing condi-
tional use provisions imposed on the facility and to obtain a condi-
tional use permit to operate a sludge facility.' 0 The county granted
the zoning permit contingent on Ad + Soil's application for the
conditional use permit; Ad + Soil, however, failed to apply for the
conditional use permit and continued operating the facility."' In
December 1983 the State authorized a permit for Ad + Soil to oper-
ate based on the site and construction plans previously approved by
9. 307 Md. at 312, 513 A.2d at 895. Local zoning boards may impose conditional
use provisions on facilities if those facilities are potentially an inconvenience or hazard
to the community. One author, in discussing the reasons for granting "conditional use"
or "special" permits,. defines the typical standard as requiring
(1) that the use must be in harmony with the intent and purpose of the locality's
zoning law and comprehensive plan; (2) that it will not adversely affect the
health, safety and welfare of the community; (3) that it will not seriously depre-
ciate surrounding property values; (4) that it must be a matter of public need or
convenience; (5) that the use will not contribute toward an -overburdening of
municipal services; and (6) that it will not cause traffic, parking, population
density or environmental problems.
6 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 44.03[1]'(1986).
10. 307 Md. at 312, 513 A.2d at 896. The existing conditional use decision concern-
ing the property authorized the operation of a sand and gravel quarry on the land, but
required the land to be restored following excavation. Id. at n.5, 513 A.2d at 895 n.5.
Additional conditional use provisions imposed by the county appear in the amendments
of the Queen Anne's County Zoning Regulations, passed on October 25, 1983.
Although Ad + Soil obtained the permits before October 1983, the court found that the
amendments, which expressly made sludge storage a conditional use, nonetheless were
applicable. The amendments permitted the land to be used for
Storage and Distribution of Sewage Sludge provided that: .... b) there be an
approved Sediment Control Plan; c) a minimum freeboard of two (2) feet be
maintained at all times; d) the storage facility shall be located in a relatively
level area; e) the storage location shall be located a minimum of one hundred
(100) feet from any property line, two hundred (200) feet from any road, one
hundred fifty (150) feet from any drainage, ditch, swale or gully, and a mini-
mum of three hundred (300) feet from any stream, lake, pond or other body of
water; f) facilities be provided for washing off and cleaning of vehicles before
they leave the site to assure that no sludge, mud or dirt will be brought onto
public roads; g) the entrance to the site shall be approved by the County or
State Highway Department whichever is applicable; h) that applicant has ob-
tained all permits from the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. The
Board shall obtain an adequate bond or other satisfactory guarantee to insure
compliance with these requirements and any other requirements the Board
may impose in accordance with Section 20.44. The Board shall also give spe-
cific consideration to the limitations, guides and standards as outlined in Sec-
tion 20.5. The Board may increase the above required setbacks, depending on
site condition, and to assure that the applicant will meet all Federal, State and
Local requirements.
QUEEN ANNE'S COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE § 16.202 (1983).
11. 307 Md. at 313-14, 513 A.2d at 896.
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the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene.' 2
Several months after commencing full operations, Ad + Soil
applied for variances from the conditional use permit.'" The Board
of Zoning Appeals denied the applications, noting that Ad + Soil
failed to show that the variances would be neither a substantial det-
riment to adjacent property nor contrary to the purpose of the ordi-
nance.' 4 The board stressed the storage facility's threat to the
public health, the jeopardy to the local residents' peaceful enjoy-
ment of their homes, and the potential for diminished property val-
ues surrounding the facility. On appeal the circuit court affirmed
the board's orders.' 5 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari
before the Court of Special Appeals considered the issues in the
case.16
The Court of Appeals first noted that the State had not pre-
empted the field in sludge storage utilization"' and that the local
ordinances did not irreconcilably conflict with the state statute au-
thorizing Ad + Soil's permit.'" In so noting, the court disagreed
with Ad + Soil's contention that the ordinances gave the local au-
thorities the ability to prohibit what the State, by general public law,
permitted.' 9 The court determined that the legislature did not in-
tend to vest absolute authority in the State and thereby preclude the
enactment and enforcement of local zoning ordinances. 20 Rather,
"the state permits must be viewed as authorization.., subject to the
lawful requirements of the applicable zoning regulations."'" If the
12. d. at 314, 513 A.2d at 896.
13. Id. These variances were necessary in order to satisfy the requirements for the
conditional use permit. d. at 315, 513 A.2d at 897.
14. Id. The court noted that "[b]ecause of undisputed evidence regarding the ema-
nation of odors from Ad + Soil's facilities, and what it viewed as unresolved questions
as to the facilities' impact on the local environment, the Board... denied the permit."
d.
15. Id. at 317.18, 513 A.2d at 898. The appeal to the Circuit Court noted in the text
was actually Ad + Soil's second appeal. The first appeal resulted in an agreement to
allow the sludge removal company to file another application with the Board of Zoning
Appeals. In the second appeal the circuit court found that the board's denial of Ad +
Soil's second application for a conditional use permit was neither arbitrary nor capri-
cious. d.
16. Id. at 318, 513 A.2d at 898.
17. Id. at 334-35, 513 A.2d at 906-07.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 335, 513 A.2d at 907.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 336, 513 A.2d at 908. The court considered Ad + Soil's contention that
City of Baltimore v. Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 255 A.2d 376 (1969), mandated reversal of the
circuit court decision. Sitnick held that a local jurisdiction could not prohibit what the
State's general public law permitted. d. at 317, 255 A.2d at 376. Ad + Soil contended
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local requirements are not inherently unreasonable, then compli-
ance with them is mandated.22 The state and local requirements
therefore are concurrent, with the state permit procedure. function-
ing as a general framework supplemented by local provisions. In
ruling against Ad + Soil, the court stressed that the corporation
could have complied with the conditional use requirements but did
not.23
Insofar as it deals with zoning regulations, Ad + Soil is a case of
first impression. Maryland courts, however, have addressed analo-
gous issues involving a choice between doctrines of "direct con-
flict"2 4 and "concurrence of powers."125  In Heubeck v. City of
Baltimore,26 for example, the Court of Appeals struck down a city
ordinance which forbade. the eviction of a tenant at the expiration of
a lease, when a state law permitted eviction. Though Heubeck in-
volved a direct conflict between state and local laws, it implicitly de-
fined the boundary between irreconcilable conflict and concurrence
of power. The court noted that "[a] conflict only exists.. when an
ordinance prohibits something permitted by the Legislature, or per-
mits something prohibited by the Legislature." 7 The court fur-
thered this notion in.American National Building & Loan Association v.
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore28 by determining that general state
law was not intended to draw an impermissible line between state
and local authority, "but rather ... to define the inclusive limits of
the State's power. ' '2 9
City of Baltimore v. Sitnick, 30 a case upon which Ad + Soil re-
lied,3 ' addressed these same principles with respect to minimum
wage regulations. The Sitnick court discussed the characterization of
local regulation as supplementary to state law, thus finding an alter-
that the state permits unconditionally authorized it to operate its facility in Queen
Anne's County. In dismissing this theory the court noted that Ad + Soil misconstrued
the nature of the State's granting of the permits. "The state statutes governing sludge
utilization," the court determined, "evidence no legislative purpose to preclude the en-
actment and enforcement of local zoning regulations." 307 Md. at 336, 513 A.2d at 908.
22. 307 Md. at 336-38, 513 A.2d at 908-10.
23. Id.
24. See State v. Gibson. 4 Md. App. 236, 247, 242 A.2d 575, 582 (1968) (defining
"direct conflict" in case in which local enactment conflicted with legislature's intention
in vehicular homicide).
25. See Sitnick, 254 Md. at 318, 255 A.2d at 383.
26. 205 Md. 203, 107 A.2d 99 (1954).
27. Id. at 209, 107 A.2d at 102.
28. 245 Md. 23, 224 A.2d 883 (1966).
29. Id. at 31, 224 A.2d at 887.
30. 254 Md. 303, 255 A.2d 376 (1969). See also supra note 21.
31. 307 Md. at 335. 513 A.2d at 907.
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native to the choice between concurrent powers and direct conflict.
solutions.3 ' The court stressed that while there may be times when
the legislature so forcefully expresses its intent to occupy a specific
field that preemption is implied, the court must exercise caution,
because applying preemption too broadly would render worthless
the concept of local rule.3 3 The court found it preferable to view
the local ordinance as a supplement to the state statute. 4
In adjudicating zoning issues the Court of Appeals has defined
the reasonable limits of zoning regulations.3 5 These cases stress
that local authority should have the power to impose conditional
uses to promote the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the
community. Therefore, even before Ad + Soil, the court had recog-
nized the need for local control over zoning regulation. Further-
more, the Court of Appeals has created a presumption that
conditional use requirements are for the benefit of the community
and that the burden to show otherwise rests with the applicant.
3 6
In Ad + Soil the Court of Appeals firmly established a two-
tiered system of zoning regulation compliance-state and local law.
By upholding the Queen Anne's County ordinances, Ad + Soil fos-
ters local control in maintaining facilities that potentially may affect
the health and safety of local citizens as well as the value of adjacent
property. In essence, it creates a system in which broad state law
and focused local ordinances are not seen to conflict, but are con-
current in existence. Therefore, the decision facilitates zoning regu-
lation tailored to serve the needs of each county. In addition, it
places a stringent burden on those seeking speial exceptions to
prove the unreasonableness of conditional use regulations and
32. 254 Md. at 324, 255 A.2d at 386.
33. Id.
34. Id. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see Moser, County Home Rule-
Sharing the State's Legislative Power with Maryland Counties, 28 MD. L. REV. 327 (1968).
35. See Lucky Stores v. Montgomery County, 270 Md. 513, 312 A.2d 758 (1973) (a
special exception to conditional use is subject to a strong showing of "need"); Rockville
Fuel & Feed Co. v. City of Gaithersburg, 257 Md. 183, 262 A.2d 499 (1970) (administra-
tive board cannot deny a special exception to conditional use absent probative evidence
of harm or disturbance to neighborhood and disharmony with the general plan for the
development of the district); Skipjack Cove Marina v. Cecil County, 252 Md. 440, 250
A.2d 260 (1968) (a subsequent purchaser takes property subject to prior decision of the
zoning board, but may be granted a special exception upon a showing of significant
change of condition); Prince George's County v. Lightman, 251 Md. 86, 246 A.2d 261
(1967) (in determining reasonable conditional uses for filling station, testimony must
show both that the proposed exception is in harmony with the general plan for the de-
velopment of the district, and that it would not adversely affect the health and safety of
adjacent properties or the general neighborhood).
36. See generally 6 P. ROHAN, supra note 9. §§ 44.03-.04.
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curbs the circumvention of local authority under the guise of state
preemption or irreconcilable conflict.
2. Defense of Equitable Estoppel.-The Court of Appeals held in
Permanent Financial Corp. v. Montgomery County-" that Montgomery
County was equitably estopped from claiming that a building's up-
per floor exceeded the height limitation imposed.by the local zoning
ordinance, 8 despite a Montgomery County Board of Appeals ruling
that the height was not in compliance with the Montgomery County
Code. The court found that the builder had designed and con-
structed the building in reasonable reliance on a building permit
issued according to a long-standing interpretation of the code's re-
quirement for calculating a building's height.3 9
Pursuant to a Montgomery County building permit, Permanent
Financial Corporation (Permanent) began construction of a four-
story office building. The structure's design incorporated a pent-
house used primarily to house mechanical equipment.4" Two mil-
lion dollars and eight and one-half months later, when the structural
shell of the building was complete, the county suspended the build-
ing permit and issued a stop-work order on the grounds that the
building violated statutory height limitations,4 set-back require-
37. 308 Md. 239. 518 A.2d 123 (1986).
38. The height limitation under the method of construction used in this structure is
established by MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 59-C-6.235 (1984). Ordinarily, the
maximum permissible building height in the area in question is 60 feet. When the prop-
erty adjoins or is directly across the street from certain residential zones, however, as
was the case here, the maximum building height is "35 [feet] plus an additional 8 feet
for nonhabitable structures." 308 Md. at 243, 518 A.2d at 125 (citing MONTGOMERY
COUNTY, MD., CODE § 59-C-6.235 (1984)). The measurement of the building height as
shown on the plans submitted by Permanent and measurement from the actual construc-
tion was 43 feet to the top of the fourth floor and 53 feet to the highest point on the
penthouse roof, therefore exceeding the height requirements. Id.
39. 308 Md. at 239, 518 A.2d at 123. The Court of Special Appeals applied equita-
ble estoppel against a municipality in Leaf Co. v. Montgomery County, 70 Md. App. 170,
178, 520 A.2d 732, 737 (1987) (county estopped from denying the existence of a con-
tract when the county code was "open to at least two reasonable and debatable interpre-
tations" in construing the writing requirement for contract renewal).
40. The court considered Permanent's contention that (1) the penthouse had a man-
sard roof, and therefore did not violate the height restrictions because of the method of
measurement for such a roof, and (2) that the penthouse housed mechanical equipment
incident to the use of the building and therefore was exempt from the height limitations.
The court ruled against Permanent's position in both respects. 308 Md. at 243-45, 518
A.2d at 125-26.
4 1. See supra note 38.
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ments,42 and floor area ratio restrictions.43
Permanent filed an application for variances and appealed to
the Montgomery. County Board of Appeals, but the board refused to
grant any variances and denied relief from the suspension and the
stop-work order.44 Both the Circuit Court for Montgomery County
and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the board's decision. The
Court of Appeals granted certiorari principally to consider Perma-
nent's contention that equitable estoppel should be applied against
the county.45 The court concluded that because of the penthouse,
Permanent failed to meet the floor area ratio and set-back require-
ments; thus, the board did not err in riefusging 0to set aside the sus-
pension and the stop-work order or to grarit the variances.4 6 The
court also concluded, however, that the county was estopped from
contending that the fourth floor of the bilding violated height re-
strictions' of the Montgomery County Code. 47
Because the code's definition of nonhabitable structures48 "was
open to at least two reasonable and debatable interpretations,"49
and Permanent had "clearly relied upon the interpretation the
County had given to the height limitation in its design of the build-
ing," ° the court concluded that "it woiild be inequitable to now
permit the County to require the removal of the fourth floor."'"
42. The building as constructed was 53 feet high and would require setbacks from
the right-of-way lines of 3 feet, 10 inches as calculated under § 59-C-6.236(b)(2) (a I-
foot setback is required from any right-of-way for every 6 feet of height by which a build-
ing exceeds 30 feet). As constructed, a portion of the cellar wall and portions of the
third and fourth floors violated these setback requirements. 308 Md. at 255-56, 518
A.2d at 131.
43. The floor area ratio permitted by the code for this building was 1.0, which means
that the gross floor area of the building could not exceed the aiea of the lot upon which
it is built. The design's inclusion of a penthouse as well as an expansion to the first floor
plans created an unacceptable floor area ratio of 1.26. Id. at 253, 518 A.2d at 130.
44. Id. at 242, 518 A.2d at 124.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 253-56, 518 A.2d at 130-31. The court stated in the conclusion of the
opinion:
For the reasons we have outlined, the County is estopped to prevent con-
struction of this building to a height of 43 feet. If the penthouse is modified to
fit within the exemptions from height controls, Permanent will have satisfied
the height restrictions of the ordinance. However, because the building cur-
rently violates height, setback and FAR [floor area ratio] restrictions, the build-
ing permit was properly suspended and the stop work order properly issued.
Id. at 257-58, 518 A.2d at 132.
47. Id. at 242, 518 A.2d at 124.
48. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 59-C-6.235 (1984).
49. 308 Md. at 251, 518 A.2d at 129.
50. Id. at 252, 518 A.2d at 129.
51. Id. at 252-53, 518 A.2d at 130.
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The court recognized that it must apply the doctrine of equitable
estoppel against municipal corporations narrowly, and that "'when
applicable, [equitable estoppel] must be bottomed on the need for
the interpretation or clarification of an ambiguous statute or
ordinance.' "52
The county and Permanent offered conflicting interpretations
of the Montgomery County Code's height restrictions, 3 focusing on
the definition of "nonhabitable structures." Permanent argued that
the code permits a height of thirty-five feet plus eight feet for
nonhabitable structures. Because Permanent planned to use the
fourth floor for offices rather than living space, Permanent con-
tended that the space was "nonhabitable" within the meaning of the
code.5 4 Permanent thus viewed "nonhabitable structures" as the
converse of ":habitable space," deriving its definition of the latter
from the BOCA Basic Building Code:55 "Habitable Space: Space in a
structure for living, sleeping, eating, or cooking. Bathrooms, toilet
compartments, closets, halls, storage or utility spaces and similar ar-
eas are not considered habitable space."15 6
The court noted that the Montgomery County Code5" adopted
the BOCA Basic Building Code.5" Therefore, the definitions con-
tained in the BOCA Code should apply in the interpretation of the
52. Id. at 251, 518 A.2d at 129 (quoting City of Hagerstown v. Long Meadow, 264
Md. 481, 493, 287 A.2d 242, 248 (1972)). Accord Kent County v. Abel, 246 Md. 395, 288
A.2d 247 (1967); Berwyn Heights v. Rogers, 228 Md. 271, 179 A.2d 247 (1962); Lipsitz
v. Parr, 164 Md. 222, 164 A. 743 (1933).
53. The parties differed in their views as to whether the penthouse incorporated a
mansard roof which would qualify the building for a height exception under § 59-B- 1.1
of the code. The court ruled that the board was not clearly erroneous in finding the
penthouse lacked a mansard roof. 308 Md. at 244-45, 518 A.2d at 125-26.
54. Id.
55. The Building Officials and Code Administrators, International, Inc. (BOCA) is a
non-profit service organization responsible for the promulgation of a series of model
codes relating to building, housing, and zoning. GALE RESEARCH Co., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
'AssocIAIONS § 3 (20th ed. 1986). The BOCA Code is a national model regulatory con-
struction code providing detailed minimum standards and safe practices of construction,
including general provisions relating to administration and enforcement.
In 1982 BOCA and the American Insurance Association reached an agreement
whereby BOCA would assume rights to the NATIONAL BUILDING CODE, a model code first
published in 1905 by the American Insurance Association's predecessor, the National
Board of Fire Examiners. BOCA published a transitional code in 1984, the BOCA BA-
sic/NAToNA. BUILDING CODE (9th ed. 1984). The latest version of the consolidated
model codes is the BOCA NATIONAL BUILDING CODE (10th ed. 1987). The citations
which follow, however, will refer to the version of BOCA's code cited by the court and
the county.
56. BOCA BASIC BUILDING CODE § 201.0 (1981).
57. MoNrGOMERuV COUNTY. MD., CODE § 8-14 (1984).
58. 308 Md. at 246. 518 A.2d at 126.
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county's building code.5 9 The county contended that the board cor-
rectly determined that "the term 'nonhabitable structures' is in-
tended to include only space occupied by water towers, water tanks,
air conditioning units or similar mechanical appurtenances."'  The
court pointed out, however, that in the past the county had consist-
ently applied the interpretation urged by Permanent,6 I although
"the County now adopts the Board's interpretation as the correct
one, and has amended its code accordingly." 6
While the court refused to disturb the board's narrow interpre-
tation of "nonhabitable structures,". it recognized that the code's
ambiguity was "an important consideration in assessing the validity
of Permanent's claim of equitable estoppel,' 6" Inexploring the va-
lidity of this claim,' the court summarized the principles of equita-
ble estoppel and its application against municipalities under
Maryland law.6 5  Because Permanent had expended substantial
funds in reliance upon a building permit issued :when the county
and Permanent shared a common interpretation of the height re-
quirement, 66 the court found it reasonable to invoke estoppel
59. Id. The court stated that "[wlhile the officials of DEP [Montgomery County De-
partment of Environmental Protection] might reasonably be expected to look to a defini-
tion contained in other sections of the [Montgomery County] code for guidance, that
definition is not binding." Id.
60. d.
61. Id. at 251, 518 A.2d at 129.
62. The county codified this change in policy in 1984 when it amended § 59-C-6.235
to provide that the additional eight feet was "for air conditioners or similar rooftop
structures and mechanical appurtenances." Id. at 246 n.4, 518 A.2d at 126 n.4; Morr-
GOMERY CouNTy, MD., CODE § 59-C-6.235 (1984).
63. 308 Md. at 247, 518 A.2d at 127.
64. The definition of equitable estoppel adopted by the court is set forth at 3 J. Pom-
EROY, EqUrrYJURISPRUDENCE § 804 (5th ed. 1941) as follows:
Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he
is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which
might have otherwise existed, either of property, or contract or of remedy, as
against another person who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and
has been led thereby to change his position for the worse and who on his part
acquires some corresponding right, either of property, of contract, or of
remedy.
See also Sarvonis v. Burke, 241 Md. 316, 319, 216 A.2d 521, 523 (1966) (After quoting
Pomeroy's definition, the court stated, "We have adopted and have continually applied
this definition of equitable estoppel.").
65. 308 Md. at 248-51, 518 A.2d at 128-29. In Gaver v. Frederick County, 175 Md.
639, 649, 3 A.2d 463, 46.. (1939), the Court of Appeals stated, "There is nothing in the
nature of a municipal corporation to.exempt it from the application of the doctrine of
estoppel as it would apply to a natural person or a business corporation."
66. The court summarized the circumstances surrounding the county's interpreta-
tion of "nonhabitable structures" and found that "it is apparent that the County per-
sisted in [Permanent's version of the definition] well into the hearing of this case by the
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against the county.67
The Court of Appeals' decision in Permanent thus has two conse-
quences. First; the decision provides a clear indication that the
Court of Appeals will enforce the board's narrow definition of the
height limitation in section 59-C-6.235 of the Montgomery County
Code68 and abandon the previously well-followed interpretation al-
lowing a more flexible application. Second, the court will not hesi-
tate to invoke equitable estoppel against municipal corporations in
situations in which a party relied upon a reasonable interpretation
of an ambiguous section of the county code, even when the party
later is found to be in violation of the code as the court interprets
it.6 9
B. Landlord-Tenant
1. Regulation of Lead-based Paint Removal.-In Ronald Fishkind
Realty v. Sampson 70 the Court of Appeals held that local regulations
concerning lead-based paint removal were inapplicable in light of
state law. The court found that state statutory law affords a tenant
an escrow remedy to compel a landlord to remove lead-based paint
easily accessible to children, even though the landlord has complied
with local regulations. 7' In so ruling, the court determined that sec-
tion 8-211.1 of the Real Property Article 72 does not conflict with the
Board, becoming convinced of the validity of a contrary interpretation only after consid-
ering the testimony of the Chairman of the Planning Commission or perhaps the deci-
sion of the Board." 308 Md. at 251, 518 A.2d at 129.
67. Id. at 247-53, 518 A.2d at 127-30. The court also discussed Permanent's asser-
tion that the doctrine of laches barred the county's enforcement of the code. The court
concluded that there was "no separate ground for laches in this case," id. at 256, 518
A.2d at 132, since "mere delay is not sufficient to constitute laches, if the delay has not
worked a disadvantage to another." Upsitz v. Parr, 164 Md. 222, 226-27, 164 A. 743,
745 (1933).
68. The code was amended in 1984. See supra note 62.
69. Estoppel is not necessary if variances can be obtained. In this case, however,
Permanent was unable to qualify for a variance in the height restriction. The court ac-
knowledged that the county employees should have detected the errors in the plans, but
stated that Permanent "was the author of its own misfortune in failing to submit prop-
erly prepared plans." 308 Md. at 257, 518 A.2d at 132. The criteria for a grant of vari-
ance are found in MONTGOMERY CouNTV, MD., CODE § 59-G-3.l(a) (1984).
70. 306 Md. 269, 508 A.2d 478 (1986).
71. Id. at 273-74, 508 A.2d at 480-81.
72. Id. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-211.1 (1988). The statute reads in relevant
part:
(a) Right of esse.-Notwithstanding any provision of law or any agree-
ment, whether written or oral, if a lessor fails to remove any and all lead-based
paint from any interior, exterior, or other surface that is easily accessible to a
child or a residential premise within 20 days after notice that lead-based paint is
1988] PROPERTY 909
narrower Baltimore City regulations promulgated to address lead-
based paint removal. 73 The court reconciled section 8-211.1 with
the local regulations by finding that the express language of the
state statute indicates a meaning and application independent of lo-
cal laws.74
Denise Sampson filed an action in the District Court of Balti-
more City pursuant to section 8-211.1 of the Real Property Article
to compel her landlord, Ronald Fishkind Realty, to remove from her
home any lead-based paint easily accessible to her children.7" At the
time the tenant's two-year-old daughter lived with her in the apart-.
ment. The parties stipulated that medical tests did not reveal an
elevated level of lead in the daughter's blood; furthermore, before
the tenant instituted the action in district court, the landlord had
removed the loose and flaking paint from the premises to the satis-
faction of the Baltimore City Housing Department inspector. 6 The
district court considered these factors in ruling against the tenant,' 7
present on the surfaces of the residence, the lessee may deposit his rent in an
escrow account with the clerk of the District Court of the district in which the
premises are located.
(b) Other rights or remedies.-The right of a lessee to deposit rent in an es-
crow account does not preclude him from pursuing any other right or remedy
available to him at law or equity and is in addition to them.
73. 306 Md. at 273-74, 508 A.2d at 480-81. BALTIMORE, MD., PUBUC LOCAL LAWS
§ 9.9 (1980) reads in relevant part:
(b) Where property situated in the City of Baltimore is leased for the pur-
pose of human habitation, the tenant of such property may assert that there
exists upon the leased premises, Vor upon the property used in common of
which the leased premises form a part, a condition or conditions which consti-
tute, or if not promptly corrected, will constitute a fire hazard or serious threat
to the life, health, or safety of occupants thereof, including but not limited to,
... the existence of paint containing lead pigment on surfaces within the dwell-
ing, provided that the landlord has notice of the painted surfaces, and if such
condition would be in violation of the Baltimore City Housing Code.
BALTIMORE, MD., HousING CODE § 706 (1987) provides:
All exterior portions of a dwelling or dwelling unit which are painted ... shall
be cleaned and freed of flaking, loose or defective surfacing materials .... No
paint shall be used for interior painting of any dwelling, dwelling unit, rooming
house or rooming unit unless the paint is free from any lead pigment.
74. 306 Md. at 280-86, 508 A.2d at 484-87.
75. Fishkind Realty itself had not applied the lead-based paint and argued that land-
lords should not be liable for removal unless they had painted the apartment. The court
rejected this position because it would not hold lessors civilly responsible unless they
acted criminally in applying the paint. Because Act of May 21, 1983, ch. 615, 1973 Md.
Laws 1266, later partially recodified at § 8-211.1, contained separate provisions for civil
and criminal liability, the court found that it was the General Assembly's intention to
hold landlords civilly liable despite their innocence in applying the paint. 306 Md. at
277-78, 280-82, 508 A.2d at 482-84.
76. 306 Md. at 272, 508 A.2d 479-80.
77. Id. at 271, 508 A.2d at 479.
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determining that section 9.9 of the Baltimore City Code of Public
Laws, 78 rather than section 8-211.1 of the state statute, governed. 71
Because the landlord had complied with the city's standards, the dis-
trict court reasoned, no rent escrow action could proceed.8 0
The circuit court reversed, finding that the General Assembly
intended section 8-211.1 to apply throughout the State without re-
gard to existing local law."' The landlord appealed.
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals first reviewed the
history of lead-based paint legislation in both Maryland and Balti-
more City.82 It next examined the landlord's three proposed inter-
pretations of the statute, each arguing that only local law applied to
the facts.8 3 After considering the language of the statute 4 and the
landlord's assertions, the Court of Appeals agreed with the reason-
ing of the circuit court and concluded that section 8-211.1 was in-
tended to apply uniformly throughout the state.8 5
Lead-based paint in residential units has concerned federal,
state, and local governments for many years.8 6 In 1970 it was esti-
mated that as many as 400,000 children in the United States suf-
fered from lead poisoning and that 200 died annually from the
poisoning.87 Baltimore was cited as having a particularly high inci-
dence of lead poisoning-as high as ten percent-among its "pre-
school slum children."' s
Baltimore City has tried to attack the lead-based paint hazard
o
78. See supra note 73.
79. Thus, the district court only required the removal of the flaking and peeling
paint and would not allow a rent escrow remedy for the lead-based paint still intact
though easily accessible to the daughter. 306 Md. at 271, 508 A.2d at 479.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 275-79, 508 A.2d at 481-84.
83. Fishkind Realty's proposed interpretations of § 8-211.1 were: First, "that § 8-
211.1 of the Real Property Article applies not to the facts stipulated, but to different lead
paint problems, leaving the plaintiff only with the remedy afforded by § 9.9 of the local
laws of Baltimore City"; second, that the statute contains undefined terms which incor-
porate the lead-based paint abatement standards of BALTIMORE, MD., PUBLIc LOCAL
LAws § 9.9 (1981); and last, that § 8-211.1, a public general law, and § 9.9. a local law,
conflict, and that § 9.9 displaces § 8-21 1.1. 306 Md. at 273, 508 A.2d at 480. For the
court's rejection of these arguments, see id. at 280-85, 508 A.2d at 484-87.
84. For the text of the law, see supra note 72.
85. 306 Md. at 286, 508 A.2d at 487.
86. See Lead-based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 91-695, 84 Stat.
2078, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2427, 2427-30 (outlining the
history and impact of the lead-based paint hazard).
87. S. REP. No. 91-1432, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 6130, 6131.
88. Id. at 6132.
several times. In the early 1960s the city enacted ordinances
prohibiting the application of lead-based paint to the interior of res-
idential units.89 The Court of Appeals upheld the regulations and
imposed stiff penalties for violators. 9° In 1971 the city enacted sec-
tion 9.9 of the Code of Public Laws, the regulation at issue in
Fishkind Realty.9 ' The language of section 9.9 permits a rent escrow
remedy when, if not promptly corrected, a condition on the prem-
ises constitutes a "serious threat to the life, health or safety of occu-
pants thereof."9 It further requires that the existence of paint
containing lead pigment comply with the Baltimore City Housing
Code.9 3 The applicable section of the code 94 calls for removal of all
"loose or peeling ... paint." 95
The State also has enacted legislation to curb the lead-based
paint problem. The General Assembly enacted the first and perhaps
most stringent legislation in 1971.96 The statute prohibited the use
of lead-based paint on any interior or exterior surface to which chil-
dren could be exposed.9 7 The legislation was modified in 1972 to
create both a criminal9" and civil penalty99 for the use of lead-based
paint, while permitting the use of the paint in certain situations. 0 0
Fishkind Realty involved the civil enforcement mechanism which pro-
vides for a rent escrow remedy when, after receiving notice, the
89. BALTIMORE, MD., HOUSING CODE § 706 (1987). For the text of the law, see supra
note 73.
90. Givner v. Commissioner of Health, 207 Md. 184, 113 A.2d 899 (1955). The
Givner court noted that ordinances providing for the abatement of conditions like lead-
based paint are for the "better protection of the health of the city" and should not be
narrowly limited. Id. at 190, 113 A.2d at 902.




94. BALTIMORE, MD., HOUSING CODE § 706 (1987). See also id. §§ 401-402 (authoriz-
ing the formation of a committee to promulgate rules and regulations regarding the
public health of Baltimore City).
95. For the text of the code, see supra note 73.
96. Act of May 17, 1971, ch. 495, 1971 Md. Laws 1105 (current version at MD. REAL
PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-211.1 (1988)).
97. Id. The language deleted from the original bill is similar to that contained in MD.
REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-211.1 (1988).
98. Act of May 21, 1973, ch. 615, 1973 Md. Laws 1266 (current version at MD. REAL
PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-211.1 (1988)). The statute holds a violator guilty of a misde-
meanor and subject to a fine of not more than $1000 or imprisonment not exceeding 30
days, or both. In addition, each day that the violation continues constitutes a separate
offense.
99. Id. For the relevant text of the statute, see supra note 72.




landlord has failed to remove the lead-based paint easily accessible
to children. The statute requires no proof of prior lead poisoning
of the children, rior does it require the paint in the dwelling to be
peeling or flaking.'°'
The focus of the opinion in Fishkind Realty is that the state stat-
ute does not conflict with the local law,' 0 2 and that it was intended
to supplement the Baltimore City regulation.' °" In order to accom-
plish this result, the court found ambiguity in the local ordinance,
thus giving the court the opportunity to reconcile the two laws.
Nevertheless, this result is appropriate and far-reaching.
The applicable laws are unambiguous in their meaning and
scope. Section 8-211.1 of the Real PropertyArticle requires re-
moval of "any and all lead-based paint from any interior, exterior or
other surface that is easily accessible to a child."'0'4 Section 9.9 of
the Public Local Laws, on the other hand, calls for removal of paint
containing lead pigment only if it violates the Baltimore City Hous-
ing Code.'0 5 The code merely requires removal of "flaking, loose,
or defective surfacing materials."' 06 The court determined that the
two laws were meant to co-exist and that the Real Property Article
was intended to supplement local ordinances. If this were indeed
the intention of the General Assembly in enacting section 8-211.1,
then the scope of the Baltimore City Housing Code would be a nul-
lity. On the other hand, it would have been inconceivable for the
court to give weight to the local provisions and thereby render sec-
tion 8-211.1 a fiction in Baltimore City.' 0 7
Despite its flawed attempt at reconciling two laws that clearly
conflict, the opinion is an important part of Maryland's newest as-
sault on the lead-based paint problem. In 1986 the General Assem-
bly passed two bills aimed at evaluating and abating the lead-based
paint hazard.'0 8 Part of that legislation creates a loan program to
101. MD. REAL PItoP. CODE ANN. § 8-21 1.1 (1988).
102. 306 Md. at 286, 508 A.2d at 487.
103. Id.
104. MD. REAL PIOP. CODE ANN. § 8-211.1 (1988).
105. For the text of the law, see supra note 73.
106. BALIMORE, MD., HOUSING CODE § 706 (1987).
107. The court in Fishkind Realty made this point in determining that § 8-211.1 was to
co-exist with and supplement § 9.9: "These phrases indicate that the General Assembly
intended § 8-211.1 to supplement and co-exist with Baltimore City's local law, not that
§ 8-211.1 is a nullity in Baltimore City." 306 Md. at 284, 508 A.2d at 486.
108. Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 627, 1986 Md. Laws 2187 (current version at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 41B, §§ 2-301 to -313 (Supp. 1987)); Act of May 13, 1986, ch. 404, 1986 Md.
Laws 1532 (current version at MD. ENvr. CODE ANN. §§ 6-601 to -608 (1987)).
912 [VOL. 47:899
1988] PROPERTY 913
help finance lead-based paint abatement.' 0 9 This program may have
afforded the court flexibility in its decision to subject landlords
statewide to the requirement of section 8-211.1, without regard to
local law. Through its decision, the Fishkind Realty court sends a
message to landlords that it is time to eradicate the lead-based paint
hazard.
2. Violation of Maryland's Consumer Protection Act.-The Court of
Appeals held in Golt v. Phillips " ° that the advertising and subse-
quent rental of an unlicensed dwelling violated the Maryland Con-
sumer Protection Act."' The court imposed liability upon the
landlord despite the tenant's inspection of the premises before mov-
ing in, finding that rental of the unlicensed dwelling failed to dis-
close a material fact and thus constituted an unfair and deceptive
trade practice." 2 Furthermore, the court determined that liability
for failure to disclose a material fact did not require the landlord's
scienter or knowledge that the building was licensed improperly for
rental purposes.3  In so holding, the court awarded the tenant
restitutionary and consequential damages.' 14
In August 1983 John Golt responded to an advertisement for a
109. Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 627, 1986 Md. Laws 2187 (curent version at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 41B, §§ 2-301 to -313 (Supp. 1987)).
110. 308 Md. 1, 517 A.2d 328 (1986).
111. Id. at 11, 517 A.2d at 333. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. §§ 13-101 to -501 (1983 &
Supp. 1987). Section 13-301 reads in relevant part:
Unfair or deceptive trade practices include any:
(1) False, falsely disparaging, or misleading oral or written statement, visual
description, or other representation of any kind which has the capacity, ten-
dency, or effect of deceiving or misleading consumers;
(2) Representation that:
(i) Consumer goods, consumer realty, or consumer services have a spon-
sorship, approval, accessory, characteristic, ingredient, use, benefit, or quantity
which they do not have;
(3) Failure to state a material fact if the failure deceives or tends to deceive.
Id. § 13-301.
112. 308 Md. at 10, 517 A.2d at 332-33.
113. Id. at 10-1I1, 517 A.2d at 332-33. The substance of the court's statutory argu-
ment has three parts. First, the lack of proper licensing is a material fact that the land-
lord failed to state. Second, the failure to disclose this fact deceived, or had a tendency
to deceive, the tenant. Therefore, these two components violated MD. COM. L-4w CODE
ANN. § 13-301(3) (1983). Third, the applicable statute did not require scienter on the
part of the landlord. In examining § 13-301(1) and (2), the court noted that "the sub-
sections require only a false or deceptive statement that has the capacity to mislead the
consumer tenant." 308 Md. at 10-11, 517 A.2d at 332-33. For the relevant text of the
statute, see supra note I 1I.
114. 308 Md. at 13-14, 517 A.2d at 334.
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furnished apartment that had been placed in the East Baltimore
Guide by Phillips Brothers and Associates. Golt inspected the
apartment and noted several items that needed cleaning and repair-
ing. After receiving Phillips Brothers' assurances that the necessary
work would be done, Golt signed a month-to-month lease, paid the
first month's rent, and made a $200 security deposit. He took pos-
session of the premises soon after, and made further repair re-
quests. Despite Golt's repeated requests, Phillips Brothers failed to
complete many of the repairs.' " 5
Golt contacted the Baltimore City Department of Housing and
Community Development, which inspected the premises in October
1983.'16 The inspector found that the landlord was in violation of
the Baltimore City Housing Code because it lacked the proper li-
cense to operate the building as a multiple dwelling." 7 In addition,
the inspection revealed other housing code violations." 8 The De-
partment of Housing and Community Development issued violation
notices and informed the landlord that it must correct the violations
and either obtain the proper license or discontinue use of the build-
ing as a multiple dwelling. Choosing the latter, Phillips Brothers
reduced the number of tenants in the building by evicting Golt." t 9
Moreover, the landlord refused to return a portion of Golt's security
deposit, allegedly for rent due in November 1983. Golt brought
suit in the district court.' 20
115. Id. at 5, 517 A.2d at 330. When Golt moved in, he learned that he would have to
share the toilet facilities with the other tenants. See infra note 118.
116. Id. Golt contacted the city department specifically to bring its attention to the
uncompleted repairs.
117. Id. See BALTIMORE, MD., Crr, CODE art. 13, § 1101 (1983), which reads: "No
person shall conduct or operate within the corporate limits of the City of Baltimore, any
rooming house, multiple family dwelling, or any combination thereof, without having
first obtained a license or a temporary certificate to do so as in this Chapter hereinafter
provided."
118. 308 Md. at 5-6, 517 A.2d at 330. These violations included "the lack of toilet
facilities in Golt's apartment, defective door locks, and the lack of fire exits and fire
doors." Id.
119. Id. at 6, 517 A.2d at 330. Got argued that the eviction was retaliatory, in viola-
tion of BALTIMORE, MD.. CODE oF PUBLIC LAwS art. 4, § 9-10(1) (1980). The court noted
that the inspector told the landlord that merely evicting one tenant would -not bring the
building within the requirements of the multiple family dwelling law unless the cooking
unit in one of the apartments also was removed. 308 Md. at 6, 517 A.2d at 330.
Although no other tenant was evicted, the district court did not rule on the issue of
retaliatory eviction. Id. at 6. 7 n.2, 517 A.2d at 330, 331 n.2. Because the issue is a
factual one and the trial court did not rule on it, the appellate court could not make a
final determination. The issue therefore was remanded to the district court. Id. at 14,
517 A.2d at 335.
120. Id. at 6, 517 A.2d at 330. Golt sought treble damages for the landlord's wrongful
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The district court determined that the landlord improperly
withheld the November rent.' 2 ' It did not find a violation of the
Consumer Protection Act, however, since the tenant "knew what the
premises looked like" before he took possession.' 22 The Circuit
Court for Baltimore City dismissed the appeal, and the Court of Ap-
peals granted certiorari.' 2
3
In evaluating the tenant's claim, the Court of Appeals disagreed
with the lower courts and concluded that the landlord in fact had
violated the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. ' 2 4 The court noted
that the issue was not whether the tenant had seen the apartment
before moving in, but whether the landlord had misrepresented the
dwelling as licensed for multiple family use. The court found that
by advertising the apartment on an open market, the landlord im-
plicitly made such a representation. Therefore, the rental to Golt
portrayed a " 'sponsorship, approval . . . [or] characteristic' " which
it did not have-namely, that the apartment was properly
licensed. '2 5
The court also determined that the landlord engaged in a de-
ceptive trade practice because the lack of proper licensing is a mate-
rial fact which "under most circumstances ... any tenant would find
important." ,26 By so ruling, the court found without merit the land-
lord's argument that Golt had seen the premises. Simply viewing an
apartment, after all, could not inform a prospective tenant that the
premises are licensed.' 27 Golt was awarded restitutionary damages
retention of the security deposit. Id. at 7, 517 A.2d at 331. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE
ANN. § 8-203(f)(4) (1988). The trial court, however, while not making specific findings
of fact, denied recovery. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
308 Md. at 16-17, 517 A.2d at 336.
121. Id. at 6, 517 A.2d at 330.
122. Id. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
123. 308 Md. at 7, 517 A.2d at 331. The circuit court's dismissal technically was im-
proper; after noting this, the Court of Appeals merely treated the dismissal as an afirm-
ance of the district court's ruling. Id. at 7 n.I, 517 A.2d at 331 n.1.
124. Id. at 9, 517 A.2d at 332. See MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 13-301(1) to -301(3)
(1983). For the relevant text of the statute, see supra note I ll.
125. 308 Md. at 9, 517 A.2d at 332. See MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 13-301(2)(i)
(1983). The court also rejected the landlord's defense that it was unaware that the
building was unlicensed for multiple family use and stressed that "[i]gnorance of the law
... is no defense." 308 Md. at 10, 517 A.2d at 332.
126. 308 Md. at 10, 517 A.2d at 332. In setting out its test for materiality the court
adopted the common-law test for fraud. Id. See alto RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 538 (1977) (a fact is deemed material if a "'reasonable [person] would attach impor-
tance to its existence in determining his [or her] choice of action").
127. 308 Md. at 1I, 517 A.2d at 332. In making this determination the court relied
upon an analogous Connecticut case, Conaway v. Prestia, 191 Conn. 484, 464 A.2d 847
(1983). in which the Connecticut Supreme Court found that a similarly situated landlord
9151988] PROPERTY
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for the three months' rent paid, as well as consequential damages
representing the cost of moving to substitute housing and the differ-
ence in rent.128 The court reasoned that the landlord of an unli-
censed dwelling is unable to recover either under the contract or
under a theory of quantum meruit, since such recovery "would de-
feat the efficacy of the regulatory statute."' 129
Until recently, the common-law concept of a rental agreement
as a conveyance of a leasehold estate resulted in a general applica-
tion of the doctrine of caveat emptor with respect to implied warran-
ties that the premises were suitable for their intended use.' 3
Maryland courts enforced the doctrine not only in connection with
the suitability of the premises, but also with respect to misrepresen-
tation and false statements.13 ' In 1973 the General Assembly en-
acted the Consumer Protection Act in order to counteract this
common-law trend. 3 2 The legislature found that because public
confidence in "merchants offering... realty"' 33 was being under-
mined, "preventive steps to investigate unlawful consumer prac-
tices"1 34 were necessary.
Included in the Consumer Protection Act are provisions
prohibiting persons from engaging in unfair and deceptive practices
in the rental, or offer for rental, of consumer realty.' 3 5 In addition,
the act enumerates unfair and deceptive trade practices which in-
violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practice Act. The Conaway court noted, "In the
present case the defendant's actions ... unquestionably offended the public policy, as
embodied by these statutes, of insuring minimum standards of housing safety and habit-
ability." Id. at 490, 464 A.2d at 852.
128. 308 Md. at 13-14, 517 A.2d at 334.
129. Id. at 12, 517 A.2d at 333-34. Cf. Harry Berenter, Inc. v. Berman, 258 Md. 290,
296, 265 A.2d 759, 763 (1970) (court will not aid in the enforcement of illegal
contracts).
130. See Thompson v. Clemens, 96 Md. 196, 211, 53 A. 919. 923 (1903) (landlord not
liable for injuries even though he broke contract to make repairs); Smith v. Walsh, 92
Md. 518, 534, 48 A. 92, 95 (1901) (landlord not liable to tenant for an injury caused by
defective condition on leased premises). Cf. Miller v. Fisher, I l l Md. 91, 94. 73 A. 84 1,
842 (1909) (landlord undertaking repairs on leased premises, though not bound to do
so, is liable for injuries caused by failure to complete repairs).
131. See, e.g., Fegeas v. Sherill, 218 Md. 472, 477, 147 A.2d 223, 225-26 (1958) (con-
cealment and nondisclosure of facts must have been with an intent to deceive).
132. See Mn. CoM. LAw CODE ANN. § 13-102(a) (1983). In this section the General
Assembly declared that it enacted the Consumer Protection Act because "there has been
mounting concern over the increase of deceptive practices in connection with sales of
merchandise, real property, and services." Id.
133. Id. at (b)(2).
134. Id. at (3).
135. See id. §§ 13-301(1), -301(2)(i), -301(2)(iv), -301(4), -301(5), -301(8), -301(9)(i),
& -30!(10)(iii).
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clude, but are not limited to, making a falseor misleading state-
ment, 136 representing that the consumer realty has a characteristic
that it does not have,'3 7 and failing to state a material fact if the
failure deceives or tends to deceive.' 3 8 Although prior case law in-
terpreting the Act had not addressed the landlord-tenant issues
raised in Golt, it laid the foundation for the Golt court's expanded
definition of misrepresentation.
3 9
The Consumer Protection Act was intended by the General As-
sembly to shield tenants from the types of deceptive practices repre-
sented in Golt. This purpose is apparent from the inclusion of
"consumer realty" in the Act and from the special treatment of re-
alty within the applicable provisions of the Act.' 4 ° While the Golt
opinion is narrow in scope, the court's reasoning is logical and cor-
rect. The advertisement and rental of an apartment does represent
that the leasing of the apartment is lawful. Furthermore, if the lease
is not lawful, then the landlord has misrepresented a fact material to
a tenant's decision to take possession of the premises, and the ten-
ant should be able to seek redress. As the court pointed out, a land-
lord cannot enforce a leasehold contract that violates the requisite
licensing statutes. 141 Thus, the court properly awarded restitution-
ary and consequential damages for the full period of Golt's tenancy.
3. Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment.-In Bocchini v. Gorn Management
Co. 142 the Court of Special Appeals held that a tenant who alleged
that the landlord failed to evict a noisy tenant had stated a cause of
action for breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.! 4 3
136. Id. § 13-301(1).
137. Id. at (2)(i).
138. Id. at (3).
139. See Smith v. Attorney General, 46 Md. App. 78, 88, 415 A.2d 651, 657 (1980)
(taking orders for furniture supposedly located in a warehouse which did not exist
showed deceit, fraud, and misrepresentation). Cf. Comment, Maryland's Consumer Protec-
tion Act: A Private Cause of Action for Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices, 38 MD. L. REv. 733
(1979).
140. See supra note 135.
141. 308 Md. at 12, 517 A.2d at 333-34. See BALTnMORE, MD., Crry CoDE art. 13,
§ 1101 (1983). Furthermore, the court noted:
It is well settled in this State that if a statute requires a license for con-
ducting a trade or business, and the statute is regulatory in the sense that it is
for the protection of the public, an unlicensed person will not be able to en-
force a contract within the provisions of that regulatory statute.
308 Md. at 12, 517 A.2d at 533. 1
142. 69 Md. App. 1, 515 A.2d 1179 (1986).
143. Id. at 12, 515 A.2d at 1185. The court also held that the tenant sufficiently pled a
cause of action for the constructive eviction that resulted from the landlord's breach of
the covenant of quiet enjoyment, but that it need not "dwell on the relationship between
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The court also established that separate actions now exist in Mary-
land "'44 for a landlord's negligent performance or nonperformance
of a covenant for quiet enjoyment, 4 5 and for deceit, when a land-
lord fraudulently induces a tenant to remain on the premises.' 4 6
Carol Bocchini rented an apartment from Gorn Management
Company' 47 in 1978. In 1983 "unbearable" noise' 48 began to ema-
nate from the apartment of Ms. Bocchini's upstairs neighbor. After
several unsuccessful efforts to resolve the problem on her own, the
tenant complained to the landlord, who eventually wrote two letters
to the neighbor. The letters proved fruitless, as the noise continued
unabated. In July 1984 the landlord told the tenant that it would do
nothing further to resolve the problem. Ms. Bocchini vacated the
apartment in August because of the noise and its detrimental effect
upon her health. 149
Gorn filed an action in district court for Ms. Bocchini's breach
of the lease. The tenant filed a counterclaim 50 containing five
counts: breach of a covenant of quiet enjoyment and constructive
eviction, negligence, deceit, nuisance, and violation of section 8-
203(c) of the Real Property Article.' 5 ' The court granted the land-
these two concepts." Id. at 12 n.7, 515 A.2d at 1185 n.7. In Stevan v. Brown, 54 Md.
App. 235, 240, 458 A.2d 466, 470, cert. denied sub nom. Tower Bldg. Corp. v. Stevan, 297
Md. 110 (1983), the court declared that a constructive eviction occurs whenever a land-
lord intends and effects a serious deprivation of the use and enjoyment of the leased
property which results in the tenant vacating the property. The court further found that
Ms. Bocchini had pled a sufficient cause of action for nuisance. 69 Md. App. at 22, 515
A.2d at 1190.
144. As to both, however, the court held that the tenant failed to state a claim. 69 Md.
App. at 22, 515 A.2d at 1190.
145. Id. at 17, 515 A.2d 1188.
146. Id at 21, 515 A.2d at 1190.
147. Gorn Management Company, the landlord, actually was the managing agent for
the owners of the apartment, Samuel and Morton Gorn. Ms. Bocchini, the tenant, also
named the Gorns individually in her counterclaim, but their liability was not an issue
before the court. Id. at 3 & n.1, 515 A.2d at 1180 & n.i.
148. The noise, which occurred when the neighbor's boyfriend visited, "consisted of
'clomping on the floor from persons walking or running heavily, exercising taking place
on the floor, a very loud alarm.clock going off at approximately 5:00 a.m., and playing
the stereo extremely loudly at late hours.'" Id. at 4, 515 A.2d at 1181 (quoting the
complaint).
149. The tenant was unable to get a good night's sleep; it was upon the advice of her
physician that she moved out. Id. at 5-6, 515 A.2d at 1181.
150. By praying for a jury trial, the tenant caused the action to be removed from the
district court to the circuit court. Id. at 3, 515 A.2d at 1180.
151. Id. at 3-4, 515 A.2d at 1181. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-203(c) (1988) con-
cerns security deposits. The fifth count remained undecided by the trial court at the
time the tenant appealed, and therefore was not considered by the Court of Special
Appeals. 69 Md. App. at 4, 515 A.2d at 1181.
lord's motion to dismiss the first four counts and entered judgment
in the landlord's favor. The tenant appealed. In reversing the dis-
trict court's decision, the Court of Special Appeals examined the law
in Maryland and elsewhere regarding covenants of quiet enjoyment,
as well as actions in tort for the nonperformance of a contractual
duty and for deceit.
In Baugher v. Williams ..2 the Court of Appeals recognized that a
covenant of quiet enjoyment is implied in every lease unless lan-
guage in the lease declares otherwise.1 53 The covenant "insulates
the tenant against acts or omissions on the part of the landlord, or
anyone claiming under him, which interfere with the tenant's right to
the use and enjoyment of the premises."' 5 4 Section 2-115 of the
Real Property Article provides:
There is no implied covenant or warranty by the gran-
tor as to title or possession in any grant of land or of any
interest or estate in land. However, in a lease, unless the lease
provides otherwise, there is an implied covenant by the lessor that the
lessee shall quietly enjoy the land.'55
Section 2-115 applies to all leases, including residential ones.156
The Bocchini court examined the law regarding the landlord's
defense that "a landlord cannot be held to have breached a cove-
nant of quiet enjoyment . . . because of conditions created by an-
other tenant."' 57 The court noted that "the law seems to be in a
state of flux and disarray."' 58 Although the traditional view that a
152. 16 Md. 35 (1860).
153. Id. at 44-45. See I H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF R L PROPERTY § 91, at 137 (3d ed.
1939). Tiffany observes that a covenant of quiet enjoyment "is implied from the mere
relation of landlord and tenant, independently of the presence of any particular words in
the lease." Id. at 138. See also 64 E. Walton, Inc. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 69 III.
App. 3d 635, 642, 387 N.E.2d 751, 755 (1979) (-A covenant of quiet enjoyment is im-
plied in all lease agreements."); Pollock v. Morelli, 245 Pa. Super. 388, 392, 369 A.2d
458 (1976) ("In every lease of real property there will be implied a covenant of quiet
enjoyment.").
154. 3 G. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 1130 (1980) (emphasis added).
Baugher v. Wilkins, 16 Md. 35 (1860), thus presented the seed for a tenant's relief under
a covenant of quiet enjoyment when the conduct was attributable to someone other than
the landlord. It remained to be firmly established, however, that a landlord was respon-
sible for the offending conduct of a tenant. See infra notes 157-164 and accompanying
text.
155. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-115 (1988) (emphasis added).
156. 69 Md. App. at 8, 515 A.2d at 1183. The court's observation is significant be-
cause the landlord in Bocchini defended on the ground that the common-law implied
covenant of quiet enjoyment applies only to commercial leases. Id. at 5-6, 515 A.2d at
1182.
157. Id. at 9, 515 A.2d at 1184.
158. Id.
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landlord cannot be held liable for the conduct of tenants supported
Gorn's position, 159 the court recognized that this position "has been
increasingly abandoned." '6 0 The Restatement (Second) of Property pro-
vides that absent some contrary agreement, "there is a breach of the
landlord's obligations if, during the period the tenant is entitled to
possession of the leased property, the landlord, or someone whose con-
duct is attributable to him, interferes with a permissible use of the
leased property by the tenant. ' 't 1
Lacking controlling precedent,' 6 the court chose to follow the
Restatement's more modem view, believing it "more appropriate"16'
that a landlord be responsible for the conduct of a tenant, over
159. Id. The traditional view has been expressed as follows:
[A landlord] is not responsible for the activities of his tenants. The mere exist-
ence of a legal relationship between landlord and tenant is not sufficient to
impose a duty on the landlord concerning tenant conduct. The test is fre-
quently fashioned to require both the landlord's knowledge and permission or
authorization of the conduct before it will be attributable to him.
R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAw OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 3:7, at 104 (1980) (citation
omitted).
The Bocchini court failed to note that Schoshinski continues: "However, when the
landlord.., fails to act on a breach of covenant by neighboring tenants which disrupts
quiet enjoyment of the premises, he has been found responsible." lId § 3:7, at 104-05
(citationis omitted). Thus, in the instant case, if the court had adhered to the traditional
view espoused by Schoshinski, the tenant still might have been able to enforce the cove-
nant of quiet enjoyment against the landlord because of the alleged clauses in the neigh-
bor's lease barring excessive noise and "barring unauthorized persons from living in the
apartment." 69 Md. App. at 5, 515 A.2d at 1181.
160. Id. at 10, 515 A.2d at 1184.
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 6.1 (1977) (emphasis added). Comment
d to § 6.1 emphasizes that "[t]he conduct of a third person outside of the leased prop-
erty that is performed on property in which the landlord has an interest, which conduct
could be legally controlled by him, is attributable to the landlord for the purposes of applying
the rule of this section." Id. comment d, at 226 (emphasis added). Illustration I I to that
comment describes a scenario similar to the case at hand and attributes the disturbances
of the other tenant to the landlord.
162. 69 Md. App. at i, 515 A.2d at 1185. The court noted that in Q C Corp. v.
Maryland Port Admin., 68 Md. App. 181, 510A.2d 1101 (1986), aff'd in part, re'd in part,
310 Md. 379, 529 A.2d 829 (1987), it had found a breach of an implied covenant of quiet
enjoyment and constructive eviction when the landlord operated a chrome waste landfill
on land to the immediate north and south of the leased property. 69 Md. App. at I I n.6,
515 A.2d at 1184-85 n.6.
163. The .court reasoned:
The insertion in a lease of a restriction against excessive noise or other offen-
sive conduct is precisely for the purpose of enabling the landlord to control
that conduct. Its principal function-at least in a multi-unit apartment lease-is
to protect the right of other tenants to the quiet enjoyment of their homes by
allowing the landlord to evict a tenant who transgresses upon that right.
69 Md. App. at 12, 515 A.2d at 1185. Cf. Parklawn, Inc. v. Nee, 243 Md. 249, 253, 220
A.2d 563, 566 (1966) (landlord not liable for nuisance created by tenant when landlord
not in a position to resolve the problem during tenant's term).
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whom-the landlord has some control, which interferes with another
tenant's quiet enjoyment of the premises."c The court thus found
that the tenant had stated a cause of action for breach of an implied
covenant of quiet enjoyment leading to a constructive eviction.
The court next addressed the tenant's charge that the landlord
had been negligent in not taking action under the covenant of quiet
enjoyment against the offending tenant, thus causing the tenant
physical and mental injury.' 65 The issue presented was "whether an
action in tort [would] lie for the nonperformance of a contractual
duty."' 66 The Court of Appeals has recognized that an action in
tort may lie for the negligent breach of a contractual undertaking. 6 7
There is a distinction, however, between the defective performance of
a contractual promise and the nonperformance of a contractual
promise. 1611
Before Bocchini no court in Maryland had found tort liability for
a landlord's nonperformance of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.
The court thus examined Maryland cases in which a landlord in-
curred tort liability for the nonperformance of a promise to repair,
164. 69 Md. App. at 12, 515 A.2d at 1185. For other cases finding a breach of an
implied covenant of quiet enjoyment in such situations, see Colonial Court Apartments,
Inc. v. Kern, 282 Minn. 533, 533. 163 N.W.2d 770, 771 (1968) (constructive eviction
found when tenants overhead "gave noisy parties twice a week, ran water early in the
morning, operated a dishwasher at late hours, subjected [the complaining tenant] to
insulting and abusive language, and disturbed [the complaining tenant's] sleep"); Home
Life Ins. Co. v. Breslerman, 168 Misc. 117, 118, 5 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (1938) (construc-
tive eviction found when landlord took no steps to abate the continuous noise emanat-
ing from the apartment above the complaining tenant's).
165. 69 Md. App. at 14-15, 515 A.2d at 1186-87. The tenant actually charged the
landlord with the negligent infliction of mental distress, a cause of action which, as the
court pointed out, does not exist in Maryland. Id. at 15 n.8, 515 A.2d at 1186 n.8 (citing
Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 66 Md. App. 46, 502 A.2d 1057, cert. denied, 306 Md.
118, 507 A.2d 631 (1986)). The court ignored the tenant's appellation and recharacter-
ized the claim as one for negligent nonperformance of a covenant of quiet enjoyment.
Id. at 15, 515 A.2d at 1186.
166. Id. at 16, 515 A.2d at 1187. "It has long been recognized," the court stated,
"that defective performance of a contractual undertaking may give rise to an action in
both tort and contract." Id. See generally W. PROSSER, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 660-67 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER & KEETON].
167. See H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 47, 338 A.2d 48, 54 (1975)
(when tort arises out of contractual relation, actual malice must be shown to merit
awarding punitive damages); St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co.. 262
Md. 192, 237, 278 A.2d 12, 33, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971) (punitive damages are
recoverable in an action for tortious deprivation of contractual rights only when malice
is shown).
168. Prosser draws "a valid line between the complete non-performance of a promise,
which in the ordinary case is a breach of contract only, and a defective performance,
which may also be a matter of tort." PROSSER & KEETON. supra note 166, § 92, at 660.
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noting that in these cases, "the line between misperformance...
and nonperformance . . has certainly been blurred, if not indeed
erased."' 69
The court found no valid reason for treating covenants of quiet
enjoyment differently from promises to repair, since "[tihe breach
of either can not only seriously interfere with the tenant's enjoyment
of his property but also create a risk of pecuniary and personal in-
jury.' 7 0 Bocchini thus established that an action for the negligent
performance or nonperformance of the covenant of quiet enjoy-
ment now exists in Maryland.' 7 1
As with the tenant's claim for negligent nonperformance of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment, her claim that the landlord had made
false representations that it would take action against the offending
tenant was "founded on the landlord's promise to perform [the] un-
derlying contractual obligation, and the gravamen of the action its
failure to do so." 7 2 In Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney 1 3 the Court of
Appeals restated the elements necessary to plead a successful action
for deceit: first, a promisor must intend not to fulfill the promise,
but instead to defraud the promisee into relying on that promise;
second, the promisee must rightfully rely upon the misrepresenta-
tion; and third, the promisee must suffer actual damage as a direct
result of the misrepresentation. 74
Actions for deceit usually arise in situations in which the person
claiming injury was induced to enter into a contractual relation-
ship "'75 rather than those in which there exists a contractual relation-
169. 69 Md. App. at 17. 515 A.2d at 1187-88. In Thompson v. Clemens, 96 Md. 196,
53 A. 919 (1903), the Court of Appeals stated that "when a landlord has agreed to make
repairs there is a duty resting on him to do so, and upon his failure the tenant may either
sue on his contract or bring an action on the case founded in tort for neglect of that
duty." Id. at 208, 53 A at 921 (emphasis in original). See also McKenzie v. Egge, 207
Md. I, 7, 113 A.2d 95, 97 (1955) (negligent breach of duty to make repairs incurs tort
liability).
170. 69 Md. App. at 17, 515 A.2d at 1188.
171. To recover under such an action, a tenant must plead and show " 'some clear act
of negligence or misfeasance on the part of the landlord beyond the mere breach of
contract.' Merely alleging that the landlord 'had negligently failed' to carry out his
promise is not enough." Id. at 18, 515 A.2d at 1188 (quoting Thompson, 96 Md. at 208-
09, 53 A. at 922).
The court found that the tenant in the instant case had failed to state a cause of
action for the negligent nonperformance of a covenant of quiet enjoyment because the
tenant had not stated how and why the landlord's failure to act was negligent. Id.
172. Id. at 18-19, 515 A.2d at 1188.
173. 292 Md. 328, 439 A.2d 537 (1982).
174. Id. at 333, 439 A.2d at 537.
175. 69 Md. App. at 20, 515 A.2d at 1189.
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ship and the misrepresentation concerns an obligation already
undertaken.'7 6 Bocchini established that an action for deceit could
arise out of an existing contractual relationship, such as when a
landlord makes misrepresentations to induce a tenant to quit the
premises.' 77 The court found such a situation "not significantly dif-
ferent" from that presented in the instant case, in which the land-
lord fraudulently induced the tenant to remain.1 78 Thus, an action
for deceit may be available to tenants when a landlord breaches a
covenant of quiet enjoyment.' 79
Tenants now have better footing for actions. against their land-
lords for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. First, the
Bocchini court establishes that a landlord is responsible for the con-
duct of a tenant that interferes substantially with another tenant's
use and enjoyment of the property. Second, a tenant's recourse
now has been expanded from the law of contracts into tort law. A
tenant may charge a landlord with the negligent performance or
nonperformance of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, or, if the cir-
cumstances warrant, with deceit. Thus, the Court of Special Ap-
peals has provided tenants with the protection needed under the
previously amorphous covenant of quiet enjoyment.
C. Other Developments
1. Service of Notice of Building Code Violation.-In Passnault v.
Board of Administrative Appeals , 0 the Court of Appeals held that the
purchaser of a dwelling house constructed in violation of the county
building code is the proper party to serve with a notice of violation
after title has passed from the vendor to the purchaser.'18 In Prince
176. The court in Bocchini noted that "to extend an action for deceit to the latter situa-
tion would be tantamount to allowing punitive damages in what essentially are breach of
contract actions, something the Court of Appeals has been reluctant to do absent a
showing of actual malice." Id.
177. Id. at 21, 515 A.2d at 1189-90. The court cited Crawford v. Pituch, 368 Pa. 489,
491, 84 A.2d 204, 205 (1951), in which a landlord made several representations to a
tenant that the landlord desired the tenant's apartment for its own use and occupancy.
When the tenants vacated, the landlord did not move in but rented the apartment to a
third person at a higher rate.
178. 69 Md. App. at 21, 515 A.2d at 1190.
179. Once again the court found that in the instant case the tenant's averments were
inadequate to sustain such an action. Id. The tenant did not aver that any specific state-
ments made by the landlord were false. Instead, the tenant merely alleged that the land-
lord refused to promise or do anything more after making two unsuccessful attempts to
remedy the situation. Id.
180. 309 Md. 466, 525 A.2d 222 (1987).
181. Id. at 467-68, 525 A.2d at 222.
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George's County this decision essentially limits the responsibility of
the vendor to building code violations issued at or before the time
of settlement.
Gerald Passnault constructed a single family dwelling in Prince
George's County. While the house was still under construction,
Passnault entered into a contract for the sale of the property. Fol-
lowing completion of the house, the Department of Licenses and
Permits conducted the standard inspections and issued a certificate
of use and occupancy. The buyers took possession following Pass-
nault's conveyance of title.' 8
2
Soon after the buyers moved in, they noticed that the roof
leaked. Initially the new owners complained to Passnault who, after
unsuccessfully attempting to remedy the problem, refused further
assistance. The buyers then requested that a building inspector
from the Department of Licenses and Permits inspect the roof. Fol-
lowing this inspection, the department served a series of three no-
tices of county building code violations on Passnault.8 3 In
substance, all three notices cited the same building deficiencies: the
nails securing the roof shingles were too short and the flashing was
of insufficient weight, thus causing the roof to leak.
Passnault took no corrective action following receipt of the no-
tices, but challenged the notices on appeal to the Board of Adminis-
trative Appeals for Prince George's County. The board affirmed the
182. Id. at 468, 525 A.2d at 223.
183. Id. The first notice of violation, dated June 18, 1984, cited Passnault for violating
CABO ONE & Two FAMILY DWELLING CODE § R-803 (1983) (Composition Asphalt Or-
ganic Felt Shingles). The second notice, dated July 16, 1984, charged Passnault with
violating-BOCA-BASIC/NATnONAL BUILDING CODE §§-854.4.4, 854.9,-854.8.3,-926.6-(9th
ed. 1984) (Nailing, Asphalt Shingles, Flashing, and Shingle Application, respectively).
309 Md. at 470 & n.3, 525 A.2d at 224 & n.3. The third notice, dated July 18, 1984,
cited violation of CABO ONE & Two FAMILY DWELLING CODE § R-803 (1983), as did the
first notice. 309 Md. at 471, 525 A.2d at 224.
BOCA is described at supra note 55. CABO, the Council of American Building
Officials, is a non-profit service organization involved in the development and promo-
tion of uniform building regulations. Id. at 472 n.5, 525 A.2d at 225 n.5. The CABO
ONE & Two FAMILY DWELLING CODE is a compilation of data from several model codes,
including BOCA's Code. The CABO version is "'to be used in interpreting the require-
ments of the [BOCA Basic Building] Code as they pertain to one- and two-family dwell-
ings.' " PRINCE GEORGE'S Cour', MD., CODE § 4-108.1 (1983 & Supp. 1986). 309 Md.
at 473, 525 A.2d at 225. The CABO ONE & Two FAMILY DWELLING CODE as well as the
BOCA BASIC/NATIONAL BUILDING CODE are adopted and incorporated by reference in
the PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., CODE §§ 4-101, -108.1 (1983 & Supp. 1986). 309
Md. at 472, 473 n.6, 525 A.2d at 225 & n.6. The most recent version of BOCA's code is
the BOCA NATIONAL BUILDING CODE (10th ed. 1987); CABO released a new edition of




notices of violation.'1 4 On appeal, the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County affirmed the board's decision,'8 5 as did the Court
of Special Appeals.'8 6
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to determine whether
the Prince George's County Department of Licenses and Permits
has the authority to serve a notice of violation on the vendor or
builder of a dwelling house constructed in violation of the building
code and to compel the vendor or builder to abate the violation five
years after the dwelling was sold to a third party.'8 7
After examining the appropriate sections of the BOCA Basic
Building Code' 8 8 and the CABO One & Two Family Dwelling
Code,' 8 9 as adopted in the Prince George's County Building
Code,' the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the depart-
ment has no such authority.'' The court looked at section 117.2 of
the BOCA Basic Building Code which specifically addresses service
of notice of violation:
The building official shall serve a notice of violation or or-
der on the person responsible for the erection, construc-
tion, alteration, extension, repair, removal, demolition, use
184. 309 Md. at 471, 525 A.2d at 224. The board concluded:
1. The roofing and flashing were improperly installed;
2. The contractor is responsible for installing the roof and flashing correctly;
3. Petitioner (Passnault] was the contractor listed on the permit;
4. Petitioner is responsible for having the roof and flashing deficiencies cor-
rected, repaired and/or replaced."
Id. (quoting the board's decision).
185. Id. The circuit court, "noting that limitations do not run against a municipality
for an exercise of a purely governmental function, held that 'there is jurisdiction in the
Prince George's County government to enforce the housing code.'" Id.
186. Id. at 472, 525 A.2d at 225. The intermediate appellate court determined:
"Nothing in [the BOCA and CABO Codes] limits the authority of the Depart-
ment to issue a notice of violation of the provisions of those codes to a builder
who has received a certificate of use and occupancy from the Department after
its inspections of a completed building or after it is sold."
Id. (quoting the Court of Special Appeals' unreported per curiam decision).
187. Id. at 468, 471, 525 A.2d at 223, 224.
188. The court primarily examined BOCA BASIc/NATIONAL BUILDING CODE §§ 117.2,
119.1.1 (9th ed. 1984). Section 117.2 is reproduced at 309 Md. 480-81, 525 A.2d 229
appendix A. Section 119.1.1, as codified in PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD.. CODE § 4-
113 (1983 & Supp. 1986) is reproduced at 309 Md. at 478-79, 525 A.2d at 228.
189. CABO ONE & Two FAMILY DWELLING CODE §§ R-803, R-106 (1983) (Asphalt
Shingles, and Violations and Penalties, respectively) are reproduced at 309 Md. at 469
n.2, 481, 525 A.2d at 223 n.2, 229 appendix B.
190. Because the county building code incorporates by reference the BOCA BA-
SIC/NATIONAL BUILDING CODE and the CABO ONE & Two FAMILY DWELLING CODE, the
court cited the model codes directly for the sake of clarity.
191. 309 Md. at 480, 525 A.2d at 229.
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or occupancy of a building or structure in violation of the
provisions of this code, or in violation of a detail statement
or plan approved thereunder, or in violation of a permit or
certificate issued under the provisions of this code. Such
order shall direct the discontinuance of the illegal action or
condition and the abatement of the violation.1 9 2
Section 117.2 contains neither temporal limits nor limits upon the
court's discretion in determining which actor is the "person respon-
sible."'9 3 Section 119:1.9, however, makes the vendor responsible
for all notices issued for violations before the time of settlement un-
less the contract of sale specifies otherwise.' 94 The court concluded
that "[i]mplicit in § 119.1.1 is that the responsibility of the vendor,
and those acting. by, through, or under the vendor, terminates at
settlement and the purchaser is responsible for notices of violation
issued subsequent to the transfer of title." 95 Because Passnault had
transferred title to the buyer before the notices of violation were
issued, the court ruled that Passnault was no longer the "person
responsible" for the violation. Therefore, the county was without
authority to compel Passnault to abate the violation.' 96
Before Passnault an individual in a like position would have had
to rely on defenses such as estoppel, laches, or the statute of limita-
tions.19 Passnault allows a vendor in Prince George's County to
192. BOCA BASIC/NATIONAL BUILDING CODE § 117.2 (9th ed. 1984).
193. 309 Md. at 478, 525 A.2d at 228. The court noted that BOCA BASIC/NATIONAL
BUILDING CODE § 201.3 (9th ed. 1984) defines the term "person" as including "a corpo-
ration or co-partnership as well as an individual," and that the term "responsible" is not
defined. 309 Md. at 477, 525 A.2d at 227.
194. 309 Md. at 478, 525 A.2d at 228. See BOCA BASIC/NATIONAL BUILDING CODE
§ 119.1.1 (9th ed. 1984); PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., CODE § 4-113 (1983 & Supp.
1986). As Judge Eldridge noted -n- his-dissent,-PRiCE-GEiiU-'gCOUN-lT, MD., CODE
§ 4-113 (1983) was repealed and replaced by the substantially identical PRINCE
GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., CODE § 4-115.1 (Supp. 1986). 309 Md. at 483 n.1, 525 A.2d at
230 n.I (Eldridge, J., dissenting.). BOCA BASIC/NATIONAL BUILDING CODE § 119.1.9
(9th ed. 1984) corresponds to PRINCE GEORGE'S CoUrT. MD., CODE § 4-115.1 (Supp.
1986). BOCA BASIc/NATIONAL BUILDING CODE § 119.1.1 (9th ed. 1984) does not corre-
spond to PRINCE GEORGE'S CoUNTY,. MD., CODE § 4-115.1 (Supp. 1986). See 309 Md. at
483-84, 525 A.2d at 230-31 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
195. 309 Md. at 479, 525 A.2d at 228.
196. Id. at 480, 525 A.2d at 229.
197. Id. at 486-87 & n.3, 525 A.2d at 232 & n.3. Judge Eldridge rejected the major-
ity's determination that BOCA BASIC/NATIONAL BUILDING CODE § 119.1.9 (9th ed.
1984) provides an "express limitation" on the plain language of § 117.2.
Section 117.2 by its terms applies to the persons "responsible for the erection,
construction, alteration, extension, repair, removal, demolition, use or occu-
pancy" of a house in violation of the building code. It does not mention
"buyer" or "seller," and applies regardless of whether the person responsible
is a buyer or seller or neither. Section 119.1.9. however, applies only to "buy-
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base a defense on statutory construction.' 98
As a result of the decision in Passnault, homeowners will bear
the burden of correcting building code violations. The court's in-
terpretation of the Prince George's County Building Code relieves a
builder of responsibility for notices of building code violations is-
sued after conveyance of title when the builder is also the vendor
and the structure is a new one-family dwelling.'9 9 But the owner
still has the right to any available actions against the builder or ven-
dor based on contractual rights. For example, the purchaser may
have a direct cause of action under express or implied warranty
against the vendor if the house was constructed in violation of the
code, and the defect could have been discovered in a reasonable
inspection. 0 "
ers" and "sellers." Both sections are specific in their language; they clearly
apply to distinct situations.
309 Md. at 484. 525 A.2d at 231 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). Because Passnault was both
the builder and the seller, judge Eldridge reasoned that § 119.1.9 defines Passnault's
responsibility as the seller of the house, not his liability as the builder. Id. at 485, 525
A.2d at 231.
[T]he majority asserts that it is implicit in § 119.1.9 that Passnault is not respon-
sible for violations when notices are issued after settlement and authorized by
§ 117.2. I disagree. This implication is totally inappropriate in light of the dif-
ferences in the pertinent statutes. An ordinance that deals with the seller's re-
sponsibility for violation notices, issued prior to settlement, concerning new one-
family dwellings, does not necessarily imply anything at all about the responsibil-
ity of a builder, for notices whenever issued, concerning any buildings or structures
that may have been constructed, altered, repaired, removed, etc.
Id. at 485-86, 525 A.2d at 231 (emphasis in original). Because many code violations
would not be apparent before occupancy by the buyer, judge Eldridge concluded that it
would not be unreasonable "to give effect to the plain meaning of § 117.2 and hold a
builder responsible for his violations of the building code under notices served after
settlement," since the equitable defenses of estoppel and laches would be available
against a municipality. Id. at 486-87, 525 A.2d at 232.
198. 309 Md. at 487 n.3, 525 A.2d at 232 n.3.
199. Id. at 486 n.2, 525 A.2d at 232 n.2. The court's reliance upon BOCA BA-
SIC/NATIONAL BUILDING CODE § 119.1.9 (9th ed. 1984) relates only to the responsibility
of the seller of the house for notice of violation issued before the execution of a contract
for sale of the property. The court's decision does not apply to builders who are not in
the business of selling. 309 Md. at 485, 525 A.2d at 237.
200. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 10-201 to -205 (1988). See also Starfish Condo-
minium Ass'n v. Yorkridge Serv. Corp., 295 Md. 693, 709-11, 458 A.2d 805, 814 (1983)
(breach of statutorily implied warranties); Loch Hill Constr. Co. v. Fricke, 284 Md. 708,
399 A.2d 883 (1979) (breach of implied warranty of habitability for inadequate water
supply). Cf Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Con-
tracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 37-38, 517 A.2d 336, 346 (1986) (vendor's liability beyond
delivery of deed and possession to vendee, in regard to a dangerous condition of prop-
erty transferred, applies only when bodily harm is suffered).
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2. Affirmative Covenants Running at Law.-The Court of Special
Appeals held in Gallagher v. Bell °20 that a covenant to pay a pro rata
share of costs to develop public streets and utilities in exchange for
a right-of-way over private property ran with the land. Thus, the
covenant did not bind covenantors after conveyance of the bur-
dened property.20 2
In reaching this holding, the court examined various elements
often required for. a .coyenant to run with the land.20 3 The court
noted that one necessary element, privity of estate between the par-
ties, can take several forms-mutual, horizontal or verticaj.20 4 Be-
cause. Maryland law had not yet determined the type of privity
required, the court adopted a vertical privity requirement as the
most rational and modem rule of law.205 The court then set forth a
limited holding that, if the parties so intend, the liability of an origi-
nal covenantor "on a covenant of the type involved here" will end
once the burdened property is conveyed. 2"
The Gallaghers bought-a house situated on a half-acre parcel
located in the middle of a large tract which the Bells owned and
intended to develop in the future.2 °7 Shortly thereafter, the Gal-
laghers entered into an agreement with the Bells under which the
Gallaghers would dedicate some of -their land for public streets and
pay a pro rata share of the cost to install the streets and certain utili-
ties.2 0 8 In 1979, before the Bells installed any streets or utilities, the
201. 69 Md. App. 199, 516 A.2d 1028 (1986).
202. Id. at 220, 516 A.2d at 1039.
203. Spencer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (1583), sei forth various criteria for determin-
ing whether a covenant runs with the land. The two most important requirements were
that the covenant concern something "in esse" and that the covenant "touch and con-
cern'-thie larid.- Sinhce-Tie- different-requirements-have-developed. The four elements
which courts frequently require for a covenant to run at law are that the covenant must
touch and concern the land, the parties must intend for it to run, there must be privity of
estate, and the covenant must be in writing. 5 R. POWELL, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 673[l], at 60-37 to -38 (1987) (citations omitted).
204. See infra text accompanying notes 227-229.
205. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
206. 69 Md. App. at 220, 516 A.2d at 1039.
207. Id. at 201, 516 A.2d at 1029. The parties' lands were once part of a 34-1/2 acre
estate owned by the Sisters of Mercy of the Union in the United States of America,
Incorporated. The Bells bought their tract from the Sisters of Mercy in 1959, at which
time a clause in the contract mentioned the excepted parcel: "The existing house and
lot in Section 4 [the Bells' tract] shall be excluded from this contract. Subsequent pur-
chaser of said lot and house shall agree to dedicate half of street bounding said lot and
share pro-rata cost of installing street and utilities by this purchaser of Section 4." Id. at
202, 516 A.2d at 1030. A year later the Sisters of Mercy sold the lot excluded from the
covenant to the Gallaghers. Id.
208. The contract provided that the Bells would grant to the Gallaghers "a temporary
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Gallaghers conveyed their property.2" 9 The Bells began installing
the roads in 1983. When Deborah Camalier, the successor to the
Gallaghers' interest, refused to pay the pro rata share, the Bells de-
manded it of the Gallaghers. The Gallaghers refused and the Bells
filed suit.2 '
Whether the Gallaghers had any continuing liability on their
promise to pay depended on whether the covenant was real, and
therefore ran with the land, or was personal to the Gallaghers. 2 ,'
The question of whether a covenant runs with the land normally
arises when the party seeking to enforce the covenant is not the
original covenantee or when the party against whom the covenant is
sought to be enforced is not the original covenantor. 2  In such
cases the issue is whether the partywho has succeeded to an interest
of one of the original contracting parties can enforce the covenant
or have it enforced against him or her.2 t3
right of way over that portion of the existing private road ... leading to Bradley
Boulevard from [the Gallaghers' property] which crosses [the Bells' property] until such
time as said portion of said private road is supplanted by a dedicated and paved road."
Id. at 203, 516 A.2d at 1030. The contract further stated:
As part of the consideration for this agreement the [Gallaghers] do hereby cov-
enant and agree for themselves, their heirs and assigns that they will dedicate
one-half of the streets bounding on their said property and shall share pro-rata
the cost of the installation of said streets and utilities by (the Bells].
Id. at 204, 516 A.2d at 1030. The agreement was signed and recorded among the
county land records. Id., 516 A.2d at 1031.
209. The Gallaghers sold their property to Deborah Camalier. Aware of the recorded
agreement between the Bells and the Gallaghers, Camalier insisted that the Gallaghers
indemnify her against the covenant. Id. at 205, 516 A.2d at 103 1. While the court ulti-
mately held the Gallaghers not liable on the original covenant, it did not address the
issue of their possible liability.under the indemnity agreement, as this issue was not
properly before the court. Id. at 220, 516 A.2d at 1039.
210. Id. at 205, 516 A.2d at 1031.
211. The difference "hinges upon whether the original covenanting parties' respec-
tive rights or duties can devolve upon their successors." R. POWELL, Supra note 203,
§ 673[l], at 60-36. Personal covenants are enforceable only between the original cove-
nanting parties while real covenants run with the land ind are enforceable against the
parties' heirs and assigns.
212. 69 Md. App. at 206, 516 A.2d at 1032.
213. Id. The court noted that the posture of the parties in Gallagher was different from
that traditionally seen in that they were the original partiesto the contract. Id. at 218,
516 A.2d at 1038. In a more traditional case, the Bells would have sued Camalier, argu-
ing that the covenant ran with the land and thus bound her. Instead, the Bells sued the
Gallaghers, asserting that the covenant was personal, not real. In order to avoid liabil-
ity, the Gallaghers argued that the real covenant ran with the land and therefore relieved
them of any obligation once they conveyed the property to Camalier. Id. at 205, 516
A.2d at 103 1. The court determined that the status of the parties did not alter the analy-
sis to be used in determining whether the covenant ran with the land.' Id. at 206, 516
A.2d at 1032.
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Most courts, including Maryland's, require four factors to co-
exist in order for a covenant to run with the land. The covenant
must be in writing, it must touch and concern the land, the parties
must have intended for the covenant to run, and there must be priv-
ity of estate.21 4
As early as 1866, in Glenn v. Canby,21 5 the Court of Appeals an-
nounced as "established doctrine" that for a covenant to run at law
it must touch and concern the land.21 6 While there are several
"touch and concern" tests, 2 17 the Gallagher court chose the test pro-
posed by Dean Bigelow,21 8 which most courts and writers now fol-
low: 21 9 "[If the covenantor's legal interest in [the] land is rendered
less valuable by the covenant's performance, then the burden of the
covenant satisfies the requirement that the covenant touch and con-
cern the land. '220 Applying the Bigelow test to the facts in Gallagher,
the court found that the covenant burdened the Gallaghers' interest
and rendered it less valuable;22' thus, the covenant touched and
concerned the Gallaghers' land.
Maryland has adopted the view that the original parties' intent
that the covenant run is "a co-equal factor" with the touch and con-
cern requirement.2 22 In Gnau v. Kinlein223 the court stated that the
214. See supra note 203. The court noted that Maryland courts "occasionally ...
[stress] one or two factors to the exclusion of others; but on the whole, it seems that the
criteria mentioned by Powell are also required in Maryland." 69 Md. App. at 209, 516
A.2d at 1033.
215. 24 Md. 127 (1866).
216. Id. at 130. The court defined "touch and concern" as follows: "[A] covenant to
run with the land must extend to the land, so that the thing required to be done will
affect the quality, value, or mode of enjoying the estate conveyed, and thus constitute a
condition annexed, or appurtenant to it." Id. In other words, the covenant must burden
the covenantor in the capacity -idowii s of-i-den-ed oper-.
217. The "touch and concern" test, as defined by the Court of Appeals, states that
whether a covenant runs with the land depends upon whether performance of the cove-
nant will "tend necessarily to enhance [the] value [of the benefited land] or render it
more convenient or beneficial to the owners or occupants." Whalbn v. Baltimore &
Ohio Ry., 108 Md. 11, 20, 69 A. 390, 393 (1908). The Gallagher court found that the
Whalen test was inappropriate for the case at hand because it "looks at the issue from the
benefit point of view." 69 Md. App. at 210, 516 A.2d at 1034. In Gallagher only the
question of burden was at issue because the Bells, who brought the action to enforce the
covenant, were the original covenantees. Id. at 211, 516 A.2d at 1034.
218. Bigelow, The Content of Covenants on Leases, 12 MicH. L. REv. 639, 645 (1914).
219. R. POWELL, supra note 203, § 673[2], at 60-41.
220. Id. For other "touch and concern" tests, see 3 H. TIFFANY, supra note 153, § 854,
at 455; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537 (1944).
221. At the same time, the Bells benefited by the covenant's performance. 69 Md.
App. at 211, 516 A.2d at 1034.
222. Id. at 212 n.9, 216 A.2d at 1035 n.9. The court looked to Tiffany, who stated that
the parties to a covenant may prevent a covenant from running by indicating their intent
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intention of the covenanting parties as to whether the covenant is
personal or extends to their assignees "may be ascertained from the
language of the conveyances alone or from that language together
with other evidence of intent. "2 24 The express language of the cov-
enant bound the Gallaghers, "their heirs and assigns. '2 2 5 This lan-
guage and other extrinsic evidence supported the court's finding
that the parties intended that the covenant run with the land and
bind the Gallaghers' successor in interest.2 26
For a covenant to run with the land, there also must be privity.
Courts mention at least three kinds of privity of estate: mutual priv-
ity, when the covenanting parties have a mutual and continuing in-
terest in the same land;22 7 horizontal privily, when the covenant arises
pursuant to a conveyance in fee from one party to the other; 2M and
vertical privity, when " 'the person presently claiming the benefit, or
being subjected to the burden, is a successor to the estate of the
to that effect. H. TIFFANY, supra note 153, § 854. at 461. See also Glenn v. Canby, 24 Md.
127, 131 (1866) (if a covenant does not touch and concern the land, then it will not run
at law, "nor bind the assignee-of the covenantor, though he be expressly included by the
general term assigns." (emphasis in original)).
While the "touch and concern" test is objective, determining the intent of the par-
ties "focuses on [their] subjective state of mind." R. POWELL, supra note 203,
§ 673[2][b], at 60-49. Intent normally is a question for the jury, but, as with any ques-
tion of fact, "if, after viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferencesfrom it in favor of
the nonmoving party, the court is able to determine an answer as a matter of law, it may
do so by granting a motion for judgment under Md. Rule 2-519 or a motion for judg-
ment n.o.v. under Rule 2-532." 69 Md. App. at 212-13, 516 A.2d at 1035. The court
examined the record and decided as a matter of law that the parties intended the cove-
nant to run with the land. Id. at 215, 516 A.2d at 1036.
223. 217 Md. 43, 141 A.2d 492 (1957).
224. Id. at 48, 141 A.2d at 495.
225. 69 Md. App. at 204, 516 A.2d at 1030. Other evidence supporting the Gal-
laghers' position that they no longer were liable on performance of the covenant in-
cluded: the covenant was intended to benefit the adjacent land of the Bells as
covenantees; before commencing this action, the Bells filed a Declaration of Covenant
among the land records asserting that because of the Gallaghers' conveyance to
Camalier, the latter "became the assignee of the Gallaghers and bound by aforesaid Agree-
ment regarding pro rata payment of the cost of installation of streets and utilities," id. at 214, 516
A.2d at 1636 (emphasis in original); and the Bells admitted that they originally sought to
recover the pro-rata share from Camalier because of the inclusion of "heirs and assigns"
in the covenant. Id. at 214-15, 516 A.2d at 1036.
226. Id. at 215, 516 A.2d at 1036.
227. Id. at 216, 516 A.2d at 1037. Powell notes that mutual privity arises from two
sets of relationships-landlord-tenant and lessor-lessee-and is the "most demanding
view of privity of estate." R. POWELL, supra note 203, § 673[21[c], at 60-59.
228. 69 Md. App. at 216, 516 A.2d at 1037. In the case at hand, there was no horizon-
tal privity because the Gallaghers bought their tract from the Sisters of Mercy, not the
Bells. See supra note 207. The court did not consider the possibility that the Bells' grant-
ing of an easement to the Gallaghers would satisfy the requirements of horizontal
privity.
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original person so benefited or burdened.' "229
Although Maryland law clearly required some form of priv-
ity, 230 the type of privity was not established before Gallagher.2 3 1
Gallagher adopted the view that no more than vertical privity is re-
quired.232 . Because Camalier was a successor to the estate of the
original covenantors, the Gallaghers, the requirement of vertical
privity was satisfied. Because the other three criteria necessary for a
covenant to run with the land also were present, 33 the court held
that the covenant ran with the land and bound Camalier, but not the
Gallaghers. 234
The Gallagher court was correct in its view that vertical privity is
the most rational choice of the various privities in that it is the easi-
est to examine. 2ss Nevertheless, the court's holding, limited to a
229. R. POWELL, supra note 203, § 67312][c], at 60-64.
230. See, e.g., Whalen v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry., 108 Md. 1!, 20, 69 A. 390, 393 (1908)
(finding that "there ... must be a privity of estate between the contracting parties");
Donelson v. Polk, 64 Md. 501, 504 (1886).("In regard to [privity of estate] there is no
conflict of authority .... ); Hintze v. Thomas, 7 Md. 346, 351 (1855) (holding that the
liability of an assignee continues only so long as privity of estate continues, so that when
the assignee makes an assignment, privity is transferred to the new assignee).
231. "Many modem cases still require some type of privity for covenants to run at
law. Unfortunately, there is frequently no consistency as to the type of privity required
even within a jurisdiction, and many courts just do not state which type of privity they
require." R. POWELL, supra note 203, § 673[2)[c], at 60-67 (footnotes omitted).
232. 69 Md. App. at 217, 516 A.2d at 1037. The court noted that requiring vertical
privity is "more rational" because it focuses on the devolutional relationship-that is,
the relationship between the Gallaghers and Camalier-rather than on the relationship
of the original contracting parties, an approach that can turn into a guessing game and
"can create artificial results." Id Vertical privity is the modem view according to Pow-
ell: "Modern legal writers unanimously favor the abolition of at least mutual and hori-
zontal privity." R. POWELL, supra note 203, § 673[2], at 60-67.
233. Gallagher did not discuss the r-eq-iiir-ement-ith-t-f6ra cbv-inant to runit must be in
writing, as this requirement apparently was met. See supra note 208.
234. 69 Md. App. at 217, 516 A.2d at 1039. Having found that the covenant ran with
the land, the court addressed the issue of whether the liability of the Gallaghers, as
original covenantors, ended when they sold their land to Camalier. Id at 217-20, 516
A.2d at 1037-39.
The court referred to Powell, id. at 218, 516 A.2d at 1038, who noted' that many
courts have held that a conveyance of the burdened land ends the covenantor's liability;
this result normally reflects the intention of the original parties. R. POWELL, supra note
203, § 673131, at 60-73 to -74. Powell notes that such a result is "less likely to be true in
the case of covenants to pay money, where the personal credit of the original covenantor
is an important factor." Id. at 60-74.
The court found, however, that the Bells did not rely specifically upon the Gal-
laghers' credit when entering into the covenant. 69 Md. App. at 219-20, 516 A.2d at
1039. The Bells, having approached Camalier for payment on the covenant before go-
ing to the Gallaghers, indicated that "[t]hey wanted, and insisted upon, the undertaking
from whomever purchased the burdened tract." Id. at 220, 516 A.2d at 1039.
235. Powell notes: "Vertical privity exists in all covenant situations except where a
covenant "of the type involved here, ' 23 6 that the continuing liability
of a covenantor will end upon conveyance of the burdened property
if the parties so intended is curious. While the court was not
presented with the typical lawsuit in which the original covenantee
brings an action against an assignee of the covenantor, it seems
overly cautious in not setting forth the same ruling without the cryp-
tic limitation. Gallagher may serve as an impetus for developing a
rule of law that will eliminate the harsh result that may occur when
any covenantor who conveys property burdened by a covenant run-
ning with the land subsequently is held liable on the promise.
RICHARD S. GORDON
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successor to the burdened or benefited land is an adverse possess6r or a disseisor." R.
POWELL, supra note 203, § 673[21[c], at 60-64.
236. 69 Md. App. at 220, 516 A.2d at 1039. The court stated that "the continuing
liability of an original covenantor on a covenant of the type involved here will end upon his
conveyance of the burdened property if the parties intended that to be the case." Id.
(emphasis added).
The court chose not to follow the conclusion of the Pennsylvania court in Leh v.
Burke, 231 Pa. Super. 98, 331 A.2d 755 (1974). Faced with facts similar to those in
Gallagher, the Leh court concluded that when an affirmative covenant is found to run with
the land, the person in possession of the burdened land when the covenant matures is
responsible for its performance. Id. at 108, 331 A.2d at 761. The Gallagher court de-
clared that it was unnecessary to establish such a rule. 69 Md. App. at 220, 516 A.2d at
1039. It remains to be determined whether courts will interpret a "covenant of the type
involved here" to mean that Gallagher applies to all covenants to make a monetary pay-
ment or only to those to pay a pro rata share of the cost of installing streets and utilities.
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VII. STATE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
A. Administrative Agencies
1. Judicial Review.--a. Exhaustion of Remedies.-Maryland Na-
tional-Capital Park & Planning Commission v. Crawford' represents a
"reverse discrimination" action challenging the merits of the affirm-
ative action policy of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Plan-
ning Commission (MNCPPC). Instead of addressing- the merits of
the policy, however, the opinion considered whether exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a prerequisite to the filing of a civil rights
2action.
Elsie Crawford, a .white female, worked as a secretary for the
MNCPPC. s She appliedfor a transfer from one division within the
MNCPPC to another and was interviewed and ranked first among all
applicants.4 Nevertheless, the position was given to another candi-
date as part of the MNCPPC's "good faith efforts to employ minor-
ity employees in all job categories in proportion to their
representation in the regional workforce."5 Ms. Crawford then filed
an administrative grievance. 6
The MNCPPC's administrative remedy scheme called for a re-
view by the department director, an appeal to the executive director
of the MNCPPC, and a final review by the Merit System Board.'
Before the Merit System Board issued its final decision, however,
Crawford filed suit, seeking damages and injunctive relief against
the MNCPPC and three of its officers8 under both title 42, section
1983 of the United States Code9 and the Maryland Constitution.' °
1. 307 Md. 1, 511 A.2d 1079 (1986).
2. -ld:at 11-.12 511 A.2d at 1084.
3. Id. at 5, 511 A.2d at 1080-81.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 6, 511 A.2d at 1081.
6. Id. at 7, 511 A.2d at 1081.
7. Id. at 7-8, 511 A.2d at 1081-82.
8. Id. at 8, 511 A.2d at 1082.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). The statute provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom or usage, of any State ... subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
10. While the opinion does not disclose the provision of the Maryland Constitution
upon which Ms. Crawford relied, MD. CONST. art. 24, the due process clause, has been
construed to imply equal protection of the laws. See Attorney General v. Waldron, 289
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The lower court ruled in Ms. Crawford's favor;" the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals affirmed the judgment.' 2
On appeal the MNCPPC, along with the State of Maryland and
the Maryland Commission on Human Relations as amici curiae,
urged the Court of Appeals to dismiss the action for failure to ex-
haust administrative remedies, citing the policy that "where pursu-
ant to a statute an administrative remedy is provided for a particular
type of case, ordinarily the administrative remedy must be invoked
and exhausted before relief is available."'" The MNCPPC also main-
tained that the affirmative action plan was constitutional.'
4
Ms. Crawford had pursued her claim through three administra-
tive levels.' 5 After being denied the position, she initially filed an
administrative grievance with the MNCPPC directly, claiming that
she had been denied the transfer solely because of her race.' 6 The
director of the MNCPPC found that although Ms. Crawford was the
first choice of the interview panel, the woman ultimately selected
also was qualified and the decision to hire her was in accordance
with the MNCPPC's affirmative action plan.'" Ms. Crawford next
appealed this decision to the executive director of the MNCPPC.' s
While the appeal was pending and before initiating the third and
final stage of the administrative grievance procedure, Ms. Crawford
filed suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. 19 Four
Md. 683, 704, 426 A.2d 929, 940 (1981) ('Although the Maryland Constitution contains
no express equal protection clause, we deem it settled that this concept of equal treat-
ment is embodied in the due process requirement of Article 24 of the Declaration of
Rights."). See generally Rees, State Constitutional Lawfor Maryland Lawlyers: Individual Civil
Rights, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 299, 315-19 (1978).
11. 307 Md. at 9-10, 511 A.2d at 1083.
12. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Crawford, 59 Md. App.
276, 475 A.2d 494 (1984).
13. 307 Md. at 13, 511 A.2d at 1085.
14. Id. at 31, 511 A.2d at 1094. The MNCPPC contended that Ms. Crawford had
failed to exhaust its statutory in-house grievance system, thereby depriving the circuit
court ofjurisdiction. The amici contended that she also was required to exhaust reme-
dies provided by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the
Maryland Commission on Human Relations. The Court of Appeals, while stating that it
normally would not consider arguments that had been raised only in an amicus brief,
declared that "because primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies
are matters which the Court will address sua sponte in appropriate circumstances, they
constitute exceptions to this general rule." Id. at 15 n.6, 511 A.2d at 1086 n.6.
15. Id. at 16, 511 A.2d at 1086.
16. Id. at 7, 511 A.2d at 1082.
17. Id. at 6, 511 A.2d at 1081.
18. Id. at 7, 511 A.2d at 1081.
19. Id.. 511 A.2d at 1082.
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days later, the executive director affirmed the director's finding.2"
Ms. Crawford then appealed this decision to the Merit System Board
of the MNCPPC.2
The Merit System Board ultimately determined that the race-
based "non-selection" of Ms. Crawford for the vacancy. "accorded
with the terms
. 
of the Commission's affirmative action plan"; there-
fore, the board upheld the selection of the other candidate. 2 While
the board's decision was pending, the MNCPPC challenged the cir-
cuit court's jurisdiction on the ground that Ms. Crawford had failed
to exhaust her administrative remedies."3 The court overruled the
demurrer and entered an order prohibiting the MNCPPC from al-
tering evidence or attempting to influence potential testimony.24
The court did. nothing else until the Merit System Board's
decision.25
After the board's decision the circuit court delivered an oral
opinion which found that "the only reason Mrs. Crawford wasn't
transferred was that she was white."2 6 The court also declared that
the MNCPPC had failed to follow its own affirmative action plan,
which contained an exception for "'clearly' more qualified appli-
cants. "27 Judgment in favor of Ms. Crawford for $500 and a
mandatory injunction ordering her transfer ensued.28
The Court of Appeals pointed out that "it is not clear from the
record how the transfer of an employee from one position to an-
other in the same grade could affect the Commission's compliance
with the affirmative action plan. ' 29 Aside from this observation the
court never questioned the plan itself. Instead, the court concen-
trated on the quasi-jurisdictional issue of exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies as a preliminary step to the filing of a civil rights
suit.3" The MNCPPC and amici curiae urged the court to require
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 7-8, 511 A.2d at 1082. "The Board's rationale for this decision was that the
Commission's affirmative action plan authorized, but did not require, a preference for
minority candidates on a list of qualified candidates." Id.
23. Id. at 8, 511 A.2d at 1082.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. d. at 9, 511 A.2d at 1083.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 6, 511 A.2d at 1081.
30. Id. at 13 & n.4, 511 A.2d at 1085 & n.4. See Board of Educ. v. Hubbard, 305 Md.
774, 787, 506 A.2d 625, 631 (1986) ("While the failure to invoke and exhaust an admin-
istrative remedy does not ordinarily result in a trial court's being deprived of fundamen-
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that employment discrimination plaintiffs not only complete the ap-
propriate in-house grievance procedure, but also exhaust remedies
provided by both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and the Maryland Human Relations Commission.3 ' The
court declared these requirements to be too great a burden.3 2
Relying initially on Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 3 the court
rejected the position of both the MNCPPC and amicii curiae which
urged strict adherence to the so-called "flexible exhaustion" rule.
3 4
The Supreme Court held in Patsy that no exhaustion of state admin-
istrative remedies is required before beginning a civil rights action
in federal courts.3 5 Although Patsy involved federal jurisdiction, the
Court of Appeals noted that "the majority of state court decisions
since Patsy have taken the position that the Patsy holding is applica-
ble to a state court section 1983 action."' 36 Relying on the Maryland
case of County Executive of Prince George's County v. Doe, the Court of
tal jurisdiction, nevertheless, because of the public policy involved, the matter is for
some purposes treated like a jurisdictional question." (emplasis in original)).
31. Id. at 15 n.6, 511 A.2d at 1086 n.6.
32. Id. at 29, 511 A.2d at 1093. The court stressed:
If we were to construe the pertinent statutes ... to require that an employee
such as the plaintiff Crawford invoke and exhaust every administrative scheme
applicable to her grievance before bringing an independent judicial action au-
thorized by statute, the burden upon such employee would be great. More-
over, the task of coordinating different judicial review actions and the
independent statutory action could be formidable."
Id. (footnote omitted).
33. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
34. The "'flexible exhaustion" rule, which the Patsy Court rejected, stated that a civil
rights complainant could be required to exhaust an administrative remedy if the follow-
ing minimum conditions are met:
(1) an orderly system of review or appeal is provided by statute'or agency rule;(2) the agency can grant relief more or less commensurate with the claim;
(3) relief is available within a reasonable period of time; (4) the procedures are
fair, are not unduly burdensome, and are not used to harass or discourage
those with legitimate claims; and (5) interim relief is available, in appropriate
cases, to prevent irreparable injury and to preserve the plaintiff's rights during
the administrative process. Where these minimum standards are met, a court
must further consider the particular administrative scheme, the nature of the
plaintiff's claim and the values served by the exhaustion doctrine in order to
determine whether exhaustion should be required.
Id. at 499. This excerpt also summarizes Maryland's policy of exhaustion. See Board of
Educ. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 786-87, 506 A.2d 625, 631 (1986) (holding that teach-
ers first must exhaust remedies before state board of education).
35. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 516-17.
36. 307 Md. at 12, 511 A.2d at 1084.
37. 300 Md. 445, 479 A.2d 352 (1984). "[Wlhen an action is brought in a state court
to enforce rights or claims under federal law, the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution is to be applied by the state court .... [A] state court exercising jurisdic-
tion in a federal cause may not refuse to apply federal law in one particular respect
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Appeals decided that notwithstanding Maryland policy, the state
courts were required to give plaintiffs such as Ms. Crawford the full
benefit of federal law. The court stated:
Consequently, if Congress in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 intended
that exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not
be a prerequisite to bringing an action under that federal
statute, regardless of the judicial forum, then the "Maryland
policy" concerning invocation and exhaustion. of adminis-
trative remedies would be immaterial, and. the Patsy hold-
ing would be fully applicable to state court section 1983
actions. 38
The MNCPPC and amici curiae had argued that the congres-
sional intent was "aimed solely at federal court actions, and that
Congress did not have such intent with regard to state court section
1983 actions."3 9 The court found, however, that "there was no vio-
lation of any applicable state law primary jurisdiction or exhaustion
requirement.' ,"4 The MNCPPC and amici curiae also had con-
tended that there were three separate administrative schemes which
Ms. Crawford must exhaust before she could be entitled to have a
state court hear her claim. 4' The court determined that Ms. Craw-
ford had exhausted one scheme and that the other two did not
apply.4 2
The court found that Ms. Crawford eventually had exhausted
the MNCPPC's three-tier grievance procedure and that the lower
court had properly exercised jurisdiction to allow her to go forward
with her case.4" The lower court, noting the constitutional nature of
where such law is deemed inconsistent with 'state policy.' Instead the entire federal sub-
stanti elaw-is appliliable."' Id. at-454-55, 479 A.2dlat 357 (ern-piasis in original). Seealso
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 243 (1942) (finding that the state court
must give the plaintiff "the full benefit of federal law").
38. 307 Md. at 14-15, 511 A.2d at 1085-86 (emphasis in original).




43. Id. at 17, 511 A.2d at 1087. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. United States Dep't of Energy,
663 F.2d 296 (D.C. Cir. 1981), one federal court of appeals declared:
The time-honored purposes of exhaustion-to allow an agency to make a rec-
ord, apply its expertise, and correct errors in its own processes as it goes
along-do not seem particularly well-served here where the... court was deal-
ing with an agency proceeding in which it had reason to believe something may
have gone fundamentally awry with the way in which the proceeding itself was
being conducted, something that transcended dubious or even patently errone-
ous legal rulings.
Id. at 309 (footnote omitted).
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the claim involved, had done nothing more than retain jurisdiction
pending completion of the in-house administrative process. 44
. The Court of Appeals went on to reject the assertion that the
EEOC had primary jurisdiction over the complaint,45 finding that
procedures under title 42, section 2000(e) of the United States
Code,46 which provide access to the EEOC as a forum for obtaining
relief from employment discrimination, and those under title 42,
section 1983"' "augment each other and are not mutually exclu-
sive. ' 48 The court was impressed by the reasoning of a recent opin-
ion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
Trigg v. Fort Wayne Community Schools,4 9 which concluded:
[Tihe Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII [of the 1964
Civil Rights Act] have granted public sector employees in-
dependent rights to be free of employment discrimination.
A plaintiff may sue her state government employer for vio-
lations of the Fourteenth Amendment through § 1983 and
escape Title VII's comprehensive remedial scheme, even if
the same facts would suggest a violation of Title VII. This
holding is consistent with the great weight of authority. 50
The court likewise concluded that the Maryland Commission on
Human Relations does not supply the "comprehensive remedial
scheme"'" contemplated by the rule of statutory construction that
ordinarily dictates exhaustion.5 2 According to the court, the juris-
diction of the state commission was designed to conform to that of
the EEOC "so that the state Commission would handle employment
discrimination in lieu of the federal agency.'"'" Thus, if the Mary-
land legislature did not intend for the commission's jurisdiction to
extend beyond that of the EEOC, and if exhaustion of EEOC reme-
dies is not a prerequisite to invoking a judicial remedy, then exhaus-
tion of remedies provided by the Human Relations Commission is
44. 307 Md. at 17-18, 511 A.2d at 1087.
45. Id. at 19-22, 511 A.2d at 1088-89.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 20 0 0(e) (1982).
47. Id. § 1983.
48. 307 Md. at 20, 511 A.2d at 1089.
49. 766 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1985).
50. Id. at 302.
51. Secretary, Dep't of Human Resources v. Wilson, 286 Md. 639, 645, 409 A.2d
713, 717 (1979).
52. 307 Md. at 25, 511 A.2d at 1091. The court noted: "The rule of statutory con-
struction, that ordinarily an administrative remedy must be invoked before resort to an
independent judicial remedy, is in part based upon an inference from the comprehen-
siveness of the statutorily created scheme." Id.




After all this, the merits of the case were relatively simple. The
MNCPPC attempted a constitutional justification of its affirmative
action plan, stating:
[Rjace-conscious programs of selection may be applied to
redress the continuing effects of past discrimination ....
[A]ffirmative relief in the form of hiring quotas or goals is
appropriate in order to rectify the past discriminatory hir-
ing practices of public employers, notwithstanding that such
remedies may result in some reverse discrimination.5
The court, however, did not address the merits of "race-conscious
programs of selection" but merely found that the MNCPPC's own
policy was not followed.5" The affirmative action plan contained a
provision which allowed the transfer if the particular applicant's
qualifications were "clearly superior"57 to those of others seeking
the position. Ms. Crawford was such an applicant.58
Crawford is a well-reasoned opinion in the field of administrative
law. The court's holding regarding the doctrine of exhaustion indi-
cates the court's unwillingness to impose costly and time-consuming
administrative procedures on a plaintiff. While the exhaustion doc-
trine has been invoked when an agency has the authority to inter-
pret a statute, 9 there is simply no reason to force a plaintiff to cope
with the procedures of three separate agencies before allowing en-
trance to the courthouse. The position of the Office of the Attorney
General as amicus curiae seems insensitive to the difficulties of an
ordinary person wandering in the valley of the shadow of bureau-
cracy. While there are often good reasons for adherence to an ex-
haustion requirement,6" the Court of Appeals properly refused to
transform-the- doctrine of-exhaustion into-an- iron-clad-rule-Never-
theless, this decision's effect on other controversies involving state
and federal agencies should be limited, as the legislature endows
54. Id.
55. Id. at 31, 511 A.2d at 1094 (emphasis in original).
56. Id. at 32, 511 A.2d at 1095. The court stressed: "We need not, and do not,
reach any of these matters in this opinion. What the above-reviewed contentions over-
look is that the circuit court found as a fact that the Park and Planning Commission
failed to follow its so-called affirmative action plan in this case." Id.
57. Id. at 33, 511 A.2d at 1095 (quoting § II of the MNCPPC's affirmative action
plan).
58. Id., 511 A.2d at 1095-96.
59. See Board of Educ. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 788, 506 A.2d 625, 632 (1986)
(finding that the Board of Education had statutory authority to interpret the Education
Article).
60. See supra note 43.
940 [VOL. 47:934
1988] STATE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
each agency with peculiar remedial powers.6' Certainly, some dis-
putes are more amenable to the expertise of an administrator or a
commission than to the jurisdiction of a court.
b. Findings of Fact.-The Court of Appeals held in Sinai Hospital
of Baltimore, Inc. v. Maryland Health Resources Planning Commission62
that there was substantial evidence to support either the granting or
the denial of a certificate of need for additional cardiac surgery facil-
ities. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the Maryland
Health Resources Planning Commission6 s (the Commission) deny-
ing two hospitals' applications.
In September 1983 Sinai Hospital of Baltimore, Inc. (Sinai) and
North Charles General Hospital (North Charles) each applied to the
Commission for a certificate of need to perform open heart sur-
gery.' The Health-General Article requires that the Commission
issue a certificate of need before a person or institution can develop,
operate, or participate in- certain health care projects.65 This re-
quirement aims to ensure that both alterations in service capacity
and major expenditures for health care facilities are necessary, af-
fordable, and in keeping with the Commission's policies. 66
The Central Maryland Health Systems Agency recommended
that the Commission grant Sinai a certificate of need, while the
Commission staff favored North Charles." The Commission desig-
61. Compare Board of Educ. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 506 A.2d 625 (1986) (finding
that teachers are required to exhaust administrative remedies before the state board of
education prior to resort to judicial review) with Maryland-National Capital Park & Plan-
ning Comm'n v. Washington Nat'l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 386 A.2d 1216 (1978) (holding
that the legislature did not intend to confer upon the taxation appeal agency exclusive
power to construe contractual noncontestability provision).
62. 306 Md, 472, 509 A.2d 1202 (1986).
63. On October 1, 1982, the Maryland Health Resources Planning Commission (the
Commission) replaced the Maryland State Health Planning and Development Agency.
Act of May 4, 1982, ch. 108, 1982 Md. Laws 1282, 1316 (codified as amended at MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-103 (1987)). The General Assembly established the
Commission as an independent body within the Department of Health and Mental Hy-
giene, MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-103 (1987), and charged it with "[p]lanning to
meet the current and future health care needs of citizens in this State." Id. § 19-102.
64. 306 Md. at 474, 509 A.2d at 1203. Both Sinai Hospital of Baltimore, Inc. (Sanai)
and North Charles General Hospital (North Charles) are located in the Central Mary-
land Health Service Area. At the time of their applications for certificates of need, three
other hospitals in the area offered open heart surgery programs. The three hospitals-
Johns Hopkins, University of Maryland, and Saint Joseph-were performing 780, 527,
and 350 cardiac surgery procedures per year, respectively. Id. at 476, 509 A.2d at 1204.
65. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-115(e)(1) (1987).
66. 306 Md. at 474, 509 A.2d at 1203. See MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 24.01.07 (1988)
(Procedures for Application Review). &"
67. 306 Md. at 474-75, 509 A.2d at 1203. Because Sinai and North Charles sought
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nated one of its members to hold a hearing on the issue. The hear-
ing officer recommended that the certificate of need be issued to
Sinai,68 believing that the state health plan compelled the Commis-
sion to grant one certificate of need despite the adequacy of existing
facilities. The full Commission subsequently denied both hospitals'
petitions.6 9
The Health-General Article requires that "[a]ll decisions of the
Commission on an application for a certificate of need . .. shall be
consistent with the State health plan and the standards for review
established by the, Commission."7 Using the formula provided by
the state health plan for estimating the future need for adult cardiac
surgery procedures, the Commission projected a 1986 need for 420
additional procedures.7 The Commission's standards for review
required it to consider present utilization as well as future needs.72
Sinai and North Charles argued that the Commission erred as a mat-
ter of law by disregarding the future need estimate calculated by
using the state health plan f6rmula. s The hospitals further con-
tended that the legislature intended that the state health plan take
precedence over the Commission's standards for review.74
The Court of Appeals determined that neither the state health
plan nor the Commission's standards for review predominate; fur-
thermore, there was no conflict between the results of the two analy-
approval for similar projects in the same area, their applications were subject to compar-
ative review. Id. at 474, 509 A.2d at 1023; MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 24.01.07B(2)
(1988). The Commission may grant only one certificate of need at a time for open heart
surgery, in order to allow the new program to develop without competition until it
reaches 350 procedures per year. 306 Md. at 476. 509 A.2d at 1204.
68. 306 Md. at 475, 509 A.2d at 1203.
69. Id.
70. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-118(c)(1) (1987).
71. 306 Md. at 476, 509 A.2d at 1204. The Commission multiplied the national use
rate by the projected population of the Central Maryland Health Services Area two years
in the future, and then subtracted the existing cardiac surgery capacity to determine the
projected need. Id.
72. Id. at 477-78, 509 A.2d at 1204-05. Then-existing regulations required the Com-
mission to consider " '[the need for the proposed health services of the population
served or to be served, including an analysis of present and future utilization.'" Id. at 477,
509 A.2d at 1204 (quoting MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 24.01.07(D) (1987) (emphasis in
original)). The current version of the regulations mandates consideration of "the need
analysis (if any) included in the State Health Plan" as well as "the Special Needs" of
"groups which may be underserved." MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 24.01.07(H) (1988).
73. 306 Md. at 479, 509 A.2d at 1205.
74. Id. As the court noted, the state health plan declares that present need in the
form of excessive waiting times is a necessary condition for granting a certificate of need;
when there is no future need, excessive waiting time is not a suffcient condition for grant-
ing a certificate of need. Id. at 477, 509 A.2d at 1205.
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ses.75 The state health plan focused on future needs, whereas the
Commission's regulation addressed present utilization of existing car-
diac surgery facilities.7 6 The court stressed that the state health plan
"neither provides a methodology for computing current need nor
prohibits the Commission from establishing current need as one of
the standards of review."77 Therefore, while the state health plan
obliged the Commission to consider future needs as a factor in de-
ciding whether to grant a certificate of need, the plan did not man-
date that future need be the sole consideration.78 Consequently, the
Commission did not err as a matter of law in denying the certificates
of need based on a finding of no present need, even though a future
need was predicted.7
The court found that because there was no error of law, the
only possible ground for overturning the Commission's decision
would be an error in the Commission's factual findings.8 0 It is well
established in Maryland that courts will not substitute their own
judgment for that of an administrative agency when there is substan-
tial evidence to support the agency's decision.8" The court found
substantial evidence to support a decision either to add to cardiac
surgery facilities or simply to maintain the existing level of service.82




79. Id. In effect, the court found determinations of present need and future need
each to be necessary but not sufficient conditions for issuance of the certificate of need.
80. Id. at 478-82, 509 A.2d at 1205-07.
81. The Court of Appeals has declared:
Whichever of the recognized tests the court uses-substantiality of the evi-
dence on the record as a whole, clearly erroneous, fairly debatable or against
the weight or preponderance of the evidence on the entire record-its ap-
praisal or evaluation must be of the agency's fact-finding results and not an
independent original estimate of or decision on the evidence. The required
process is difficult to precisely articulate but it is plain that it requires restrained
and disciplined judicial judgment so as not to interfere with the agency's factual
conclusions under any of the tests, all of which are similar. There are differ-
ences but they are slight and under any of the standards the judicial review
essentially should be limited to whether a reasoning mind reasonably could
have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached. This need not and
must not be either judicial fact-finding or a substitution ofjudicial judgment for
agency judgment.
State Ins. Comm'r v. National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, 248 Md. 292, 309-10.
236 A.2d 282, 291-92 (1967).
82. 306 Md. at 480-81, 509 A.2d at 1205. The court found that the waiting time for
elective open heart surgery at the three hospitals offering the procedure was well below
the one-month maximum established by the state health plan. d. at 477, 509 A.2d at
1205. Moreover, the frequency of open heart surgery was decreasing nationwide, ap-
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Because the Commission could have reasonably concluded that its
standards for issuing certificates of need were not satisfied, the court
upheld the Commission's denial of the hospitals' applications.83
2. Savings and Loan Associations.--a. Right to Refund.-In Chevy
Chase Savings & Loan, Inc. v. State8 4 the Court of Appeals held that a
savings and loan association which as a member had contributed
capital to the Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Corporation
(MSSIC) had no right to a refund from MSSIC's insurance fund
upon withdrawing from the insolvent corporation unless funds re-
mained after repaying creditors. 85 The court further held that
MSSIC's delay in repaying central reserve fund contributions, which
were used to maintain the liquidity of MSSIC members, resulted
from a statutory modification of MSSIC's contract with Chevy Chase
Savings & Loan (Chevy Chase) and was not an unconstitutional ex-
ercise of the State's power.86
In 1962 the Maryland legislature created MSSIC as a nonstock,
nonprofit corporation whose members were state-chartered savings
and loan associations."' MSSIC maintained two separate funds; an
insurance fund to insure the savings accounts of MSSIC members,88
and a central reserve fund to provide for the liquidity of MSSIC
I
parently as a result of new medicines and medical techniques, increased hospital effi-
ciency, and economic factors. Id. at 481, 509 A.2d at 1206. Sinai and North Charles
claimed that they could have cardiac surgery facilities operating within three months of
Commission approval, diminishing the importance of the need projected more than two
years in the future. Id., 509 A.2d at 1206-07. Nevertheless, the three existing cardiac
surgery facilities were ready and willing to expand to provide an additional 220 proce-
dures. Id., 509 A.2d at 1206.
83 -ld-at-482-509 A.2d at 1207.
84. 306 Md. 384, 509 A.2d 670 (1986).
85. Id. at 407, 509 A.2d at 682.
86. Id. at 387, 509 A.2d at 672.
87. Id. The State required all Maryland chartered savings and loan associations to
obtain insurance through either the Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Corporation
(MSSIC) or the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). Id. at 388,
509 A.2d at 672. The purposes of MSSIC were to:
(1) Promote the elasticity and flexibility of the resources of members;
(2) Provide for the liquidity of members through a central reserve fund; and
(3) Insure the savings accounts of the members.
MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 10-103 (1980). The statutes pertaining to MSSIC were're-
pealed by Act of May 18, 1985, ch. 6, 1985 Md. Laws 4118.
88. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 10-105 (1980). MSSIC required each member to
contribute to the insurance fund "as a capital deposit" an amount equal to two percent
of its free share accounts. MSSIC Rule § 3-301, reprinted in 306 Md. at 417, 509 A.2d at
687 (appendix). MSSIC issued certificates of deposit as evidence of these contributions,
but the certificates paid no interest or dividends. 306 Md. at 389, 509 A.2d at 672.
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members.89 MSSIC obtained the capital necessary to pursue these
purposes through the contributions of the member savings and loan
associations.90 A 1974 amendment9 ' to the MSSIC statute which
provided that "the Central Reserve Fund shall not be subject to pay-
ment of insurance claims against [MSSIC]"'92 heightened the dis-
tinction between the central reserve fund and the insurance fund.
On October 12, 1984, Chevy Chase notified MSSIC of its inten-
tion to withdraw from MSSIC upon approval of Chevy Chase's ap-
plication for Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC) membership.9 3 Early in 1985, financial difficulties caused
the failure of two savings and loans and ultimately of MSSIC itself."
The General Assembly convened an extraordinary session between
May 17 and 28, 1985, at which the legislature merged MSSIC into
the newly created State of Maryland Deposit Insurance Fund Corpo-
ration (MDIF). 95 The General Assembly formed MDIF as a non-
stock, nonprofit corporation and a state agency within the
Department of Licensing and Regulation.9 6 On May 22, 1985,
89. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 10-104(c) (1980). MSSIC Rule 3-901, reprinted in 306
Md. at 420-27, 509 A.2d at 688-92 (appendix). MSSIC members were required to capi-
talize the central reserve fund by buying interest-bearing "Capital Notes" issued by
MSSIC. 306 Md. at 390, 509 A.2d at 673. Each member was obligated to purchase
capital notes equivalent to one-half of one percent of assets for a savings and loan asso-
ciation having less than $75 million in assets, or one and one-half percent of assets for
savings and loan associations having greater assets. MSSIC Rule § 3-901(B), reprinted in
306 Md. at 421, 509 A.2d at 688-89 (appendix).
90. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 10-10 7 (c) (1980) ("Each member shall make the
investments and pay the assessments, premiums, and other charges that are required for
participation in the corporation.").
91. Act of April 9, 1974, ch. 152, 1974 Md. Laws 743 (amending MD. FIN. INST. CODE
ANN. § 10-104(4)).
92. Id.
93. 306 Md. at 397, 509 A.2d at 677.
94. Id. at 392, 509 A.2d at 674. A "silent run" on certain MSSIC-insured savings
and loan associations in early 1985 caused these institutions to borrow heavily. An an-
nouncement by MSSIC on May 9, 1985, of a change in management at one of its mem-
ber savings and loan associations caused the runs to increase and to spread to other
institutions. On May 13. 1985, two savings and loan associations were placed in conser-
vatorship; on May 14, 1985, the Governor proclaimed a state of emergency and sus-
pended withdrawal from savings and loan associations insured by the insolvent MSSIC.
Id.
95. Id. at 393, 509 A.2d at 674-75. The legislative objective behind the creation of
the Maryland Deposit Insurance Fund Corporation (MDIF) was to provide insurance for
those savings and loan associations that remained solvent after MSSIC became insol-
vent, until such time as they could obtain insurance from the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) and to liquidate MSSIC's assets in an orderly manner.
Id. at 392-93, 509 A.2d at 674.
96. Id. at 393, 509 A.2d at 674-75. MSSIC, in contrast, was not a state agency; no
action by its board of directors could take effect unless approved by the director of the
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FSLIC approved Chevy Chase's membership application effective
May 23, 1985; the following day Chevy Chase notified its depositors
that FSLIC had insured their accounts. 97
On May 28, 1985, Chevy Chase demanded that MDIF, as
MSSIC's successor in interest, repay $21,630,107 from the insur-
ance fund and $42,970,900 from the central reserve fund. 98 Chevy
Chase based its claim for return of its insurance fund contributions
upon the theory that its right to repayment vested when it gave no-
tice of intent to withdraw from MSSIC, or in the alternative, upon its
withdrawal from MSSIC after obtaining FSLIC insurance.99 There-
fore, its claim took priority over depositors' claims because it was
payable earlier than the depositors' claims. Chevy Chase contended
that it had an unconditional right to the money on May 24, 1985, the
date of its withdrawal from MSSIC. The depositors' claims, how-
ever, were not payable until there was a determination of the "net
insurable loss" of each free share account of the member savings
and loan in default. 1°
The court rejected Chevy Chase's claim for reimbursement of
its contributions to the insurance fund. 0 ' The court found that the
earliest date on which Chevy Chase could seek repayment under
MSSIC Rule 3-504 was May 24, 1985, the date on which Chevy
Chase notified its depositors of the termination of MSSIC insur-
ance.'O2 Although there was cash in the insurance fund on that date,
MSSIC was insolvent because its liabilities clearly exceeded its re-
sources, even if the full extent of its liabilities was not yet known.' 03
Division of Savings and Loan Associations, a state agency within the Department of Li-
censing and Regulation. Id. at 388, 509 A.2d at 672.
97. Id.-at 397; 509-A.2d at-67-7.. - -
98. Id. at 397-98, 509 A.2d at 677. MSSIC Rule § 3-503, reprinted in 306 Md. at 418-
19, 509 A.2d at 687-88 (appendix), governs repayment of insurance fund contributions
to withdrawing members. MSSIC Rules §§ 3-901(B)(6) and 3-901(K), reprinted in 306
Md. at 422-23, 426-27, 509 A.2d at 690, 692 (appendix), govern repayment of central
reserve fund contributions to withdrawing members.
99. 306 Md. at 400-01, 509 A.2d at 678.
100. Id. at 401, 509 A.2d at 679.
101. Id. at 399, 509 A.2d at 678.
102. Although May 24, 1985, was the earliest possible date of payment, MSSIC Rule
§ 3-503(B) provided that MSSIC should specify an insurance termination date no later
than 12 months after the member gave notice of its intent to withdraw. Because the
court found no record of MSSIC setting a "terminal date," it found that the terminal
date could be as late as October 13, 1985. 306 Md. at 400, 509 A.2d at 678.
103. The court held that MSSIC became liable for the depositors' claims on May 18,
1985, although the claims were not liquidated and payable on that date according to
traditional insurance rules. In support of its ruling, the court quoted a leading authority
on insurance:
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Therefore, all claims against MSSIC after May 18, 1985, the date of
MDIF's creation, should be governed by the law relating to
insolvency.' °4
Maryland law prohibits a corporation from purchasing or re-
deeming any of its stock "if the corporation is insolvent or the trans-
action would cause the corporation to become insolvent." 0 5
Because this law also governed MSSIC,' 0 6 the court found that re-
turn of insurance fund contributions to withdrawing members like-
wise was subject to the implied condition that MSSIC be solvent at
the time of withdrawal."0° Chevy Chase could not withdraw its in-
surance fund contributions because MSSIC was insolvent before
Chevy Chase satisfied the conditions for withdrawal established in
MSSIC Rule 3-503.108
Not only did the court reject Chevy Chase's arguments assert-
ing its priority due to the timeliness of its claim, but the court also,
through its analogy to ordinary business corporations, gave the
claims of depositors, as creditors, higher priority than the claims of
Chevy Chase as a shareholder.'0 9 The depositors, as the intended
beneficiaries of the insurance fund, stood as creditors when MSSIC
became insolvent; therefore, their claims had priority over those of
Chevy Chase.'to
"When a loss covered by the policy is sustained, the liability of the insurer
is determined as of the date of the loss and according to the terms of the policy
without regard to the fact that the insurer thereafter became insolvent or that
the actual amount of the insured's claim was not determined until after the
insurer had become insolvent."
Id. at 401-02, 509 A.2d at 679 (quoting 2A G. CoucH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 22:74, at
679 (rev. ed. 1984)). Note, however, that the court also recognized that MSSIC was not
subject to Maryland insurance regulations. Id. at 388, 509 A.2d at 672 (citing MD. FIN.
INST. CODE ANN. § 10-114 (1980)).
104. 306 Md. at 402, 509 A.2d at 679.
105. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-311(c) (1985). The court viewed Chevy
Chase's contribution to the insurance fund as equivalent to the purchase of stock in an
ordinary business corporation. 306 Md. at 402, 509 A.2d at 679.
106. Nonstock corporations such as MSSIC are governed by MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns
CODE ANN. § 5-201 (1985).
107. 306 Md. at 405, 509 A.2d at 681.
108. Id. See MSSIC Rule § 3-503, reprinted in 306 Md. at 418-19, 509 A.2d at 687-88
(appendix). The Court of Appeals previously had noted:
The general rule ... is that after a building association has become insolvent
... the right of every shareholder to equality in the distribution attaches as a
paramount equity and no shareholder has the right to defeat that equality by
withdrawing [assets from the association).
Wyman v. McKeever, 239 Md. 130, 133, 210 A.2d 537, 539 (1965).
109. 306 Md. at 402-03, 509 A.2d at 679.
110. Id. In cases involving mutual insurance companies, the Court of Appeals has
held that a policyholder does not become a creditor unless the policy has matured
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The court next considered whether MSSIC's delay in repay-
ment of contributions to the central reserve fund breached the con-
tract between Chevy Chase and MSSIC."' Chevy Chase argued
that according to the terms of the contract," 12 it was entitled to re-
payment of all its central reserve fund contributions on April 13,
1985, six months after giving notice of its intent to withdraw from
MSSIC."'s The court disagreed, declaring that the contract between
MSSIC and Chevy Chase gave Chevy Chase no right to repayment
of its central reserve fund contributions until its membership in
MSSIC terminated." 4 The earliest date on which Chevy Chase
before the insolvency. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Baltimore & Ohio Employees' Relief
Ass'n, 77 Md. 556, 573, 26 A. 1045, 1047-48 (1893) (finding that an accident insurance
policy matured at the time an employee became disabled). Maryland has applied the
same rule to members of fraternal benefit societies and mutual endowment societies.
Failey v. Fee, 83 Md. 83, 95-96, 34 A. 839, 842 (1896) ("When the [insurance] certifi-
cates matured the holders thereupon became creditors, and they remain so notwith-
standing the subsequent insolvency of the (fraternal] Order."). Chevy Chase's claim had
not matured because it was still a member of MSSIC at the time MSSIC became insol-
vent. By-contrast, the depositors were never members of MSSIC and thus their claims
matured upon MSSIC's insolvency. See 306 Md. at 402-03, 509 A.2d at 679-80.
111. 306 Md. at 407, 509 A.2d at 682. The State did not dispute the claim that Chevy
Chase was " 'entitled to a return of its Central Reserve Fund contributions when the
liquidity problems of member associations are resolved."'" Id. (quoting circuit court's
holding).
112. The contract incorporated portions of the MSSIC Rules. See id. at 407-08, 509
A.2d at 682. The pertinent rule provided:
Membership in the [Central Reserve] Fund may be terminated should any
member withdraw from membership in the Corporation or be expelled. Any
withdrawing member shall notify the Fund of its intention to withdraw at least
three (3) months prior to termination of its membership. In the event of such
termination ... the capital notes shall be surrendered and cancelled and pay-
mentshall-be made-of-the-investment-in-said-notes-plus-accrued interest, if-any,
less any advances, loans or other indebtedness of the member, and the collat-
eral, if any, shall be returned.
Any member having given notice of its intention to withdraw from mem-
bership and requesting payment of its capital notes, in accordance with the pro-
visions of Section 3-901(B)(6) shall be entitled to receive the face amount of the
capital notes within six months after notice of its intention to withdraw; in the
event the Central Reserve Fund does not have sufficient cash available to pay
the withdrawing member the full amount of the capital note, then, in that event
the Fund may make partial payments of funds received from maturing securi-
ties to the withdrawing member until the full amount due the member is paid.
Any such deferred payments shall continue to bear interest as though the mem-
ber were still an active participant in the Fund.
MSSIC Rule § 3-901(B)(6), -901(K), reprinted in 306 Md. at 422-27, 509 A.2d at 690-92
(appendix).
113. 306 Md. at 407-08, 509 A.2d at 682.
114. Id. at 408, 509 A.2d at 682.
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could have terminated its membership was May 24, 1985.' ' As-
suming that, under its contract with MSSIC, Chevy Chase was enti-
tled to a total repayment of its central reserve fund contributions on
that date," 6 the merger of MSSIC into MDIF on May 18, 1985,
changed that contract." 7 Following the merger, withdrawals from
the central reserve fund were subject to the terms adopted by
MDIF's director and approved by its board." i8 Because the director
and the board refused Chevy Chase's request for repayment of cen-
tral reserve fund contributions until liquidity problems were re-
solved, Chevy Chase was required to wait for repayment.' 9
Finally, the court examined whether the State'st delay in repay-
ment of central reserve fund contributions amounted to an uncon -
stitutional taking of Chevy Chase's property. In determining
whether or not an unconstitutional taking has occurred, a court
must consider "three factors which have 'particular significance':
(1) 'the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant'; (2) 'the
115. Id.
116. The court assumed "that, but for [the merger], Chevy Chase would have been
entitled to all of its contributions to the [central reserve fund] as of May 24, 1985, with-
out regard to the liquidity requirements of MDIF's members." Id. at 409, 509 A.2d at
683. This approach allowed the court to avoid deciding the correct interpretation of
MSSIC Rule § 3-901 (K), which, according to the court, "bristles with questions of inter-
pretation superimposed on questions of fact." Id. at 408, 509 A.2d at 682.
117. Id. at 409, 509 A.2d at 683. The court declared that the merger of MSSIC into
MDIF ended MSSIC's corporate existence, and with it, all MSSIC rules that conflicted
with the merger statute. Id. at 410, 509 A.2d at 683. Because this is the foundation of
the court's opinion, the date of Chevy Chase's withdrawal from MSSIC takes on enor-
mous significance. If Chevy Chase effectively had withdrawn from MSSIC prior to the
merger, then the contract for return of Chevy Chase's contribution would have become
executory prior to the merger and the merger would not have affected the contract. In
analyzing this aspect of the case, the court found that the legislation merging MSSIC
into MDIF was effective May 18, 1985, but earlier in the opinion the court described the
legislation as taking effect June 1, 1985, one week after Chevy Chase withdrew from
MSSIC. Compare id at 409, 509 A.2d at 683 with id. at 393, 509 A.2d at 674. The source
of this ambiguity is the legislation itself: "[The Act] shall take effect from the date of its
passage. However, if any provision, or portion of a provision of this Act cannot take
effect immediately, the specific provision, or portion of a provision, shall take effectJune
1, 1985." Act of May 18, 1985, ch. 6, 1985 Md. Laws 4118, 4128-29. Although the court
did not address this issue in its opinion, it is apparent that the court concluded that the
relevant provisions took effect on May 18, 1985.
118. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 10-112(b) (1985).
119. 306 Md. at 409-10, 509 A.2d at 683. On appeal Chevy Chase also raised the
constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts, but the Court of Appeals
ruled that because Chevy Chase did not assert this issue in its complaint and the trial
court did not decide the issue, the matter was not properly before it. Id. at 416, 509
A.2d at 686. The court stated that even if the issue of impairment had been properly
raised, the outcome would have been the same. The merger did not significantly impair
the contract, and the public purpose furthered by the delay outweighed any impairment
that did exist. Id., 509 A.2d at 686-87.
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extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations'; and (3) 'the character of the govern-
mental action.' "120
The Court of Appeals found that these factors did not outweigh
the State's interest in resolving the economic emergency.' 2 1 In the
court's judgment, the delay in repayment of central reserve fund
contributions caused only a slight economic impact upon Chevy
Chase.' 22 The court noted that the contributions earned interest
until the time of repayment; Chevy Chase did not contend that the
interest rate was a factor indicating that a taking had occurred.'
2 3
Furthermore, the delay in repayment did not interfere with a dis-
tinct, investment-backed expectation of Chevy Chase, because
Chevy Chase could not expect the MSSIC bylaws to remain un-
changed. 2 4 The court emphasized that Chevy Chase chose to enter
a regulated business and knew that MSSIC's charter was subject to
legislative amendment.'2 5 Therefore, although Chevy Chase ex-
pected to receive repayment of its central reserve fund contributions
no later than six months after its withdrawal from MSSIC, because
Chevy Chase was aware of the State's power to unilaterally change
MSSIC's rules, its only legitimate expectation was that any such
changes would be consistent with MSSIC's objectives.' 2 6
The character of the state action resulting in the delay in repay-
ment was consistent with the original purposes of MSSIC.' 27 The
purpose of the central reserve fund was to provide liquidity for
MSSIC members; the reason for the delay in repayment was that the
fund's assets were needed to provide liquidity for MDIF's solvent
members. In the court's view, the only change effectuated by the
merger was that the repayment of central reserve fund contributions
120. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224-28 (1986) (quoting
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 10,4, 124 (1978)).
121. 306 Md. at 414-16, 509 A.2d at 686-87. The Supreme Court applied this balanc-
ing approach in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911).
122. 306 Md. at 412, 509 A.2d at 684.
123. Id. at 410-11, 509 A.2d at 684. Following the circuit court decision, the State
appropriated funds for the central reserve fund and directed MDIF to repay members by
December 31, 1986. The fact that Chevy Chase could expect payment between July 1,
1986, and December 31, 1986, and would receive interest for the delay influenced the
appellate court's decision that the economic impact was slight. Id.
124. Because it found no legitimate expectation, the court did not explicitly consider
whether this delay interfered with investment-backed expectations. The assurance that
Chevy Chase's central reserve fund contribution would be repaid with interest may have
satisfied the court with respect to the issue of interference.
125. Id. at 411-12, 509 A.2d at 684.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 412, 509 A.2d at 684.
950 [VOL. 47:934
STATE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
was not conditioned expressly on the availability of funds in excess
of MDIF's reasonably anticipated needs. 2 ' Accordingly, the delay
in repayment of Chevy Chase's central reserve fund contributions
pursuant to the MSSIC plan did not amount to an unconstitutional
taking of its property.'
29
The court correctly decided the insurance fund issue. MSSIC
Rule 3-503 conditioned repayment of insurance fund contributions
upon withdrawal from MSSIC. The date of Chevy Chase's with-
drawal was clearly May 24, 1985, and it was obvious that MSSIC was
insolvent at that time. The court reasonably concluded that statutes
governing corporations applied to the nonstock, nonprofit corpora-
tion and therefore prohibited MSSIC members from withdrawing
assets when MSSIC became insolvent. In addition, it would be con-
trary to the principle of insurance if members of a group who under-
took to spread a risk among themselves were permitted to escape
that liability by withdrawing after the loss is realized.
The court's decision on the central reserve fund issue is equally
supportable. Because the effective date of the merger was May 18,
1985, MSSIC's dissolution occurred before Chevy Chase's with-
drawal. Moreover, Chevy Chase had no legitimate expectation that
the MSSIC bylaws would not change, beyond the expectation that
any changes would be constitutional and consistent with MSSIC's
original purpose. MDIF maintained the central reserve fund for li-
quidity purposes, and lack of liquidity was the cause of the delay.
MDIF would repay Chevy Chase's central reserve fund contribution
with a fair rate of interest by December 31, 1986. While Chevy
Chase was not free to put these assets to other uses during this time,
it is difficult to regard the delay as an unconstitutional taking.
b. Pro Rata Distribution.-A second case growing out of the
1985 savings and loan emergency was United Wire, Metal & Machine
Health & Welfare Fund v. State of Maryland Deposit Insurance Fund
Corp. '30 In United Wire the Court of Appeals held that the distribu-
tion plan proposed by the State of Maryland Deposit Insurance
Fund Corporation (MDIF), under which some depositors of a failed
savings and loan association would be paid in full while other depos-
itors would receive less than their full deposits, violated neither the
common-law rule of pro rata distribution nor state and federal equal
128. Id.
129. Id. at 416, 509 A.2d at 686.
130. 307 Md. 148, 512 A.2d 1047 (1986).
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protection guarantees.' 3 '
United Wire was a major depositor' 2 in Old Court Savings and
Loan, Inc. (Old Court), one of the savings and loan associations that
failed in the spring of 1985. s3 MDIF was the state agency charged
with paying insured depositors for any net loss on their accounts
after liquidation of the assets of the insolvent savings and loans.' 3 4
The General Assembly created MDIF after the failure of several
large savings and loan associations rendered insolvent MDIF's pred-
ecessor, the Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Corporation
(MSSIC).13 5
In January 1986 the Governor announced the State's plan for
financing the expected insurance losses. In March 1986 MDIF, as
receiver of Old Court, moved in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
for authority to implement the general distribution plan for Old
Court depositors." 6 The immediate effect of the plan would be dis-
tribution of the full account balance of up to $5000 for each ordi-
nary depositor, and up to $100,000 for each Individual Retirement
Account (IRA) depositor.13 7 United Wire, which intervened in the
receivership proceedings, opposed the motion on the grounds that
the plan's disparate treatment of depositors violated the rule of pro
rata distribution and was state action depriving United Wire of
131. Id. at 156-57, 512 A.2d at 1051-52.
132. The United Wire, Metal & Machine Health & Welfare Fund and the United Wire,
Metal & Machine Pension Fund deposited approximately $16 million in Old Court Sav-
ings and Loan, Inc. (Old Court). Id. at 153, 512 A.2d at 1049.
133. Id. at 151-52, 512 A.2d at 1049. Old Court was placed in conservatorship in May
1985 and in receivership in November of the same year. Id.
134. Id. at 151, 512 A.2d at 1048.
135. Id. For a discussion of the creation of the Maryland Deposit Insurance Fund
Corporation (MDIF), see supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
136. 307 Md. at 152, 512 A.2d at 1049. The general distribution plan included a vari-
ety of strategies tailored to each of the five troubled savings and loan associations. Id.
137. The plan provided for an immediate distribution to Old Court depositors in the
following manner:
- Each depositor with an aggregate deposit balance of less than $100 will
receive payment in full from the State.
- Each depositor with an -aggregate deposit balance between $100 and
$5000 will receive an interest-bearing transaction account at Maryland National
Bank with a deposit balance equal to that depositor's former Old Court
accounts.
- Each depositor with an aggregate deposit balance exceeding $5000 will
receive $5000 from the State.
- Each depositor with an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) balance of
$100,000 or less will receive an interest-bearing IRA at Maryland National
Bank with a deposit balance equal to that depositor's former Old Court IRA.
Id. at 152-53, 512 A.2d at 1049.
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equal protection. 3 8
United Wire argued that the financing plan would "fundamen-
tally alter the nature of the risks shared by co-equal depositors" in
Old Court."3 9 While approximately half of the depositors would re-
ceive payment in full immediately, the other half would have to rely
upon the State eventually fulfilling its insurance obligation.' 40 The
State's distribution plan therefore would violate the common-law
principle that each depositor in an insolvent savings and loan associ-
ation has a right to equality in the distribution of its assets.",' Ac-
cordingly, United Wire contended that any distribution of funds
must be pro rata.' 42
Because the proposed plan would not distribute the assets of
Old Court,' 4 3 the Court of Appeals held that United Wire's argu-
ment for pro rata distribution must rest on other grounds.' 4 4 Never-
theless, the court recognized that "it is also clear that the principle
of equality of treatment extends beyond the distribution of assets of
an insolvent savings and loan association." ' 4' The court therefore
considered whether the proposed distribution equalled MDIF's ad-
vance payment of insurance on deposits, 41 or whether it more
properly would represent voluntary state action. 147 If the proposed
138. Id. at 153, 512 A.2d at 1049-50. The circuit court granted MDIF's motion and
United Wire appealed from the order. Id. at 154, 512 A.2d at 1050.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 155, 512 A.2d at 1050-51.
141. Id. at 154, 512 A.2d at 1050-51. MDIF cited as authority Wyman v. McKeever,
239 Md. 130, 210 A.2d 537 (1965), in which the Court of Appeals declared:
The general rule, now firmly established by the great majority of the cases on
the subject, is that after a building association has become insolvent in fact,
even though this is not known, the right of every shareholder to equality in the
distribution attaches as a paramount equity and no shareholder has the right to
defeat that equality by withdrawing, perfecting an incompleted attempt to with-
draw, or retaining the fruits of a completed withdrawal.
Id. at 133, 210 A.2d at 539.
142. 307 Md. at 153, 512 A.2d at 1049.
143. Id. at 154-55, 512 A.2d at 1050. The circuit court found as a matter of fact that
the proposed distribution was not a distribution of the assets of Old Court in liquidation
and therefore did not require pro rata distribution. Because United Wire did not contest
this finding, the Court of Appeals expressed "no opinion on whether the obligation of
MDIF as an insurer of the accounts in Old Court is in any way an asset of that associa-
tion." Id. at 155 n.2, 512 A.2d at 1050 n.2.
144. Id. at 155, 512 A.2d at 1050. Although the Old Court assets were not to be
distributed under the plan, they would be used in administering the plan. United Wire
apparently used this as a basis for challenging the distribution. Id. at 153, 512 A.2d at
1049.
145. Id. at 155, 512 A.2d at 1050.
146. Id. at 155-56, 512 A.2d at 1051.
147. Id. at 157, 512 A.2d at 1051. The parties offered alternative interpretations of
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distribution were an advance insurance payment, as United Wire
suggested, then it would not be subject to the common-law rule of
pro rata distribution. 4 8 Section 10-110.1 (c) of the Financial Institu-
tions Article 149 abolished any common-law rule of pro rata distribu-
tion that might otherwise have been applicable to the payment of
the nature of the proposed distribution. The court did not determine which interpreta-
tion was legally correct, but analyzed both interpretations and found that the proposed
distribution was lawful regardless of which interpretation was used. Id. at 156-57, 512
A.2d at 1051.
148. Id. at 156, 512 A.2d at 1051.
149. The applicable statute, which became effective April 3, 1986, reads:
(c) Cash payments or issuance of obligations.-Subject to any other conditions es-
tablished under law, if the Fund Director is reasonably satisfied that an insura-
ble loss will be incurred upon final liquidation, in order to facilitate the
payment of deposit insurance to depositors of a member association and to
reasonably reduce the administrative costs of a liquidation, including demands
on any hardship withdrawal plan, the Fund may, either upon final liquidation or
earlier, and either from available moneys in the Fund or from any other State
funds advanced to the Fund for that purpose:
(2) Make a cash payment or payments, in an amount equal to all or any portion
of the depositors' savings accounts, to any or all of the depositors of a member
association in receivership ....
MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 10-110.1(c) (1986 & Supp. 1987) (emphasis added by the
court). Although the statute took effect after the circuit court decision, the Court of
Appeals noted that appellate courts ordinarily apply the law in effect at the time the case
is decided. 307 Md. at 156, 512 A.2d at 1051. See, e.g., Pickett v. Prince George's
County, 291 Md. 648, 662, 436 A.2d 449, 457 (1981) ("A well-known rule of law is that
appellate courts decide cases according to then existing laws in the absence of some
impairment of constitutional rights .... "); Mraz v. County Comm'rs, 291 Md. 81, 90,
433 A.2d 771, 776 (1981) ("[A] change in the law that does not impair existing substan-
tive rights but only alters the procedures involved in the enforcement of those rights
ordinarily applies to all actions whether accrued, pending, or future unless a contrary
intention-is expressed."); McClain-v.-State-288-Md. 456, 464;-419-Az2d-369,-372-(1980)
(collecting cases). For a further discussion of the applicability of newly enacted statutes,
see the analysis of Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Riverdale Heights Volun-
teer Fire Co., 308 Md. 556, 520 A.2d 1319 (1987), infra notes 280-318 and accompany-
ing text.
Note, however, that another amendment to the Financial Institutions Article, also
effective April 3, 1986, reinforced the common-law rule of pro rata distribution:
(f) Distribution of assets.-In any distribution of assets on liquidation of a sav-
ings and loan association for which a receiver has been appointed under § 9-
708 of this Part 11 of this subtitle:
(i) All unsecured claims of any class of priority shall be paid in full, or provi-
sion made for payment, before any claims of lesser priority are paid, and if
there are insufficient funds to pay any class of claims of one priority in full,
distribution to claimants in such class shall be made pro rata ....
MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 9-712 (1986). The court's opinion did not address this
apparent conflict, perhaps assuming that the issue of insufficient funds was moot be-
cause depositors were to be repaid from state funds rather than Old Court's funds.
Although the state funds may in fact be sufficient to repay all depositors in full, actual
repayment remains subject to the vagaries of state politics. The court did not fully an-
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insurance under the plan.' 50
Moreover, even if the State's payments to Old Court depositors
were "voluntary [S]tate action," as MDIF suggested, the rule of pro
rata distribution still would not apply.'"' Because the State would
not be legally obligated to contribute, as a voluntary contributor it
could distribute the funds on its own terms, as long as those terms
were within constitutional limits.'
52
The State has broad discretion in distributing its funds. Never-
theless, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. to
the United States Constitution and article 24 of the Maryland Decla-
ration of Rights limit that discretion whenever individuals are af-
forded disparate treatment. 53 The Supreme Court has held that an
unequal distribution of state benefits is subject to scrutiny under the
equal protection clause,' 54 but that "[g]enerally, a law will survive
that scrutiny if the distinction it makes rationally furthers a legiti-
mate state purpose."' 55
The Court of Appeals found that the proposed distribution
plan was intended to further two legitimate purposes. First, the
plan would alleviate the financial hardship suffered by Old Court
depositors by making some cash available before completion of the
liquidation process.' 5 6 Second, the plan would reduce the costs of
administering the receivership' 5 7 by reducing the number of af-
fected depositors from 34,000 to approximately 7,000.' Because
the proposed distribution plan bore a rational relationship to its le-
gitimate purposes, the plan did not violate the equal protection
clause. '9
swer United Wire's contention that the distribution plan fundamentally altered the na-
ture of risks shared by co-equal depositors.
150. 307 Md. at 156, 512 A.2d at 1051.
151. Id. at 157, 512 A.2d at 1051 (quoting MDIF's brief).
152. Id.
153. Id., 512 A.2d at 1052; U.S. CONST. amend XIV; MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art.
24. Although the Maryland Declaration of Rights has no express equal protection
clause, the Court of Appeals has interpreted article 24 as imposing much the same re-
quirement as the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. See Attorney
Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 704, 426 A.2d 929, 940-41 (1981).
154. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67 (1982) (holding that an Alaska plan to dis-
tribute surplus funds to state residents in proportion to the length of their residency
violated the equal protection clause). -'
155. Id. at 60.
156. 307 Md. at 158, 512 A.2d at 1052.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 160, 512 A.2d at 1053.
159. Id. at 159-60, 512 A.2d at 1053. The Supreme Court summarized the law as
follows:
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United Wire also contested MDIF's plan to create fully liquid
IRA accounts for Old Court IRA depositors at Maryland National
Bank with'balances equal to the depositors' Old Court IRA bal-
ances, up to $100,000 each."o MDIFjustified this aspect of the pro-
posed distribution plan on the grounds that there was a substantial
question as to whether or not a financial institution in receivership
can serve as an IRA trustee,16 ' that distributions from an IRA to
depositors under the age of fifty-nine would result in substantial tax
penalties, and that pro rata distribution might prevent IRA deposi-
tors over age seventy from withdrawing the amounts required by the
Internal Revenue Service.' 62 The court held that it was sufficient
that MDIF could show that IRAs presented problems significantly
different from other accounts and that the contested parts of the
plan bore a rational relationship to the State's purpose in resolving
those problems. 6 3
Although the court correctly decided this case, it left a discon-
certing question unresolved. In order for the court to hold that sec-
tion 10-110.1(c) abolished the common-law rule of pro rata
distribution with respect to the distribution of deposit insurance
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications.made by its laws are
imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis,",it does not offend
the Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with mathemati-
cal nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality."
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)). United Wire sought to establish that MDIF bore the
burden of proving that the general distribution plan would be more cost effective than a
pro rata distribution. The Court of Appeals refused to shift the burden of proof to
MDIF, pointing out that " '[i]f any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain-the classification, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was en-
acted must be assumed.' " 307 Md. at 159, 512 A.2d at 1052-53 (quoting Whiting-Tur-
ner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 304 Md. 340, 352, 499 A.2d 178, 185 (1985)).
160. 307 Md. at 160-61, 512 A.2d at 1053. United Wire also argued that if IRAs were
to be treated specially, then multi-employer benefit funds maintained pursuant to the
Employees' Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), such as themselves, must
receive equal treatment. The court disagreed, however, distinguishing between ac-
counts established as IRAs and accounts established through the investment decisions of
pension fund managers, asserting that the problems of the former do not pertain to the
latter. Id. at 161, 512 A.2d at 1053-54.
161. Id. at 160, 512 A.2d at 1053. MDIF relied on I.R.C. §§ 408(a)(2), 408(n)(l)-
(n)(3), 581 (current version at I.R.C. §§ 408(a)(2), 408(n)(l)-(n)(3), 581 (West Supp.
1987)).
162. 307 Md. at 160, 512 A.2d at 1053. While United Wire presented persuasive re-
buttals to all of these contentions, the court did not decide which interpretation of the
rules governing IRAs was correct.
163. Id. at 160-61, 512 A.2d at 1053. The court indicated that if MDIF had decided to
pay IRA depositors simply to avoid being "peppered" with questions, this would be a
sufficiently rational basis for MDIF's action and would withstand judicial review. Id.
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payments, the court first had to find that section 9-712 did not apply
to the MDIF insurance. Section 10-110.1(c) allows unequal distri-
butions "[slubject to any other conditions established under
law."'" Section 9-712, amended at the same Special Session, con-
tains such a condition by requiring that assets of a liquidated savings
and loan association be distributed pro rata.' 65 The circuit court
found that the MDIF insurance obligation was not an asset of Old
Court.' 66 Because United Wire did not contest this factual finding,
the Court of Appeals did not reconsider this aspect of the decision
below and expressly denied deciding it.' 6 7 In spite of this uncer-
tainty, the court properly determined that MDIF's interpretation of
the statute was reasonable. Moreover, because MDIF's distribution
plan was rationally related to the legitimate end of reducing the bur-
den of administering the Old Court receivership, the plan did not
violate equal protection.
3. Unemployment and Workers' Compensation.-a. Employer's
Right to Set-off.-In Potter v. Bethesda Fire Department, Inc. 168 the Court
of Appeals held that a Montgomery County fire department was a
"quasi-public corporation." Therefore, the fire department was en-
titled to a set-off of workers' compensation benefits against the disa-
bility retirement benefits received by a firefighter. 6 9
The case culminated a nine-year struggle through the Maryland
administrative and court systems.'7M Theodore Potter was a salaried
firefighter with the Bethesda Fire Department, Inc. (BFD). 7 1 In
1978 he filed a claim for workers' compensation due to ajob-related
injury.' 7 2 At that time the Insurance Company of North America
(INA) was BFD's insurer.1 7 3 Potter received a subsequent injury
while Montgomery County insured BFD. Potter then retired under
Montgomery County's disability retirement program.' 7 4 Because
Potter was receiving disability retirement'benefits, BFD, Montgom-
ery County, and INA claimed the right to a statutory set-off of work-
164. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 10-110.1(c) (1986 & Supp. 1987).
165. Id. § 9-712(f)(1) (1986).
166. 307 Md. at 154-55, 512 A.2d at 1050.
167. Id. at 155 & n.2, 512 A.2d at 1050 & n.2.
168. 309 Md. 347, 524 A.2d 61 (1987).
169. Id. at 365-66, 524 A.2d at 69-70.
170. For an analysis of the procedural aspects of this case, see Survey of Developments In
Maryland Law-Civil Procedure, 45 MD. L. REV. 501, 509 (1986).
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ers' compensation benefits pursuant to article 101.17-
The court first discussed the proper interpretation of sections
21(a)(2) and 33 of article 101, recognizing that a statute must be
interpreted to effectuate the real and actual intention of the legisla-
ture.' 76 According to the court, section 21(a)(2) was designed to
encompass "all the various and sundry bodies of a governmental
nature in the diverse system of government existent. in Maryland,
... and make each of them 'employers' in the contemplation of the
Workmen's Compensation Act."' 77 The court relied on Frank v.
Baltimore County, '78 which held that the legislative scheme in sections
21 and 33 was to provide a single remedy for injured government
employees eligible, for double compensation, and to discharge an
employer or an insurer from its obligation to pay workers' compen-
sation when disability pension benefits exceed the amount of work-
175. Id. The relevant statutes, MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, §§ 21, 33, 67 (1985 & Supp.
1987), address the overlapping of workers' compensation benefits and disability retire-
ment benefits and identify the employers covered by these statutes. Section 21 provides
in pertinent part:
(a) Coverage of employer.-The following shall constitute employers subject to
the provisions of this article:
(1) Every person that has in the State one or more employees subject to
this article.
(2) The State, any agency thereof, and each county, city, town, township,
incorporated village, school district, sewer district, drainage district, public or
quasi-public corporation, or any other political subdivision of the State that has
one or more employees subject to this article.
Id. § 2 1(a) (Supp. 1987). Furthermore, § 21(b)(4) provides that, except in certain loca-
tions including Montgomery County, "every person who is a member of a volunteer fire
or rescue squad ... shall be deemed for the purpose of this article, to be in the employ-
ment of the political subdivision of the State where the department is organized." See
also-id. at-(c)(5)- (1985)-(listing-localities.-not-covered by the-statute).-
Section 33 provides in pertinent part: .
(c) Whenever by statute, charter, ordinances, resolution, regulation or policy
adopted thereunder, whether as part of a pension system or otherwise, any
benefit or benefits are furnished employees of employers covered under
§ 21(a)(2) of this article.... the benefit or benefits when furnished by the em-
ployer shall satisfy'and discharge pro tanto or in full as the case may be, the
liability or obligation of the employer and the Subsequent Injury Fund for any
benefit under this article.
Id. § 33(c) (1985).
Finally, § 67 defines "employer" as "those persons who fall within the require-
ments of § 21(a) of this article." Id. § 67(2) (Supp. 1987).
The county, BFD, and INA contended that because Potter was receiving disability
retirement benefits from Montgomery County in excess of any benefits he was eligible to
receive from workers' compensation, they were entitled to a set-off of the workers' com-
pensation paid to Potter. 309 Md. at 349-50, 524 A.2d at 62.
176. 309 Md. at 353, 524 A.2d at 63-64.
177. Id. at 355, 524 A.2d at 65.
178. 284 Md. 655, 399 A.2d 250 (1979).
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ers' compensation benefits.""9 Thus, if BFD was a covered
employer under section 21(a)(2), BFD and its insurers, INA and
Montgomery County, were entitled to a set-off pursuant to section
33(c)."'8 If section 21 did not apply to BFD, however, section 33(c)
likewise would not apply and Potter could receive both types of
benefits. '8 '
To fall within the scope of section 33(c), BFD had to qualify as a
.8quasi-public corporation." 82 Because there was little case law re-
garding quasi-public corporations, 8" the court relied on scholarly
treatises and defined a quasi-public corporation as one which "has
the characteristics of a public corporation in function, effect or sta-
tus."t8 4 The court found, however, that the legislative intent of sec-
tion 21(a)(2) was to confine quasi-public corporations to those of a
governmental nature only.'8 5
The court examined the Montgomery County Code,'8 6 the fire
179. Id: at 659, 399 A.2d at 253-54.
180. 309 Md. at 356, 524 A.2d at 65. The court also noted Mazor v. Department of
Correction, 279 Md. 355, 369 A.2d 82 (1977), which held that § 33 entitled both the
employer and its insurer to discharge of its obligation. Id. at 360, 369 A.2d at 86.
181. 309 Md. at 356, 524 A.2d at 65. In Frank the Court of Appeals held that
[any employee benefit provided by a public employer, "whether as part of a
[statutorily adopted) pension system or otherwise," is sufficient to bring section
33 into play, and that under the juxtaposition provided in that section there
exists no reason why the employer should not be discharged from his compen-
sation obligation whenever the total amount of any employee benefit, whether
furnished entirely or partially by employer funds, is equal to or better than the
workmen's compensation award.
284 Md. at 661, 399 A.2d at 254 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 33(c) (1985)).
182. 309 Md. at 356, 524 A.2d at 65. This was so because BFD did not fall within the
other classifications of § 21 (a)(2). d. For the relevant text of the statute, see supra note
175.
183. 309 Md. at 356-57, 524 A.2d at 65. Article 101 does not define a "quasi-public"
corporation; moreover, at the time of this case, only 12 cases had come before the Court
of Appeals concerning "quasi-public" corporations. Id.
184. Id. at 357, 524 A.2d at 66. The court relied heavily on I C. SWERINGEN,
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (rev. penn. ed. 1983),
which defines quasi-public corporations as those which "fall within the class of private
corporations, but which, nevertheless, by reason of the nature and extent of their opera-
tion and effect on the welfare of the public at large, have been styled quasi-public corpo-
rations." Id. § 63, at 600 (footnote omitted). The treatise further identifies quasi-public
corporations as "private corporations which have accepted from the state the grant of a
franchise or contract involving the performance of public duties." Id. at 601 (footnote
omitted). Finally, it addresses fire departments specifically, stating: "A corporation or-
ganized for the protection of the property of fellow citizens from fire is not for the pri-
vate gain and profit of its members but for the public benefit. Accordingly a fire engine
company is considered to be a public or quasi municipal corporation .... "' Id. at 602
(footnotes omitted). See 309 Md. at 357-58, 524 A.2d at 66.
185. 309 Md. at 358, 524 A.2d at 66.
186. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 21-4A(a) to -4A(c) (1984).
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department's functions, and the extent of control that the county
exercised over the fire. department in concluding that the fire de-
partment was indeed a quasi-public corporation.' 8 7 Although BFD
was privately chartered and was an independent corporate entity,' 88
if "the services the county has entrusted to it are so important and
necessary to all of the people," the business is affected with a public
interest and the corporation thus becomes quasi-public.' 89
The court concluded that because the fire department was sub-
ject to the Workmen's Compensation Act, it was an employer under
the provisions of the statute. '9 Accordingly, Potter, as an employee
of BFD, could receive workers' compensation for his injuries.' 9 '
Potter also was entitled to pension benefits; consequently, the provi-
sions of article 101, section 33(c) applied.' 9 2 Section 33(c) states
that employee benefits provided under section 21(a)(2), including
pension benefits, discharge pro tanto the employer's obligation re-
garding workers' compensation.' 9 3 Therefore, BFD, Montgomery
County, and INA were entitled to a set-off to the extent the disabil-
ity pension met or exceeded Potter's workers' compensation
benefits. '
9 4
While Potter did not greatly alter existing Maryland law, the
court's interpretation of sections 21 and 33 expanded the availabil-
ity of the set-off provision by enlarging the range of quasi-public
187. 309 Md. at 360-63. 524 A.2d at 67-69.
188. Id. at 361, 524 A.2d at 68.
189. Id. at 362, 524 A.2d at 68.
190. Id. at 365, 524 A.2d at 69-70.
191. Id., 524 A.2d at 70. The MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE, ch. 21, Fire and
Rescue Services (1984), provided insight into whether fire departments were to be
treated as governmental in nature or as strictly private organiztionis.- ThVe court empha-
sized the county's control over the fire departments' locations, guidelines, communica-
tions, dispatchments, transfers of apparatus in emergencies, and master defense plans,
to underscore the assertion that BFD was a quasi-public corporation. 309 Md. at 362-
63, 524 A.2d at 67-68.
Moreover, the court pointed out that because the fire departments contributed to
the general welfare, the county had a manifest interest in the corporations. The county
'also levied a tax on property owners to benefit the independent fire departments. be-
cause the departments provided a public function. Id.
Finally, the court focused on the benefits firefighters received that would have been
unavailable to a private corporation's employees. The county was authorized to provide
employees of independent fire and rescue corporations with pay plans, salaries, tax ben-
efits', and workers' compensation benefits similar to those afforded government workers.
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE §§ 20-37(c), 21-4m (1984). See 309 Md. at 364, 524
A.2d at 69.
192. 309 Md. at 365, 524 A.2d at 70.
193. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 33(c) (1985).
194. 309 Md. at 365-66, 524 A.2d at 70.
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corporations to include fire departments. Although this decision
may lead to further expansion of the set-off provision, the court em-
phasized that only quasi-public corporations which are governmen-
tal in nature may invoke section 33.195
b. Statutory Employers.-The Court of Appeals held in Brady v.
Ralph Parsons Co. '96 that the Mass Transit Administration (MTA)19 7
was not a "statutory employer"' 9 under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act' 9 9 and .therefore was not immune from common-law actions
for negligence in the construction of the Baltimore subway. 20 0 Ac-
cordingly, a company hired by the MTA to implement safety regula-
tions at a subway construction site could not avoid tort liability by
asserting the MTA's immunity. 20 '
The MTA, as owner of the Baltimore subway, contracted with
the Ralph Parsons Company (Parsons), for Parsons to act as a con-
struction manager during the building of a Baltimore subway sta-
tion. 02 Parsons was to oversee all safety programs, assume
responsibility for safety on the project, and "correct any unsafe acts
or conditions that may be detected." 20  The MTA also contracted
with Hensel-Phelps Construction Company to be the principal con-
195. Id. at 356-58, 524 A.2d at 65-66.
196. 308 Md. 486, 520 A.2d 717 (1987).
197. The Mass Transit Authority (MTA), an instrumentality of the Department of
Transportation, owns the Baltimore subway and its stations. Id. at 489 & n.3, 520 A.2d
at 719 & n.3.
198. A "statutory employer" is
1) a principal contractor;
2) who has contracted to perform work;
3) which is part of his trade, business or occupation; and
4) who has contracted with another party as a subcontractor for the execution
by or under the subcontractor of the whole or any part of such work.
Honaker v. W.C. & A.N. Miller Dev. Co., 278 Md. 453, 460, 365 A.2d 287, 291 (1976)
(footnotes omitted).
199. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
200. 308 Md. at 508, 520 A.2d at 729.
201. Id. Under MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 58 (1985), a party who is neither an "ac-
tual" employer nor a "statutory" employer is a "third party" amenable to suits at law.
The statute provides in relevant part:
Where injury or death for which compensation is payable under this article
was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other
than the employer to pay damages in respect thereof, the employee, or in the
case of death, his personal representative or dependents as hereinbefore de-
fined, may proceed ... by law against that other person to recover damages
Id.
202. 308 Md. at 490, 520 A.2d at 720.
203. Id. at 491, 520 A.2d at 720 (quoting the MTA-Ralph Parsons Company (Parsons)
contract).
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tractor on the project.20 4 Hensel-Phelps, in turn, subcontracted a
portion of the construction work to Rocky Mountain Skylight Com-
pany, Donald Brady's employer. 20 5
In January 1981 Brady died after falling from a scaffold at the
subway construction site. 20 6 Brady's family filed a tort action in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City against Parsons, alleging that the
company had negligently performed its contractual safety responsi-
bilities.2 7 The circuit court granted Parson's motion for summary
judgment, concluding that as Brady's "statutory employer,"208 the
MTA was immune from suits at law, and that Parsons, as an in-
dependent contractor for the MTA, shared this statutory immu-
nity.2 ° Accordingly, Brady's family could not bring a tort action
against Parsons; the 'exclusive remedy was a claim for workers'
210compensation.
According to the Court of Appeals, 211 Parsons would have been
entitled to judgment as a matter of law if: (1) the MTA was Brady's
"statutory employer" and thus immune under the Act; and (2) Par-
sons was performing the MTA's nondelegable duty of providing a
safe work site, rather than assuming a personal duty toward
Brady. 2  The central question before the court, therefore, was
whether the MTA was a "statutory employer" within the meaning of
the Act.
The court focused on article 101, sections 15 and 62. Section
15 provides that employers must provide compensation for the disa-
204. 1d at 490, 520 A.2d at 720.
205. 1&
206. Id. at 488-89, 520 A.2d at 719.
207. Id. at 491, 520 A.2d at 720. The circuit court dismissed the other parties origi-
nally named as defendants. Id at 491M n7,-520A2d at 720 n.7.
208. Id. at 494, 520 A.2d at 722. Neither party argued before the circuit court that the
MTA was the "statutory employer" of the decedent. Id at 494 n.i 1, 520 A.2d at 722
n.l .
209. Id. at 493-94, 520 A.2d at 721. The circuit court relied on Athas v. Hill, 300 Md.
133, 476 A.2d 710 (1984), concluding that Parsons shared this immunity. The Court of
Appeals held in Athas that an employee could not sue a supervisory co-employee under
§ 58 for failure to provide a safe workplace. Because the responsibility for safety was a
nondelegable duty of the employer, the supervising co-employee did not assume a per-
sonal duty toward the injured worker. Id. at 148, 476 A.2d at 718. The circuit court
concluded that Athas' reasoning should be extended to include an independent contrac-
tor performing a statutory employer's nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace.
308 Md. at 494, 520 A.2d at 721-22.
210. 308 Md. at 494-95, 520 A.2d at 722.
211. Brady's family appealed the circuit court's decision to the Court of Special Ap-
peals. Before the intermediate court reviewed the case, the Court of Appeals granted
certiorari. Id. at 495, 520 A.2d at 722.
212. Id. at 503 n.17, 520 A.2d at 726 n.17.
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bility or death of an employee which results from an accidental in-
jury "arising out of and in the course of his employment without
regard to fault as a cause of such injury."12 13 Moreover, the statute
declares that workers' compensation shall be the employee's sole
remedy against the employer. 2 4  Employers thus are "immune"
from any action at law that workers might bring against them.2t 5
Section 62 of the Act extends this immunity to the workers'
"statutory" employers2 16
-a principal contractor which employs
subcontractors. According to the statute, the principal contractor
must pay workers' compensation to its subcontractors' employees as
if those employees worked dire'ctly for the principal contractor. 1 7
A statutory employer is immune from suits at law under this section,
just as "actual" employers are immune under section 15.2 8 The
injured worker's sole remedy is a claim under the Act.2 9
Unlike actual employers and statutory employers, however,
third parties are not immune from suits instituted by employees.22
Because Rocky Mountain Skylight Company, and not the MTA, was
Brady's actual employer, the court had to determine whether the
MTA was Brady's statutory employer or a mere "third party." After
213. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 15 (1985).
214. Id.
215. 308 Md. at 498, 520 A.2d at 723.
216. Id. at 499-500, 520 A.2d at 724-25. Section 62 provides in pertinent part:
When any person as a principal contractor, undertakes to execute any work
which is a part of his trade, business or occupation which he has contracted to
perform and contracts with any other person as subcontractor, for the execu-
tion by or under the subcontractor, of the whole or any part of the work under-
taken by the principal contractor, the principal contractor shall be liable to pay
to any workman employed in the execution of the work any compensation
under this article which he would have been liable to pay if that workman had been
immediately employed by him; and where compensation is claimed from or proceed-
ings are taken against the principal contractor, then, in the application of this
article, reference to the principal contractor shall be substituted for reference
to the employer, except that the amount of compensation shall be calculated
with reference to the earnings of the workman under the employer by whom he
is immediately employed.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 62 (1985) (emphasis added). The term "statutory employer"
does not appear in the statute. It was coined by the Court of Appeals in State v. Bennett
Bldg. Co., 154 Md. 159, 140 A. 52 (1928), in which the court noted that "[t]he result
then is that' where the prescribed conditions exist, the principal contractor becomes by
the act the statutory employer of any workman employed in the execution of the work."
Id. at 162, 140 A. at 53.
217. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 62 (1985).
218. 308 Md. at 502, 520 A.2d at 726.
219. Id.
220. See supra note 201.
221. 308 Md. at 488-89. 520 A.2d at 719.
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setting forth the requirements for a principal contractor as used in
the definition of statutory employer, 22 the court noted that there
must always be two contracts. 2 The first, termed the "antecedent"
or "principal" contract, is a contract between the principal contrac-
tor and a third party in which the principal contractor agrees to exe-
cute work for the third party. 224  In the "subcontract" a
subcontractor agrees to do all or part of the work that the principal
contractor already agreed to perform for the third party. 5
Applying these requirements, the court concluded that the
MTA could not be considered the statutory employer of a subcon-
tractor's employee because the MTA owned the entire subway; the
MTA never had to enter into a principal contract with any third
party.226 The MTA never promised to perform work for a third
party; therefore, it could not possibly have entered into a second
contract in which a subcontractor agreed to do work that the MTA
had promised to perform.2 27 The MTA was thus a "third party"
amenable to suits at law under section 58.228
Because the MTA lacked statutory immunity, it could afford no
222. See supra note 198.
223. 308 Md. at 503-04, 520 A.2d at 726-27.
224. Id.
225. I at 504-05, 520 A.2d at 727. As the court observed, the true statutory em-
ployer in this case was Hensel-Phelps. Hensel-Phelps became the principal contractor
by entering into an antecedent contract with the MTA, a third party, to build the subway
station. Hensel-Phelps then subcontracted a portion of its contractual duties to Brady's
employer, Rocky Mountain. Id. at 508 n.24, 520 A.2d at 729 n.24.
In its motion for summary judgment, Parsons argued that it shared Hensel-Phelps'
statutory immunity because it was exercising Hensel-Phelps' nondelegable duty to pro-
vide a safe place to work. Id at 493-94, 520 A.2d at 721. The circuit court simply disre-
garded this argument in holding that the MTA was the statutory employer.
226. id at 5-0506,_520 A-2d-C727-28:-Parsons-asserted-at-oral-argument- that-the
grant contract between the Maryland Department of Transportation and the United
States was the antecedent contract. Because the record did not contain the grant con-
tract, the court chose not to rule on the company's contention. Id. at 505-06 n.22, 520
A.2d 727-28 n.22.
The court stated in the same footnote, however, that "a mere financing agreement,
which grants funds for a construction project, between an owner or contractor and a
third party will not give rise to an antecedent contract unless the agreement also re-
quires that the owner or contractor perform work or services for the third party." Id.
Thus, the court implied that even if the grant contract had been entered into evidence
the court would not have ruled it an antecedent contract.
227. ld. at 506, 520 A.2d at 728. The court acknowledged that the MTA contracted
with Hensel-Phelps to build the subway station. This contract, however, was not a "sub-
contract" within the meaning of § 62. According to the court, a subcontract must be a
contract that assigns some of the obligations of a prior contract to another party. Be-
cause the MTA had no prior contract from which obligations could be assigned, its con-
tract with Hensel-Phelps could not be a subcontract. Id
228. id. at 508, 520 A.2d at 729.
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protection to Parsons.2 29 The construction company, the court
held, stood in no different position than any other third party liable
to suit at law under section 58.2 0 Thus, the circuit court erred in
granting Parsons summary judgment.2 3'
The Court of Appeals then refuted another argument that Par-
sons had advanced in favor of immunity. Parsons contended that it
was acting as the MTA's agent within the meaning of section 7-702
of the Transportation Article. 32 As an agent, Parsons argued, it
was immune from suit; the sole remedy for Brady's family was an
action against the MTA.233
Because section 7-702 does not define an agent, the court set
out to determine the legislative intent behind the statute.234 The
concept of agency encompasses two types of relationships.23 5 A
master-servant relationship exists when the master may "control
and direct" the servant in performing work.236 In the relationship
between an independent contractor and a principal, the independ-
ent contractor acts as the principal's agent, but is not subject to the
principal's control. 2 7
According to the court, by using terms such as "employees"
and "officers," "which are traditionally considered to be servants of
a principal," the legislature intended the term "agent" to be given a
similar construction. 2 8 Thus, the court ruled, only those parties
who met the definition of a servant would be considered "agents"





232. Id. at 509, 520 A.2d at 729. Section 7-702 provides:
(a) Administration [MTA] liable for contracts and torts.--Subject to subsection (b)
of this section, the Administration is liable for its contracts and torts and for the
torts of its officers, agents, and employees in connection with the performance
of the duties and functions of the Administration under this title.
(b) Exclusive remedy is suit.-The exclusive remedy for a breach of contract or
for a tort committed by the Administration, its officers, agents, or employees is
a suit against the Administration. No execution may be levied on any property
of this State or of the Administration.
MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 7-702 (1977).
233. 308 Md. at 509, 520 A.2d at 729.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 510, 520 A.2d at 730.
236. Id. (citing Mackall v. Zayre Corp., 293 Md. 221, 230, 443 A.2d 98, 103 (1982)).
237. Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14N, comment a (1958) (explaining
that an independent contractor is a type of agent, not servant).




The court next determined that Parsons did not meet the defi-
nition of a servant because the element of control was lacking.240
Parsons was a "separate, distinct business," which had not surren-
dered control over its operations or the conduct of its employees. 24'
Because the MTA had no right to supervise or control Parsons'
work, Parsons was not an "agent" within the meaning of section 7-
702 and therefore was not immune from suit.24
2
In Brady the Court-of Appeals made it -abundantly clear that it
would strictly scrutinize any attempts by companies contracting with
the MTA to claim immunity from tort actions. In light of this opin-
ion it would be difficult to make a convincing argument that the
MTA is a statutory employer; since the agency is unlikely to enter a
principal contract with a third party. There also seems to be little
chance of persuading a court that a company hired by the MTA is
actually the MTA's servant. The court gave short shrift to Parsons'.
contentions that because it was required to make periodic reports to
MTA and to consult with MTA about numerous phases of its work,
it was a servant rather than an independent contractor..2 43 Accord-
ing to the court, an employer's right to supervise an employee,
merely to determine whether work is done according to the con-
tract, does not prevent the relationship from being that of in-
dependent contractor and principal. 44
c. Striking Workers.-The Court of Appeals held in Sinai Hospital
of Baltimore, Inc. v. Department of Employment & Training245 that striking
workers were not disqualified from receiving unemployritent com-
pensation benefits on the ground that they had left employment vol-
uritarily without good cause. 46 Furthermore, workers who refused
240. Id. The burden of proving that one is a servant rests with the party asserting that
status. Globe Indemnity Co. v. Victill Corp., 208 Md. 573, 584, 119 A.2d 423, 428-29
(1956).
241. Id. The court added that Parsons was not within the "business household" of the
MTA. Id.
242. Id. at 513, 520 A.2d at 732. The court quickly dispensed with one other argu-
ment advanced by Parsons. Parsons asserted that it was immune from suit because, at
the time of Brady's fall, Parsons was performing the nondelegable duty of Rocky Moun-
tain, Brady's employer, to provide a safe workplace. As authority for this proposition,
Parsons relied on the court's opinion in Athas. According to the court, however, since
the Athas opinion stated that it was limited to cases arising under "similar facts and cir-
cumstances," its holding applied only to supervisory co-employees. Thus, the holding
did not extend to Parsons, an independent contractor. Id. at 507-08, 520 A.2d at 729.
243. Id at 513, 520 A.2d at 731.
244. Id.
245. 309 Md. 28, 522 A.2d 382 (1987).
246. Id. at 31. 522 A.2d at 384.
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their employer's offer to return to their prestrike positions were not
disqualified from unemployment compensation when that offer was
made prior to workers filing claims for unemployment benefits. 47
Members of the National Union of Hospital and Health Care
Employees (the Union), called a strike against Sinai Hospital of Bal-
timore, Inc. (Sinai). 248 The collective bargaining agreement be-
tween the Union and Sinai had expired, and the parties could not
reach a new agreement.249 Sinai notified the striking Union- mem-
bers that they could return to their prestrike positions, but if they
failed to do so, they would be replaced permanently and would be
ineligible for unemployment benefits. 50 Within the week Sinai re-
placed all of the striking employees; the strike soon. ended.2 5 '
Because the employees had been permanently replaced during
the strike, they filed for unemployment compensation benefits.2 52
Sinai opposed the employees' claims on two grounds. First, Sinai
contended that the employees had left their jobs voluntarily and
therefore were ineligible for benefits under article 95A, section
6(a). 253 Second, because the employees had refused an offerof suit-
able employment from Sinai, they were disqualified from receiving
unemployment compensation benefits under section 6(d).2 " The
dispute came before a special examiner of the Department of Em-
247. id. at 45-46, 522 A.2d at 391.
248. Id. at 31-32, 522 A.2d at 384.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 32, 522 A.2d at 384. Sinai contended that by refusing to return to their
jobs, the striking workers had refused an offer of suitable employment; therefore, under
MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A, § 6(d) (1985 & Supp. 1987). they would be disqualified from
receiving unemployment benefits. 309 Md. at 32-33, 522 A.2d at 384.
251. Id. at 32, 522 A.2d at 384.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 32-33, 522 A.2d at 384. MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A, § 6(a) (1985 & Supp.
1987), provides in pertinent part:
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: . . . [ilf the Executive Director
finds that the individual's unemployment is due to his leaving work voluntarily
without good cause. Only a cause which is directly attributable to, arising from,
or connected with the conditions of employment or actions of the employer
may be considered good cause .... Only a substantial cause which is directly
attributable to, arising from, or connected with the conditions of employment
or actions of the employer, or another cause of such a necessitous or compel-
ling nature that the individual had no reasonable alternative other than to leave
the employment may be considered a valid circumstance.
254. 309 Md. at 32-33, 522 A.2d at 384. MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A, § 6(d) (1985 &
Supp. 1987), provides that an individual is disqualified from receiving benefits when
"Itihe Executive Director finds that he failed, without good cause, either to apply for
available, suitable work, when so directed by the Executive Director, or to accept suita-
ble work when offered him." Therefore, Sinai contended that the employees had left
their jobs voluntarily and were disqualified from receiving benefits under § 6(a), as well
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ployment and Training, that department's Board of Appeals, and
subsequently the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. All concluded
that the workers were not disqualified. 5
In deciding whether the employees had left their employment
voluntarily when they participated in the strike, the Court of Ap-
peals examined the legislative intent behind section 6(a). 56 The
court cited its previous decision in Allen v. Core City Target Y. Pro-
gram,257 in which it had declared that the statute "expresses a clear
legislative intent that to disqualify a claimant from benefits evidence
must establish that the claimant, by his or her own choice, intention-
ally, of his or her own free will, terminated the employment.- 258
The Court of Appeals found that in labor disputes the employ-
ees are not seeking to terminate the employment; rather, they are
trying to ameliorate poor working conditions and benefits in order
to continue work. 259 Thus, the court determined that the term "vol-
untary leaving" refers to a permanent severance of the employment
relationship; it. does not include a temporary interruption in the per-
formance of services.260
Furthermore, the court pointed out that subsection (a) does not
as being disqualified under § 6(d) for refusing to accept Sinai's offer to return to work
prior to the strike's end. 309 Md. at 32-33, 522 A.2d at 384.
255. Id. at 31, 522 A.2d at 384. The lower courts and the agency found that the labor
strike was a special situation which did not constitute a voluntary leaving and that the
offer to return the employees to their pre-strike positions was made before the employ-
ees filed their claims; thus, the employees were not disqualified under either § 6(a) or
(d). Id. at 40-41, 45-46, 522 A.2d at 388, 391.
256. Id. at 34-36, 522 A.2d at 385-86. The court focused both on the meaning of
"voluntary" and on the reasoning behind other decisions which had found that a volun-
tary leaving did not occur when employees departed during a labor dispute. The court
relied-on Inter-sland Resorts, Ltd. v. Akahane, 46 Haw. 14-0,- 77-21- d-7-(1962), in
which the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that a temporary interruption in the perform-
ance of services, as in the case of striking workers in a labor dispute, is not a voluntary
leaving as contemplated within the unemployment compensation statutes. Id. at 150-51,
377 P.2d at 721-22. See also Mark Hopkins, Inc. v. California Employment Comm'n, 24
Cal. 2d 744, 748-49, 151 P.2d 229, 231-32 (1944) (same); Penflex, Inc. v. Bryson, 506
Pa. 274, 287, 485 A.2d 359, 365 (1984) (same).
257. 275 Md. 69, 338 A.2d 237 (1975).
258. Id. at 79, 338 A.2d at 243. In Sinai the court noted that the special examiner
found as a fact that the employees had not "voluntarily left" their employment, as they
intended only to obtain a satisfactory collective bargaining agreement and then return to
their employment. 309 Md. at 36, 522 A.2d at 386.
259. 309 Md. at 35-36, 522 A.2d at 386. The court cited Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-
Chalmers Co., 166 F. 45, 52-53 (7th Cir. 1908), which held: "A strike is a cessation of
work by employees in an effort to get for the employees more desirable terms ....
Neither strike nor lock out completely terminates . . . the relationship between the
parties."
260. 309 Md. at 36, 522 A.2d at 386-87.
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apply to labor disputes at all. In determining that section 6(a) and
section 6(e), which explicitly concerns labor disputes, are mutu-
ally exclusive, the court agreed with Employment Security Administration
v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 26 2 and looked to the legislative intent behind
the statute. 263 Because unemployment compensation is remedial in
nature, the court noted that it should read the statute liberally in
favor of eligibility.264 A strict construction of disqualification provi-
sions is consistent with this reading.265 The court found that while
subsection (e) does not expressly preclude applying subsection (a)
to unemployment arising from a labor dispute, reading the subsec-
tions together in light of the statute's purpose suggests that the sub-
sections are exclusive.2 66 The court distinguished labor disputes
from other types of employer-employee situations, finding that the
legislature intended to treat persons leaving work due to a labor
dispute differently from those who leave for other reasons.26 7 The
court stressed that applying subsection (a) to labor disputes would
render subsection (e) partially surplusage, which would be inconsis-
tent with canons of statutory interpretation.?68
261. MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A, § 6(c) (1986). The statute provides that an individual is
disqualified from unemployment benefits when "uneuiployment is due to a stoppage of
work, other than a lockout, which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, estab-
lishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed."
262. 292 Md. 515, 438 A.2d 1356 (1982). For a discussion of Browning-Ferris, see infra
notes 268 and 270.
263. 309 Md. at 39-40, 522 A.2d at 388. The court noted .that in interpreting a stat-
ute, it first must examine the language of the statute, taking care to read pertinent parts
of the legislative language together; give effect to all those parts if possible; and render
no part surplusage. The court also should look to the particular problem involved and
the objectives the legislature sought to attain. Id.
264. Id. at 40, 522 A.2d at 388.
265. Id.
266. Id. Because the court found § 6(a) and (e) mutually exclusive, it was not required
to decide whether the employees' departure constituteda constructive voluntary leaving
or whether Sinai effectively discharged the employees when it permanently replaced
them. Id. at 37, 522 A.2d at 387.
•267. Id. at 41, 522 A.2d at 388-89. See Penflex, Inc. v. Bryson, 506 Pa. 274, 287, 485
A.2d 359, 365 (1984) (distinguishing labor disputes with regard to unemployment
compensation).
268. 309 Md. at 42, 522 A.2d at 389. The court relied on its decision in Employment
Sec. Admin. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 292 Md. 515, 438 A.2d 1356 (1982). Browning-
Ferrs involved a situation similar to that in Sinai, as striking workers became unemployed
because they were involved in a labor dispute. The court found compelling weight in
both American and English precedents that "stoppage of work" as used in § 6(e) re-
ferred to the curtailment of the employer's operations. The court opined, "To interpret
'stoppage of work' as cessation of work by the individual employee would make the
phrase practically synonymous with 'unemployment' as used in the same sentence." Id.
at 524-25, 438 A.2d at 356.
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The court also considered whether article 95A, section 2269 in-
corporated a voluntariness disqualification into section 6(e) which
would prevent employees who voluntarily stopped work to partici-
pate in a strike from receiving unemployment compensation bene-
fits. 270 Relying on its previous decision in Browning-Ferris, the court
held that section 6(e) only disqualifies an employee from receiving
benefits when. the employer's business ceases operations due to a
strike.27 .
Next, the court addressed Sinai's contention that the employees
were disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation
under section 6(d) because they failed to accept suitable work of-
fered to them by Sinai. 2 " The court found section 6(d) inapplicable
because the employees had not filed claims for unemployment com-
pensation when Sinai made the offer.273 The court reviewed the
structure of article 95A and determined that "the legislative scheme
contemplates (1) the filing of a claim and (2) an initial determination
of eligibility by the Secretary. ' 274 Thus, an employee cannot be dis-
qualified from a benefit before a determination of eligibility for that
benefit has been reached. The employees in Sinai had not filed any
claims for benefits at the time Sinai made the offer for employment;
therefore, they had not yet become eligible for the unemployment
compensation. As a result, they could not be disqualified from re-
ceiving the benefit.2 75
269. Section 2 declares the general policy of article 95A.
The legislature . . . declared that in its considered judgment the public good,
and the general welfare of the citizens of this State require the enactment of
this measure. . . for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to
be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A, §-2 (1985). + .. .
270. 309 Md. at 41, 522 A.2d at 387. Browning-Ferris rejected this contention, noting
that the only disqualification in § 6 was the stoppage of work requirement and that § 2
did not encompass any general disqualification based on fault. 292 Md. at 525, 438 A.2d
at 1362. Further, to incorporate § 2 into § 6(e) would render § 6(a), the voluntary leav-
ing provision, superfluous, and § 6(e) controls § 2. Id. at 526-27, 438 A.2d at 1363.
271. 309 Md. at 39-42, 522 A.2d at 387-89.
272. Id. at 43, 522 A.2d at 390. For the pertinent text of the statute, see supra note
254.
273. 309 Md. at 44, 522 A.2d at 390.
274. Id. MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A, § 7(b) (1985). directs that a claim for benefits "shall
be made in accordance with such regulations as the Executive Director may prescribe."
Section 4 finds an unemployed individual eligible to receive benefits only if he has regis-
tered for work and has made a claim for benefits. Id. § 4(a)-(b).
275. 309 Md. at 45-46, 522 A.2d at 391. The court reaffirmed its holding in State v.
Wheatley, 192 Md. 44, 63 A.2d 644 (1948), in which the court had explained that a
determination of eligibility is made at the time of a claimant's application for benefits.
309 Md. at 48-49, 63 A.2d at 646.
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Finally, the court gave great weight to the opinion of the board,
noting that while an agency's interpretation of the law is not binding
on a court, the "agency's expertise in its particular field is entitled to
deference. 2 71 6 In this instance, the board's opinion was not incon-
sistent with that of the legislature or the courts.
This decision is consistent with the Court of Appeals' earlier
decisions interpreting statutes concerning unemployment compen-
sation. The court had previously determined that the particular in-
tent of article 95A, section 6(e) controls over the general intent of
section 2.277 Thus, a finding that employees who Ceased work due
to a labor strike are not disqualified from unemployment compensa-
tion benefits under section 6 comports with precedent. Likewise,
the court's determination that section 6(a) does not apply to labor
disputes, which fall under the domain of section 6(e), is consistent
with the intent of the legislature. 8
B. Governmental Functions
1. Governmental Immunity.--a. Retrospective Application of Immu-
nity Statute.-In Washington Suburban Sanitary. Commission v. Riverdale
Heights Volunteer Fire Co. 1 9 the Court of Appeals held that, absent a
clear legislative intent to the contrary, a state statute conferrin' im-
munity on a fire company operated prospectively. Therefore, the
statute did not apply to substantive issues in cases pending at the
time the statute became effective.28 °
Fire damaged an apartment building in Riverdale in January
1980.28 ' The insurer paid $462,668 to settle the claim and then
sued the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (WSSC), al-
leging that WSSC had failed to maintain the fire hydrant closest to
the fire.28 2 When firefighters initially attempted to obtain water
from the hydrant, it was dry. 285 The firefighters then had to venture
some distance to obtain water from a working hydrant, delaying
276. 309 Md. at 46, 522 A.2d at 391.
277. Employment Sec. Admin. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 292 Md. 515, 526, 438 A.2d
1356, 1363 (1982).
278. 309 Md. at 37-38, 522 A.2d at 387-88.
279. 308 Md. 556, 520 A.2d 1319 (1987).
280. Id. at 568-69, 520 A.2d at 1326.
281. Id. at 558, 520 A.2d at 1320.
282. Id.
283. Id. The insurer alleged that WSSC had a duty to maintain the fire hydrants and
that before the date of the fire it had been put on notice of the defective fire hydrant. Id.
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their efforts to fight the fire.2 8 4
In September 1984 WSSC filed a third-party negligence claim
in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County against Riverdale
Heights Volunteer Fire Company (the fire company), which had re-
sponded to the fire.28 5 WSSC alleged that the fire company had
been negligent in initially attaching its hoses to a hydrant it knew
was inoperable. 28 6 The fire company moved to dismiss on the
ground that section 5-309.1(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceed-
ings Article,28 7 enacted in 1983, granted it immunity for ordinary
negligence. 288 The circuit court granted the fire company's motion
to dismiss; WSSC appealed.28 9
The question before the Court of Appeals was whether the cir-
cuit court properly applied section 5-309.1(a) retrospectively. The
fire company argued that unless a constitutional prohibition or con-
trary legislative intent mandates otherwise, the court should apply a
newly enacted statute to decide substantive issues in cases pending
when the statute takes effect. 290 To support this argument, the fire
company relied on the 1964 Court of Appeals decision inJanda v.
General Motors Corp.291 and the 1974 Supreme Court decision in
Bradley v. School Board of Richmond.292
Injanda the Court of Appeals applied an amended unemploy-
ment law retrospectively.293 Moreover, theJanda court set forth in
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. WSSC asserted that the fire company's negligence was active and primary
while any negligence on WSSC's part was passive and secondary. Alternatively, WSSC
averred concurrent negligence. Id. at 558-59, 520 A.2d at 1320-21.
287. Section 5-309.1(a) took effect on July 1, 1983, more than three years after the
fire. See Act of May 31, 1983, ch. 546, 1983 Md. Laws 1736. The statute provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except for any willful-6r grossly
negligent act, a fire company or rescue company, and the personnel of a fire
company or rescue company, are immune from civil liability for any act or omis-
sion in the course of performing their duties.
MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-309.1(a) (1984).
288. 308 Md. at 559, 520 A.2d at 1321.
289. Id. The circuit court reasoned that § 5-309.1(a) applied to WSSC's claim for
contribution or indemnity because WSSC had made no payments to the insurer by the
date the statute took effect. WSSC then settled with the insurer, but appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals. Before that court considered the case, however, the Court of
Appeals issued a writ of certiorari on its own motion. Id.
290. Id. at 562, 520 A.2d at 1322.
291. 237 Md. 161, 205 A.2d 228 (1964).
292. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
293. 237 Md. at 171, 205 A.2d at 234. Janda involved the 1963 amendment of a 1962
unemployment law. The 1962 law, which took effect on December 6 of that year, pro-
hibited employees who received payments in lieu of paid vacation from receiving unem-
ployment benefits for weeks in which they had received those payments. Act of May 8,
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dicta four rules for determining whether to apply a statute retro-
spectively or prospectively.29 According to the first rule, a statu-
tory change affecting only procedure ordinarily applies
retrospectively.295 Second, a statute affecting substantive law or
rights will not apply retrospectively unless it is clear that the legisla-
ture so intended."' Third, no matter what the legislative intent, a
court will not apply a statute retrospectively if to do so would harm
constitutionally protected rights.297 The fourth rule provided:
A statute which affects or controls a matter still in liti-
gation when it became law will be applied by the court re-
viewing the case at the time the statute takes effect
although it was not yet law when the decision appealed
from was rendered, even if matters or claims of substance
(not constitutionally protected), as distinguished from mat-
ters procedural or those affecting the remedy are involved,
unless the Legislature intended the contrary.298
The fire company based its argument on this fourth rule.299
.According to the Riverdale Heights court, theJanda holding did
not apply because the statute at issue in Janda clearly reflected the
legislature's intent that the law apply retrospectively.300 Neverthe-
less, the court admitted that the last ofJanda's four rules supported
the fire company's position."s' According to the court, however, the
fourth rule was inconsistent with Maryland law, which presumes that
a statute operates prospectively unless the statute reveals legislative
intent to the contrary. 0 2 Because of this inconsistency, and because
the court had never applied the rule to decide a case, the court re-
1961, ch. 883, 1961 Md. Laws 1602 (submitted to referendum in November 1962). In
1963 the General Assembly amended this law to permit unemployment benefits when an
employer paid the allowance in lieu of vacation under a written contract in effect on
December 6, 1962, as long as the normal practice of the employer was not to grant
vacations with pay. Act of April 30, 1963, ch. 729, 1963 Md. Laws 1518. Because extra
pay in lieu of vacation had not barred benefits before December 6, 1962, thejanda court
found a "clear and unmistakable" legislative intent to permit those discharged employ-
ees who had been disqualified from receiving benefits by the 1962 statute to become
qualified again. 237 Md. at 171, 205 A.2d at 234.
294. 237 Md. at 168-69, 205 A.2d at 232-33.
295. Id. at 168, 205 A.2d at 232.
296. Id. at 168-69, 205 A.2d at 232.
297. Id. at 169, 205 A.2d at 232-33.
298. Id., 205 A.2d at 233.
299. 308 Md. at 562, 520 A.2d at 1322.
300. Id.
301. Id
302. Id. at 560-61, 520 A.2d at 1322.
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jectedjanda's fourth rule.30 3
The court next addressed the fire company's argument that it
should follow the Supreme Court's decision in Bradley v. School Board
of Richmond304 in deciding whether to apply section 5-309.1 (a) retro-
spectively o.3 0  Bradley held that a statute authorizing the award of
attorneys' fees in school desegregation cases should apply to a case
pending on appeal when the statute became law.306 While the
Supreme Court -did not go so far as to hold that courts must always
apply new laws to pending cases, it did "reject the contention that a
change in the law is to be given effect in a pending case only where
that is the clear and stated intention of the legislature. 3 0 7
After thoroughly analyzing the' Bradley decision, the Court of
Appeals simply chose not to follow it.3 08 The court was "far from
persuaded" that the Supreme Court's reasoning was more precise
or led to a more predictable result than its own reasoning in previ-
ous decisions. °30 Those decisions demonstrated that under Mary-
land law statutes are presumed to "operate prospectively, absent a
clear legislative intent to the contrary."3 10 Thus, section 5-309.1(a)
should be presumed to operate prospectively unless the General As-
sembly expressly intended retrospective application.31
Examining the statute, the court found nothing to indicate that
the legislature intended a retrospective effect.3 t2 A retrospective
application of the statute would deprive victims of a fire company's
negligence of "fully accrued causes of action for compensatory dam-
ages." 31 3 "A construction which produces that kind of interference
with substantive rights, whether or not the interference is of consti-
tutional magnitude, is to be avoided." ' 4 Accordingly, the court re-
303. Id. at 563-65, 520 A.2d at 1323-24.
304. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
305. 308 Md. at 565, 520 A.2d at 1324.
306. 416 U.S. at 724.
307. Ia a 715.
308. 308 Md. at 568, 520 A.2d at 1325.
309. Id. In support-of this point, the court cited, inter alia, Vitar Assocs. v. Mayor of
Annapolis, 301 Md. 558, 571-72, 483 A.2d 1263, 1270 (1984) (holding invalid a statute
imposing retroactive license fees); Evans v. McCoy, 291 Md. 562, 587, 436 A.2d 436,
448 (1981) (finding that statute creating a presumptive meaning of "child" expressly
applied to instruments executed before the statute took effect); Dryfoos v. Hostetter,
268 Md. 396, 407, 302 A.2d 28, 34 (1973) (holding invalid a statute retroactively curing
defective acknowledgements on deeds of trust).
310. 308 Md. at 568, 520 A.2d at 1325-26.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 568-89, 520 A.2d at 1326.
313. Id. at 569, 520 A.2d at 1326.
314. Id.
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versed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings on WSSC's negligence claim."1 5
In disapproving Janda's fourth rule, the court did away with a
rule which was clearly inconsistent with Maryland law. In rejecting
Bradley's reasoning, the court went a step further, finding that re-
gardless of what the Supreme Court has said, statutes in Maryland
operate prospectively absent a clear legislative intent otherwise.3 1 6
The court could have stopped short of rejecting the Supreme
Court's reasoning while still holding that section 5-309.1(a) applied
prospectively. Quoting one of its previous decisions, the Supreme
Court noted in Bradley that "exceptions to the general rule that a
court is to apply a law in effect at the time it renders its decision
'have been made to prevent manifest injustice.' ",3,7 In Bradley there
was no manifest injustice in requiring the Richmond School Board
to pay attorneys' fees out of state funds; therefore, the new statute
could be applied retrospectively. On the other hand, summarily re-
moving a negligence victim's fully accrued cause of action against
the fire company would meet almost any definition of injustice. The
Court of Appeals ignored this escape route, however, preferring to
issue a prohibition against a general rule of retrospectivity.
b. Tort Immunity of Police Officers.-In Ashburn v. Anne Arundel
County3 '1 the Court of Appeals declined to expand the tort liability
of police officers in alcohol-related accidents. The court held that a
police officer acting in a discretionary capacity,3 19 as opposed to a
ministerial one, is immune from any liability arising out of the ac-
tion.32 ' Accordingly, a police officer who exercises discretion in de-
ciding not to detain a drunk driver will be immune from liability in
315. Id at 570-71, 520 A.2d at 1326-27.
316. In a number of cases preceding this decision, the Court of Special Appeals did
apply Bradley in order to give a statute retrospective effect. See, e.g., Maryland Ins. Guar.
Ass'n v. Muhl, 66 Md. App. 359, 504 A.2d 637 (1986) (retrospectively applying statute
assigning claim priorities in insured liquidation proceedings); Courtney v. Richmond, 55
Md. App. 382, 462 A.2d 1223 (1983) (retrospectively applying statute providing for
granting of adoption decrees without parental consent); T & R Joint Venture v. Office of
Planning & Zoning, 47 Md. App. 395, 424 A.2d 384 (1980) (retroactively applying ordi-
nance giving standing to county agency in zoning case).
317. 416 U.S. at 716 (quoting Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 282 (1969)).
318. 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986).
319. The Court of Appeals has defined discretionary capacity as follows: "lAin act
falls within the discretionary function of a public official if the decision which involves an
exercise of his personal judgment also includes, to more than a minor degree, the man-
ner in which the police power of the State should be utilized." James v. Prince George's
County, 288 Md. 315, 327, 418 A.2d 1173, 1180 (1980).
320. 306 Md. at 626, 510 A.2d at 1082.
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any suit arising from the drunk driver's subsequent actions.321
Officer Dennis Freeberger of the Anne Arundel County Police
Department discovered an intoxicated man, John Millhaim, in a
pickup truck on a convenience store parking lot. 32 2 The officer re-
quested that Millham move his vehicle to the side of the lot and
discontinue driving for the evening. As soon as the officer departed,
Millham drove his truck from the lot and hit a pedestrian, John
Ashburn.32 3 Ashburn, who lost his left leg in the accident, sied
Millham, the police officer, the county, and the police depart-
ment. 2 '4  He asserted that under section 16-205.1(b)(2) of the
Transportation Article,325 police officers have a mandatory duty to
detain all suspected drunk drivers.32 6
Ashburn argued that the officer neglected his mandatory duty
when he failed to detain Millham, and therefore was unable to claim
immunity from liability.3 2 7 In addition, Ashburn argued that "under
the circumstances of this case, a special duty was imposed upon Of-
ficer Freeberger to protect [Ashburn]. 328 The defendants, on: the
other hand, argued that the officer was immune from liability under
the public official immunity doctrine and that, even if this immunity
were unavailable to him, Freeberger owed Ashburn no special duty
to protect him from Millham's actions.3 29
321. Id.
322. Id. at 619, 510 A.2d at 1079. The parties agreed that Miliham was the driver of
the vehicle and that under Maryland law he could have been charged with drunk driving.
Id. at 619-20, 510 A.2d at 1079.
323. d. at 620, 510 A.2d at 1079.
324. Id.
325. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1(b)(2) (1987). This statute provides:
Except-as-provided-in -subsection-(c) -of- this section, ifa police-officer-stops--or
detains any individual who the police officer has reasonable grounds to believe
is or has been driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while intoxicated,
while under the influence of alcohol, or in violation of an alcohol restriction,
and who is not unconscious or otherwise incapable of refusing to take a chemi-
cal test for alcohol, the police officer shall:
(i) Detain the individual;
(ii) Request that the individual permit a chemical test to be taken of the indi-
vidual's blood or breath to determine the alcoholic content of the individual's
blood;
(iii) Advise the individual of the administrative penalties that shall be imposed
for refusal to take the test; and
(iv) If the individual refuses to take the test, send a sworn report to the Ad-
ministration within 72 hours after detention ....
Id.
326. 306 Md. at 620, 510 A.2d at 1079.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 620-21, 510 A.2d at 1079-80.
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The Court of Appeals declared that "Officer Freeberger [was] a
public official when acting within the scope of his law enforcement
function,""'s and that he exercised discretion in deciding not to
arrest Millham. 3s ' Until the middle of this century, the-majority of
American courts held that all public employees were liable for their
own torts."3 ' Maryland, however, departed from this premise in the
1898 case of Cocking v. Wade,"3 in which the Court of Appeals rec-
ognized the need to protect a public official from liability arising
from the negligent performance of a discretionary aspect of the
job.3 3 4 Maryland courts now apply the rule set forth in Duncan v.
Koristenis 33 5  to all tort claims against public officials:
"[G]overnmental immunity is extended to all nonmalicious acts of
public officials as opposed to public employees when acting in a discre-
tionary as opposed to ministerial capacity." 3 3 6
The court did not agree with Ashburn that section 16-
205.1(b)(2) set forth a mandatory procedure for the handling of
drunk drivers. "By the plain meaning of this statute, its directives
are not invoked until the officer 'stops or detains' 33 7 any individ-
ual."33 8 Officer Freeberger did not "stop and detain" Millham, but
rather "found" the drunk driver sitting in a truck; therefore, section
330. Id. at 622, 510 A.2d at 1080. See also Bradshaw v. Prince George's County, 284
Md. 294, 302, 396 A.2d at 255, 261 (1978) (finding that police officer acted within scope
of duty in tending to victim at scene of crime); Robinson v. Board of County Comm'rs,
262 Md. 342, 347, 278 A.2d 71, 74 (1971) (finding that police officer was not immune
for malicious acts in arresting plaintiff).
331. 306 Md. at 624, 510 A.2d at 1081.
332. Id. at 621, 510 A.2d at 1080. See also W. PROSSER, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D.
OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW Or TORTS § 132, at 1056 (5th ed. 1984) [herein-
after PROSSER & KEETON].
333. 87 Md. 529, 40 A. 104 (1898).
334. Id. at 541, 40 A. at 106. The Cocking court held that the decision of a sheriff not
to move a prisoner was purely discretionary in scope. Because the court determined
that the sheriff acted in good faith, he was not held accountable for the prisoner's death
at the hands of a lynch mob. Id.
335. 260 Md. 98, 271 A.2d 547 (1970).
336. Id. at 104, 271 A.2d at 550 (emphasis in original). See Bradshaw v. Prince
George's County, 284 Md. 294. 303, 396 A.2d 255, 260-61 (1979); Robinson v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 262 Md. 342, 346-47, 278 A.2d 71, 74 (1971); Clark v. Ferling, 220
Md. 109, 113, 151 A.2d 137, 139 (1959).
337. The Court of Appeals considers "stop and detain" to mean "apprehend." "(A$h
accused is 'apprehended' when a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that
the person is or has been driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated or while under the
influence of alcohol and the police officer reasonably acts upon that information by stop-
ping or detaining the person." Willis v. State, 302 Md. 363, 376, 488 A.2d 171, 178
(1985).
338. 306 Md. at 625, 510 A.2d at 1082.
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16-205.1(b)(2) did not apply. 3 9
The court went one step further by stating that even if the stat-
ute did apply and Freeberger's actions were considered ministerial,
the officer still would not be liable since Ashburn did not establish
that Freeberger owed him a duty under tort law.3 40 As stated over
eighty years ago in West Virginia Central Railway Co. v. Fuller, 4 '
"[T]here can be no negligence where there is no duty that is due;
for negligence is the breach of some duty that one person owes an-
other." 42 Maryland courts follow the rule that absent a special rela-
tionship one has no duty3 43 to control a third person's conduct so as
to prevent harm to another.3 4 4 More particularly, "absent a 'special
relationship' between police and victim, liability for failure to pro-
tect an individual citizen against injury caused by another citizen
does not lie against police officers. 3 45
The court stated that a police officer's duty is to protect the
public.3 46 " '[11f the police were held to a duty enforceable by each
individual member of the public, then every complaint-whether
real, imagined, or frivolous-would raise the spectre of civil liability
for failure to respond.' ""4 This would result in unnecessary, hasty
arrests by officers to avoid lawsuits and an increase in litigation, with
a consequentially heavy burden on the court system.3 48 Thus, the
court has recognized a special need to protect police officers from
tort liability arising out of the performance of their duties. This rec-
ognition has allowed the police, as well as other public officials, to
continue to make necessary discretionary decisions without the
339. Id. at 626, 510 A.2d at 1082.
340. Id.
341.- 96-Md.-652,--54-A. 669-(1903).
342. Id. at 666, 54 A. at 67 1.
343. Duty has been defined as "an obligation, to which the law will give recognition
and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another." PRosSER &
KEETON, supra note 333, § 53, at 356.
344. 306 Md. at 628, 510 A.2d at 1083. See aLso Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 242-
44, 492 A.2d 1297, 1300-01 (1985) (finding that probation officer owes no duty to third
person for probationer's harmful acts); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965)
("There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from
physical harm to another unless . . .a special relation exists ....").
345. 306 Md. at 628, 510 A.2d at 1083. See also Davidson v. City of Westminster. 32
Cal. 3d 197, 203, 649 P.2d 894, 897, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252, 255 (1982) (no duty absent
special relationship); Morgan v. District of Columbia. 468 A.2d 1306, 1308 (D.C. App.
1983) (same).
346. 306 Md. at 628, 510 A.2d at 1084. A police officer's breach ofduty to protect the
public "is most properly actionable by the public in the form of criminal prosecution or
administrative disposition." Id.
347. Id. at 629, 510 A.2d at 1084 (quoting Aorgan, 468 A.2d at 1311).
348. Id. at 629-30, 510 A.2d at 1084.
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added anxiety of possible lawsuits brought by angry citizens.3 49 If a
police officer must worry about personal consequences every time a
decision is made, then decisions will be few and far between. The
nature of law enforcement dictates that a police officer must not be
hindered from making split-second decisions.
The court made it clear that this holding does not preclude an
individual from bringing a negligence action against a police of-
ficer.350 A suit will lie if the individual proves the. existence of a
special relationship with the police officer by showing that the "po-
lice officer affirmatively acted to protect the specific victim or a spe-
cific group of individuals like the victim, thereby inducing the
victim's specific reliance upon the police protection. "35 The court
found that Freeberger's actions did not constitute an affirmativeact
specifically for the protection of Ashburn.35 2 The statute's purpose
is to protect the public-not a particular class of individuals; there-
fore, no special relationship existed between Ashburn' and
Freeberger, and the officer was immune from any civil liability. 353
The court thus refused to expand tort law to impose liability on
police officers for the actions of third parties in alcohol-related acci-
dents.55 4 In recent years Maryland courts have attempted to limit
the scope of liability in alcohol-related tort cases by specifically de-
nying that public officials, or any other individuals, are liable for the
349. The court recognized that better fora in which to review charges against police
officers for breaches of their duties are the disciplinary proceedings or criminal prosecu-
tion as found in MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 727-734D (1986). 306 Md. at 630, 510 A.2d
at 1084.
350. 306 Md. at 630, 510 A.2d at 1085.
351. Id. at 630-31, 510 A.2d at 1085.
352. Id. at 631-32, 510 A.2d at 1085.
353. Id. at 632, 510 A.2d at 1085. The majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue
have found that there is no special relationship between a police officer and an individ-
ual injured by a drunk driver. Id. See, e.g., Jackson v. Clements, 146 Cal. App. 3d 983,
989, 194 Cal. Rptr. 553, 556 (1983) ("Although it is unquestionably the policy of this
state to deter drunk driving, neither statutory nor decisional law authorized the recogni-
tion of a cause of action against these defendants based on the officers' failure to take
the protective action suggested by the plaintiffs."); Crosby v. Town of Bethlehem, 90
A.D.2d 134, 135, 457 N.Y.S.2d 618, 619 (1982) (finding no special relationship).
A special relationship was established in Irwin v. Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745,467
N.E.2d 1292 (1984), in which police officers stopped an apparently intoxicated driver
but then allowed the driver to continue driving. The driver eventually caused an acci-
dent that killed several people. The court based its holding on the foreseeability of the
accident as a consequence of the failure to detain the drunk driver and the fact that the
state statute appeared to protect both intoxicated individuals and any other users of the
roads. Id. at 762-64, 467 N.E.2d at 1303-05.
354. 306 Md. at 628, 510 A.2d at 1083.
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actions of third parties who cause injury.3 55 The courts appear in-
clined not only to protect public officials from liability in such cases
but also to extend protection from liability to almost everyone else
except the drunk driver.
.2. Election Law Violations.-In a four to three decision in Snyder
v. Glusing3 56 the Court of Appeals held that in order to set aside a
political election for violations of the election laws, the challenging
party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the outcome
of the election might have been different had there been no viola-
tion.3 57 Because the trial judge's application of this standard was
not clearly erroneous, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's
determination that the results of the election should stand.,
Gary Snyder was the unsuccessful candidate for State Senator
from the Eighth Legislative District in the 1986 Republican primary
election.35 9 The successful candidate, Edward Glusing, distributed
a sample ballot which violated the election laws. 60 Snyder alleged
that had there been no violation, the outcome of the election might
have changed.3 6 1
Pursuant to article 33, section 19-2,362 Snyder petitioned the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County to void Glusing's nomination as
State Senator.3 63 Snyder alleged that the ballot's proponents vio-
lated article 33, section 11-3(b) by holding themselves out as the
official Republican Committee, and section 26-16(a)(7) by failing to
355. This trend is demonstrated by the following trilogy of cases. In 1985 the court
held in Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 253, 492 A.2d 1297, 1306 (1985), that probation
officers were not liable for the actions of a probationer despite the fact that they were
awareof tlhe probationer's previous alcohol-related accidents. In 1986 the court de-
cided Ashburn, holding that a police officer was not liable for the failie oares( a -drfik
driver. Finally, in 1987 in Kuykendall v. Top Notch Laminates, Inc., 70 Md. App. 244,
520 A.2d 1115 (1987), the court held that an employer was not liable for the accident
caused by two of its intoxicated employees after a nonmandatory business party. Id. at
252, 520 A.2d at 1118.
356. 308 Md. 411, 520 A.2d 349 (1987).
357. Id. at 427, 520 A.2d at 358.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 414, 520 A.2d at 351.
360. Id. at 418, 520 A.2d at 353. See infra note 365.
361. Id. at 420-21, 520 A.2d at 354.
362. Article 33, § 19-2 provides that, "'If no other timely and adequate remedy is pro-
vided by this article . . . any registered voter may seek judicial relief from any act or
omission relating to an election ... on the grounds that the act or omission:... (2) may
... have changed the outcome of the election." MD. ANN. CODE art. 33. § 19-2 (1986).
363. 308 Md. at 417, 520 A.2d at 352. Snyder's petition also sought to void Michael
Kosmas' election to the Republican State Central Committee, the official governing
body of the Republican party. id.
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indicate on the ballot the candidate responsible for the literature. 4
Finally, Snyder alleged that the ballot was false, fraudulent, and de-
ceptive, and that its purpose was to mislead voters.3 65 The lower
court disposed of the alleged section 11-3(b) violation, but found
that the failure to identify Glusing as the candidate responsible for
the ballot violated section 26-16(a)(7).3 66
In the Court of Appeals' first consideration of this case, 67 the
court held that the trial court incorrectly applied the standard of
proof mandated by article 33, section 19-5.368 The statute provides
364. Id. at 417-18, 520 A.2d at 352-53. The sample ballot was distributed at the polls
on the day of the primary. At the top of the ballot appeared the words, "Support your
oficial Republican ballot" next to a logo similar to that used by the Republican State
Central Committee. The ballot also contained an endorsement statement signed by
Helen Delich Bentley, the incumbent Congresswoman. At the bottom of the ballot ap-
peared the words "Authority: Bernice Patterson, Treasurer." The ballot endorsed a
number of.candidates, including Glusing for the State Senate and Kosmas for the Re-
publican State Central Committee. Snyder discovered the text of the ballot on the day
of the primary when he visited the polls. Id. at 414-17, 520 A.2d at 351-52.
Snyder alleged a violation of MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 11-3(b) (1986), which pro-
vides in pertinent part, "It shall be unlawful for any organization other than the State
central committee for the State to hold itself out as the official organization or governing
body of any political party." Snyder further alleged that the ballot violated § 26-
16(a)(7), which provides:
(a) The following persons shall be guilty of prohibited practices and shall be
punished in accordance with the provisions of this section:
(7) Campaign Literature. Every person who ... causes to be published or
distributed any ... sample ballot ... relating to or concerning any candidate
... for public or party office ...unless such . . .sample ballot . . .clearly
indicates the name of the candidate or committee responsible for the literature
and contains, but set apart therefrom, an authority line which shall include the
name and address of the . . . treasurer ... responsible for the publication or
distribution of the same ....
li § 26-16(a)(7). Although the sample ballot declared, "Authority, Bernice Patterson,
Treasurer," it failed to name Glusing as the candidate for whom Patterson was treas-
urer. 308 Md. at 417-18, 520 A.2d at 352-53.
365. Id. at 417, 520 A.2d at 352-53.
366. Id. at 420-21, 520 A.2d at 354. At oral argument on this case's first trip to the
Court of Appeals, Snyder's counsel was pressed to declare whether § 11-3(b) was a part
of the case. The attorney told the court, "My case is under 26-16[a](7), your Honor, and
I believe that is all we need to address as far as this case is concerned." Thus, the Court
of Appeals considered the § 26-16(a)(7) violation to be Snyder's sole contention. Id.
367. 307 Md. 548, 515 A.2d 767 (1986) (per curiam). The trial court had adopted
Glusing's argument that he could not, as a matter of law, violate § 11-3(b). Glusing
relied on Culotta v. Raimondi, 251 Md. 384, 389, 247 A.2d 519, 522 (1968), in which
the Court of Appeals held that individuals could not violate § 11-3(b) because they did
not constitute an organization; § 11-3(b) proscribes only an organization's conduct. In
its first consideration of this case, however, the Court of Appeals only addressed the
issue of the § 26-16(a)(7) violation. 308 Md. at 419-20, 520 A.2d at 353-54; 307 Md. at
550, 515 A.2d at 768.
368. 308 Md. at 421, 520 A.2d at 354.
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that a court may nullify an election when an act or omission materi-
ally affected the rights of the parties or the purity of the election
process, or might have changed the outcome of an election.3 69 The
lower court required Snyder to show by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the use of the sample ballot in fact changed the outcome
of the election, whereas the proper application of section 19-5
would have required Snyder to show that the use of the sample bal-
lot might have altered the results.3 70 The Court of Appeals therefore
reversed and remanded the case.3 7 ' On remand the lower court
found that Snyder had presented clear and convincing evidence that
Glusing had violated section 26-16(a)(7) and that the use of the im-
proper sample ballot constituted an act or omission under article 33
which materially affected the parties' rights and interests and the pu-
rity of the election process.3 72 Nevertheless, the trial court deter-
mined that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the outcome
of the election might have changed absent the violation. 7 3
On appeal for the second time, the Court of Appeals consid-
ered Snyder's contention that the lower court had erred in consider-
ing only the effect of the 26-16(a)(7) violation, rather than the effect
of the defective ballot as a whole. 74 In determining that the trial
court did not err, the court found that the trial court's consideration
of a hypothetical, violation-free sample ballot was an acceptable ap-
proach to the complex causation problem. 7 5
The majority devoted most of its opinion to an analysis of the
369. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 19-5 (1986). The statute provides:
Upon a finding, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that the act or omis-
sion involved materially affected the rights of interested parties or the purity of
the. elections.-process and; ...
(1) Might have changed the outcome of an election already held, the court
shall:
(i) Declare null and void the election ... or
(ii) Order any other relief that will provide an adequate remedy.
Id. (emphasis added).
370. 308 Md. at 420, 520 A.2d at 354.
371. Id. at 421, 520 A.2d at 354.
372. Id. at 421-22, 520 A.2d at 355.
373. Id. at 422, 520 A.2d at 355.
374. Id. Snyder asserted that it was the combined effect of the § 26-16(a)(7) violation
and the representations of official Republican status, whether the latter constituted a
§ 11-3(b) violation or not, which might have changed the outcome of the election. Id.
375. Id. at 423, 520 A.2d at 356. The lower court imagined an error-free sample bal-
lot identifying Glusing as the candidate responsible for the ballot, and thus eliminating
the inference that Glusing was the "official" Republican candidate. The trial court con-
cluded that Snyder had failed to prove that an error-free ballot might have ch-nged the
outcome of the election. Id.
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legislative intent of section 19-5.376 The majority determined that
section 19-5 requires one contesting an election to demonstrate that
the alleged violation might have changed the outcome of the elec-
tion, not that the violation absolutely would have changed the elec-
tion results.3 77 Combining the "clear and convincing" standard of
proof with the language of the statute, the court determined that the
section 19-5 burden is satisfied when evidence shows that there is a
substantial probability that the outcome might have been different. 3 78
The majority declared that the lower court judge did not err in
concluding that Snyder had failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the outcome of the election might have been different
had there been no violation of the election law.3 79 It is for the trier
of fact to decide the strength of the causal connection between the
violation and the election outcome; because there was evidence
which tended to support the trial court's decision, the Court of Ap-
peals could not hold that this decision was clearly erroneous.3 8 0
The dissent focused on the application of the standard of proof
and the legislative intent behind the statute to find that the trial
judge and the majority had read article 33 too narrowly.38 ' Noting
that article 33, subtitle 19, speaks of an "act or omission" and not
merely a violation, the dissent argued that the legislature intended
to provide judicial relief to a voter from any act inconsistent with
article 33 regardless of whether or not that act amounted to statu-
tory violation s.38  Thus, the dissent faulted the trial court and the
majority for looking only to technical violations of the election laws
and failing to consider any other act or omission which may have
changed the election's outcome.38 3
The dissent also found that the distribution of the sample bal-
lots violated section 11-3(b), which prohibits an "organization"
from holding itself out as the "official" State Central Committee of a
political party.38 4 The dissent argued that several individuals work-
376. Id. at 424-26, 520 A.2d at 356-57. The trial judge concluded that the legislature
intended to make it difficult for a trial court to invalidate an election. The Court of
Appeals found that this interpretation and the trial judge's factual determination were
not erroneous. Id. at 425-27, 520 A.2d at 356-58.
377. Id. at 425, 520 A.2d at 356.
378. Id., 520 A.2d at 357.
379. Id. at 427, 520 A.2d at 358.
380. Id. at 426-27, 520 A.2d at 358.
381. Id. at 428-32, 520 A.2d at 359-60.
382. Id. at 431, 520 A.2d at 360. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, §§ 19-1 to -5 (1986 &
Supp. 1987).
383. 308 Md. at 431-32, 520 A.2d at 360.
384. Id. The statute defines an organization as "any combination of two or more per-
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ing together may constitute an "organization." Thus, even if Glus-
ing and his supporters did not technically violate section 11-3(b), they
clearly violated the statute's spirit.3 85 The dissent concluded that
the trial judge was required to look both to the technical section 26-
16(a)(7) violation and to the act of distribution of sample ballots to
determine whether the outcome of the election might have been
changed. By not applying this broader scope of review, the trial
judge failed to reach the correct conclusion. 86
In interpreting the statutory provisions, the Court of Appeals
found a legislative intent to provide a uniform procedure for afford-
ing judicial relief for election-related acts.38 7 Moreover, the legisla-
ture mandated that the statute be interpreted liberally to effectuate
its purposes.38 8 The majority in this case focused only on the con-
struction of the statutory language. Nevertheless, it is clear from
the divided court and the language of the legislative history that
there may be some latitude in interpreting this statute to include a
sons formed for the purpose of assisting the promotion of the success or defeat of any
candidate." MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § l-1(a)(12) (1986 & Supp. 1987). Thus, the dis-
sent argued, the Glusing-Patterson-Kosmas association, as well as the distributors of the
sample ballots, constituted an organization under § 1-1(a)(12), and therefore would be
violative of § 11-3(b). 308 Md. at 431, 520 A.2d at 360.
385. 308 Md.. at 432, 520 A.2d at 360...
386. Id.
387. Act of May 28, 1985, ch. 755, 1985 Md. Laws 3559. In 1985 the General Assem-
bly repealed and re-enacted portions of the election law. The new statute, but not the
old, employed the "act or omission" language which is central to the Snyder opinion.
The preamble to the 1985 Act declared:
The General Assembly of Maryland, recognizing that the timely determina-
tion of issues arising with respect to elections will facilitate the administration
of elections, promote equity among interested parties, and enhance the confi-
dence of the citizens of the State in the elections process, and recognizing that
existing law does not uniformly provide for such determinations, and recogniz-
ing that the delayed determination of issues that may affect the outcome of
elections often does not provide an adequate remedy, and concluding that a
judicial determination of election-related issues affords the fullest opportunity
for providing a timely and adequate remedy, enacts this statute for the pur-
poses and objectives hereinabove mentioned and declares that it should be lib-
erally construed to effectuate these purposes and objectives ....
Id. at 3560. See 308 Md. at 424-25, 520 A.2d at 356-57.
388. 308 Md. at 425, 520 A.2d at 356.
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1. Mid-Cycle Reassessment of Property.-In Supervisor of Assessments
v. Chase Associates' the Court of Appeals held that converting an
apartment building to condominiums and filing a condominium
declaration constituted neither a change in use nor a subdivision of
land. Therefore, a mid-cycle reassessment of the property was
unauthorized.2
The State Department of Assessments and Taxation assesses
real property every three years, and normally does not modify the
assessments within the three-year cycle.' Nevertheless, when a
"substantial change occurs in the use of the property" 4 or when the
property is subdivided,5 it may be inspected and revalued. Chase
Associates questioned the legality of a mid-cycle reassessment of a
residential apartment building that it had converted to
condominiums. 6
Chase purchased the property in January 1981 and filed a con-
dominium declaration in June.7 Subsequently Chase received retro-
active, individual assessment notices for each of the units, with a
total value over three times greater than the 1980 assessed value.'
Chase and the unit owners appealed.'
1. 306 Md. 568, 510 A.2d 568 (1986). This case consolidated two appeals brought
by the Supervisor of Assessments from circuit court judgments for the building owner
(Chase Associates) and individual unit owners, and for Marvin Ellin. who owned eleven
units. Id. at 573-74, 510 A.2d at 570.
2. Id. at 578-79, 510 A.2d at 573.
3. Id. at 570, 510 A.2d at 569. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 232(8) (1980). This
statute-was amended.in 1979 to change the requirement of annual reassessment to one
of triennial review. The provisions of article 81 governing real property taxation were
recodified as part of the Tax-Property Article. The recodified provisions took effect
February 1, 1986, and were not applied in Chase. 306 Md. at 570, 510 A.2d at 569.
4. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 232(8)(d)(2) (1980) (recodified at MD. TAX-PRoP. CODE
ANN. § 8-104(c)(1)(ii) (1986)). Subsequent revisions to the statute deleted the word
'substantial." Id. (Supp. 1987). See infra note 10.
5. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(a)(1) (1980) (recodified at MD. TAX-PROP. CODE
ANN. § 8-104(c)(l)(v) (1986 & Supp. 1987)).
6. 306 Md. at 572, 510 A.2d at 570.
7. Id. at 571, 510 A.2d at 569. Chase Associates purchased the outstanding stock of
what was then a cooperative. As the units were sold, the buyers 'reimbursed Chase for
their share of the real property taxes, based on Chase's December 1980 assessment no-
tice, which took effect on July I, 1981. Id. at 572, 510 A.2d at 570.
8. Id. The aggregated individual values of the 1981 assessment totalled
$14,175,350, while the 1980 assessment reflected a value of $3,603,700.
9. Chase Associates made a timely appeal to the Supervisor in November 1981.
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The court considered whether converting the building to con-
dominiums constituted a "change in use" within the meaning of ar-
ticle 81, section 232(8)(d)(2) and whether filing a condominium
declaration subdivided the land within the meaning of article 81,
section 19(a)(1).' ° Addressing the first issue, the court concluded
that section 19(a)(1)'s provision that "land may be reassessed when-
ever it has been subdivided" did not apply to the conversion to con-
dominiums since the building was not "land."" The court pointed
to the preceding sentence of the statute, which stated that "the land
itself and the buildings or other improvements thereon shall be val-
ued and assessed separately" to establish the limited meaning of
,,land.,",12
The court then considered whether the filing of a condominium
declaration constituted a subdivision of the land.'" Noting the nar-
row meaning of "subdivision" in land use law as a "formal division
of a parcel of land into several smaller lots to be separately sold,
The Supervisor rescinded the reassessment for the first year, but affirmed it for the sec-
ond and third years of the triennial cycle. Id. The Property Tax Assessment Appeals
Board upheld the Supervisor's reassessment. Ud at 573, 510 A.2d at 570. In response,
two separate appeals were filed to the Maryland Tax Court, one by Chase Associates and
the unit owners, and the other by Ellin. The Tax Court upheld the reassessments on the
basis of the Supervisor's "substantial change in use" rationale. The Circuit Court for
Baltimore City reversed in both cases. Id. The Supervisor appealed to the Court of
Special Appeals; the Court of Appeals granted certiorari before the Court of Special
Appeals considered the cases. Id at 573-74, 510 A.2d at 570-71.
10. Id. at 571, 510 A.2d at 569. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(a)(1) (1980) declared
that "land may be reassessed whenever it has been subdivided." MD. ANN. CODE art. 81,
§ 232(8)(d) (1980) provided that
[any property shall be reviewed, physically inspected and revalued . . . in any
year that: (1) The zoning classification of the property is changed; (2) A sub-
stantial change occurs in the use of the property; (3) Extensive improvements
are made to the existing property; (4) The previous assessment was clearly
erroneous due to an error in calculation or measurement of the improvements
on the property.
After the Chase decision, these provisions were recodified together at MD. TAX-PRop.
CODE ANN. § 8-104(c)(1) (1986). See supra note 3.
In 1986 the General Assembly made several significant changes to provisions con-
cerning reassessment. New § 8-104(c)(1)(v) now requires revaluation when "a subdivi-
sion occurs." "Subdivision" is "the division of real property into two or more parcels by
subdivision plat, condominium plat, time-share, metes and bounds, or other means."
Id. (Supp. 1987). In § 8-104(c)(I)(ii) the change in use provision has been expanded to
include "a change in use or character." Id. The statute no longer requires that the
change be "substantial." It is not clear whether condominium conversion would trigger
a reassessment under the new statute.
11. 306 Md. at 576, 510 A.2d at 572.
12. Id. at 575, 510 A.2d at 571.
13. Id.
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leased, or developed,"' 4 the court held that the condominium re-
gime had not "subdivided" the land. 5 According to the court, no
subdivision occurred because each individual owner continued to
possess an undivided interest in the common areas, including the
land.' 6
Finally, the court held that converting the apartment building
to condominiums did not amount to a "substantial change in use"
of the property.' 7 The court found that the Maryland Tax Court
had incorrectly equated "change in value" with "change in use."'"
The purpose of mid-cycle reassessments is to improve "the accuracy
with which a property's assessed value reflects its current value"
throughout the cycle.' 9 Interpreting "change in use" to encompass
every event that might change the value of the property-would not
only unreasonably stretch the meaning of the word "use," but
would ignore the legislature's purpose in enacting the statute.2 °
The legislature sought to link reassessment with the occurrence of
specific events, including a substantial change in use, but not a mere
change in value.2 1
. After interpreting the phrase "change in use," the court de-
cided that Chase's conversion of the apartment building into condo-
miniums did not constitute such a change.2 2  Converting the
building to condominiums, the court held, resulted in a change of
ownership, but not a change in use.23 Although the Supervisor of
14. Id. at 575-76, 510 A.2d at 571-72. See 7 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CON-
TROTS § 45.0112] (1987).
15. 306 Md. at 576, 510 A.2d at 572.
16. Id. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-107(a) (1988).
17. 306 Md..at-578,-5.10 A.2d at 573.
18. Id. at 577, 510 A.2d at 572-73. The Tax Court assumed that changing the use to
condominiums would increase the value. The Court of Appeals pointed out, however,
that the statute was not triggered by every change in value, but only by those amounting
to a "substantial change in use." The court gave the word "use" its "ordinary meaning"
of"the purpose or object to which something is applied." Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2523 (unabridged ed. 1971)). In the context of the case,
"use" specifically referred to "the nature of the activities pursued on the property." ld
at 578, 510 A.2d at 573 (citing Martin v. Liberty County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 152 Ga.
App. 340, 343, 262 S.E.2d 609, 612 (1979) (finding that for tax assessment purposes,
"use" refers to activity pursued on the property)).
19. Id. at 577, 510 A.2d at 572. The court suggested that the statute may have been
drafted narrowly out of concern for the administrative burden which a general reassess-
ment provision would create, and the "predictability and consistency" with which the
reassessment statute would be used. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 577-78, 510 A.2d at 572-73.
22. Id. at 578, 510 A.2d at 573.
23. Id. Cf Bridge Park Co. v. Borough of Highland Park, 113 N.J. Super. 219, 222,
Assessments had consistently interpreted condominium conversion
as a change in use for the purpose of reassessments, the court nev-
ertheless concluded that consistent interpretation did not justify ig-
noring the statute's plain meaning. 24
The Court of Appeals in Chase determined that condominium
conversion does not trigger mid-cycle reassessment by examining
the restrictive statutory language. The court observed, however,
that mid-cycle reassessment is intended to improve the accuracy
with which an assessment reflects a property's current value. Con-
verting to condominiums usually leads to an increase in value.
Clearly, the legislature could add condominium conversion to the
statutory list of specified events that trigger mid-cycle reassessment.
While condominium' projects and owners have received a
favorable result under the decision in Chase, the court reached this
result by interpreting statutory language that has since changed.
The most recent provision authorizes reassessment of property
whenever "a change in use or character" or "a subdivision" occurs.
"Subdivision" includes "the division of real property into two or
more parcels by.. . condominium plat. '" 25 It is unresolved whether
condominium conversion would constitute a "change in character"
or a "subdivision" under this new statute.26
2. Transfer Tax.-The Court of Appeals held in Nordheimer v.
Montgomery County27 that Maryland's statute authorizing the Mont-
gomery County condominium transfer tax ordinance did not con-
flict with the Maryland Horizontal Property Act.2 ' The court also
declared that the county transfer tax did not violate the equal pro-
tection provisions of the state and federal constitutions.29
The Maryland Horizontal Property Act3 0 prohibits local gov-
273 A.2d 397, 398-99 (1971) (holding condominium conversion not a change in use for
purposes of zoning); Graham Court Ass'n v. Town Council, 53 N.C. App. 543, 281
S.E.2d 418, 420-23 (1981) (same); Baker v. Town of Sullivan's Island, 279 S.C. 581, 585,
310 S.E.2d 433, 435-36 (1983) (same).
24. 306 Md. at 579. 510 A.2d at 573.
25. See supra note 10.
26. Cf Patty v. Board of County Comm'rs for Worcester County, 271 Md. 352, 317
A.2d 142 (1974) (finding it difficult to show "change in character of neighborhood" by
condominium conversion for zoning purposes).
27. 307 Md. 85, 512 A.2d 379 (1986).
28. Id. at 100, 512 A.2d at 387. The court also held that taxpayers had no cause of
action for a declaratory judgment or for a refund of condominium taxes already paid.
Id. at 98, 512 A.2d at 386.
29. Id. at 104, 512 A.2d at 388.
30. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-122(b) (1988).
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ernments from enacting laws that impose burdens on condominium
properties but not on all other similar property."' The act provides
that in the event of a conflict between the statute and any other law,
the act shall prevail.3 2 Chapter 648 of the Acts of 1980 authorized
Montgomery County to impose a four percent tax on the initial
transfers of condominium units.33 Montgomery County then
amended its code pursuant to the power granted to it by the legisla-
ture to tax the initial condominium transfers.3 4
Parkside Associates acquired title to a 954-unit apartment com-
plex in July 1980, converted the apartments to condominiums, and
began selling units in April 1981 ."5 Montgomery County demanded
that Parkside Associates pay .over $2,700,000 in taxes on the initial
title transfers pursuant to section 52-21(h) of the Montgomery
County Code.36 Parkside Associates paid the -taxes.3 7  Later the
Parkside tenants brought an action against Parkside Associates;
Nordheimer, who was a Parkside Associates general partner; and
Montgomery County, seeking a declaratory judgment that the con-
dominium transfer tax was. invalid.3" Parkside Associates and
Nordheimer filed.a cross-complaint against the County, seeking a
refund of taxes already paid, an injunction against requiring pay-
31. The statute provides:
Except as otherwise provided in ihis title, a county, city, or other jurisdiction
may not enact any law, ordinance,, or regulation which would impose a burden
or restriction on a condominium that is not imposed on all other property of
similar character not subjected to a condominium regime. Any such law, ordi-
nance, or regulation, is void. Except as otherwise expressly provided in §§ I I-
130, 11-138, 11-139, and. 11-14b of this title, the provisions of this title are
statewide in their effect. Any law, ordinance, or regulation enacted by a county,
city, or other jurisdiction is preempted by the subject and material of this title.
Id. For a detaileii disiussih-6fthe-Horizontal-Property Act-,-see Rockville Grosvenor,
Inc. v. Montgomery County, 289 Md. 74, 422 A.2d 353 (1980).
32. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-122(b) (1988).
33. 307 Md. at 89, 512 A.2d at 381. Chapter 648 of the Acts of 1980 amended the
public local laws of Montgomery County and specifically authorized the county to im-
pose a tax of "four percent of the value of the consideration for the initial transfer of a
residential unit subject to a condominium regime offered for rent for residential pur-
poses prior to the establishment of the condominium regime. The tax shall be paid by
the initial transferor of the residential unit." Act of May 20, 1980, ch. 648, 1980 Md.
Laws 2258.
34. 307 Md. at 89, 512 A.2d at 381; MorTGOMERY CouN-rv, MD., CODE § 52-21
(1984).
35. 307 Md. at 90, 512 A.2d at 381.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. id. at 90-91, 512 A.2d at 381-82. The tenants claimed that the transfer tax vio-
lated the Maryland Horizontal Property Act and the equal protection clauses of both the
Maryland and the United States Constitutions. Id.
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ment of taxes on future transfers, and a declaration that the transfer
tax was invalid.39 The circuit court granted the County's motion for
summary judgment, and all parties but Montgomery County
appealed.4"
Parkside Associates argued that taxing transfers of condomin-
ium units violated the Horizontal Property Act's prohibition against
laws burdening only condominiums." ' Parkside Associates pointed
to the absence of a similar tax on initial transfers of cooperative
units as evidence of the unequal burden on condominium trans-
fers,42 and asserted that the Horizontal Property Act must prevail
over the "conflicting" provision authorizing the county tax.43 Fur-
thermore, Parkside Associates claimed that the tax violated the
equal protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions.44
In addressing whether chapter 648 conflicted with the Horizon-
tal Property Act, the court held that although the act prevents local
governments from imposing a condominium transfer tax without
imposing a similar tax on cooperative units, chapter 648 does not
conflict with the equal burden provision of the act, but rather cre
ates a limited exception. 45 The Horizontal Property Act states that
no "county, city, or other jurisdiction" may enact a law imposing a
burden only on condominiums.4 6 By its terms, this provision does
not apply to the State.47 Therefore, the Horizontal Property Act did
not prohibit the General Assembly from enacting chapter 648 au-
thorizing the county condominium transfer tax ordinance.4 8
The court also rejected Parkside Associates' equal protection
challenge to the county transfer tax ordinance. Because the statute
in question involved no suspect class or fundamental right, the ra-
tional basis test was applied.49 A tax statute satisfies the test for
39. Id. at 91-92, 512 A.2d at 382.
40. Id. at 92, 512 A.2d at 382. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari before the
Court of Special Appeals heard the case. Id.
41. Id. at 92-93, 512 A.2d at 382-83.
42. Id. On July 1, 1981, the General Assembly authorized and'Montgomery County
enacted a tax on the initial transfer of cooperative units. Id. at 94, 512 A.2d at 383.
43. Id. at 93, 512 A.2d at 383.
44. Id. at 101, 512 A.2d at 387.
45. Id. at 100-01, 512 A.2d at 386-87.
46. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-122(b) (1988).
47. 307 Md. at 100, 512 A.2d at 387.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 101, 512 A.2d at 387. The General Assembly ordinarily cannot pass a
statute that binds future General Assemblies. See, e.g., Montgomery County v. Bigelow,
196 Md. 413. 423. 77 A.2d 164. 167 (1950) (noting that "It]he legislature cannot by
statute 'preclude' the repeal of any statute by a subsequent legislature"); Wright v.
Wright's Lessee, 2 Md. 429, 449 (1852) (finding no constitutional power of one legisla-
1988] 991
992 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 47:986
equal protection purposes if "the classifications made in imposing
the tax are not utterly arbitrary."5 Even if there exists no reason-
able difference between condominiums and cooperatives relevant to
the purposes of the tax, since a tax statute needs no other purpose
than that of raising revenue, any " 'imaginable factual basis' " for
justifying the classifications will suffice. 5 Because Parkside Associ-
ates had not met its burden of demonstrating that the distinction
between condominium and cooperative transfers was "palpably ar-
bitrary," 52 the court rejected Parkside Associates' equal protection
argument. 53
The decision in Nordhfimer rested on the conclusion that the
Horizontal Property Act, in providing that no "county, city, or other
jurisdiction" may enact laws imposing unequal burdens on condo-
miniums, did not apply to the State. This conclusion is unassailable
in light of the undisputed principle that a statute only applies to the
State when the legislature expressly names the State in the statute or
when the Statute reflects a clear intent that it apply to the State.5 4
Furthermore, to hold that the Horizontal Property Act prohibited
the General Assembly from authorizing the county transfer tax
would violate the principle that the General Assembly ordinarily
cannot restrict future legislatures.55
ture to limit the power of another legislature, except in the case of a grant or other
contract).
50. 307 Md. at 102, 512 A.2d at 387.
51. Id. .at 102-03, 512 A.2d at 387-88 (quoting Lane Corp. v. Comptroller of the
Treasury, 228 Md. 90, 97, 178 A.2d 904, 908 (1962) ("absolute mathematical equality"
not required in tax classifications)). See Villa Nova v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 256
Md. 381; 391, 260 A.2d 307, 312 (1970) ("It is only when the attempted classification
has no reasonable basis in the nature of the businesses classified and burdens are im-
posed unequally on taxpayers between whom there is no real difference that the courts
will interfere.").
52. 307 Md. at 102-03, 512 A.2d at 387-88. The court applied the "palpably arbi-
trary" standard set forth in Lane Corp., 228 Md. at 97, 178 A.2d at 908.
53. 307 Md. at 104, 512 A.2d at 388.
54. See, e.g., In re Arnold M., 298 Md. 515, 522, 471 A.2d 313, 316 (1984) (finding the
State not a "parent" for purposes of child abuse statute because "no commonly under-
stood meaning of that word encompasses the State, its agencies or instrumentalities,"
and statute did not make it "clear and indisputable" that State was intended to come
within its provisions); City of Baltimore v. State, 281 Md. 217. 223, 378 A.2d 1326, 1329
(1977) (The State is not bound by a legislative enactment "unless the enactment specifi-
cally names the State or manifests a clear and indisputable intention that the State is to
be bound.").
55. See supra note 49.
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B. Foreign Corporations
1. Exemptions for Foreign Sales Corporations.-In Comptroller of the
Treasury v. Armco, Inc.56 the Court of Special Appeals held that a
Maryland statute5 7 which exempts from state tax the income of an
affiliated domestic international sales corporation (DISC)5 8 only
when the DISC's parent corporation has at least fifty percent of its
net income allocable to Maryland, discriminates on the basis of a
corporation's business location, and thereby violates the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution. 59 Nevertheless, due pro-
cess principles allow the State to tax interest income received by a
nondomiciliary corporation conducting business in Maryland if the
income is related to the corporation's Maryland business.6 °
In 1978 the General Assembly amended aricle 81, section
280A(c) to prevent double taxation of DISCs in Maryland. 6 ' The
amendment excluded from a DISC's state taxable income the per-
centage of dividends equivalent to what may be excluded under the
amended Internal Revenue Code.62 The exclusion, however, is only
56. 70 Md. App. 403, 521 A.2d 785 (1987).
57. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 280A(c)(7) (1980 & Supp. 1987).
58. Congress created domestic international sales corporations (DISCs) in 1971
when it amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide incentives for United
States firms to increase their exports. A DISC was a hollow bookkeeping entity with a
favored tax treatment, established to isolate a corporation's foreign sales. It had no
assets, property, or personnel, and was not subject to federal tax. One-half of the
DISC's income was taxable to the parent corporation, while tax on the remaining one-
half was deferred until either the accumulated income was distributed to the sharehold-
ers or the DISC no longer qualified for special tax treatment. 70 Md. App. at 407, 521
A.2d at 786-87. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 390-92 (1984); 26
U.S.C. §§ 991-997 (1982).
The Tax Reform Act of 1984, 26 U.S.C. §§ 921-927, 991-997 (Supp. I1 1985), ter-
minated DISCs in most instances to address technical objections raised by foreign trad-
ing partners. Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs) were created to replace DISCs. FSCs
provide comparable federal tax benefits. See Tatarowicz, State Taxation of Accumulated
DISC Income and Foreign Sales Corporations, 4J. ST. TAx'N 3 (1985).
59. 70 Md. App. at 413, 521 A.2d at 790. The commerce clause provides that "[the
Congress shall have the power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several States, and with Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 3.
The Supreme Court has held that the commerce clause was adopted "to create an
area of free trade among the several states." McLeod v.J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327,
330 (1944). Furthermore, the commerce clause is "not merely an authorization to Con-
gress to enact laws for the protection or encouragement of commerce among the States,
but . . . even without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the
power of the States." Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
60. 70 Md. App. at 424, 521 A.2d at 795.
61. Id at 408, 521 A.2d at 787. Without a special provision, a state could tax the
DISC's allocable income both when it is in the hands of the DISC and when it is in the
hands of the parent corporation. Id.
62. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 280A(c)(7) (1980 & Supp. 1987). The statute provides:
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available when a parent corporation's DISC has at least fifty percent
of its net taxable income subject to Maryland taxation.63
After the General Assembly enacted the tax exclusion provision
for DISCs, Armco excluded $17,643,847 that it received from its
DISC, Armc0 Export; Sales Corporation, from its determination of
state taxable income. ' The Comptroller of the Treasury found that
the DISC did not qualify for the tax exclusion because only two per-
cent of its net income was subject to Maryland tax.65 Therefore, the
Comptroller assessed Armco an additional $23,499 in tax.66 Armco
conceded that it did not qualify for the exclusion under the statute,
but appealed the assessment to the Tax Court, arguing that the stat-
ute violated the commerce clause. 67 The Tax Court -affirmed the
Comptroller's ruling on the grounds that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to declare the statute unconstitutional.6" The
Circuit Court for Baltimore City reversed the order of the Tax
Court, holding that the statute unconstitutionally discriminated
against interstate commerce.69
In affirming the circuit court's decision the Court of Special Ap-
peals relied on Supreme Court decisions which have held that the
purpose of the commerce clause is to protect free trade by avoiding
preferential treatment for in-state businesses. 0 The court ruled
that because section 280A(c)(7) only permits a tax advantage for
parent corporations with DISCs conducting at least fifty percent of
their business in Maryland, the statute impermissibly discriminates
against interstate commerce. 7 I The court dismissed the Comptrol-
There shall be subtracted from taxable income of the taxpayer the following
items to the extent included in federal income: . . . (7) to the extent that the
dividends-are-included in taxable income, the percentage of dividends received
from an affiliated domestic international sales corporation (as defined by Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1954 § 992(a)), which is equivalent to the percentage that
would be excluded if the domestic international sales corporation.was not qual-
ified under § 992(a). However, this exclusion shall be available only if at least
50 percent of the net taxable income of the domestic international sales corpo-
ration is subject to-Maryland taxation ....
Id.
63. Id.
64. 70 Md. App. at 409, 521 A.2d at 788.
65. Id
66. Id.
67. Id. at 410, 521 A.2d at 788.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 411, 521 A.2d at 789. See Maryland v. Louisiana. 451 U.S. 725 (1981);
Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977); Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
71. 70 Md. App. at 411, 521 A.2d at 789.
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ler's assertion that the limited exclusion was permissible because it
was designed to eliminate double taxation, reasoning that a com-
pany with less than fifty percent of its income allocable to Maryland
always will pay a double tax.72 Furthermore, the court rejected the
Comptroller's argument that because Maryland has adopted a con-
stitutionally acceptable apportionment formula to determine a
DISC's state tax, the qualified tax exclusion also is constitutional.73
Instead, the court found that the apportionment formula's constitu-
tionality is irrelevant to the question whether the qualified tax exclu-
sion discriminates against interstate commerce 7 4
After deciding that section 280A(c)(7) was unconstitutional, the
court considered whether to invalidate the entire subsection of the
statute or sever the unconstitutional limitation. 7- The court ex-
amined legislative intent to determine if the legislature would have
enacted the provisionhad it known the limitation was invalid.7 6 The
court found that the legislature's intent was to address the problem
of double taxation of DISCs. Severing the unconstitutional provi-
sion would achieve this goal by extending the tax exemption to all
parent corporations conducting business in Maryland.7 7 Conse-
quently, the court severed the provision.
Next the court considered whether the State violated due pro-
cess by taxing interest payments Armco received from loans made
to the Iron Ore Company of Canada (IOCC).7 s The State could tax
Armco's interest income only if there was a "minimal connection"
or "nexus" between the interstate activities of Armco and Maryland,
72. lId at 413, 521 A.2d at 790. The Comptroller appeared to argue that the intent
was not to discriminate against interstate commerce, but rather to put a ceiling on the
double tax. Id. -
73. Id. at 414, 521 A.2d at 790.
74. Id at 415, 521 A.2d at 791.
75: Id. at 416, 521 A.2d at 791.
76: 'Id The court presumed that the legislature generally desires its invalid enact-
ments to be severed if possible. d. Nevertheless, "courts have often refused to sever
when the severed statute would impose a duty, sanction, or substantial hardship on the
otherwise excepted class." O.C. Taxpayers for Equal Rights, Inc. v. Mayor of Ocean
City, 280 Md. 585, 600, 375 A.2d 541, 550 (1977).
77. 70 Md. App. at 417, 521 A.2d at 792. Striking the entire provision would deny
the tax benefit to all parent corporations conducting business in Maryland. Id.
78. fit In 1978 Armco received $282,570 in interest payments from a loan made to
the Iron Ore Company of Canada (IOCC). Armco excluded this income from taxable
income in its Maryland return. The Comptroller, however, added the interest to
Armco's state taxable income. Id. at 411, 521 A.2d at 789. The Tax Court reversed the
Comptroller's assessment on the grounds that the activities of Armco and IOCC were
not unitary. id. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City reversed the Tax Court, holding
that since Armco operated a financial services subsidiary, the State could tax Armco's
interest income from the loan it made to IOCC. Id.
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as well as a "rational relationship between the income attributed to
the state and intrastate values of the enterprise."17 9 Armco argued
that because Armco and IOCC were not a unitary business, the State
could not apportion the interest income to Maryland. The court,
however, held that a lack of unitariness did not per se preclude the
State from taxing any income Armco received from I0CC.8 0 There
are "variations on the theme" of unitariness;8 ' the " 'economic real-
ities' of an enterprise dictate the apportionability of income the par-
ent receives. ' 82 Because a state tax is presumed constitutional, the
burden was on taxpayer Armco to prove that the interest income
was unrelated to its unitary business operations in Maryland.8" The
court could not determine whether Armco had met this burden,
since the Tax Court did not examine the issue and the factual record
was incomplete. Thus, the court remanded the case to allow the
Tax Court to answer this purely factual question.84
When deciding commerce clause issues, the Supreme Court has
prohibited a state from imposing a tax "which discriminates against
interstate commerce.., by providing a direct commercial advantage
to local business." 85 If individual states were permitted to enact
laws favoring out-of-state businesses, it "'would invite a multiplica-
tion of preferential trade areas destructive' of free trade which the
clause protects. "86 State taxes with either a discriminatory purpose
or discriminatory effect thus have been found to violate the com-
merce clause. 8 ' A case-by-case approach is necessary to properly
balance the national interest in maintaining open trade with a state's
interest in exercising its taxing powers. 88
Numerous Supreme Court decisions have held that when states
apply a particular tax to both interstate and intrastate commerce, tax
benefits. for local businesses are unconstitutional unless similar-ben-
79. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980).
80. 70 Md. App. at 420, 521 A.2d at 793. The State validly may tax the income of a
corporation if it finds unitariness between the corporation's activities in the State and
the corporation's activities that generated the income. Id.
81. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 167 (1983).
82. 70 Md. App. at 420, 521 A.2d at 793 (quoting Mobil, 445 U.S. at 441).
83. Id. at 418, 521 A.2d at 792.
84. Id. at 425, 521 A.2d at 796.
85. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458
(1959). See also Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963); Nip-
pert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Guy v. City of Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434
(1879); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
86. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977) (quoting
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951)).
87. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Hawaii, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984).
88. Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 328.
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efits are given to out-of-state businesses.8 9 For example, in Mary-
land v. Louisiana9" the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
Louisiana's "First Use" tax, which imposed a tax on natural gas
brought into the state while exempting local gas users.9' Similarly,
in Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission" a New York statute
which subjected out-of-state sales of securities to a higher tax than
in-state sales was unconstitutional because it promoted intrastate
sales at the expense of interstate sales.9" The Court found in West-
inghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully94 that a tax credit limited to gross re-
ceipts from a DISC's export of goods from New York State
unconstitutionally penalized DISCs that conducted shipping from
other states.95
The Court of Special Appeals applied the correct commerce
clause analysis in Armco. The State only provided a tax benefit to
DISCs conducting at least fifty percent of their business in Mary-
land. As a result, DISCs conducting less than half their business in
the State paid a tax which Maryland DISCs did not. The tax exclu-
sion clearly provided a commercial advantage to local businesses in
Maryland and had a discriminatory effect which violated the com-
merce clause.
In severing the unconstitutional section of the statute, rather
than invalidating the entire provision, the court followed a series of
Court of Appeals decisions. 6 Because a statute is presumptively
severable, and because severance in this case would not unduly bur-
den Armco, the court correctly decided that it was unnecessary to
invalidate the entire provision. 7 The legislature's dominant pur-
89. See supra note 59.
90. 451 U.S. 725 (1981). The Supreme Court developed a four-part test to deter-
mine the validity of a state tax under the commerce clause. A state tax is valid only if the
tax: " 1) has a substantial nexus with the State; 2) is fairly apportioned; 3) does not
discriminate against interstate commerce; and 4) is fairly related to services provided by
the State." id. at 754.
91. Id. at 760.
92. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
93. Id. at 336-37.
94. 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
95. Id. at 401, 407.
96. See Cities Servs. Co. v. Maryland, 290 Md. 553, 577, 431 A.2d 663, 676 (1981)
(severing grandfather clause in an exception to the retail service station Divestiture
Law); O.C. Taxpayers for Equal Rights. Inc. v. Mayor of Ocean City, 280 Md. 585, 603,
375 A.2d 541, 551 (1977) (severing grandfather provision in charter clause which pro-
hibited nonresident voting); Sanza v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 245 Md. 319, 338-
39, 226 A.2d 317, 327-28 (1967) (severing unconstitutional standards from an obscenity
statute).
97. See OC Taxpayers, 280 Md. at 600-01, 375 A.2d at 549-50.
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pose in enacting section 280A(c)(7) was to limit double taxation of
DISCs; the court's severing of the unconstitutional portion of the
statute still allowed Maryland to accomplish the legislature's goal.
While the court did not decide whether Maryland's tax on
IOCC's interest payments to Armco violated due process, the court
held that a lack of unitariness between a "taxpayer and payor corpo-
ration" does not necessarily preclude a state from taxing income
which the taxpayer receives from the payor.98 This determination is
consistent with the Supreme Court's holding that "the Constitution
imposes no single formula on the States" for determining state tax
on income arising out of interstate activities. 99 The court focused
on whether Armco made the loan to 10CC as an ",extraordinary iso-
lated transaction" or in the ordinary course of business. 0 0 Because
it was unclear whether Armco had demonstrated that it had not
earned the interest income as a part of its unitary business, the court
properly remanded the case to the Tax Court.
2. Solicitation of Business in Matyland.-The Court of Special Ap-
peals held in Matthew Bender & Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury' 0 ' that
article 81, section 316(c) of the Annotated Code of Maryland' 0 2 and
title 15, section 381(a) of the United States Code' permit the
Comptroller of the Treasury to consider "solicitation" along with
other activities conducted within Maryland when determining
whether a foreign corporation is "doing business" in the State and
thus subject to Maryland taxation.4
Under article 81, section 316,010 foreign corporations must pay
tax only on income derived from business carried on within the
State. The corporation may determine the amount of taxable in-
come through separate accounting_ or,in the case of a unitary busi-
ness, through measuring the corporation's property, payroll, and
sales located in Maryland.' 06 Title 15, section 381(a) of the United
States Code,'0 7 however, limits taxation under section 316 by
98. 70 Md. App. at 422, 521 A.2d at 794.
99. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 164 (1983).
100. 70 Md. App. at 423-25, 521 A.2d at 795-96.
101. 67 Md. App. 693, 509 A.2d 702 (1986).
102. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 316 (1980 & Supp. 1987).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a) (1982).
104. 67 Md. App. at 711, 509 A.2d at 711.
105. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 316 (1980 & Supp. 1987). The current version of
§ 316, which took effect July 1. 1987, provides the same methods for determining taxa-
ble income as those applied by the court. See id.
106. Id. at (b), (c) (Supp. 1987).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a) (1982). The statute provides:
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prohibiting any state from collecting a tax from a corporation if the
only business conducted within that state is solicitation of orders for
products to be delivered from outside the state.108
. Matthew Bender is a publisher of legal texts with its principal
offices outside of Maryland.' 09 In 1981 the Comptroller of the
Treasury mailed Bender a notice informing the company that it was
liable for Maryland income taxes for 1975 through 1980 because
Bender had conducted business within the State." 0 Bender paid
$74,081 to cover the tax and the assessed interest,"' and then filed
an amended return requesting a full refund."' The Comptroller
denied this request, and Bender appealed to the Tax Court." ,s
The Tax Court reversed the Comptroller's denial of the refund
request, holding that Bender's activities were not sufficient to trig-
ger Maryland income tax under the State statute."' The circuit
court, however, reversed the Tax Court's order, finding that Bender
(a) No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to impose, for
any taxable year ending after September 14, 1959, a net income tax on the
income derived within such State by any person from interstate commerce if
the only business activities within such State by or on behalf of such person
during such taxable year are either, or both, of the following:
(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his. representative, in
such State for sales of tangible personal property, which orders are
sent outside the State for approval or rejection, and, if approved, are
filled by shipment or delivered from a point outside the State; and
(2) the solicitation of orders by such person or his representative, in such
State in the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer of
such person, if orders by such customer to such person to enable such
customer to fill orders resulting from such solicitation are orders de-
scribed in paragraph (1).
Id.
108. Section 316, which Congress enacted in response to Northwestern States Port-
land Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959), was intended to relieve the per-
ceived administrative burdens of state taxation. Developments in the Law-Fedral
Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARv. L. REV. 953, 974 (1962). In
Northwestern States the United States Supreme Court held that due process does not bar a
state from taxing a foreign corporation's net income derived solely from the interstate
sale of products. 358 U.S. at 464-65.
109. 67 Md. App. at 696, 509 A.2d at 703.
110. Id. Although Bender solicited orders from customers in Maryland through mail
orders and commissioned sales personnel, orders for publications were sent to Bender's
principal offices. Bender received printing services from a Maryland printer, Port City
Press, and Bender sent representatives to Maryland to consult with the printer from time
to time. Bender also supplied Port City Press with paper for printing. Id. at 697, 509
A.2d at 703-04.
111. Id. at 696, 509 A.2d at 703.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 697, 509 A.2d at 704.
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was conducting business within Maryland and was therefore subject
to taxation for the years in question.' 5
In determining, whether the circuit court erroneously had re-
versed the Tax Court, the Court of Special Appeals identified and
applied the three-pronged analysis for review of a Tax Court deci-
sion' 16 derived from the Court of Appeals decision in Ramsay, Scar-
lett & Co v. Comptroller of the Treasury."' First, the court must
determine whether the .agency recognized and applied the correct
principles of law to the case." 8 Second, the agency's factual find-
ings must be supported by substantial evidence." 9 Finally, the re-
viewing court must assess whether the agency appropriately applied
the law to the facts.' 2
0
The Court of Special Appeals held that the Tax Court did not
apply the correct principles of law when it failed to consider
Bender's solicitation activities along with its other activities in deter-
mining whether Bender owed Maryland taxes. 12 ' The court found
no support for the Tax Court's interpretation of title 15, section
381 (a) of the United States Code, inasmuch as nothing in the statute
precludes a state from considering solicitation along with other in-
trastate activities in determining a corporation's tax liability.'
2 2
Thus, the circuit court properly reversed that aspect of the Tax
Court's decision. '
23
115. Id. at 698, 509 A.2d at 704.
116. Id. at 705, 509 A.2d at 708. The court refers to the circuit court's review of the
Tax Court's judgment as "appellate." Id., 509 A.2d at 707. In a strict sense, however.
because the Tax Court is an administrative agency and does not exercise a judicial func-
tion, review of its decision is an exercise of original jurisdiction, not appellate review.
Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 276 Md. 36, 47, 343 A.2d 521, 527 (1975).
The tripartite test applied by the court is set forth in detail in Comptroller of the Treas-
ury v. World Book Childcraft Int'l, 67 Md. App. 424, 508 A.2d 148 (1986).
117. 302 Md. 825, 490 A.2d 1296 (1985).
118. World Book, 67 Md. App. at 438, 508 A.2d at 155-56.
119. Id. at 438-39, 508 A.2d at 156.
120. Id. al 439, 508 A.2d at 156.
121. 67 Md. App. at 711, 509 A.2d at 711. The Tax Court believed that Congress
only intended to permit states to consider solicitation with other activities related to
solicitation. Id. at 708, 509 A.2d at 709. By not including solicitation in its analysis of
whether Bender's unrelated activities created a sufficient nexus to Maryland for tax pur-
poses, the Tax Court applied a narrow standard which made it more difficult to find tax
liability. If solicitation and unrelated activities are considered together, it is easier to
find that a corporation's activities create a sufficient connection with a state to warrant
taxation.
122. Id. at 707, 509 A.2d at 709. The statute is silent on this point. It prohibits state
taxation of a person if that person's "only business activities" are solicitation of orders.
15 U.S.C. § 381(a) (1982). No distinction is made between other activities which are
related to solicitation and those which are not. Id.
123. 67 Md. App. at 711, 509 A.2d at 711.
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The circuit court, however, improperly substituted its judgment
for that of the Tax Court when it found that Bender indeed was
doing business in Maryland.' 24 The proper. course would have been
for the court to remand the case to allow the Tax Court to apply the
correct interpretation of section 381 to the facts.' 25 Because the de-
termination of whether Bender was "doing business" in Maryland
was within the expertise of the Tax Court, the Court of Special Ap-
peals held that neither the circuit court nor itself should decide this
issue. 1 26
Under article 81, section 229(o), the circuit court must affirm
the Tax Court's order if it is not erroneous as a matter of law and if
it is supported by substantial evidence appearing in the record..2 7
The Court of Appeals consistently has interpreted this statute to
mean that the judiciary is under no statutory constraint when it
reverses the Tax Court for an erroneous conclusion of law.12 8 Be-
cause the circuit court found that the Tax Court committed an error
of law in failing to consider solicitation along with other activities,12 9
Bender does not depart from precedent.
The Court of Special Appeals also determined that the circuit
court improperly substituted its judgment for that of, the Tax Court
in finding that Bender was conducting business within Maryland. 30
Under section 229(o), the circuit court may not reverse the Tax
Court if the Tax Court has not committed an error of law and if the
Tax Court's decision is supported by substantial evidence. 3 ', Judi-
cial review of a decision of the Tax Court is limited; it "need not and
must not be either judicial fact finding or a substitution of judicial
judgment for agency judgment. "132
Title 15, section 381 (a) of the United States Code' exempts a
corporation from state taxation if the corporation's only business
activity within the state is solicitation of orders for the sale of tangi-
124. d. at 711-12, 509 A.2d at 711.
125. id. at 712, 509 A.2d at 711.
126. d. at 711-12, 509 A.2d at 711.
127. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81. § 229,(o) (Supp. 1987).
128. See, e.g., Ramsey, Scarlett & Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 302 Md. 825,
834, 490 A.2d 1296, 1301 (1985) (discussing standard of review); Supervisor of Assess-
ments v. Carroll, 298 Md. 311, 318-19, 469 A.2d 858, 862-63 (1984) (discussing errone-
ous finding that homes were devoted to farm use).
129. 67 Md. App. at 711-12 n.6, 509 A.2d at 711 n.6.
130. Id. at 711-12, 509 A.2d at 711.
131. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 229(o) (Supp. 1987).
132. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Diebold, 279 Md. 401, 407, 369 A.2d 77, 81
(1977).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a) (1982).
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ble personal property when the orders are approved and filled
outside of the state. 134 The statute and its legislative history 3 5 do
not distinguish between business activities which are related to so-
licitation and those which are not; rather, the statute merely states
that solicitation alone does not subject a corporation to state tax
liability.'316 Thus, once it is established that a corporation engages
in business activities beyond mere solicitation, a state may examine
those activities- together with solicitation to determine whether the
state may tax the corporation. The Court of Special Appeals there-
fore correctly directed the circuit court to remand the case to the
Tax Court with instructions to consider Bender's solicitation activi-
ties along with its other activities in order to determine whether





135. See S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., IsL Sess., reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2548, 2554.




1. Duty.--a. Banks.-The Court of Appeals held in Jacques v.
First National Bank of Maryland' that once a bank has agreed to pro-
cess a loan, it owes its customer a duty of reasonable care in the
processing and evaluation of the loan application.2 Declaring that a
cause of action in negligence exists when a defendant bank has
"failed to exercise that degree of care which a reasonably prudent
bank would have exercised .under the same or similar circum-
stances,", the court found a duty which never before had been rec-
ognized in Maryland.'
On July 30, 1980, Robert and Margaret Jacques entered into a
residential sales contract contingent upon their ability to obtain
specified financing.' The parties modified the contract to require
the Jacques to increase their downpayment to "whatever amount
necessary to qualify for a mortgage loan."' The Jacques submitted
an application for a mortgage along with the contract and adden-
dum to the First National Bank of Maryland (the Bank).7 The Jac-
ques also paid the required $144 fee for the appraisal and credit
report necessary to initiate processing of the loan.' When the Bank
informed the Jacques that they qualified for a loan well below their
expectations,9 the Jacques requested that their application be re-
fused outright; the Bank denied the request under the provisions of
1. 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986).
2. Id. at 544, 515 A.2d at 764.
3. Id.
4. SeeJacques v. First Nat'l Bank of Maryland, 62 Md. App. 54, 60, 488 A.2d 210,
212-13 (1985) ("The Jacques have requested that this Court recognize a duty which has
never before been recognized in Maryland; a duty which would run in direct conflict
with the long established right of a person to refuse to do business with others, for
nearly any reason or for no reason at all.").
5. 307 Md. at 528-29, 515 A.2d at 756-57. The contract required the Jacques to
secure the purchase price of $142,000 by paying $30,000 down and the balance of
$112,000 through a conventional deed of trust, due in 30 years and bearing interest at
the rate of 12-1/4% per year. Id.
6. Id. at 529, 515 A.2d at 757.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 530, 515 A.2d at 757. The Bank informed the Jacques that they qualified
for a loan of only $41,400. The Jacques then attempted to obtain financing from Metro-
politan Federal Savings and Loan, which issued a commitment for a 30-year loan in the
amount of $100,000 at 13-7/8% interest. Id.
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the contract.' ° The Jacques proceeded to settlement with the
Bank's mortgage loan, obtaining the balance of the money from rel-
atives and a short-term personal loan of $50,000 from the Bank."
The Jacques sued the Bank in the Circuit Court for Montgom-
ery County and went to trial before a jury on counts of malicious
interference with contract, gross negligence, and negligence."2 The
jury returned a verdict in favor of the Bank on the first two counts
and in favor of the Jacques on the negligence count.s TheJacques
appealed on the ground that the judge erred in instructing the jury
concerning the plaintiffs' duty to mitigate damages; the Bank cross-
appealed, asserting that it owed no duty in processing a loan
application. '
The Court of Special Appeals held that, prior to the parties en-
tering into a contractual relation, the Bank did not owe the Jacques
a duty of care in processing the loan application.'" Because the in-
termediate appellate court did not address the Jacques' argument
concerning the duty to mitigate damages, the Court of Appeals con-
sidered only the duty of care issue. Concluding that the Bank owed
a duty of care, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and
remanded for proceedings on the Jacques' contentions.' 6
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Bank and the Jacques
had a contractual relationship which included an implied promise to
use reasonable care.' 7 The issue was whether a breach of this im-
plied promise gave rise to a cause of action in negligence. "
The court found that the mere negligent breach of a contractual
duty, standing alone, will not sustain an action in tort.'" There are
10. Id. On appeal, the court considered whether the B.Bank owed a duty of care to
accede to the applicants' request in order to avoid economic loss. The court found that
the Bank correctly refused the request as it was obligated under the contract to offer a
commitment in the amount for which it deemed the applicants to be qualified. Id. at
541, 515 A.2d at 763.
!1. Id. at 530, 515 A.2d at 757.
12. Id. at 527, 530-31, 515 A.2d at 756-58. The Jacques' complaint was in five
counts: malicious interference with contract, breach of fidelity, negligence, gross negli-
gence, and prima facie tort. The trial court directed a verdict against the Jacques on the
breach of fidelity count. The Jacques entered a voluntary dismissal on the prima facie
tort count. 62 Md. App. at 58, 488 A.2d at 212.
13. 307 Md. at 531, 515 A.2d at 758.
14. Id.
15. 62 Md. App. at 65, 488 A.2d at 215.
16. 307 Md. at 545, 515 A.2d at 765.
17. Id. at 540, 515 A.2d at 762.
18. Id. at 534-35, 515 A.2d at 759-60.
19. Id. at 534, 515 A.2d at 759. See Heckrotte v. Riddle, 224 Md. 591, 595, 168 A.2d
879, 882 (1961) ("The mere negligent breach of a contract, absent a duty or obligation
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two considerations in finding a tort duty: "the nature of the harm
likely to result from a failure to exercise due care, and the relation-
ship that exists between the parties."-20  Because the foreseeable
harm here involved only economic loss, 21 the court required an "in-
timate nexus" between the parties, which may be satisfied by con-
tractual privity or its equivalent, as a condition to the imposition of
tort liability.2
2
The court took care not to overturn the common-law rule that
"ordinarily a proprietor may refuse to do business with a person for
any reason except race, color, creed, or national origin."123 Here,
however, the Bank did not refuse, but instead undertook to process
the Jacques' mortgage application. The court focused on the rela-
tionship between the parties in determining whether it should rec-
ognize a concomitant tort duty under these circumstances.24 More
precisely, the court set out to determine whether its "intimate
nexus" requirement had been satisfied.
The court reasoned that the extraordinary financing provisions
in the real estate contract put the Bank on notice of the Jacques'
vulnerability due to their legal obligation to proceed to settlement
with whatever loan the Bank offered them. 25 The court also consid-
ered the nature of the banking industry, noting that "It]he law gen-
erally recognizes a tort duty of due care arising from contractual
dealings with professionals such as physicians, attorneys, architects,
imposed by law independent of that arising out of the contract itself, is not enough to
maintain an action sounding in tort.").
20. 307 Md. at 534, 515 A.2d at 759.
21. Id. at 535, 515 A.2d at 760. The court relied on two early, leading economic loss
decisions that considered claims of the existence of tort duties. In Glanzer v. Shepard,
233 N.Y. 236, 238-39, 135 N.E. 275, 275-76 (1922), the Court of Appeals of New York
held that a public weigher of beans was liable to the buyer for negligent weighing. In
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 188, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931), the same
court found that a public accountant was liable in tort, but only to the client, for negli-
gent preparation of a balance sheet.
22. 307 Md. at 534-35, 515 A.2d at 759-60. The court.found it significant that in
both Glanzer and Uitramares the New York court had no difficulty in finding that the ac-
tors under each contract owed a duty of care to the parties with whom they had contrac-
tual privity or its legal equivalent. Id. at 536, 515 A.2d at 760-61. "By contrast, where
the risk created is personal injury, no such relationship need be shown." Id. at 535, 515
A.2d at 760. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)
(manufacturer held liable for consumer's injuries resulting from defective automobile).
23. 307 Md. at 539, 515 A.2d at 762. The court recently reaffirmed this rule in Sil-
bert v. Ramsey, 301 Md. 96, 100-01, 482 A.2d 147, 149-50 (1984) (finding that racetrack
owner had right to eject track patron previously convicted of violating lottery laws).
24. 307 Md. at 540, 515 A.2d at 762.
25. Id. at 540-41, 515 A.2d at 762-63.
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and public accountants." 26 In addition, the court looked to its hold-
ing in St. Paul at" Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Insurance,27 which
declared that in occupations requiring special skill, those who repre-
sent that they possess the particular skill will be obliged to act with
reasonable care.28
The court focused on decisions which have relied heavily on the
nature of the industry in deciding whether to impose tort liability
absent a contractual relationship. In Djowharzadeh v. City National
Bank & Trust Co. 29 the Court of Appeals of Oklahoma found that a
bank owed a duty to maintain the confidentiality of information pro-
vided by a loan applicant, stressing the close relationship between
the banking industry and public interest.30 Similarly, the Supreme
Court of Iowa held in Duffie v. Bankers' Life Association of Des Moines s3
that an insurance company has a duty to act promptly regarding all
applications submitted. The Iowa court emphasized that the insur-
ance industry was affected with a public interest; moreover, an in-
surance company required a state franchise in order to do
business.3 2
The court considered the public nature of the business in Jac-
ques, but carefully pointed out that it was not assigning this part of
the test as much weight as did the Iowa and Oklahoma courts.33 Be-
cause the court found that a contractual relation existed, it was not
necessary to determine the Bank's liability absent a contract.3 4
26. Id. at 541, 515 A.2d at 763.
27. 262 Md. 192, 278 A.2d 12, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971) (finding that mort-
gage broker had duty to act with reasonable care).
28. Id. at 219, 278 A.2d at 26 (adopting trial court's conclusions of law).
29. 646 P.2d 616 (Okla. Ct.-App. 1982).
30. Id. at 619. The court stated:
Banks exist and operate almost solely by using public funds and are invested
with enormous public trust. Their financial power within the community
amounts to virtual financial monopoly in the field of lending. The legislature
has carefully defined their corporate charge within finite limits in direct propor-
tion to their power.
Id.
31. 160 Iowa 19, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913).
32. Id. at 25, 139 N.W. at 1089.
33. 307 Md. at 542, 515 A.2d at 763.
34. Id. at 539, 515 A.2d at 762. The court distinguished the case at bar from situa-
tions in which a prospective customer simply submits an application for a loan. Id.
When a bank or insurance company has not undertaken to process an application, courts
generally have found no duty. See, e.g., Patten v. Continental Casualty Co., 162 Ohio St.
18, 24, 120 N.E.2d 441, 444-45 (1954) (no duty to act on insurance policy within a
reasonable time absent a contract); Zayc y. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 338 Pa.
426, 429, 13 A.2d 34, 36 (1940) (delay in acceptance of contract not actionable unless a
contract can be found).
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The possibility exists that in the future Maryland courts will
face the question of imposing tort liability on a bank absent a con-
tract when the only foreseeable damages are monetary. In light of
the court's reluctance to abrogate the common-law rule that a party
may refuse to do business with another party for any reason, it
seems unlikely that absent an agreement supported by valuable con-
sideration, banks and other similarly situated institutions will have a
duty of reasonable care imposed upon them.
The opinion inJacques suggests that the court may be willing to
extend tort actions for economic loss absent the requirement of
privity when the relationship between the parties satisfies the alter-
native "intimate nexus" requirement. In light of the factors consid-
ered by the court in Jacques in determining whether there was an
"intimate nexus" between the parties, it is possible that the court
will extend liability to other professionals who conceivably could
stand in a similar relationship to their clients.
b. Builders, Developers, and Architects.-In Council of Co-Owners At-
lantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting- Turner Contracting Co.35 the Court of
Appeals extended 'tort liability to builders, developers, and archi-
tects for the risk of personal injury to parties who enjoy no contrac-
tual privity with them. 6 The court held that
privity is not an absolute prerequisite to the existence of a
tort duty in this type of case, and that the duty of builders
and architects to use due care in the design, inspection,
and construction of a building extends to those persons
foreseeably subjected to the risk of personal injury because
of a latent and unreasonably dangerous condition resulting
from that negligence."
The court also stated that when a hazardous defect is discovered
before injury results, a negligence action will lie for the recovery of
the reasonable cost of correcting the defect.3 8
The council of unit owners of Atlantis Condominiums 3 9 and
three individual unit owners brought suit against the general con-
tractor,40 developer,4 ' and architects 42 responsible for the build-
35. 308 Md. 18, 517 A.2d 336 (1986).
36. Id. at 22, 517 A.2d at 338.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The Atlantis Condominium is a 2 1-story building in Ocean City, Maryland, con-
sisting of 198 individual units. Id.
40. The unit owners alleged that the general contractor, Whiting-Turner Con-
tracting Company, negligently constructed the building. Id. at 23, 517 A.2d at 339.
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ing's construction. The unit owners alleged that the defendants'
negligent construction and installation of ten vertical utility shafts
and the related electrical work resulted in latent defects which could
have resulted in a fire threatening the safety of the owners and their
property.4" The lower court sustained the defendants' demurrers
and concluded that "Maryland law would not recognize a tort duty
in the absence of privity under these circumstances, and that in any
event a duty would not be recognized where only economic loss was
claimed.""
The Court of Appeals advanced the general premise that the
decision to impose a duty should not rest on the"'fortuitous circum-
stances of the nature of the resultant damage,"45 but instead on the
magnitude of the risk created by the negligent conduct of the build-
ers and architects.46 The court then examined a developer's poten-
tial liability for hazardous conditions in each of three roles: owner
and occupier ofthe land, creator of the improvement, and vendor of
the dwelling units.4
As owner of the property, a developer has a nondelegable duty
to those persons who may come upon the property; however, the
scope of the duty depends on the status of the individual entering
the land."8 When the developer, as owner, sells the property, the
developer generally is liable only if the hazardous defect existed at
the time of the sale and the developer "knew or had reason to know
of the condition and of the risk involved, and failed to disclose that
information to the vendee."4 9 After the sale of the property the
landowner's liability extends only to actual personal injury. The
41. The -unit. owners alleged that the developer, Colonial Mortgage Service Com-
pany, negligently or knowingly permitted the defective construction, which deviated
from building plans and the building code. They also claimed Colonial negligently ob-
tained an occupancy permit and negligently misrepresented, through advertising and
the sale of the units, the "building's suitability for occupancy." Id.
42. The unit owners sued the design and supervising architects, Meyers & D'Aleo,
Inc., for negligently inspecting, supervising, and accepting the work. Alexander Ewing
and the partnership of Ewing Cole Erdman Rizzio Cherry Parsky, the architects em-
ployed to inspect and certify the building, were sued for negligent inspection and mis-
representation of the building's habitability. d.
43. Id. at 22, 517 A.2d at 338.
44. Id. at 24, 517 A.2d at 339.
45. Id. 21t 35, 517 A.2d at 345.
46. "[Clonditions that present a risk to general health, welfare, or comfort but fall
short of presenting a clear danger of death or personal injury will not suffice." Id. at 35
n.5,.517 A.2d at 345 n.5.





unit owners did not allege that the developer's negligence had in
fact resulted in personal injury."
As a vendor of residential property, a developer had no liability
at common law because implied warranties for the sale of improved
real property did not exist. The rule of caveat emptor reigned
supreme."1 The legislature has passed laws imposing implied war-
ranties" in these cases, but the unit owners did not allege a breach
of this warranty.5"
Finally, when, as in the instant case, the developer is the creator
of.the building project and there is a violation of a building code
provision which has caused or could cause death or personal injury,
a nondelegable duty is imposed on the developer.5 4 A developer
who is liable only by reason of vicarious liability resulting from this
nondelegable duty has a right to indemnity from the negligent
party. Thus, as .creator of the building project, the developer in this
case was liable for the hazardous risk created by architects' and
builders' negligent construction in violation of a safety provision of
the building code. 5
Originally, tort liability of builders and architects did not ex-
tend to third *parties with whom there was no contractual privity.
56
Gradually the law recognized exceptions to this general rule. 7 Nev-
ertheless, courts have been reluctant to extend these exceptions as
50. Id. at 38, 517 A.2d at 346.
51. Id.
52. The legislature did not take the initial step away from the rule of caveat emptor in
this area of tort law until 1970. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-203(a) (1988) (war-
ranties in contracts for sale of land). The legislature passed additional legislation to
provide implied warranties for the sale by a developer of newly constructed or converted
condominium units. See id. § 11-13 1.
53. 308 Md. at 38, 517 A.2d at 347.
54. Id. at 39, 517 A.2d at 347. The court suggested that if the question of nondele-
gable duty had been based on a broader claim, it would have found liability based on
"unreasonably dangerous conditions created as a result of development." Id.
55. Id. at 40-41. 517 A.2d at 348.
56. Id. at 24, 517 A.2d at 339.
57. These exceptions include instances in which: (I) the builder fraudulently or de-
liberately obscured defects in the construction, see Bryson v. Hines, 268 F. 290, 294 (4th
Cir. 1920) (delivery to government of negligently constructed railroad track); Penn-
sylvania Steel Co. v. Elmore & Hamilton Contracting Co., 175 F. 176, 177 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1909) (fraudulent concealment of defects in bridge concrete); (2) the construction cre-
ated a defect that was imminently or inherently dangerous, see Johnston v. Long, 56 Cal.
App. 2d 834, 133 P.2d 409, 410 (1943) (negligent maintenance of door); Holland Fur-
nace Co. v. Nauracaj, 105 Ind. App. 574, 577, 14 N.E.2d 339, 341 (1938) (negligent
installation of furnace); and (3) the construction created a nuisance per se, see Littell v.
Argus Prod. Co., 78 F.2d 955, 957 (10th Cir. 1935) (construction of oil derrick). 308
Md. at 25, 517 A.2d at 340.
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far as in the area of products liability,58 where a manufacturer's duty
of care has been extended "just about as far as the prudent eye can
foresee unreasonable harm."59 In the case of a builder, there has
been no tort liability for injuries which occurred after the owner ac-
cepted the building or other subject of the contract.6'
The general rule which has evolved declares:
[T]he contractor is liable to all those who may foreseeably
be injured by the structure, not only when he fails to dis-
close dangerous conditions known to him, but also when
the work is negligently done. This applies not only to con-
tractors doing original work, but also to those who make
repairs, or install parts, as well as supervising architects
and engineers. There may be liability for negligent design,
as well as for negligent construction.6 1
This rule extends the duty of builders and architects to a third per-
son even in instances in which the owner has accepted the work.62
Several courts across the Nation already have recognized this rule as
law.63
While traditionally Maryland has not embraced this general
58. Exceptions to nonliability in the area of products liability extend to negligence
for failure to: (1) inspect or test the materials, see Trowbridge v. Abrasive Co., 190 F.2d
825, 828 (3d Cir. 1951) (inspection of grinding wheels); Pierce v. Ford Motor Co., 190
F.2d 910, 912 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 887 (1951) (inspection of new automobile
parts); (2) inspect or test the finished product, see Kriss v. Kelsey Hayes Co., 29 A.D.2d
901, 287 N.Y.S.2d 926, 927 (1968) (inspection of pliers); (3) discover any defects or
dangerous elements, see Walton v. Sherwin Williams Co., 191 F.2d 277, 282 (8th Cir.
1951) (ingredient in weed killer); (4) make accurate representations in advertising and
sales, see Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla. 1953) (labeling of seed
packets); and (5) disclose known defects and dangers,-see-Schubert v.J.R.-Clark Co., 49
Minn. 331, 339, 51 N.W. 1103, 1105 (1892) (defects in ladder). See generally W. PROSSER,
D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 684
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
59. 308 Md. at 26, 517 A.2d at 340. In products liability cases the beginning of this
trend away from nonliability started in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 214 N.Y. 382,
i1 N.E. 1050 (1916).
60. 308 Md. at 26, 517 A.2d at 340.
61. PROSSER & KEETON, SUpra note 58, § 104(A), at 723.
62. 308 Md. at 28, 517 A.2d at 341.
63. See, e.g., Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469, 474-75 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Gichner Iron Works, Inc. v. Hanna, 351 U.S. 989 (1956) (contractor's negligent repair
of stair rail); Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 580-81, 498 P.2d 1179, 1182
(1972) (negligent installation of glass door); Drexel Properties, Inc. v. Bay Colony Club
Condominium, Inc., 406 So. 2d 515, 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 198 1), remiew denied, 417 So.
2d 328 (Fla. 1982) (negligent construction of condominiums); Totten v. Gruzen, 52 NJ.
202. 210, 245 A.2d I, 5 (1968) (negligent design of apartment heating system); Oates v.
Jag, Inc., 314 N.C. 276, 277, 333 S.E.2d 222, 223-24 (1985) (negligent construction of
house).
rule, an examination of pertinent case law reveals the development
of the law in this direction. For example, in Marlboro Shirt Co. v.
American District Telegraph Co. 6 the Court of Appeals held that a con-
tractor who failed to fulfill a contract owed no duty to the general
public for negligent actions resulting in property damage.6 5
The court in Otis Elevator Co. v. Embert 61 assumed "the existence
of tort duty on the part of the elevator maintenance contractor in
favor of a user of the elevator, notwithstanding the absence of priv-
ity."'" The court denied recovery to the injured elevator user not
because of the absence of privity but because it could find no duty of
the elevator company which could be related to the accident."
Finally, in Krieger v. JE. Greiner Co. 69 and Coffey. v. Derby Steel Co. 70
the court reaffirmed its holding in Otis. The court based its deci-
sions not upon whether a duty was owed to third parties, but upon
whether there existed any duty related to the suffered injury.7 '
The court in Council of Co-Owners followed this general trend by
extending tort liability of contractors, architects, and developers to
third parties for negligent construction despite the lack of privity.
72
The changes in this area of tort law parallel those in the area of
products liability, in which the requirement of privity for recovery in
tort actions has been all but abolished. One easily can predict an
increased broadening of liability in the construction area.
Oftentimes construction defects are discovered well after the
owner has accepted the building. If the contractor, architect, and
developer cause a defect through negligent construction, they
should be held liable for any damages caused, especially if personal
64. 196 Md. 565, 77 A.2d 776 (1951).
65. Id. at 571-72, 77 A.2d at 778.
66. 198 Md. 585, 84 A.2d 876 (1951).
67. 308 Md. at 30, 517 A.2d at 342. See Embert, 198 Md. at 599, 84 A.2d, at 882
("[Wie shall assume that MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company and the cases which antici-
pated or followed it are law in Maryland.").
68. Embert, 198 Md. at 602, 84 A.2d at 883.
69. 282 Md. 50, 382 A.2d.1069 (1978) (finding that consulting and design contracts
imposed no duty to supervise safety).
70. 291 Md. 241, 434 A.2d 564 (1981) (finding plaintiff's fall unrelated to defend-
ant's duty to inspect steel beam).
71. Krieger, 282 Md. at 69, 382 A.2d at 1079; Coffey, 291 Md. at 259, 434 A.2d at 574.
See 308 Md. at 30, 517 A.2d at 343.
72. For other cases extending this liability, see Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel
Co., 166 F.2d 908 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 846 (1948); Pastorelli v. Associated
Eng'rs Inc., 176 F. Supp. 159 (D.R.I. 1959); Paxton v. Alameda County, 119 Cal. App.
2d 393, 259 P.2d 934 (1953); Kapalczynski v. Globe Constr. Co., 19 Mich. App. 396, 172
N.W.2d 852 (1969); Gasteiger v. Gillenwater, 57 Tenn. App. 206, 417 S.W.2d 568
(1966).
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injury is involved. It is an easy step from allowing recovery after the
injury has occurred to recovering in tort law after the defect is dis-
covered but before the injury has occurred. A latent defect with the
potential to cause serious physical harm is just as undesirable as one
that already has done so. 73
The court has taken its first step to allow recovery for negligent
construction which has the potential for injury, even though the
holding extends only to the risk of personal injury and not to eco-
nomic injury. 74  Contractors, architects, and developers are ex-
pected to deliver hazard-free buildings, and they should be
responsible for any negligent actions which prevent their finished
product from being safe.
c. Property Owners.-In Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace Limited Part-
nership75 the Court of Appeals refused to abolish the firefighter's
rule76 and thereby extend tort law to encompass negligence suits by
.firefighters7 7 injured during the course of their dangerous employ-
ment.78 The court held that the owner or occupant of the property
has no duty to keep the pioperty prepared and safe for firefighters;
nevertheless, the owner or occupant must abstain from willful or
wanton misconduct or entrapment and warn of hidden dangers.79
The court based its holding not on the traditional premises liability
rationale that firefighters are mere licensees, ° but on the newer the-
73. The court in Council of Co-Owners stated that "it is not necessary... to wait until
bodily harm occurs, and an action will lie to recover the cost of repairing a condition
created by such a breach of duty where there is shown to exist an actual risk of death or
bodily injury." 308 Md. at 40-41, 517 A.2d at 348.
74. In products liability cases recovery often is denied whether privity is present or
not if the injury is-a-purely economic-one. Id at 33, 51-7-A.2d-at 344. Nevertheless, some
courts refuse to distinguish between the risk of physical injury and the risk of economic
loss. Id. at 34, 517 A.2d at 345. See Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 230, 342
N.E.2d 619, 621 (1976) (sale of real estate). Perhaps the court's next step will be to
extend recovery to include the risk of economic harm.
75. 308 Md. 432, 520 A.2d 361 (1987).
76. The firefighter's rule limits a firefighter's ability to recover in tort for injuries
arising out of the course of employment, because of the inherently hazardous nature of
that occupation. Id. at 447, 520 A.2d at 368.
77. The firefighter's rule also applies to police officers. Id. at 442 n.4, 520 A.2d at
366 n.4.
78. Id. at 447-48, 520 A.2d at 368.
79. Id. at 443, 520 A.2d at 366.
80. Id. at 444, 520 A.2d at 367, The classification of firefighters as licensees, not
invitees, is significant:
An invitee is in general a person invited or permitted to enter or remain on
another's property for purposes connected with or related to the owner's busi-
ness; the owner must use reasonable and ordinary care to keep his premises
safe for the invitee and to protect him from injury caused by an unreasonable
1012
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ory of public policy."'
David Flowers, a firefighter with the Kensington Volunteer Fire
Department, responded, along with other members of the depart-
ment, to a fire alarm at the Rock Creek Terrace Apartments. The
twelfth floor lobby became so smoke-filled that it was impossible to
see. While evacuating tenants from the twelfth floor, Flowers fell
down an open elevator shaft and sustained severe and permanent
injuries.8 2 Flowers sued Rock Creek Terrace Limited Partnership,
the apartment owners; Sting Security, Inc., the supplier of the build-
ing's security services; Larry Cline, a Sting Security employee; and
Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the elevator manufacturer.8 3
The court held that because Flowers was a firefighter injured on
the job, the firefighter's rule prevented him from bringing suit
under tort law. The defendants had no duty to keep the premises
safe for firefighters, but merely a duty to warn of any hidden dan-
gers.84 The court found it inappropriate to base its holding on the
traditional premises liability rationale in a case in which three of the
four defendants were not owners of the property.8 5 Rather, the
court focused on public policy: "[I]t is the nature of the firefighting
occupation that limits a fireman's ability to recover in tort for work-
related injuries."8 6
The firefighter's rule has a long history in tort law in Maryland
risk which the invitee, by exercising ordinary care for his own safety, will not
discover. A licensee is generally defined as one who enters the property with
the knowledge and consent of the owner but for his own purposes or interest;
the owner owes no duty to a licensee under the traditional common law view
except to abstain from wilful or wanton misconduct or entrapment.
Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co., 282 Md. 238, 242, 384 A.2d 76, 79 (1978) (citations
omitted).
81. 308 Md. at 447, 520 A.2d at 368.
82. Id. at 436-37, 520 A.2d at 363.
83. Id. at 437, 520 A.2d at 363. Flowers alleged as the basis of his suit four factual
foundations for liability:
that Rock Creek and Sting Security knew of prior suspicious fires and failed to
take any measures to prevent future fires, that Rock Creek failed to adopt rea-
sonable safety precautions, including the installation of smoke detectors and
sprinklers, that Rock Creek and Westinghouse installed an elevator system
which was not sufficiently fire proof, and that Rock Creek, Sting Security and
Westinghouse failed to warn Flowers of the open elevator shaft.
Id.
84. Id. at 443, 520 A.2d at 366. The court declared that "an open elevator shaft
concealed by the smoke of the fire is not a hidden danger in the sense of an unreasona-
ble danger that a fireman could not anticipate upon attempting to perform his firefight-
ing duties." Id at 452, 520 A.2d at 370-71.
85. Id at 443, 520 A.2d at 366.
86. Id. at 447, 520 A.2d at 368.
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and across the country. Earlier cases barred firefighters from recov-
ering in tort for injuries received in the course of employment be-
cause of their status on the premises as licensees. Later cases,
though still based on the premises liability theory, recognized the
inherent dangerousness of a firefighter's job. A firefighter is ex-
posed to the risk of fire-related injuries often attributable to a prop-
erty owner's negligence. The general rule, as developed, was that
property owners ordinarily did not owe a duty of reasonable care to
firefighters.8 7
Maryland first considered the duty owed to a firefighter in
Steinwedel v. Hilbert.8" The Court of Appeals held that "a fireman
entering premises to put out fire is a licensee only, and not an invi-
tee, and that the owner or occupant of the premises is not under any
duty of care to keep his premises prepared and safe for a fireman." 9
Forty years later in Aravanis v. Eisenberg90 the Court of Appeals
based its decision on the premises liability theory, but for the first
time recognized the implications which arise because of a
firefighter's public function. 9 The court denied an injured
firefighter recovery in a tort action, although the court intimated
that the merits of Aravanis' position depended on "whether the ini-
tial occupational hazard of the fire being no longer involved, the
fireman retains his status as a licensee only, or whether he is entitled
to the greater care due an invitee." 92
The court explored this concept of changing status more
closely in Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co.9" Sherman, a police officer,
responded to a call from a bank concerning a forged check. While
in a small teller's cage, Sherman bent over to pick up the dropped
forged check and hit his back on a coin changing machine. 94 The
court held-that the change in status from licensee to invitee as stated
87. Id. at 439, 520 A.2d at 364.
88. 149 Md. 121, 131 A. 44 (1925).
89. Id. at 123-24, 131 A: at 45. Steinwedel, an employee of the Fire Insurance Sal-
vage Corps of Baltimore, entered the defendant's leased premises to fight a fire and was
injured falling down an open and unguarded elevator shaft. Id. at 122, 131 A. at 45.
90. 237 Md. 242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965).
91. The court in Aravanis stated:
[I]f the fireman is injured by the flames or gases of the conflagration, apart
from unusual factors operative after the fire has begun, he cannot recover.
Fighting the fire, however caused, is his occupation. Compensation for injuries
sustained in the fulfilment of his duties, absent other circumstances, is the obli-
gation of society.
Id. at 251, 206 A.2d at 153 (footnote omitted).
92. Id. at 254, 206 A.2d at 155.
93. 282 Md. 238, 384 A.2d 76 (1978).
94. Id. at 239-40, 384 A.2d at 78.
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in Aravanis was not relevant because Sherman was injured during,
not after, the period of risk anticipated in responding to the bank's
call.9 5 Sherman therefore was unable to recover under tort law
based on his status as a licensee.
The court in Flowers, following the lead of several other states,
96
thus has redefined the basis for the firefighter's rule without chang-
ing its overall effect. The necessity of limiting police officers' and
firefighters' recovery for job-related injuries under tort law remains
paramount. 97 Without the firefighter's rule, the courts would be
crowded with tort cases involving police officers and firefighters be-
cause of the potential for liability arising from the nature of their
jobs.
The court also has placed the rule on a. much firmer base. The
old premises liability theory did not fully encompass all conceivable
cases involving injury to police officers and firefighters, since it
could be invoked only by property owners or occupants who faced
liability due to their negligence. Had the court not redefined the
basis of the firefighter's rule, both Westinghouse and Sting Security
could have been liable for Flowers' injury because they did not en-
joy the status of property owners. This would open the door to nu-
merous other tort actions.
A rule based on public policy considerations covers all possible
circumstances because it focuses on the relationship between the
public and the firefighter or police officer. A person who accepts a
job as a police officer or firefighter promises to protect the public
and must accept the risks inherent in the vocation, including the risk
of injury caused by the negligence of a citizen whom the public ser-
95. Id. at 246, 384 A.2d at 81.
96. See, e.g., Pottebaum v. Hinds, 347 N.W.2d 642, 645 (Iowa 1984) ("[B]asing the
fireman's rule on the status of the injured party would seem to unfairly limit the rule's
application to the landowner/occupant context .. "); Calvert v. Garvey Elevators, Inc.,
236 Kan. 570, 577, 694 P.2d 433, 439 (1985) ("The Fireman's Rule in Kansas is not to
be based upon 'premises law,' or categorizing fire fighters as mere licensees when per-
forming their duties, but upon public policy."); Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343,
350 (Minn. 1979) ("[W]e conclude that firemen are not classified as licensees, invitees,
or sui generis.").
97. Police officers and firefighters can recover under tort law in some instances:
Negligent acts not protected by the fireman's rule may include failure to warn
the firemen of pre-existing hidden dangers where there was knowledge of-the
danger and an opportunity to warn. They also may include acts which occur
subsequent to the safety officer's arrival on the scene and which are outside of
his anticipated occupational hazards .... Moreover, the fireman's rule does
not apply to suits against arsonists or those engaging in similar misconduct.
308 Md. at 448-49, 520 A.2d at 369 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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vant has sworn to protect.98
2. Tortfeasor Releases.-In Morgan v. Cohen99 the Court of Ap-
peals overruled precedent set in Lanasa v. Beggs' 00 by holding that in
the case of concurrent or subsequent tortfeasors, a release of one
does not release the other unless done so in unambiguous terms.''
If the release is ambiguous, the court must look to the intent of the
parties to determine. the nature and extent of the release.'
0 2
This case consolidated two separate appeals from judgments in
favor of Dr. Edward Cohen. Dr. Cohen, an orthopedic surgeon,
treated Darlyn Morgan for a broken leg resulting from a motorcycle
accident. After an unsuccessful second operation by Dr. Cohen,
Morgan settled her claim against the driver of the motorcycle and
executed a release.'0 3 Ten months later, another physician per-
formed a third operation which healed Morgan's injury, although
her left leg remained two inches shorter than the right. Morgan al-
leged that the permanent deformity was caused by Dr. Cohen's neg-
ligent treatment.' 0
Dr. Cohen also treated Wendy Hovermill for a dislocation of
her pelvis resulting from an automobile accident. The doctor alleg-
edly discontinued traction too soon, thus causing an immediate
redislocation of the pelvis and permanent injuries to Hovermill.' 0 5
Hovermill settled the suit against the original tortfeasor and exe-
98. Some courts, while retaining the firefighter's rule, have based the rule on a pub-
lic policy similar to the assumption of risk doctrine in negligence cases. "Firemen are
engaged by the public to encounter risks inherent in firefighting; they assume those
risks, and therefore they should not recover for fire-related injuries." Id. at 445, 520
A.2d at 367. See Krauth v. Geller, 31 NJ. 270, 273-74, 157 A.2d 129, 131 (1960) ("[1]t is
the fireman's-business to-deal-with that-veryhazard and-hence- . -he-cannot-complain-of
negligence in the creation of the very occasion of his engagement.").
99. 309 Md. 304, 523 A.2d 1003 (1987).
100. 159 Md. 311, 151 A. 21 (1930). For a discussion of Lanasa, see infra text accom-
panying notes 137-141.
101. 309 Md. at 316, 523 A.2d at 1008-09.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 307, 523 A.2d at 1004. The release stated in relevant part that Morgan did
release . . . Frank Armetta and Puritan Insurance Company ... and all other
persons . . . of and from any and all claims, (and] damages which the under-
signed now has.., or which may hereafter accrue on account of or in any way
growing out of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bod-
ily and personal injuries . .. and the consequences thereof, resulting or to re-
sult from the accident . .
d.
104. Id. at 307-08, 523 A.2d at 1004.
105. Id. at 308, 523 A.2d at 1004-05. Hovermill's injuries include "a one-inch leg
length discrepancy, a fused sacroiliac joint, an asymmetrical pelvis and a grossly de-
formed bony birth canal which is much reduced in size." Id., 523 A.2d at 1005.
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cuted a release. 10 6
Both Morgan and Hovermill sued Dr. Cohen for his negligent
treatment of their injuries, but Dr. Cohen was granted summary
judgment in both suits. 10 7 The Circuit Court for Baltimore City
based its decision in Morgan's case solely on the release. In
Hovermill's case, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County "charac-
terized the alleged negligent treatment as an aggravation of a single
bodily injury and held that that single injury had been both satisfied
and released."' 0 8 Morgan and Hovermill requested that the court
apply article 79, section 13'09 retroactively and adopt the "modern
rule" 0 pertaining to releases of this nature."' They contended
that the injuries inflicted by Dr. Cohen were separate from those
received in the motor vehicle accidents and that because the re-
leases were ambiguous, parol evidence should be admissible to
prove intent.' 12
The court first examined the Maryland version of the Uniform
106. Id. Because Hovermill was a minor, her mother actually executed the release on
her behalf. The document stated in relevant part that Hovermill released "Jones ... and
all other persons ... from any and all claims (and] damages . . . of whatsoever kind or
nature, and particularly on account of . . bodily injuries, known and unknown and
which have resulted or may in the future develop, sustained by [Hovermill] in conse-
quence of [the] accident." Id.
107. Id. at 309, 523 A.2d at 1005.
108. Id. at 308-09, 523 A.2d at 1005.
109. Id. at 309, 523 A.2d at 1005. This statute, which took effect July 1, 1986,
provides:
A release executed by a person who has sustained personal injuries does
not discharge a subsequent tort-feasor who is not a party to the release and:
(1) Whose responsibility for the injured person's injuries is unknown at the
time of execution of the release; or
(2) Who is not specifically identified in the release.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 79, § 13 (Supp. 1987). Because Morgan's and Hovermill's accidents
occurred in 1980 and 1979, respectively, the statute did not apply to their causes of
action. 308 Md. at 307-08, 523 A.2d at 1004-05. The statute abrogated Maryland's com-
mon-law rule concerning releases ofjoint tortfeasors. In effect, Morgan and Hovermill
were asking the court to do the same by judicial fiat regarding all causes of action which
arose before July I, 1986, and for which the statute of limitations had not yet run.
110. The "modem rule" which many courts have adopted states that the physician is
not released, as a matter of law, by release of the original tortfeasor unless the release
contains clear language to that effect. 309 Md. at 309 n.3, 523 A.2d at 1005 n.3. See also
Williams v. Physicians & Surgeons Comm. Hosp., 249 Ga. 588, 591,292 S.E.2d 705, 707
(1982) (focusing on consideration paid and intent of parties); Fieser v. St. Francis Hosp.
& School of Nursing, 212 Kan. 35, 41-42, 510 P.2d 145, 151 (1973) (same); Annotation,
Release of One Responsible for Injury as Affecting Liability of Physician or Surgeon for Negligent
Treatment of Injury, 39 A.L.R.3d 260, 273-79 (1971).
II1. 309 Md. at 309, 523 A.2d at 1005.
112. Id. at 310, 523 A.2d at 1005.
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Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act" 3 which provides that "re-
covery of a judgment by the injured person against one joint tort-
feasor does not discharge the other joint tort-feasor."" 14 The court
declared that this statute, which in effect changed the Lanasa rule,
applied "at least when the tortious conduct is concerted or the torts
are concurrent." II It refused, however, to hold that the statute ex-
tended to successive tortfeasors,' 6 though the court noted that
"the Act abrogated the common law rule that the release of one
joint tortfeasor releases alL"" 7
The court found that if the Act applied to these cases, Dr. Co-
hen would not be discharged from liability unless a contrary intent
were determined from the release. It then held that it would reach
the same result even if the Act did not apply, thereby overruling
Lanasa."8 The court declared:
The parties to a release, absent legislative restriction, ordi-
narily are free to expand or contract the scope of the in-
strument in accordance with their agreement. They should
not have to fear that a court will later rule that a release of
the original tortfeasor also released the physician by opera-
tion of law." 9
The court then turned to the terms of the actual releases to deter-
mine from their intent whether or not they in fact discharged Dr.
Cohen from liability.120
The court found that the injuries which Dr. Cohen inflicted on
Morgan and Hovermill were not caused by the accidents.' 2' This
made them "separate and additional harms for which ... he could
be held independently liable, assuming proper proof."' 22 The court
determined that the releases, though couched in broad and unam-
113. Mn. ANN. CODE art. 50. §§ 16-24 (1986).
!14. Id. § 18.
115. 309 Md. at 315, 523 A.2d at 1008.
116. Id. The court in Trieschman v. Eaton, 224 Md. 111, 115, 166 A.2d.892, 894
(1961), stated that the Act's definition of joint tortfeasors "literally embraces successive
wrongdoers liable for the same harm even though one may be also liable to the injured
person for additional damages."
117. 309 Md. at 315-16, 523 A.2d at 1008 (footnote omitted).
118. Id. at 316, 523 A.2d at 1008-09.
119. Id., 523 A.2d at 1009.
120. Id. at 317, 523 A.2d at 1009.
121. Id. at 318, 523 A.2d at 1009. The court acknowledged that the original
tortfeasors also could have been liable for the injuries suffered after the accidents. Dr.
Cohen's alleged negligence came after the accidents; "but for" the accidents Dr. Cohen
would not have treated Morgan and Hovermill. Id.
122. Id., 523 A.2d at 1009-10.
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biguous terms as to the original tortfeasors, were ambiguous as to
the subsequent torts; therefore, parol evidence was admissible to
show the parties' intent.' 23 The court then remanded the cases for
further proceedings. 2 4
Judge Rodowsky dissented, stating that Morgan and Hovermill
had discharged their claims against Dr. Cohen when they executed
the releases. 25 "It remains a matter of law that the wrong of the
original tortfeasor is a proximate cause of the aggravation of the
bodily harm also caused by the treating physician"; 26 therefore, a
release of the original tortfeasor is a release of the subsequent
tortfeasor. Rodowsky stressed that allowing Parol evidence to prove
the intent of the releases would adversely affect Maryland contract
law. 127
American tort law in this area is clear concerning certain well-
defined principles. A negligent party is liable for the harm he or she
causes directly as well as any additional harm caused by a third party
who attempts to help the victim, even if the third party acts negli-
gently.12  A physician who negligently treats the victim is liable only
for his or her own actions. 2 9 The courts consider this negligent
treatment a subsequent tort for which the original negligent party is
jointly liable.'3 0 Nevertheless, much confusion exists throughout the
country regarding the difference between jointly liable concurrent
or successive tortfeasors and joint tortfeasors as they existed at com-
mon law,' and between releases and satisfaction.'" 2 The Maryland
123. Id., 523 A.2d at 1010.
124. Id. at 320, 523 A.2d at 1010.
125. Id. at 321, 523 A.2d at 1011.
126. Id. at 322, 523 A.2d at 1011.
127. Id. at 323, 523 A.2d at 1012.
128. Id. at 310, 523 A.2d at 1005-06. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 457
(1964).
129. 309 Md. at 310, 523 A.2d at 1006. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 433A comment c (1964).
130. 309 Md. at 310, 523 A.2d at 1005-06. See also Trieschman v. Eaton, 224 Md. I 11.
115, 166 A.2d 892, 894 (1961) (finding successive wrongdoers liable for the same
harm).
131. Jointly liable concurrent or successive tortfeasors are those "who did not act in
concert ... [but] had done.., acts that had combined to cause a single harm." 309 Md.
at 311, 523 A.2d at 1006. Originally,joint tortfeasors were those defendants "who acted
in concert, and the act of one was considered the act of all." Id. Eventually, courts
applied the term joint tortfeasors both to jointly liable concurrent tortfeasors and true
joint tortfeasors. At the same time, courts developed a principle which applied to both
types of tortfeasors: "[T]he plaintiff was entitled to but one compensation for his loss.
and that satisfaction of his claim, even by a stranger to the action, would prevent its
further enforcement." Id. at 31' 523 A.2d at 1006.
132. "A satisfaction is an acceptance of full compensation for the injury; a release is a
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cases provide no exception to the general confusion.' 3
In Cox v. Maryland Electric Railways' 3 4 the Court of Appeals de-
clared that "[ilt is neither just nor lawful that there should be more
than one satisfaction for the same injury, whether that injury be
done by one or more."'3 5 Because Cox simply articulated the desire
to prevent double recovery, it was unnecessary for the court to dis-
tinguish between true joint tortfeasors and jointly liable concurrent
or subsequent tortfeasors. 3 6
The court in Lanasa v. Beggs '31 extended Cox's holding, but in
so doing caused confusion. In Lanasa the plaintiff was injured when
the taxicab in which she was riding collided with a truck.'38 If a
court deemed both drivers to be negligent, then the torts would not
be joint but concurrent. The plaintiff executed for consideration a
covenant not to sue the cab company, yet retained the right to take
action against the truck driver.'3 9 The court held that the covenant
not to sue was satisfaction which precluded a suit against the truck
driver.' 4 ° In so doing, the court incorrectly extended Cox to apply
unity of action to concurrent tortfeasors as well as joint tortfeasors.
The court also confused the terms release, satisfaction, and cove-
nant not to sue. 41
In an attempt to clarify existing Maryland tort law, the Morgan
court overruled Lanasa. The court seemed to base its decision on
the Maryland statute which took effect in 1986, even though the
court claimed to reach its holding because of Lanasa's erroneous
surrender of the cause of action, which might be gratuitous, or given for inadequate
consideration." Prosser,Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 41 3, 423 (1937)
(footnote omitted), cited with approval in 309 Md. at 312, 523 A.2d at 1007. A release at
common law to one of two true joinit tortfeaidrs released the oth-er because of their
concerted action. A release to one of two concurrent or subsequent tortfeasors would
not necessarily release the other because they were independent wrongdoers. 309 Md.
at 312, 523 A.2d at 1007.
133. 309 Md. at 313, 523 A.2d at 1007.
134. 126 Md. 300, 95 A. 43 (1915).
135. Id. at 306, 95 A. at 44.
136. 309 Md. at 314, 523 A.2d at 1007-08.
137. 159 Md. 311, 151 A. 21 (1930).
138. Id. at 313, 151 A. at 22.
139. Id. at 318-19, 151 A. at 25.
140. Id. at 322-23, 151 A. at 26-27. The court stated:
[Slince this cause of action is an entire and indivisible cause of action, its full
satisfaction by one of the joint tort feasors is a complete satisfaction as to the
other joint tort feasors.... The rule of this court is founded on the indissolu-
ble unity of a cause of action against joint tort- fasors.
Id.
141. 309 Md. at 314, 523 A.2d at 1008.
reading of Cox.' 42 Without the passage of the statute, it is doubtful
that the Maryland court would have taken such an enormous step as
to overrule a longstanding precedent.
This ruling dispensed with the general confusion and corrected
what appeared to be an inequitable situation. When Morgan and
Hovermill executed their releases as to the original tortfeasors, they
had no reason to expect that Dr. Cohen's treatment would cause
them harm. Without this holding, an injured party might be reluc-
tant to execute a release until the victim was certain that the medical
treatments had caused no ill effects. The court in Morgan has as-
sured that plaintiffs will feel free to avoid litigation by releasing an
original tortfeasor without foregoing a cause of action for a doctor's
subsequent negligent treatment.
B. Intentional Torts
1.. Tortious Interference with Contract.-In Ronald M. Sharrow,
Chartered v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 143 the Court of
Appeals held that an attorney adequately stated a cause of action for
tortious interference with contract against an insurer who capital-
ized on a client's need for money by negotiating with the client and
requiring him to state falsely that he had advised his attorney of his
intention to settle directly with the insurer.' 44 This holding repre-
sents the adoption by Maryland courts of a broad rule that does not
require the insurer's actions to be egregious in nature, but rather
defines as actionable "any purposeful conduct, however subtle, by
which an insurer improperly and intentionally induces or persuades
a client to discharge his counsel and settle directly with it. ' '145
Sharrow averred that State Farm, knowing that Sharrow was
representing the client, sensed that the client was in desperate need
of money when the client contacted the insurer for an advance on
his pending claim.'4 6 State Farm denied the request for an advance
and instead negotiated a settlement with the client which required
him to execute a document discharging Sharrow as his attorney and
stating that he had advised Sharrow of his intention to settle his
142. "Lanasa erroneously read Cox to extend the notion of a unity of action to concur-
rent tortfeasors as well." Id.
143. 306 Md. 754, 511 A.2d 492 (1986).
144. id. at 770, 511 A.2d at 500-01.
145. Id. at 767, 511 A.2d at 499.
146. Id. at 757, 511 A.2d at 494. Sharrow was representing Donald Zorbach in a suit




claim directly. 147 Sharrow sued State Farm in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City for tortious interference with contract.' 48 State Farm
demurred to the complaint.' 49 The circuit court dismissed the com-
plaint and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court's
judgment. ' 5 0
Speaking through Judge Wilner, the Court of Special. Ap-
peals' 5 ' recognized that most cases imposing liability for interfer-
ence with an attorney-client relationship have required "'egregious'
conduct by the insurance company, 52 such as a fraudulent state-
ment made to induce the client to dismiss the attorney and settle
directly with the insurer.1' The Court of Appeals found this stan-
dard overly restrictive, holding that the better rule makes actionable
any conduct, however subtle, which induces or persuades a client to
discharge an attorney." -
Maryland has long recognized the tort of intentional or mali-
cious interference with contract.' 55 One hundred years ago, the
Court of Appeals decided the seminal case of Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
147. Id. at 757, 511 A.2d at 494.
148. Id. at 756, 511 A.2d at 493.
149. Id. at 760, 511 A.2d at 495.
150. Id.
151. Ronald M. Sharrow, Chartered v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 63 Md. App.
412, 492 A.2d 977 (1985).
152. For cases requiring that an insurer's conduct be egregious in order to be actiona-
ble, see Volz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 498 F.2d 659, 663 (5th Cir. 1974), and Herman v.
Prudence Mut. Casualty Co., 41 Il. 2d 468, 476-77, 244 N.E.2d 809, 813 (1969).
153. 63 Md. App. at 420, 492 A.2d at 982. See Lurie v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.,
270 N.Y. 379, 1 N.E. 2d 472 (1936) (insurance company threatened claimant, stating
that unless he repudiated the retainer with his attorney, he would receive no compensa-
tion for his injuries); Klauder-v.-Cregar, 327-Pa. 1. 192-A. 667 (1937.). (claimant induced
into settlement by adjuster who informed her that "if she would settle out of court, the
power of attorney... that she signed would be no good, that she would not have to pay
her attorney if she settled").
154. 306 Md. at 766-67, 511 A.2d at 499. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 766 (1977) declares;
There is no technical requirement as to the kind of conduct that may result in
interference with the third party's performance of the contract. The interfer-
ence is often by inducement. The inducement may be any conduct conveying
to the third person the actor's desire to influence him not to deal with the
other. Thus it may be a simple request or persuasion exerting only moral pres-
sure. Or it may be a statement unaccompanied by any specific request but hav-
ing the same effect as if the request were specifically made. Or it may be a
threat by the actor of physical or economic harm to the third person or to per-
sons in whose welfare he is interested. Or it may be the promise of a benefit to
the third person if he will refrain from dealing with the other.
Id.
155. 306 Md. at 763, 511 A.2d at 497.
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Gardiner Dairy Co. 5 ' The court found that an action in tort would lie
when a person induced a party to a contract to break it, intending
thereby to injure the other or to benefit personally.'3 7 The plaintiff
need not prove express malice, but only that the defendant inter-
fered wrongfully and without justification. 5 ' In Natural Design v.
Rouse Co. '59 the court held that an action will lie when, absent a
breach of contract, there is malicious or wrongful interference with
an economic.relationship.' This cause of action likewise requires
only legal malice, rather than ill will or spite.' 6 '
It is well settled that contracts between attorneys and clients,
like other business contracts, are protected from tortious interfer-
ence by third parties.' 6 2 Furthermore, "[t]he great weight of au-
thority sustains the right of a client at any time before judgment, if,
acting in good faith, to compromise, settle or dismiss [a] cause of
action without [the] attorney's intervention, knowledge or con-
sent."16 Additionally, an insurer has both a right and a duty to set-
tle a claim within its insured's policy limits if it is reasonable to do
so. 164
The court in Sharrow reasoned, however, that the insurer's duty
156. 107 Md. 556, 69 A. 405 (1887). In Knickerbocker a dairy and the Sumwah Ice and
Coal Company entered into a contract whereby Sumwalt agreed to supply ice to the
dairy. Because of business exigencies, Sumwalt was forced to purchase ice from Knick-
erbocker Ice Company, which then threatened to cease supplying ice to Sumwalt if it
continued to supply the dairy. Id. at 558, 69 A. at 406.
157. Id. at 565, 69 A. at 409.
158. Id. at 568, 69 A. at 411.
159. 302 Md. 47, 485 A.2d 663 (1984).
160. Id. at 69, 485 A.2d at 669. See Lakeshore Investors v. Rite Aid Corp., 67 Md.
App. 743, 753, 509 A.2d 727, 732 (1986) (holding that proof of breach of contract is not
necessary to sustain a cause of action for tortious interference with contract).
161. 302 Md. at 71, 485 A.2d at 670. See Stannard v. McCool, 198 Md. 609, 617, 84
A.2d 862, 866-67 (1951) (interference with contract to purchase land); Cumberland
Glass Mfg. Co. v. Dewitt. 120 Md. 381, 392, 87 A. 927, 931 (1913) (interference with
contract to sell gin flasks); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 58, § 129, at 983.
162. See Annotation, Liability in Tortfor Inteference with Attorney-Client or Physician-Patient
Relationship, 26 A.L.R.3d 679 (1969). Some courts have found that the doctrine of tor-
tious interference with contract does not apply to attorney-client contracts. See, e.g.,
Walsh v. O'Neill, 350 Mass. 586, 589-90, 215 N.E.2d 915, 918 (1966) ("There is, we
think, a strong public policy to assure one in need of legal help freedom to select an
attorney, to change attorneys, and to seek and obtain advice as to the competency and
suitability of any attorney for the particular need of the client."); Orr v. Mutual Benefit &
Health Accident Ass'n, 240 Mo. App. 236, 242, 207 S.W.2d 511, 515 (1947) (finding
that insurer had a right to settle claim directly with insured).
163. Boyd v. Johnson, 145 Md. 385, 389, 125 A. 697, 698 (1924).
164. 306 Md. at 766, 511 A.2d at 498. See State Farm v. White, 248 Md. 324, 333, 236
A.2d 269, 273 (1967) (holding that insurer's duty to insured to settle within policy limits
contains elements of both good faith and reasonable care).
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does not permit it to interfere with a contingent fee contract be-
tween attorney and client by inducing the client to settle directly
with the insurer.165 Nevertheless, the precise nature of the conduct
necessary to constitute a cause of action is a matter of some dispute
in the courts. ' 6 For example, a number of jurisdictions require
egregious conduct "which would appear to leave inactionable more
subtle and sophisticated means of inducing a client to discharge his
attorney."'.6 7 Another line of cases merely considers whether it was
the purposeful conduct of the insurer or the client that resulted in
the discharge of counsel and the direct settlement between the cli-
ent and the insurer.'"
The Court of Appeals followed the broader rule, defining as
actionable intentional conduct designed to improperly induce a cli-
ent to repudiate the attorney-client contract and settle directly with
the insurer.'69 . In accordance with this line of cases, the court
viewed the central issue as whether it was the insurer's or the client's
conduct that triggered the discharge of the attorney.7 °
This decision establishes that attorney-client contracts are pro-
tected under Maryland law from tortious interference by third par-
ties. '7  Furthermore, a third party's conduct need not be egregious
in order to state a cause of action.17 2 Attorneys thus are afforded a
high degree of protection from the potential misconduct of an in-
surance company who aggressively seeks settlement with an injured
party.
2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Ditress.-The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals held in Reagan v. Rider '7 that severe emotional dis-
tress, as a requisite element of a cause of action for the intentional
infliction of emotional distressi-may-be determined by the nature of
the defendant's conduct along with evidence of the intensity and du-
ration of the distress.' 74 Furthermore, in many cases a court may
165. 306 Md. at 766, 511 A.2d at 498.
166. Id. at 767, 511 A.2d at 499.
167. Id. at 768 n.4, 511 A.2d at 499 n.4. See supra note 152.
168. See Edwards v. Travelers Ins. Co., 563 F.2d 105, 120-21 (6th Cir. 1977); State
Farm Fire Ins. v. Gregory, 184 F.2d 447,448 (4th Cir. 1950); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v.
St. Joseph's Hosp., 107 Ariz. 498, 502-03, 489 P.2d 837, 841-42 (1971); Weiss v. Mar-
cus, 51 Cal. App. 3d 590, 600-01, 124 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304-05 (1975).
169. 306 Md. at 767, 511 A.2d at 499.
170. Id. at 768, 511 A.2d at 499.
171. Id. at 765, 511 A.2d at 496.
172. Id. at 767, 511 A.2d at 499.
173. 70 Md. App. 503, 521 A.2d 1246 (1987).
174. Id. at 513, 521 A.2d at 1251.
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infer the existence of the distress solely from the extreme and outra-
geous nature of the defendant's conduct.' 7 5
Glenda Rider testified that between the ages of eleven and sev-
enteen she was subjected to sexual abuse by her stepfather, John
Reagan.' 76 Rider sued her stepfather in the Circuit Court for Balti-
more County for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and invasion of privacy. ' 77 The court dismissed all counts
except that for intentional infliction of emotional distress,' 78 which
was submitted to the jury and resulted in a verdict for Rider in the
amount of $28,845.179 Reagan appealed from that judgment. 8 °
On appeal the court considered whether the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to allow the jury to consider the is-
sue of causation as well as that of the severity of the emotional dis-
tress.' 8 ' Regarding causation, the court held that the expert
testimony in the case provided sufficient evidence to allow the issue
to go to the jury;' 8 2 furthermore, the distress need not immediately
follow the event which caused it.' 8 3 As to the severity issue, the
court held that the nature of Reagan's conduct and the intensity and
duration of Rider's emotional distress allowed the jury properly to
find that the emotional distress was severe.' s 4The court's holding represents a departure from the strict re-
quirements of the cause of action for intentional infliction of emo-
175. Id.
176. Id. at 506, 521 A.2d at 1247 ("What began as harmless backrubs soon
progressed to sexual contact, including masturbation and cunnilingus, but not sexual
intercourse .... [TIhere were several hundred such encounters over a six-year period,
when she was between the ages of 11 and 17.").
177. Id. at 505, 521 A.2d at 1247.
178. Id.




182. Id. at 508, 521 A.2d at 1248.
183. Id. at 507, 521 A.2d at 1248. Reagan asserted that because Rider's emotional
distress did not become apparent immediately after and in direct response to the sexual
acts, she failed to show a causal connection. Id. Reagan pointed to Moniodis v. Cook,
64 Md. App. 1, 494 A.2d 212, cert. denied, 304 Md. 631, 500 A.2d 649 (1985), in support
of his assertion. The court there stated: "The evidence concerning the cause of Ms.
Cook's distress is ... unequivocal: her testimony and that of her husband revealed that
she was affected immediately following and in direct response to her termination." Id. at
19, 494 A.2d at 221. The court reasoned in Reagan that while the emotional distress in
Moniodis did follow immediately and in direct response to an act, Moniodis did not hold
immediacy to be a requirement. Additionally, the Reagan court relied on expert testi-
mony in order to find that the jury properly could have concluded that causation was
established. 70 Md. App. at 507-08, 521 A.2d at 1248.
184. 70 Md. App. at 514, 521 A.2d at 1251.
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tional distress. Ten years ago, Harris v. Jones 185 reached the highest
court in Maryland. This case of first impression recognized the in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress as a new and independent
tort and repudiated earlier holdings that such claims could not be
sustained except as a parasitic element of damage accompanying an
established tort.'" 6 The Court of Appeals held that in order to
maintain a claim for the new tort, four elements must coalesce:
(1) The Conduct must be intentional or reckless;,
(2) The conduct must be extreme and outrageous;
(3) There must be a causal connection between the
wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and
(4) The emotional distress must be severe.' 8 7
Noting that thirty-seven jurisdictions then appeared to have recog-
nized the cause of action,'8 " the court adopted the reasoning of the
Supreme Court of Virginia in Womack v. Eldridge."8 9 The Court of
Appeals noted that the Virginia court was concerned with distin-
guishing true from spurious claims and the "trifling annoyance from
the serious wrong.""
Since that time Maryland courts have faced repeated attempts
to extend the availability of the cause of action.' 9 ' Until Reagan,
however, the courts had declined to do so. The Court of Special
Appeals relied on these earlier Maryland cases and the Restatement
(Second) of Torts in order to distinguish between severe emotional
response and mere emotional upset.' 9 2 The Restatement stresses that
"[t]he law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe
185. 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977).
186.-1id.at-566, 380 A.2d at 614.
187. Id. The court stated that the four requisite elements of the tort are not to be
considered independently, but rather are to coalesce into a single body. Id.
188. Id. at 564, 380 A.2d at 613.
189. 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974).
190. 281 Md. at 566, 380 A.2d at 614.
191. 70 Md. App. at 505, 521 A.2d at 1246. See, e.g., Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490,
505-06, 408 A.2d 728, 736 (1979) (man's negligent misrepresentation that he was di-
vorced from first wife at time of marriage to plaintiff); Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md: App. 1,
15-17, 494 A.2d 212, 219-21, cert. denied, 304 Md. 631, 500 A.2d 649 (1985) (termination
of employee for failure to submit to polygraph test); Dick v. Mercantile Safe-Deposit &
Trust Co., 63 Md. App. 270, 275-77,492 A.2d 674, 676-78 (1985) (bank's tactics used in
attempting to collect on overdue debt); Beye v. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 59 Md. App.
642, 656-58, 477 A.2d 1197, 1204-05, cert. denied, 301 Md. 639, 484 A.2d 274 (1984)
(resignation of employee due to intolerable working conditions); Continental Casualty
Co. v. Mirabile, 52 Md. App. 387, 402-05, 449 A.2d 1176, 1185-87, cert. denied, 294 Md.
652 (1982) (supervisor's humiliation and assault and battery of employee).
192. 70 Md. App. at 509, 521 A.2d at 1249.
1026 [VOL. 47:1003
1988] TORTS 1027
that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it."' 93 The
court therefore focused on the intensity and duration of the distress
in determining its severity.
194
Without losing sight of the policy concerns underlying a strict
application of the tort's four elements,' 95 the court reasoned that
the severity of the distress need not be manifested by an inability to
function in day-to-day life.' 96 Although earlier -case law seemed to
construe the severity requirement as necessitating such a show-
ing,' 97 the court distinguished the instant case in that Rider pro-
duced medical evidence in support of her claim in addition to
evidence as to the nature of the outrageous conduct.' 98 The court
reasoned that the very nature of the conduct along with the expert
testimony guaranteed that the emotional distress was genuine and
serious.' 99
The ramifications. of this decision may be far-reaching. The
193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1985).
194. 70 Md. App. at 509-10, 521 A.2d at 1249.
195. Id. at 509, 521 A.2d at 1248.
196. Id. at 513, 521 A.2d at 1250.
197. For example, in Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md. App.- 1, 494 A.2d 212 (1985), cert.
denied, 304 Md. 631, 500 A.2d 649 (1985). the Court of Special Appeals found that there
was no evidence from which a jury properly could have concluded that three of the
plaintiffs suffered the sort of disablement required by Harris. In Moniodis plaintiffs each
suffered symptoms such- as lost sleep, increased smoking, and hives. Id. at 16, 494 A.2d
at 219-20. None of the three indicated even a temporary inability to carry on to some
degree the daily routine of their lives. The prevailing plaintiff, however, produced evi-
dence to the effect that she no longer was able to participatie in the daily routine of life.
Id. Importantly, the Moniodis court found that the evidence was "more than enough to
permit a jury finding that Ms. Cook was severely distressed." Id.
Likewise, in Leese v. Baltimore County, 64 Md. App. 442, 497 A.2d 159, cert. denied,
305 Md. 106, 501 A.2d 845 (1985), the court applied the requirements of Harris and
found that the plaintiff's amended declaration did not contain the specific facts which
must be pleaded in order to set forth a prima facie case of severe injury. Id. at 472, 497
A.2d at 174-75. The holding in Leese further indicated that in order to plead a cause of
action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, plaintiffs must show some sort
of resultant functional disability as a result of the defendant's actions. Id. The court
required that severe emotional distress be manifested by an inability to function or tend
to necessary matters. Id. Finally, in Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 66 Md. App. 46,
60, 502 A.2d 1057, 1250 (1986), the court found that the plaintiff failed to show that her
emotional distress was severe because she produced no evidence that she could not
function or tend to her everyday affairs.
198. 70 Md. App. at 513, 521 A.2d at 1250. The court stated that while medical evi-
dence in support of a claim is not an absolute prerequisite to recovery, it is an important
factor in assessing the severity of the distress. Id.
199. Id., 521 A.2d at 1251. The nature of the conduct can assure that the claim for
emotional distress is genuine and serious. The court found that "[wihen the acts of the
defendant are so horrible, so atrocious and so barbaric that no civilized person could be
expected to endure them without suffering mental distress, the jury may find as a matter
of law that 'severe' emotional distress resulted." Id.
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court at last appears willing to relax the previously strict formal re-
quirements for stating a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. In the court's view, the law still may protect de-
fendants from spurious claims by viewing the four elements not dis-
cretely but rather as a combination of four factors which toget her
comprise a whole.20 0 The holding thus expands the law to provide a
plaintiff with a cause of action even when actual evidence of the se-
verity of the distress is lacking. A plaintiff may recover if evidence
establishes that the defendant's conduct was so outrageous as to al-
low an inference of severe harm.
C. Insurance
1. Household Exclusion Clause.-In State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.2 ' the Court of Ap-
peals reaffirmed the rule that a household exclusion clause in an
automobile liability insurance policy is invalid as contrary to public
policy. 20 2 Moreover, the court clarified recent precedent by holding
that this invalidity extends only to the amount of the minimum lia-
bility coverage required by statute.203
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State
Farm) issued Robert Carroll, Jr. an automobile liability insurance
policy which provided $100,000 coverage for each person and
$300,000 for each accident.2 ' The policy contained a household
exclusion clause which excluded coverage for injury to "any insured
or any member of an insured's family residing in the insured's
household." 0 5
Carroll allowed a friend, Christina Glass, to drive his car while
Carroll and another friend rode as passengers. The car went off the
road, killing Glass and the other friend and injuring Carroll.20 6
Glass was insured by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Na-
tionwide) through a policy which provided coverage for any acci-
200. Id. at 513-14. 521 A.2d at 1251.
201. 307 Md. 631, 516 A.2d 586 (1986).
202. Id. at 633. 516 A.2d at 586-87. The court so held in Jennings v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 302 Md. 352, 488 A.2d 166 (1985). For a discussion ofjennings, see
infra notes 212-216 and accompanying text.
203. 307 Md. at 633, 516 A.2d at 587. The statutory minimum personal injury cover-
age is $20,000 for any one person and $40,000 for any two or more persons. MD.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 17-103(b)(1) (1987); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(a) (1986).




dent involving her use of a motor vehicle belonging to someone
other than a member of her household.2 07
Carroll sued Glass' estate, asserting that Nationwide was the
primary insurer for the accident. 20 8 Nationwide then brought the
instant suit, seeking a declaration that the household exclusion
clause in State Farm's policy to Carroll was void in its entirety as
contrary to public policy, thereby making State Farm the primary
* 209 SaeFinsurer. State Farm, on the other hand, asked the trial court to
uphold the clause and declare Nationwide the primary insurer.21 0
Alternatively, State Farm argued that should the court rule the ex-
clusion invalid, State Farm's liability should be limited to the statu-
tory minimum requirements for insurance coverage.2 1
Both Nationwide and State Farm focused their arguments on
the proper interpretation ofJennings v. Government Employees Insurance
Co. 2 12 The Court of Appeals ruled inJennings that household exclu-
sion clauses in automobile liability insurance policies were void as
against public policy.2  TheJennings court, however, had not been
required to determine the extent of the invalidation.21 4 In the cir-
cuit court both State Farm and Nationwide agreed that ifJennings
applied, State Farm's argument that the household exclusion provi-
sion was entirely valid would fail. 2 5 The trial court not only applied
Jennings to the instant action, but interpretedJennings to render State
Farm's household exclusion clause completely invalid.216  The
207. Id. at 633-34, 516 A.2d at 587.




212. 302 Md. 352, 488 A.2d 166 (1985). See 307 Md. at 634-35, 516 A.2d at 587.
Jennings was injured while a passenger in his own car being driven by his stepson. 302
Md. at 353-54, 488 A.2d at 167. Jennings carried a policy through Government Employ-
ees Insurance Company (GEICO); the policy contained a household exclusion similar to
that in Carroll's policy. Id. at 354, 488 A.2d at 167.
Jennings sued his stepson for negligence; GEICO refused to defend the suit on the
stepson's behalf. Id. After the stepson defaulted, Jennings brought suit seeking a decla-
ration that GEICO was obligated to satisfy the default judgment against the stepson. Id.
Jennings appealed after the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of GEICO.
Id. at 355, 488 A.2d at 167. The Court of Appeals held that household exclusion clauses
conflict with the mandatory liability insurance embodied in statute, and therefore the
clauses violate public policy. Id.
213. Jennings, 302 Md. at 362, 488 A.2d at 171.
214. 307 Md. at 633, 516 A.2d at 586-87.
215. Id. at 634, 516 A.2d at 587. Jennings was decided while the instant case was pend-
ing before the circuit court; therefore, State Farm contended that the court should not




Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari while State Farm's ap-
peal in the Court of-Special Appeals was pending.21
7
Before the Court of Appeals, State Farm argued that since pub-
lic policy requires no more coverage than that specified by statute,
any exclusion clause should be valid with respect to any amounts in
excess of that statutory minimum requirement.21 8 Nationwide, on
the other hand, interpreted Jennings to mean that because a house-
hold exclusion clause is invalid, it should be stricken in its entirety
from the policy. 2 9 Therefore, the policy should be read as though
the clause never existed, making State Farm the primary insurer and
further requiring that the bodily injury coverage in Carroll's policy
apply to any accident in which Carroll was involved.22 °
The court first reviewed the historical development of Maryland
law with respect to household exclusion rules, noting that before
1972 courts did not question the validity of the clauses. 22 ' The
court pointed out, however, that in 1972 the General Assembly sub-
stantially changed public policy in Maryland concerning motor vehi-
cle insurance by mandating compulsory insurance and minimum
coverage.22 As Judge Eldridge declared in Jennings, "[A] clause in
an insurance policy, which is contrary to 'the public policy of this
State, as set forth in . . . the Insurance Code' or other statute, is
invalid and unenforceable.1 223
While basing its decision on this established principle, the State
Farm court found that Nationwide readJennings too broadly.22 4 In-
stead, the court determined thatJennings more properly supported
State Farm's argument. The court stressed that the legislature
.merely mandated minimum liability coverage. Furthermore, liabil-
ity coverage in excess of the statutory minimum is expressly author-
ized by article 48A, section 541 225--Any clause which exc-clu-des
coverage of the insured would violate public policy only to the ex-
217. d.
218. Id. at 634-35, 516 A.2d at 587.
219. Id. at 635, 516 A.2d at 587.
220. Id.
221. Id., 516 A.2d at 588.
222. Id.
223. Jennings, 302 Md. at 356, 486 A.2d at 168 (quoting Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.
v. Insurance Comm'r, 293 Md. 629, 643, 446 A.2d 1140, 1147 (1982)).
224. 307 Md. at 636, 516 A.2d at 588.
225. MD. ANN. CODF art. 48A, § 541 (1986). Subsection (b) of the statute provides in
pertinent part: "Nothing in this subtitle or in Title 17 of the Transportation Article
prevents an insurer from issuing ... a policy of motor vehicle insurance providing liabil-
ity coverage in excess of the requirements of the Maryland Vehicle Law." Subsection
(c)(2) further declares: "There shall be available to the insured the opportunity to con-
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tent that it prevents the insured from enjoying mandatory minimum
coverage. Thus, such exclusion clauses would be valid as against
any amounts in excess of these requirements. 26 Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court and de-
termined that State Farm, as the primary insurer, would be liable
only for the statutorily required minimum coverage. 227
2. Uninsured Motorist Coverage.-The Court of Appeals held in
Hoffman v. United Services Automobile Association 28 that an express
agreement with the insured could bind an insurer to provide unin-
sured motorist coverage in excess of the statutory minimum. 2 9
Moreover, the court reaffirmed the general rule that prohibits
"stacking ' '2 3 of uninsured motorist policies.23 '
Kenneth and Sandra Hoffman as named insureds purchased an
insurance policy for their two vehicles, paying separate premiums
for each vehicle. The policy from United Services Automobile Asso-
ciation (USAA) contained liability and uninsured motorist coverage,
as well as a "Supplementary Uninsured Motorists" endorsement.
This endorsement amended the definition of an "uninsured" vehi-
cle to include an "underinsured" vehicle and proceeded to define
an "underinsured" vehicle.23 2 The policy provided $300,000 cover-
age for each person injured and $500,000 for each accident
($300,000/$500,000).233
While visiting in Connecticut, the Hoffmans were passengers in
a car driven by Richard Whelan, a Connecticut resident. Richard
Nowakowski, also a Connecticut resident, struck Whelan's car, kill-
ing Sandra Hoffman and inflicting serious injuries on Kenneth
Hoffman. 23 4
Whelan's insurance policy from Hanover Insurance Company
contained underinsured coverage limits of $50,000/$100,000.
Nowakowski held a policy from Travelers Insurance Company con-
tract for higher amounts than those provided under Title 17 of the Transportation Arti-
cle .... "
226. 307 Md. at 637. 516 A.2d at 589.
227. Id. at 644, 516 A.2d at 592.
228. 309 Md. 167, 522 A.2d 1320 (1987).
229. Id. at 179, 522 A.2d at 1326.
230. "Stacking" describes a situation in which all available policies are added together
to create a larger pool from which the injured party may draw when a single policy is
insufficient to make the individual whole.
231. 309 Md. at 183, 522 A.2d at 1328.
232. Id. at 168-69, 522 A.2d at 1320-21.




taining liability coverage of only $20,000/$40,000.235 Whelan and
Hoffman sued Nowakowski in Connecticut state court.236 Upon
agreement between the parties, the court apportioned Nowakow-
ski's liability coverage and Whelan's underinsured motorist cover-
age. 23 7 The estate of Sandra Hoffman received the full person limit
of $20,000 from Nowakowski's liability coverage and $30,000 from
Whelan's underinsured motorist coverage.2 38  The court granted
Kenneth Hoffman $5398 from Nowakowski's coverage and $8379
from Whelan's coverage.2
3 9
Hoffman then sued USAA in the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut for the benefits under his policy's
"Supplementary Uninsured Motorists" endorsement. 240 Hoffman
also sought to combine the limits of his and his wife's underinsured
motorist coverage on their two vehicles to reach a total coverage of
$600,000/$1,000,000.24 I
In opposition USAA argued that article 48A, section 543(a),242
prohibited Hoffman from recovering "uninsured" motorist benefits
from USAA since the estate already recovered $50,000 from an-
other insurer. 243 Moreover, USAA stressed that the amount already
recovered exceeded the statutorily required uninsured motorist cov-
erage. 244 Finally, USAA argued that should Hoffman be permitted
to recover under his policy, both the policy's language and Mary-
land law prohibit "stacking," thereby limiting USAA's exposure to a
single coverage of $300,000/$500,000.245
235. Id. The court assumed that Nowakowski's low liability limits established him as
the underinsured motorist, thereby triggering the underinsured motorist coverage of
both Hanover Insurance Company and the United Services Automobile Association. Id.
236.-Id. Kenneth Hoffman sued both individually and as the personal representative
of his wife's estate. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 169-70, 522 A.2d at 1321. The court arrived at this figure by deducting the
$20,000 received from Nowakowski's coverage from the full person limit of $50,000
under Whelan's policy. Id.
239. Id. at 170, 522 A.2d at 1321.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 543(a) (1986). The statute provides: "Notwithstand-
ing any other provisions of this subtitle, no person shall recover benefits under the cov-
erages required in §§ 539 and 541 of this article from more than one motor vehicle
liability policy or insurer on either a duplicative or supplemental basis." Id.
243. 309 Md. at 170, 522 A.2d at 1321.
244. Id. Maryland statutes require every motor vehicle liability insurance policy is-
sued in Maryland to have uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of
$20,000/$40,000. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c) (1986); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 17-103(b)(1) (1987).
245. 309 Md. at 170, 522 A.2d at 1321.
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With respect to USAA's first argument, Hoffman claimed that
his coverage was issued in addition to the statutorily required cover-
age and therefore was beyond the intended reach of section
543(a).24 6 As to the second argument, Hoffman claimed that since
he was paying two separate premiums he was entitled to recover
under each.247 The federal court certified questions pertaining to
these issues to the Maryland Court of Appeals.
2 48
In addressing USAA's contentions, the Court of Appeals first
reiterated the intent of the uninsured motorist coverage, as declared
inNationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Webb. 249 "[T]he purpose of un-
insured motorist statute is 'that each insured under such coverage
have available the full statutory minimum to exactly the same extent
as would have been available had the tortfeasor complied with the
minimum requirements of the financial responsibility Law.' "250
Next, the court examined the language of the policy itself. By the
express language of the supplementary endorsement, the court
found that USAA agreed to extend coverage to an "underinsured"
motorist.2 1' "Underinsured motorist coverage applies when an in-
sured is involved in an accident with a motorist, who may carry ex-
tensive liability insurance far in excess of any amounts statutorily
required, but whose liability coverage is less than the insured's un-
derinsured motorist coverage. "252
The court carefully considered three earlier Maryland cases on
which USAA had relied.253 In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Benton 2s4 the-
court had construed article 48A, sections 539 and 543(a), to rule
that an injured plaintiff could recover personal injury benefits under
only one policy. 255 The court extended Benton's principles to unin-
sured motorist coverage in Yarmouth v. Government Employees Insurance
Co. ,256 noting that section 543(a) expressly governs recovery of both
246. Id.
247. Id. at 170-71, 522 A.2d at 1321.
248. Id. at 171, 522 A.2d at 1322. In all, four questions were certified.
249. 291 Md. 721, 436 A.2d 465 (1981).
250. Id. at 737, 436 A.2d at 474 (quoting Webb v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 479
S.W.2d 148, 152 (Mo. App. 1972)). This premise was reiterated to some extent in
Yarmuth v. Government Employees Ins. Co.. 286 Md. 256, 264, 407 A.2d 315, 319
(1979).
251. 309 Md. at 173-74, 522 A.2d at 1323.
252. Id. at 174, 522 A.2d at 1323 (citing 8CJ. APPELMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 5103, at 515-16 (1981) and Note, Underinsured Motorist Coverage: Legislative Solu-
tions to Settlement hifficulties, 64 N.C.L. REV. 1408, 1408 n.4 (1986)).
253. Id. at 174-77, 522 A.2d at 1323-25.
254. 278 Md. 542, 365 A.2d 1000 (1976).
255. Id. at 545-46, 365 A.2d at 1003-04.
256. 286 Md. 256, 407 A.2d 315 (1979).
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uninsured motorist benefits and personal injury protection bene-
fits. 257 Finally, in Rafferty v. Allstate Insurance Co. 258 the court deter-
mined that section 543(a) prohibited additional recovery from a
secondary insurer when the primary insurer already had paid more
than the statutory minimum.2 59
According to the court, USAA's reliance on the three cases was
misplaced. 2  While the policy coverages at issue in those cases
were similar to each other, they were distinguishable from USAA's
policy in that none provided a supplementary endorsement.211
Moreover, the court found that the language of section 543(a) sup-
ports additional recovery under the optional excess underinsured
motorist coverage.262 The court determined that the General As-
sembly, through express language in the statute, precluded the ap-
plication of section 543(a) to coverages not required in sections 539
and 541. 2 6' This proposition found additional support in section
541(b), which declares that nothing prevents an insurer from pro-
viding liability coverage which exceeds the minimum statutory
amount.2 64 Moreover, amendments to section 541 enacted shortly
after the case began provided implicit support to the finding that
section 543(a) would not preclude recovery under a second policy
when the insurer issues "underinsured" coverage.2 65
257. Id. at 264, 407 A.2d at 319.
258. 303 Md. 63, 492 A.2d 290 (1985).
259. Id. at 71, 492 A.2d at 294-95.
260. 309 Md. at 176, 522 A.2d at 1324.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 177, 522 A.2d at 1325. For the text of the statute, see supra note 242.
263. 309 Md. at 177, 522 A.2d at 1325. Section 539 requires only a minimum per-
sonal injury protection-in the amount-of $2500- Section-54 1(a)-requires minimum liabil-
ity coverage in the amount of $20,000/$40,000. Section 541(c) requires minimum
uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of $20,000/$40,000. See MD. ANN. CODE art.
48A, §§ 539, 541 (1986).
264. Id. § 541(b).
265. 309 Md. at 178, 522 A.2d at 1325. In 1981 the General Assembly added
§ 541(c)(1), which redefined "uninsured" vehicle to include any vehicle with liability
coverage "less than the amount provided to the insured under this subsection." Act of
May 19, 1981, ch. 510, 1981 Md. Laws 2122, 2123. This moved § 541(c) to § 541(c)(2)
and added the requirement that insurers "shall [make] available to the insured the op-
portunity to contract for higher amounts than those provided under Title 17 of the
Transportation Article." Id. at 2122. Finally, the General Assembly added section
541 (c)(3) which states: "[Tihe limit of liability for an insurer providing uninsured mo-
torist coverage under this subsection is the amount of that coverage less the sum of the
limits under the liability insurance policies... applicable to the bodily injury or death of
the insured." Id. at 2123-24. The court noted that a legislative committee memoran-
dum interpreted this amendment as making uninsured motorist coverage operate as un-
derinsured motorist coverage. 309 Md. at 178-79, 522 A.2d at 1325.
The court held that it would deprive the 1981 changes of their force to read
In addressing the question of "stacking" policies, the court
cited its recent decisi6n in Howell v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance
Co. 266 and held that the express language of the policy limited Ken-
neth Hoffman's recovery to $300,000/$500,000.267 The court re-
jected Hoffman's contention that he was permitted to aggregate
coverage limits because he was paying separate premiums on each
of his vehicles. The court found that the second premium served
merely to pay for the increased risk of added passengers and
miles. 68
As a result of this decision, if an insurer provides in its policy,
or in any supplements thereto, coverage in greater amount or scope
than the minimum required by statute, the insurer will be unable to
rely on section 543(a) to preclude payment to the insured. 269 An
insured will be entitled to supplemental recovery even though the
insured previously has recovered from another insurer, as long as
the prior recovery does not exceed the supplemental coverage.
Nevertheless, the court's prohibition against 'stacking" underin-
sured motorist coverage will prevent an insured from recovering
under multiple policies issued by a single insurer.27 0
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§ 543(a) as precluding recovery of uninsured motorist benefits when the amount already
received from a second policy meets or exceeds the statutory minimum. Id. at 179, 522
A.2d at 1325-26.
266. 305 Md. 435, 505 A.2d 109 (1986) (certified question case holding that stacking
of uninsured motorist benefits is prohibited).
267. 309 Md. at 182, 522 A.2d at 1327.
268. Id. at 183, 522 A.2d at 1327-28.
269. Id. at 179, 522 A.2d at-1326.
270. Id. at 183, 522 A.2d at 1327-28.
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